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ABSTRACT  
This thesis is a critique of the idea that genocide is a domestic process and that only 
some groups are worthy of protection against genocide. By looking at the destruction 
of the Unión Patriótica in the con-text of a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, in 
which a polarised circulation of sympathy, antipathy, indifference and oblivion 
occurred, the thesis not only challenges the notion that genocides occur in locations 
detached from the international community, but also unveils how affect is mobilised 
through narratives which support and contest this fantasy. Thus, the thesis contends 
that geopolitical narratives can help solidify a genocidal conjuncture by allowing the 
amalgamation of various actors into a perpetrator bloc, but also disintegrate it by 
bringing about a fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide. In contrast to 
the two-dimensional geopolitical imagery that genocide takes place within the borders 
of the nation-state, it is argued, instead, that a fragmented geography, galvanised by a 
continuous victimisation-resistance spiral that links different actors, places, and 
dramas together, enables genocide to unfold. The thesis therefore proposes con-
textualisation as a new method to research genocide as a geopolitical phenomenon.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1 GEOPOLITICS AND GENOCIDE:  SCRIPTS,  NETWORKS AND 
AFFECTIVE-DISPOSITIONS  
Between 1984 and 1985 Colombia saw the emergence of the Unión Patriótica (UP). 
The UP was a political front created as part of the peace agreement between the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government. 
The UP was not a homogenous group; it was an organization within which different 
people‘s needs and expectations met. Therefore, some guerrilla fighters demobilised 
and joined many others from different political backgrounds, including members of 
the Communist Party (PC) and the Democratic Front, trade union members, workers, 
youth organisations, and peasants. From 1985 to 2002, when the group formally 
ceased to exist in Colombian politics, more than 5000 of its members had been 
assassinated, hundreds of other members had been disappeared or forced to leave the 
country, some others had gone back to continue waging war against the state, and 
many others had abandoned their political identity in order to survive the violence. 
This, altogether, brought about the destruction of the UP. 
 Yet the destruction of the UP has been overlooked by genocide scholars and 
relegated to oblivion by transnational political networks. Indifference for the victims‘ 
suffering has been linked to sympathy for Colombian elites and antipathy towards 
insurgents (first represented as the embodiment of communism and then criminalised 
as drug traffickers). Thus, massacres, systematic selective assassinations, forced 
displacement, disappearings, torture, illegal imprisonment, the targeting of buildings, 
households and entire towns associated with the socio-political power of the UP have 
been overshadowed by the long-lasting armed conflict between the Colombian state 
and narcoguerrillas. Today, World Bank narratives promoting the idea that armed 
conflicts are about greed rather than grievances (Collier 2000) are contributing to 
shape a dominant interpretative framework that focuses on understanding the 
multidimensional violence in Colombia through the lens of resource war theory often 
disregarding the connections between the armed conflict and other forms of collective 
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violence.
1
 This, together with the lack of alternative approaches to study the complex 
dynamics involved in the intersubjective violent clash between perpetrator of 
genocidal violence and civilian social networks, has reinforced the passing attention 
paid to the destruction of the UP.  
Eduardo Pizarro‘s (1999) and Steven Dudley‘s (2004) stance encapsulate the 
dominant macronarrative among Colombian scholars, according to which the 
destruction of the UP was the consequence of the political strategy developed by 
FARC and the PC during the 1980s; namely ‗the combination of all forms of 
struggle‘.2 Put simply, the claim is that FARC‘s combination of arms and politics 
placed the UP in an awkward position which legitimised the violent targeting by 
paramilitary groups. This macronarrative relies on perpetrators‘ accounts and scripts 
put forward by most Colombian administrations since 1984.
3
 Although, after the mid 
1990s, victims‘ organisations started challenging such interpretations by publishing 
accounts of what they argued was the genocide of the Unión Patriótica 
(Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del Meta 1997; 
ASFADDES et al. 2000), victims‘ micronarratives were disregarded because 
scholars‘ macronarratives alleged that victims‘ over-ideological narratives impeded 
an objective assessment of the violence. Thus, scholars almost exclusively referred to 
the political assassinations of UP members as part of the armed conflict, which 
demonstrated the political character of the violence (i.e., Ramírez and Restrepo 1988).  
Even though, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, some studies looked at the 
connection between political assassinations and poor electoral results (Pinzón 1989; 
Vélez 1992), so by the mid 1990s scholars usually mentioned in passing the 
destruction of the UP. Not even in regional studies of Urabá, where the massacres 
against the UP proliferated during the 1990s, did scholars overcome ‗the combination 
of all forms of struggle‘ micronarrative (Ramírez 1997). It was not until 2000 that 
Leah Carroll carried out a major scholarly account of the ‗political violence‘ against 
                                                 
1
 Rangel (2000) focuses on the criminalisation of the guerrilla groups to examine the insurgency 
economy of Colombia. In contrast, Sanchez and Formisano (2005) develop a more complex analysis 
linking armed conflict, violence and crime, which offers a contribution to the Collier-Hoeffler model.  
2
 Campbell argues that it is useful ―to draw a distinction between the ‗micronarratives‘ of the 
participant-interpreters (the political actors) and the ‗macronarratives‘ of the observer-interpreters (the 
media and academics) and explore the relationship between them‖ (1998a: 43). 
3
 Ó Tuathail uses the term script ―to describe a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, 
scenarios and attributes which are deemed relevant and appropriate to defining a place in foreign 
policy‖ (1992: 156). 
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the UP, establishing connections with the democratization process. Her PhD thesis did 
not trigger much interest amongst Colombian scholars. Today, however, Carroll‘s 
(2011) just-released book comes timely to ignite the reassessment of the destruction 
of the UP.  
Throughout the last ten years few scholars have researched the complex dynamics 
of the violence against the UP, despite the fact that a superficial narrative of the 
destruction of the UP continues to dominate. Mauricio Romero (2003: 193-222) 
dedicates a whole chapter to the targeting of UP leaders in Urabá in his study of the 
expansion of the Campesino Self-defence forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU). 
Andrés Fernando Suárez (2007) also focusing on Urabá, has produced the most recent 
account, which gets closer to studying the violence against the UP as part of a 
different form of collective violence. According to his analysis of the region from 
1991 to 2001 a case of reciprocal extermination occurred between former members of 
the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and UP members in the framework of the dispute 
for territorial control between FARC and the ACCU. Romero‘s and Suárez‘s 
discussions of ‗political identities‘ and ‗reciprocal extermination‘ contribute to better 
the understanding of the violence against the UP in a particular region. However 
neither of them puts this episode into the context of the targeting of the UP in 
different regions and different times. Furthermore, they analyse the targeting of the 
UP through the ‗logic of the armed conflict‘, thereby limiting the understanding of the 
multiplicity of motives involved in it. 
As the destruction of the UP was not only the political destruction of a group; as 
the perpetrators did not exclusively target UP members, but also the complex web of 
relationships that constituted the social power of the group; as the violence spread 
against children, elderly, and any sector of the population identified by the 
perpetrators as UP; and as it developed from individual attempts to destroy the 
political power of the group into a complex network of violent relations aimed at the 
social destruction of the UP, this thesis moves away from the above accounts and 
places the destruction of the UP at the centre of the analysis. It does so, through an 
interdisciplinary method which seeks to confront mainstream macronarratives that 
have made it inconceivable to consider the destruction of the UP as a case of 
genocide. In so doing, it engages with human rights grassroots organisations‘  
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accounts of the UP genocide (REINICIAR 2006a, 2007, 2009), and a handful of 
books and articles written by academics, journalists, and lawyers which have hitherto 
been relegated to the fringe of Colombian scholarship (Dudley 2004; Rodríguez 2005; 
Cepeda 2006; Cepeda and Girón 2005; Ortíz 2006). Cepeda‘s and Ortíz‘s efforts are 
valuable for they contribute to the conceptual debates and gather empirical evidence 
about the systematic destruction of the UP. To the extent that these authors explore it 
as a state-led process restricted to Colombian politics (Cepeda 2006: 102), such an 
account fits what one may call the genocide script. By contrast, this thesis challenges 
this account by questioning the very idea that the UP genocide was exclusively state-
orchestrated and contained within Colombian borders and continues the author‘s 
attempts to unveil the complexities of the destruction of the UP and to draw from it 
lessons for genocide studies (Gomez-Suarez 2007, 2008, 2010).  
This is not to suggest that it is futile to debate the destruction of the UP as a case of 
genocide. Instead, it is to argue that in order to fully understand the destruction of the 
UP one needs to go beyond the genocide script. The point is, then, not to argue for or 
against considering the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide but to deconstruct 
the genocide script; a script that informs such a debate and narrows our understanding 
of the genocidal conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP occurred. A 
glance into the historical process leading to such a conjuncture shows that the 
‗Colombian crisis‘ was far from domestic. First, it evolved from the liberal modern 
state building process carried out under the guidelines of modernization theory and 
the Alliance for Progress, which was resisted by different social groups that, 
influenced by the 1959 Cuban revolution,  created guerrilla groups (cf. Bolívar 2003). 
Second, the criminalisation of social movements in Colombian politics (Archila 2005: 
87-128) was entangled with the US National Security Doctrine which was exported to 
Latin America through the training of armed forces in the School of the Americas 
(SOA) during the cold war (Gill 2004). Third, counterinsurgency policies, ―a major 
element of post-World War II [US] foreign policy toward […] the ‗third world‘‖ 
(Doty 1996: 75), became the touchstone of Colombian elites leading to the creation 
and proliferation of paramilitary groups (Medina 1990; Romero 2003). 
Other factors contributed to worsen the crisis. The increasing international demand 
for marihuana during the late 1970s brought about the creation of drug gangs, which 
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fostered the consolidation of self-defence groups (Palacios 2003: 276-9). The Reagan 
doctrine
4
 contributed to the decision made by Colombian elites to start opening up the 
political system in 1985, and at the same time reinforced the radicalisation of the 
armed forces in their fight against communism; these ambiguous policies resulted in 
the stigmatization of political forces challenging the traditional political structures. 
With the end of the cold war, the global south was overflowing with arsenals of small 
arms and light weapons, no longer required for the superpowers‘ confrontation, and 
Private Military Companies (PMCs) proliferated to carry out the traditional task of 
national armies (see Lilly et al. 2002). Such a privatisation and transnationalisation of 
violence had two consequences: first, it contributed to strengthen the coercive power 
of paramilitary groups in strategic geographical regions of Colombia, and second, it 
internationalised security thus weakening further the Colombian state‘s monopoly of 
the legitimate use of violence. 
In this context, paramilitary groups (trained by international mercenaries), the 
Colombian army (of which officials were trained at SOA), PMCs (operating and 
transnationally funded), drug traffickers (operating globally), and Colombian elites 
(supported by US administrations) targeted the socio-political power of the UP.  As 
the UP (unevenly) resisted the (violent) targeting, these actors escalated violence and 
gathered together in a perpetrator bloc consolidating a hard power against which the 
soft power of the UP had few chances of survival. The hard power of the perpetrators 
and the soft power of the UP were not only the product of the combination of long-
term processes and contingent events but also the materialisation of their interactions 
within broader transnational networks. Due to the connections between military, 
political, and criminal actors across the Americas, the targeting of the UP was another 
case of political violence in Latin America which metamorphosed into a genocidal 
conjuncture within the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere. 
This short discussion of the geopolitics involved in the UP genocide relies on 
traditional understandings of international politics. But, it is insufficient to map the 
geopolitical con-text of the UP genocide,
5
 that is, the narratives displaying Colombia 
                                                 
4
 The Reagan doctrine was a mix of promoting democracy and confronting communism in the Third 
World (Slater 2004: 110-2).  
5
 The practice of hyphening is common in academic writing. Con-text seeks to emphasise the 
indistinguishable discursive dimension embedded in what it is usually portrayed as objective-
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as a genocide-free locale in the evolving global space. More generally, such narratives 
are related to a particular ―ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the 
governmental production and management of territorial space‖ (cf. Ó Tuathail 1996: 
7; 12; 14). One can only understand the way Colombia is portrayed by US foreign 
policy makers if one sees it in the context of Latin America in the space of US foreign 
policy. For about a hundred and twenty years –from the Monroe Doctrine (1823) until 
World War II– ‗Latin America‘ was the frontier upon which the space of US foreign 
policy materialised. Nevertheless, since at least the mid 1980s US foreign policy has 
become the space in which the institutionalisation of particular ways of seeing and 
displaying a given state or/and a ‗region‘ within the global order take place. Latin 
America‘s place in US foreign policy space has, since then, been unresolved and 
problematic and as such Latin American countries have been institutionalised as 
‗faraway-so-close‘ dramas. Within the con-text of such dramas, the hyperreal writing 
of Colombia in US foreign policy has permitted the display of fantasies which not 
only downplayed the destruction of the UP but were also integral part of what could 
be characterised as a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.
6
  
During the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (1980-1986) 
government officials and common people supported the violence against the UP.
7
 
Hegemonic cold war narratives legitimised the violence against the ‗communist 
enemy‘; security forces were therefore a central actor in various regional coalitions 
for violence against the UP. It was not coincidence that the patterns of the onset of 
genocidal violence coincided with other cases of extreme political violence in Central 
America. Between 1987 and 1991, during the first genocidal cycle a sharp increase in 
massacres was related to a transformation in the perpetrator bloc, which placed drug 
traffickers and paramilitary groups at the core of the regional coalitions for violence. 
Although the cold war came to an end in 1989, anticommunism continued to inform 
the narratives of Colombia‘s political, economic and military elites and broader social 
                                                                                                                                           
interpretedless spatial-temporal settings. This follows Ó Tuathail‘s ―logic of using a disruptive play on 
the name of the old/official to designate an entirely new field of problematizations‖ (1996: 67). 
6
 Following Baudrillard, hyperreal is used throughout this thesis as an adjective that emphasises the 
character of actors and processes which are generated ―by models of a real without origin or reality‖ 
(1983: 2). 
7
 According to Ivan Cepeda (2006) the genocide of the UP occurred in three periods: 1984-1991, 1992-
2002, and 2002-2006. The thesis‘ findings support such a periodisation. However, in this study each 
‗genocidal cycle‘ is broken into different periods, according to the transformations undergone by 
victims and perpetrators.  
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networks. This was so because in Colombia, contrary to the Central American 
experience, guerrilla groups gained military might despite the collapse of Soviet 
communism.  
During the second genocidal cycle (1992-2002), human rights discourse and the 
consolidation of the democratization campaign shaped a so-called ‗liberal-
democratic‘ common sense in the urban areas. However, as the privatisation of 
violence had reinforced the power of multiple illegal armed groups in rural regions 
genocidal massacres in Meta and Urabá were common practice between 1991 and 
1997. Each regional dynamic evolved differently. Suffice for now to say that 
survivors from different regions usually resettled somewhere else, allowing new UP 
strongholds to flourish. Thus, they continued to challenge traditional political 
entrepreneurs and ad hoc authoritarian military governors who, in order to maintain 
the status quo, allied with outlaws. In these settings, the UP was trapped in the battle 
between paramilitary groups and FARC. Paramilitaries and PMCs continued targeting 
the UP because they did not distinguish between the UP and FARC. 
Cepeda (2006) argues that from 2002 to 2006 the last phase of the genocide 
occurred. In this period, some survivors continued to be targeted. In fact, 
assassinations and persecution intensified during the ‗war on terrorism‘ that President 
Alvaro Uribe, a key ally in the ‗global war on terror‘, fought against FARC (FDM 
2006). The survivors‘ sense to date is that although the group no longer formally 
exists as a political entity, to have once been a member, to have had a relative who 
was a member of the UP, or to ask for reparation justice and truth is a stigma that 
allows the destruction to continue. From 2006 to 2010, then, a cycle of apparently 
post-genocidal violence followed.  
The analysis of these genocidal cycles challenges the genocide script that reduces 
extremely complex geopolitical processes visible in the ‗third world‘ to internal crises 
that must be halted by the international community. Hence, rather than resorting to 
mainstream macronarratives to argue that the destruction of the UP was genocide, this 
research finds that the destruction of the UP could help advance critical voices and 
research agendas in genocide studies. Along the lines of Martin Shaw (2007) one 
could then argue that the destruction of the UP was genocide because it was an 
(irregular) intersubjective clash, in which a perpetrator bloc crystallised turning 
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against the socio-political power of the civilian network surrounding the UP. As such 
clash occurred across geopolitical con-texts, it needs to be con-textualised. This thesis 
is a first attempt to con-textualise the UP genocide. The third section discusses the 
epistemological and ontological implications of such a method, suffice for now to say 
that con-textualistion contributes to dealing with the neglect of the UP genocide in 
Colombian scholarship and complements the work of critical scholars who, across 
various disciplines, are challenging the genocide script by unveiling the complex 
relationship between geopolitical contexts, narratives, and the perpetrators and 
victims of genocidal violence.  
Deconstructing the genocide script  
This thesis does not propose a new definition of genocide as such, nor does it support 
a fixed concept of genocide to study the destruction of the UP. Instead, by looking at 
the UP genocide, it questions the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC) 
definition for essentialising victims and deconstextualising genocidal processes and 
attempts to overcome the proliferation of definitions and the excessive legalism 
surrounding the convention.  As the UNGC has reified the scripting of genocide as 
one-sided domestic process by emphasising the passiveness of genocide-victims and 
the prosecution of the perpetrators, this section draws on critical accounts to 
deconstruct the genocide script. Shaw‘s (2007) attempt to bring back the 
fundamentals of Raphael Lemkin‘s definition into the understanding of genocide is an 
important step in this regard, for Lemkin argued that  
 
genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of 
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves … and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups (1944: 79). 
 
The importance that Lemkin placed on broader processes supports the need to 
question the legal definition stated under article II of 1948 UNGC, which (re)defined 
genocide as 
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the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
 
Lemkin‘s concern with the destruction of national groups meant that for him genocide 
occurred alongside transnational processes. However, the way in which the UNGC 
has been understood, genocide is assumed to be ‗produced‘ in domestic contexts and 
‗punished‘ internationally. Thus, many accounts have fallen into the trap of what one 
may call the domestic myth and, as such, have contributed to reinforce it. Problematic 
assumptions lie at the core of the domestic myth: first, that cold war genocides are the 
product of leaders‘ barbarism, their domestic interests and their abuse of state power 
(i.e., Kuperman 1996; Kissi 2003); second, that states are the perpetrators of genocide 
(i.e., Chalk 1994); and third that the international community is complicit, if at all, in 
the occurrence of genocide because of its inaction (i.e., Power 2003; Valentino 2003). 
Critical approaches that regard the Westphalian system of international states as a 
genocidal structure have also been trapped in the domestic myth. Kuper, for example, 
argues that 
 
The sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to 
commit genocide … no state explicitly claims the right to commit genocide but the right is 
exercised under other more acceptable rubrics, notably the duty to maintain law and order, 
or the seemingly sacred mission to preserve the territorial integrity of the state (1981: 162).  
 
The issue, however, is not that the idea of an international system based on the 
principle of sovereignty makes genocide more likely –examples of genocidal violence 
abound in the post-Westphalian international system (i.e, Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, to 
mention but few). Rather the point is that genocide is as such a geopolitical 
phenomenon. 
Throughout history, a multiplicity of cross-border processes has brought together 
various violent collective actors (both legal and illegal), state agencies, and 
individuals in what this author calls perpetrator blocs (Gomez-Suarez 2007). Whereas 
in the pre-1980s, state institutions usually played a central part in the ‗order of 
genocide‘ (due either to the state-builders‘ search for concentrating coercion or to 
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maintain it); in the post-1980s, processes of privatisation of violence have 
increasingly decentralised the concentration of coercion bringing to the fore of the 
perpetrator blocs the multiplicity of public/private legal/illegal networks that have 
been usually involved in genocidal campaigns (cf. Kaldor 1999). As such, the role of 
ordinary people in perpetrator blocs has become more prominent. This is not to say 
that ordinary people did not collude with state institutions before.
8
 On the contrary, 
colonial settlers and paramilitaries supporting core constituencies have played 
important roles in modern genocides (see Moses and Stone 2006; Mann 2006). Yet, 
recently, violent collective actors have more actively and openly designed and 
coordinated extremely violent campaigns and colluded with state institutions. As 
perpetrator blocs resemble less hierarchical structures and more dynamic complex 
networks,
9
 state agencies need to be approached not as the headmasters of genocide 
but as important nodes amongst many.
10
 Hence the importance of understanding the 
transformations in the way the nodes communicate with one another and the 
circulation of sympathy/antipathy determining the position of state-nodes within the 
perpetrator blocs.
11
 
 Not only perpetrator blocs mutate during genocide, but the target groups also 
undergo dramatic transformations. Therefore, the search for ‗the essential internal 
properties‘ of the target groups, which has resulted, as the debate on political groups 
exemplifies,
12
 in stagnating debates about inevitable membership and voluntary 
                                                 
8
 Goldhagen‘s (1996) book, for instance, unveils the role of ordinary people in the Nazi genocide in 
Poland.  
9
 An exponent of the hierarchical character of contemporary genocidists is Mark Levene. In his view, 
the Rwandan case offers a blue print of the perpetrators of genocide: ―at the top a small group of core 
planners and directors in control of the key apparatus of the state… below them… middle managers 
who ensure that the orders and directives from the top can be carried out and are acted upon finally at 
the bottom of the pyramid a mass of hands-on operatives‖ (Levene 2005: 99). 
10
 There is a growing literature on networks. This thesis relies on Jon Arquila and David Ronfeldt‘s 
characterisation, according to which networks are divided into three classes: the Chain, the Hub and 
the All-channel. The chain and the hub are both hierarchical models of network. The All-channel 
model, in contrast, is not hierarchical and requires dense communications; ―[d]ecision-making and 
operations are decentralized, allowing for local initiative and autonomy‖ (Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001: 
9). In the last decades, perpetrators blocs have started to resemble hybrid networks:  complex mixtures 
of hierarchical and non-hierarchical models. 
11
 Foucault‘s (2002) discussion of 16th century cosmogony has inspired the reflection on 
sympathy/antipathy throughout this thesis.  
12
 Since 1946, when the UN resolution ―declared genocide to be a crime under international law 
whether committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds,‖ the idea of including political 
groups as a category of groups to be protected has been largely contested (Kuper 1981: 24). 
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affiliation,
13
 is futile. As scholars have recently argued ―genocide is carried out 
against a group that the perpetrator believes has essential properties … however 
fictive such a belief may be‖ (Straus cited in Levene 2005: 87). Indeed, Semelin 
argues that it is ―in the imaginary representations of the executioner that the figure of 
the victim … is first constructed‖ (2007: 21). This suggests that the imaginary line the 
UNGC draws between the political and the protected groups is misleading.
14
 
Genocide-victims need instead to be considered as complex social actors. Shaw‘s 
(2007: 113-30) argument that genocidists target civilians because of the social power 
they represent must then be complemented with Powell‘s suggestion of understanding 
victims as networks (2007: 542). This would allow genocide-victims to be understood 
as dynamic civilian social networks, affected by transnational processes, by the 
portrayal of them by other networks, and by the violence inflicted by the perpetrator 
blocs. 
 The foregoing indicates that the irregular intersubjective violent processes between 
civilian social networks and perpetrator blocs are not one-sided.
15
 The violent actions 
of the perpetrator blocs produce reactions on the side of the civilian social networks, 
which attempt unevenly to resist the violence through political, social, and economic 
(and sometimes violent) strategies. Perpetrator blocs interpret these strategies as 
tactics aiming at eroding the various actors‘ positions in particular social contexts. 
Thus, contrary to scholars‘ understanding of genocide as a different form of violence 
(that should be studied separately from war),
16
 genocide‘s overlap with warfare goes 
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 See Bauer (1999) for arguments in favour of the inevitable membership of the target groups. Note 
however, that in his keynote speech on the First Graduate Conference of Genocide and Holocaust 
Studies at Clark University in April 2009, he seemed to have moved away from this position. For the 
irrelevance of the inevitable membership see Kuper (1981). Following Kuper, many scholars have 
opposed the 1948 UNGC exclusion of political groups (i.e., Fein 1993; Chalk 1994; Charny 1994; 
Shaw 2007). 
14
 In this regard Kuper‘s words have not lost validity: ―in the contemporary world, political differences 
are at the very least as significant a basis for massacre and annihilation as racial, national, ethnic or 
religious differences. [And t]hen too, the genocides against racial, national, ethnic or religious groups 
are generally a consequence of, or intimately related to, political conflict‖ (1981: 39). 
15
 The one-sidedness of genocide was first argued by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990). It gained wide 
support by many scholars during the 1990s. Fein, for instance, argued that genocide is ―an 
asymmetrical slaughter of a disorganized group or collectivity by an organized force‖ (cited in 
Markusen 1996: 80). 
16
 For example, Horowitz argues that ―it is operationally imperative to distinguish warfare from 
genocide… because] domestic destruction and international warring are separate dimensions of 
struggle‖ (1987: 38). Similarly, Chalk and Jonassohn contend that ―there is not anything to be gained 
analytically by comparing cases that have little in common except that they produce large numbers of 
casualties‖ (1990: 24). 
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beyond the external link between war and genocide (Shaw 2003).
17
 To such an extent 
that Shaw (Forthcoming) nowadays argues that genocide is itself ―a particular 
structure of conflict.‖ In fact, as he previously argued, genocide entails ―a clash of 
social power and experience between [at least] two social forces‖ (Shaw 2003: 40). 
Armed conflicts, as such, are not genocidal. Instead, they degenerate over time. Only 
eventually, the particular geopolitical con-texts in which armed conflicts unfold 
contribute to metamorphose them into genocidal conjunctures in which ―hard power 
is used to destroy soft power‖ (Shaw 2007: 112). Advancing Shaw‘s approach, one 
might contend that such conjunctures crystallise in part after armed conflicts have 
escalated into degenerate wars. For in degenerate wars various actors begin colluding 
to destroy the social power of civilian networks. Later, while killing, violence, and 
coercion of individuals thought to be members of the collective self escalate, the 
perpetrator bloc crystallises consolidating thus a hard power. This abstract description 
is more complex in reality because the hard power of the perpetrator bloc is a 
dynamic matrix that changes over time depending on the combination of political, 
social, economic, military, and affective power, in the same way that the soft power 
of civilian social networks depends on the fusion of social, political, economic, and 
affective power. The way in which both powers evolve is determined amongst other 
things by the asymmetrical intersubjective character of the clash between perpetrators 
and victims, which mainly relies on military power on the perpetrators‘ side and on 
affective power for the victims. 
 Intent is certainly important in the (irregular) coordinated plans deployed by the 
perpetrator blocs against the civilian social networks. However, it is not central, as 
scholars following Lemkin and the UNGC contend (i.e., Fein 1994).
18
 Genocide is not 
about the intention to destroy a civilian social network. Genocide is about ―relations 
of destruction‖ (Barta 1987: 238), albeit not in the strict economic sense Barta 
suggests, but rather in a geopolitical sense which includes economic amongst many 
other cross-border social relations. The need to move to geopolitical relations of 
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 Kuper (1981) is the first scholar to point out the overlap between war and genocide. Later, Markusen 
(1996) pinned down the link between total war and genocide. 
18
 Fein argues that genocide is characterized by ―a pattern of purposeful action‖ leading to the 
destruction of a significant part of a targeted group and contends that the ―critics who dwell on the 
difficulty of establishing such intent often do not understand the difference between intent and motive‖ 
(1994: 97). 
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destruction is not only confirmed by Michael Mann‘s conclusion that ―[m]urderous 
cleansing is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators‖ (2006: 7) but also by Shaw‘s 
contention that intention should be taken into account only as an indicator of 
deliberate policy-driven action, for ―policy and its drives are [not] coherent and 
consistent over large range of actions and often long periods of time‖ (2007: 83). As 
the next section elaborates, genocidal geopolitical conjunctures cannot be 
preconceived by the perpetrator blocs. Instead, these crystallise alongside broader 
conflicts in which multiple perpetrators are involved. The constant circulation and 
reproduction of sympathy, antipathy, indifference and oblivion, complement such 
conjunctures by enabling certain actors to construct (hyper)real collective selves as 
target for destruction. 
 In sum, the deconstruction of the genocide script shows that dominant 
macronarratives reify the domestic myth and essentialise genocides as extremely rare 
events, product of perpetrators‘ intent. In contrast, this thesis functions as a critical 
eye unravelling the genocide script by firstly con-textualising the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture in which transnational processes allowed the destruction of 
the UP and secondly by bringing to the attention of genocide scholars a case largely 
disregarded because it does not suit such a script. 
Theorising genocidal geopolitical conjunctures   
Although western responses to genocide have come under strong criticism in post 
cold war years (i.e., Cushman and Meštrović 1996; Barnett 2002), and even the role 
of the West in post World War II genocides has begun to be critically scrutinised (i.e., 
Jones 2004; Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2010), the study of genocide 
continues to be trapped in the domestic myth. This has resulted in a hegemonic liberal 
discourse that claims that the West could have done (and should do) better in 
preventing genocide. Indeed, in some cases the lack of political will to act allowed the 
genocidal campaigns to continue. However, as the previous sections suggest, such 
campaigns are seldom the products of isolated indigenous forces. Instead, sometimes 
geopolitical con-texts crystallise into genocidal conjunctures.  
Hence, genocidal geopolitical conjunctures could be described as ‗complex 
geometries of coexistent time-spaces‘ in which goods, peoples, ideas and affect 
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circulate.
19
 These complex geometries are product of the convergence of long-term 
processes (i.e., state-building, globalisation, nationalism) and combinations of 
contingent events (i.e., economic crises, political reforms, social mobility). Upon 
these geometries some sectors of social, economic, political and military networks 
amalgamate into a perpetrator bloc to resolve already tense human interactions. In so 
doing, they further escalate violence against civilian social networks, which are 
interpreted as being the source of tensions –a threat. The intensification of violence 
occurs in tandem with the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy. This contributes to the 
radicalisation of the frames of interpretation that seek to accommodate various others 
within the idea of a collective self. In this context, those who cannot be 
accommodated are, to use Baumann‘s words, ―construed in the antigrammar of 
genocide: For us to survive as ourselves, the others must die‖ (2004: 46). However, as 
the reproduction of an antigrammar of genocide coexists with various grammars of 
identity/alterity,
20
 genocidal geopolitical conjunctures materialise upon the 
intersubjective relationship between genocidists and victims. Or, better put, in a 
dialectic process, in which classificatory structures that define identity/alterity are 
entangled with processes whereby perpetrators‘ hard power solidifies and victims‘ 
soft power evolves. This genocidal process of reordering sociomaterial relations takes 
place in a ―folded and striated geography‖ thus entwining apparently distant subjects, 
objects, events and places together.
21
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 By geopolitical is meant that transnational and international processes do not exist separately but 
rather intermingle in complex ways. This is not meant to reify an absolute conception of space based 
on Euclidian geometry. Processes are seldom contained within the borders of a nation state. Rather, a 
relative conception of space –which problematises the notion of distance and considers that spaces can 
only be understood as a fluid system of relations (Harvey 1969)– informs the notion of genocidal 
geopolitical conjunctures in the sense that they are inscribed with the imaginary of a world divided into 
nation states. 
20
 Baumann and Gingrich use the word grammar as ―a simple shorthand for certain simple 
classificatory structures that… can be recognized in a vast variety of processes concerned with defining 
identity and alterity… [which] are intrinsically related to social conceptions which… are always 
shaped and influenced by their respective historical and sociological contexts‖ (Baumann and Gingrich 
2004: ix). This anthropological definition rejects any essentialist connotations by embracing a ‗soft‘ 
concept of identity, which relates identity/alterity to social contexts and processes. 
21
 See Murdoch‘s (1998: 370) discussion of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and geography. In line with 
ANT, the term ‗sociomaterial relations‘ is used here to point out the importance of the relationship 
between human beings and their environment. 
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International Relations (IR) scholars are, at least in theory, better placed to analyse 
the con-texts in which genocides occur.
22
 However, the shadow of the domestic myth 
has also laid over IR (see, for instance, Harff and Gurr 1988; Wheeler 2000; 
Campbell 2001; Valentino 2003). Barnett‘s (1997) account, in particular, is a 
powerful critique of the United Nations Security Council‘s decision to abstain to 
directly intervene in Rwanda, and as such it portrays the genocide as a domestic 
event. The failure to observe the long term transnational processes that crystallised 
during the genocide allows for the reproduction of an idealist scenario that imagines 
the perpetrators of genocide as domestic forces acting thanks to the inaction of 
international actors.
23
 In decontextualising genocides from genocidal geopolitical 
conjunctures, scholars misconstrue genocidal processes and help to produce them as 
scripts.
24
 More importantly, they contribute to the rise of ontopological orders of 
representation which transhistoricise present-situations through imbedding the topos 
with essentialist ahistorical actors and dramas (see Campbell 1998a: 80). As a result, 
the genocide script, whereby complex genocidal geopolitical conjunctures are reduced 
to two-dimensional domestic crises in which a state orchestrates the mass murder of 
passive fixed social groups, is used to create a blueprint for the deeds of the 
international community; a community represented as an enlightened collective self, 
detached from the very genocidal geopolitical conjunctures that aid its reproduction. 
Otherwise, how could it be explained that the genocide in Darfur and the destruction 
of the UP are either disregarded or normalised by writing them as domestic dramas 
topical of backward places in the evolving process of mastering the global space 
while the Holocaust is usually depicted as a global drama?  
An idealist representation that eclipses the geopolitics of genocide is not only what 
is at stake here, but also the conflictive construction of western identity vis-à-vis its 
violent past (Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Given that IR and Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies lie at the core of this conflictive construction of identity, critical 
interdisciplinary approaches are needed to unveil how global grammars of 
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 Only recently genocide scholars started paying attention to geopolitical processes (Bloxham 2007, 
2009). Traditionally, they had focused on analysing the failures of the ‗international community‘ in its 
deed as preventer of genocide (i.e., Harff 1987; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). 
23
 This imagery supports and is reinforced by scholars such as Rae (2002) who argues that today state-
builders usually resort to genocide when they are not contained by the international system. 
24
 As Midlarsky, correctly argues ―[w]hatever the virulence of the ideological underpinnings, the actual 
events occurring just prior to the genocide and the relevant geopolitical setting are crucial‖ (2005: 18). 
26 
 
identity/alterity are reproduced in genocidal geopolitical conjunctures and how these 
folded and striated geographies are the product of the provincialisation of what one 
may label as a paranoic western self, which ―generously distribute the right to be 
different, while secretly and inexorably working to produce a pale and 
undifferentiated world‖ (Baudrillard 1996: 84). 
Various scholars have already paid attention to the relationship between ‗domestic‘ 
and ‗international‘ factors and the identity politics involved in the occurrence of 
genocide.
25
 Hence, this thesis builds upon the work of historians Mark Levene (2000, 
2005) and Donald Bloxham (2007, 2009), IR scholars Martin Shaw (2007, 2009), 
David Campbell (1998a, 1998b)–and to less extent David MacDonald (2008)– and 
critical geopolitician Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996). The issue is not about whether 
geopolitical contexts matter, as Levene, Bloxham and recently Shaw demonstrate, nor 
is it whether essentialist ahistorical representations allow for genocides to unfold, as 
Campbell and Ó Tuathail convincingly argue, nor whether a trivial representation of 
the Holocaust has come to form ―a collective past, shared by many western nations, 
upon which leaders freely draw to make foreign policy and domestic policy 
distinctions‖ (MacDonald 2008: 2).26  Instead, the issue is to bring together these 
different contributions to account for the crystallisation, solidification and 
disintegration of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures.  
This thesis aims to unveil how the connections between transnational economic, 
political, social and military networks (re)create spatial-temporal frames which aid the 
construction of civilian social networks as (trans)national threats; in this 
intersubjective production of reality, dominant narratives of (inter)national politics 
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 Scholars taking into account structural process have considered international relations in their 
analysis of colonial and contemporary genocides. Starting from Sartre‘s (1968) theory of genocide in 
colonization, which could be read as ―a theory of genocide in the international relations of the great 
powers‖ (Kuper 1981: 46), scholars began to understand social structures as drivers of genocide (see 
Wallimann, Dobkowski, and Rubenstein 1987, 2000). This insight contributed to path-breaking works, 
which trace back the history of twentieth century genocides and show the connection between 
imperialism and genocide (Moses 2002, 2008). 
26
 Levene‘s work is concerned with the occurrence of genocide within the development of the modern 
international system, Bloxham has worked extensively on the geopolitical contexts of the Armenian 
and Nazi genocides. Shaw has recently proposed a theoretical framework to study genocidal clusters. 
Campbell and Ó Tuathail share the same epistemological assumptions and both deal with genocidal 
violence in Bosnia; their findings prompt a focus on how interpretations of international politics allow 
for violence to unfold. MacDonald studies how the Holocaust has framed contemporary western 
identity politics by looking at how it has been used in Bosnia, Australia, New Zealand and America; 
this thesis disagrees, however, with the main assumption of his analysis: the uniqueness and 
unprecedentedness of the Holocaust. 
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polarise the grammars of identity seeking to secure a hyperreal collective self; as a 
result, sympathy/antipathy towards either the civilian networks or the hyperreal 
collective self are radicalised allowing not only for genocides to unfold but also for 
ending them. The thesis does this by con-textualising the destruction of the UP within 
the changing imageries of international politics, which are constitutive part of the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.  Although recent research studies the regional 
patterns of genocide during the cold war in Latin America (Esparza, Huttenbach, and 
Feierstein 2010), the assumption remains amongst most of the contributors that the 
international system is a ‗material‘ external-fixed-structure that stamps social patterns 
in isolated locales producing genocide.
27
 Since such an assumption is in itself 
problematic (Walker 1993), this thesis moves beyond the line of inquiry that seeks to 
uncover the relationship between genocide and the great powers‘ struggle for 
mastering space. Instead, it unsettles the genocide script embedded in the 
reproduction of the imagery of geopolitics, which hides away the convolutions of 
genocide. 
Thus, the analysis goes beyond the critique by scholars, human rights activists, and 
politicians who, thanks to the scripting of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides 
through the lenses of what Duffield (2001) calls ‗new barbarism‘, continue to rely on 
the domestic/international dichotomy to argue that post-cold war genocides mainly 
happened through the ‗inaction‘ of the international community (i.e., Jackson 1990; 
Power 2003).
28
 Although, indeed, the lack of a military intervention allowed 
genocidal campaigns to unfold, the active flows of capital, goods, people, and 
narratives ignited political, economic, and military elites‘ antipathy towards social 
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 Adam Jones‘s (2004) edited book, which studies the involvement of Western powers in some 
genocides mistakenly considered as results of domestic processes, is another excellent attempt to unveil 
how genocidal processes have been linked with the developments of a western-led international 
system. Linda Melvern (2000) develops a similar critique further in regards with the Rwandan 
genocide. As such, these books epitomise a line of research that relies on the inside/outside dichotomy 
but at the same time challenges the ‗domestic‘ character of genocide. 
28
 In an interconnected world it is a misrepresentation to suggest that domestic factors can be singled 
out as the drivers of genocide. Yet these misleading accounts are common ground in IR. Barkawi and 
Laffey (2006: 362) contend that IR‘s Eurocentric nature explains why ―when mass slaughter takes 
place in locales… removed from the West, as in Africa, it is … attributed to non-Western factors such 
as the absence of modern political, economic and social arrangements.‖ This has helped to consolidate 
scripts such as ‗murderous states‘ and ‗failed states‘ (Zartman 1995), which reify the fantasy of the 
domestic nature of genocide by imagining some geographies and subjectivities as more prone to 
experience genocide. IR‘s Eurocentric narratives have to some extent been contested by genocide 
scholars (Kuper 1981; see Levene 2005).  
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groups. This escalated the armed conflicts and allowed the radicalisation of violence 
entrepreneurs, army officers and paramilitary leaders. Eventually, they amalgamated 
in perpetrator blocs and construed civilian networks as threats through an 
antigrammar of genocide. This was the case not only in the destruction of the UP, as 
discussed earlier, but also in  the Bosnian genocide, in which complex flows (of 
resources and capital) allowed for the emergence of a war economy (Kaldor 1999: 
64). Upon the unfolding of such an economy an ahistorical antipathy towards an 
essentialised other construed as a threat imbued tense social interactions. This 
facilitated the collusion of various actors, who circulated micronarratives, which 
relied on and reinforced macronarratives recreating the simulation that a ―national 
community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity‖ (Campbell 
1998a: 13).  
In both cases, the perpetrators‘ alliances were not fixed and hierarchical, but fluid. 
Moreover, the hard power that materialised from their alliances was based on the 
grammars of identity/alterity which circulated the idea that they shared a solidarity-
bond. Antipathy towards ‗threatening‘ civilian networks was central in reinforcing 
sympathy not only amongst perpetrators, but also between them and broader sectors 
of social networks. The diffusion of sympathy/antipathy solidified the imaginary 
division between different collective selves. In this process, sympathy/antipathy were 
radicalised thus (re)producing the intersubjective clash between perpetrators and 
victims. Both the international community and the evolving civil society played a role 
in such radicalisation. Scripts transferred by popular media reinforced (and recreated) 
the antipathy of some sectors of the perpetrator blocs. Informal networks provided 
arms and narratives, which enabled them to construe civilian networks as cohesive 
groups made of essential immutable characteristics and to destroy them. Finally, 
political representations, embodied in the international community‘s scripting of 
genocides as ‗domestic‘ dramas, boosted murderous processes of state formation.29  
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 Campbell (1998a) deconstructs the micronarratives of the international community and the 
macronarratives of media and scholars so as to problematise their role in the genocidal process of state 
formation in Bosnia. Ó Tuathail (1996) develops an excellent account of practical geopolitics in the 
breakup of Yugoslavia. Drawing on this theoretical framework I wrote an account of practical 
geopolitics in 1980s US-Colombian relations (Gomez-Suarez 2010). References to the media and 
informal networks indorse critical geopolitical writers who categorise geopolitics into popular, formal 
and practical geopolitics (for a concise discussion see Dodds 2007: 45). 
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This thesis focuses on the (re)production of antipathy towards the UP, but it does 
not seek to generalise the findings so as to suggest that there is a teleological linear 
process which is part of other genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. Although similar 
patterns can be found in different conjunctures, a large connection of unseen and 
unexpected events and narratives trigger unique dynamics of victimisation and 
resistance. Furthermore, the analysis shows that antipathy cannot be understood in 
isolation. Rather, it has to be approached as part of a dynamic nexus of affective-
dispositions, in which sympathy, indifference, oblivion, and antipathy are 
indivisible.
30
 The thesis unveils the role that such nexus played in the crystallisation, 
solidification and disintegration of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within 
which the destruction of the UP happened. Consequently, it maps the circulations of 
‗emotional (dis)connections‘ in the grammars of identity/alterity that (re)produced a 
multiplicity of collective selves;
31
 amongst which one was eventually construed, 
through an antigrammar of genocide, as a multifaced threat that had to be destroyed. 
This is not to say that the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture was the product of the 
circulation of affective-dispositions. As political (socio-natural) devices that allow 
human interaction affective-dispositions do not produce genocide and war on 
themselves. However, as affective-dispositions are mechanisms through which power 
circulates, these are, to use Foucault‘s words, ―invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, 
transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms 
of global domination‖ (1980: 99). In the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture here 
studied, sympathy, antipathy, indifference, and oblivion were invested with 
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 This thesis differs from IR scholars who equate affect and emotions (Crawford 2000). Rather, it is 
closer to poststructural and constructivist theorists (Edkins 2003; Ross 2006). 
31
 Affective-dispositions and emotional (dis)connections are interrelated. However, recalling that affect 
and emotion follow different logics and pertain different orders –affect is not entirely containable in 
knowledge but is analyzable in effect and emotion is the subjective content inserted into narrativizable 
action-reaction circuits (Massumi 2002)– it could be argued that emotional (dis)connections capture the 
way how affective-dispositions shape the subjectivities of actors who become victims, perpetrators and 
spectators. In the same sense that affect is not used as a loose synonym for emotion, affect and 
affective-dispositions have different meanings. After a growing poststructural line of analysis that 
follows Spinoza and Deleuze, the thesis considers that affects ―occur in an encounter between manifold 
beings, and the outcome of each encounter depends upon what forms of composition these beings are 
able to enter into‖ (Thrift 2004: 62). Insofar affect is relational, affective-dispositions are the concrete 
expressions of the different forms that affect takes once it emerges in the bodies. Thus affective-
dispositions are at the same time both individual and collective, and become the target of different 
forms of power, which ―work to organise affect to have certain effects upon motion and emotion‖ 
(Adey 2008: 440).  
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hyperreality,
32
 colonised by state institutions,
33
 and utilised by social groups during 
their continuous circulation. It was in this flux that affective-dispositions were 
instrumentalised by social groups to escalate violence and to resist violence, to take 
action and to stand aside, to remember and to forget. Although the con-textualisation 
of other genocides is needed, the research on the destruction of the UP suggests that 
the circulation and reproduction of sympathy, indifference, antipathy, and oblivion,
34
 
or what one might call a political economy of affective-dispositions is a complex 
process that must be mapped for any genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.
35
  
To be sure, the idea of a political economy of affective-dispositions suggests, 
similarly with Ahmed‘s ‗affective economy‘, that affect does not ―positively inhabit 
anybody or anything, meaning that ‗the subject‘ is simply one nodal point in the 
economy, rather than its origin and destination‖ (2004: 46). Yet it recognises that 
governing apparatuses play an important role in the circulation and reproduction of 
affective-dispositions,
36
 for as this study shows, state-nodes shape the ―operative 
frameworks, within which,‖ to use Butler‘s words, ―certain lives are regarded as 
worthy of protection while others are not‖ (2009: 50). Thus, affective-dispositions 
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 This means that radicalised affective-dispositions (simulations of the real) become, to use 
Baudrillard‘s words, ―more real than the real itself‖ (quoted in Ó Tuathail 1992: 157). 
33
 State leaders do not only colonise affective-dispositions during genocide, rather this is central part of 
the scripting upon which geopolitics are constantly performed. As Ó Tuathail‘s reflections on the 
invasion of Iraq show, state leaders use ―affect-saturated memory and ‗gut feelings‘‖ so as to deepen 
the disposition of broader social networks ―to view certain regions, peoples, and faiths as hostile‖ 
(2003: 858). It is in particular conjunctures, such as the ‗war on terror‘, that the polarisation of 
sympathy/antipathy inscribes with hyperreality the grammars of identity/alterity allowing the 
circulation of narratives, which could eventually crystallise into an antigrammar of genocide. 
34
 Production is consciously excluded because in the ‗history‘ of the reproduction of power the search 
for origins is futile, hence, instrumentalising Baudrillard‘s thoughts, it could be argued that ―production 
[has been always] dead, long live reproduction‖ (1983: 126).  
35
 Political economy, as first proposed by Antoine de Montchrétien in 1615, was about studying the 
conditions under which production or consumption was organised within nation-states. The division 
between production and consumption was criticised by Marx in A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy. Marx argued that production, consumption, distribution, and exchange (circulation) 
were all links to a single whole: a distinct mode of production, which in bourgeois society was the 
capitalist mode of production and reproduction. Although I do not seek to explain why capitalism 
generates a particular production-circulation-reproduction of affective-dispositions, Marx‘s critique is 
useful to explain what it is understood here by political economy: a political economy is the ever-
changing set of links through which a given x circulates, is produced and reproduced –Ahmed, 
borrowing from Marx‘s Capital, for example, relies on ‗the economic‘ as a limited analogy to offer ―a 
theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate, but as that which is accumulated over time‖ (2004: 
45).  
36
 Ben Anderson‘s recent work on the targeting of morale by the military on the war on terror is a good 
example of this line of inquiry, which maintains that ―[w]ork on affect must take care not to presume 
either the manipulation of affect in a form of hierarchical domination from a central source, or the 
escape of affect over any and all forms of power… it is the aleatory, indeterminate, nature of affect that 
provides the ground and support for modalities of power‖ (2010: 431). 
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constantly circulate across the margins of various networks through the scripting of 
social processes which privilege some narratives over others.
37
  
Since scripts are part of geopolitics, which is understood here as ―a discursive 
practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‗spatialize‘ international politics in such a 
way as to represent a ‗world‘ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and 
dramas‖ (Ó Tuathail 1996: 59), there are at least two reasons to study geopolitics 
critically.
38
 First, to ―challenge the geographing of (global political) space as a system 
of pregiven containers for politics‖ (Dalby quoted in Ibid.: 62), within which 
genocides happen. Second, to trace the way in which politicians, socio-economic 
elites and military officers craft scripts that target affective-dispositions, aiming thus 
at producing particular collective emotional (dis)connections vis-à-vis sectors of the 
perpetrator blocs and the civilian social networks.
39
 Thus, critical geopolitics  
contributes to meet the twofold interest of this thesis: firstly, to analyse the 
combination of (geopolitical) processes and events that made a political economy of 
affective-dispositions the axis for (a) the radicalisation of large sectors of social 
networks against, (b) the disconnection of others from, and (c) the solidarity-
connection of few with the UP; secondly, to discuss how transformations both in the 
political economy of affective-dispositions and in geopolitical con-texts, fractured the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture making possible for the UP to seek to bring the 
perpetrators to justice.  
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 The term margin seeks to overcome the fixed idea of national borders, which Parker (2009) argues 
no longer hold for postinternational societies. 
38
 Following Gramsci‘s notion of organic intellectuals Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 194) argue that 
―the notion ‗intellectuals of statecraft‘ refers to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, 
foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct 
the activities of statecraft.‖ 
39
 Mathew Sparke‘s (2007) analysis on the geopolitical discourse of fear that legitimated the war on 
terror exemplifies how through discourse analysis it is possible to unveil how collective emotional 
responses are to a large extent influenced by scripts product of statesmen‘s calculations. In recent years 
scholars have studied the connection between affect and thinking, through film (Connolly 2002), and 
affect and human and non-human interactions, through the geographies of spaces of practice 
(McCormack 2003). However, this thesis exclusively deals with the link between affect and the scripts 
circulating in micro- and macronarratives. Future research would indeed benefit from broadening the 
analysis to films, spaces of practices, and architecture. 
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Con-textualisation  
Critical geopolitics, post-structuralist IR, and critical genocide studies
40
 are at the core 
of the interdisciplinary approach proposed by this thesis to overcome the genocide 
script and to understand how the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture studied here 
crystallised. The method has as its object of study the fold at which the direct physical 
violence inflicted upon the bodies of civilian networks merges with shifting 
geopolitical con-texts. Its aim is to con-textualise the geopolitics of genocide. Such 
method, here called con-textualisation, ontologically and epistemologically relies on 
Laclau and Mouffe‘s assertion that ―all objects are constituted as objects of discourse, 
and that there is not ontological difference between linguistic and behavioural aspects 
of social practice‖ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107). Furthermore, by ―analysing the 
way in which political forces and social actors construct meaning within incomplete 
and undecidable social structures‖ and by aiming to ―describe, understand, interpret 
and evaluate carefully constructed objects of investigation… to account for 
incomplete or misleading understandings and to redescribe phenomena in new terms‖ 
this method fits within the broader realm of discourse theory (Howarth 2000: 129; 
139). 
Con-textualisation is closely related to Foucault‘s strategy of problematisation. For 
it seeks to uncover how the international community‘s scripting of genocide 
reinforces essentialist assumptions of both victims and perpetrators and relies on 
hyperreal imaginings of security and social order, which polarises a political economy 
of affective-dispositions thus contributing to the crystallisation of genocidal 
geopolitical conjunctures. However, both strategies differ in the sense that con-
textualisation aims to map the amalgamation of geopolitical narratives and the 
topologies of genocidists and genocide-victims.
41
 In this regard, it borrows from 
critical geopolitics the tactic of deconstructing scripts so as to unveil (1) how scripts 
overshadow raw events and (2) how they are constructed in cross-border interactions, 
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 Scholars part of what Dirk Moses calls ‗critical genocide studies‘ largely support ‗post-liberal‘ 
theories of genocide. Contrary to liberals, who argue that ―[g]enocide is established when an agent, in 
particular the modern state, can be determined to possess the requisite genocidal intention‖, post-
liberals see that genocides are ―not merely the contingent outcome of aberrant settler violence, but 
inherent in the structure and logic of the colonial project‖ (2002: 19-26).  
41
 Topology is understood here as critical mapping of networks. 
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which reinforce sympathy/antipathy towards a particular civilian network, or relegate 
it to indifference/oblivion.  
Altogether, con-textualisation is a tactic to de-essentialise genocide and, as such, to 
tackle the following set of questions that emerge from looking into a genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture: 
  
1. How do geopolitical con-texts affect the civilian networks‘ grammars of 
identity/alterity and the identity the perpetrators fashion about the social 
networks they target for destruction? 
2. How do geopolitical con-texts shape the processes that bring together the 
perpetrators of genocide as networks integrating civilian sectors with various 
collective violent actors? 
3. What are the scripts and representations exchanged in geopolitical con-texts 
that shape mindsets which put forward an antigrammar of genocide that 
promotes the destruction of an apparently cohesive collective self ? 
4. Do genocidal geopolitical conjunctures finally crystallise when a rather small 
perpetrator bloc unleashes –unrestrained by large social networks– murderous 
campaigns against the social fabric (soft power) of an apparently coherent 
collective self, within which some sectors resist the violence but usually fail to 
influence sections of the very social networks –that stand indifferent– so as to 
timely halt the escalation of violence? How does this contribute to materialise 
a fictive self/other binary into the writing of a ‗material‘ outside globe made 
up of multiple insides? 
 
In dealing with these questions, con-textualisation maps a political economy of 
affective-dispositions. The circulation of such dispositions allows social groups to 
amalgamate and to structure grammars of identity/alterity. This results in an uneven 
flow of scripts and representations which bring closer or isolate some sectors of social 
networks in the onset of the escalation of violence. Hence, to con-textualise a political 
economy involves carrying out a genealogy of the institutionalised ways of seeing and 
displaying geopolitical conjunctures as ‗local dramas‘ in the making of the global 
space.  
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In recent years, such institutionalisation has been both the product and the result of 
defining a place for such dramas –politically bounded by national borders– within the 
space of US foreign policy. This has been possible because of the reproduction of an 
assemblage of scripts that precede ―actual events and appropriates those events as part 
of itself‖ and, as such, creates a convenient reality that relies on ―the marginalization 
of alternative meanings and alternative scripts‖ (Ó Tuathail 1992: 157). Since the 
creation of reality through mere representations is part of what Ó Tuathail calls ‗the 
principle of hyperreality‘ in foreign policy, whereby scripts structure ways of seeing 
reality admitting ―only certain political possibilities as ways of responding to that 
‗reality‘,‖ the result is ―a persuasive story designed to explain the messy complexity 
of events in a simple fashion‖ (Ibid.). The deconstruction of such stories is then 
central in dealing with the principle of hyperreality that institutionalises the 
representation of a country in US foreign policy. However, the issue that remains is 
who creates the scripts that underpin the writing of the global through US foreign 
policy. 
Agnew‘s and Ó Tuathail‘s (1992) contribution sheds light on this regard by 
demystifying the idea that geopolitics is only a discursive practice created by the 
‗wise men‘ who consider themselves the inheritors of ‗scientific‘ geopolitics. They 
also deem the description of a foreign policy as geopolitics, they contend that there 
are  
 
two different types of geopolitical reasoning … [1] Practical geopolitics refers to the 
spatializing practices of practitioners of state-craft such as statepersons, politicians, and 
military commanders …  [2] Formal geopolitics refers to the spatializing practices of 
strategic thinkers and public intellectuals who set themselves up as authorities on the 
totality of the world political map (Ó Tuathail 1996: 60). 
 
Notwithstanding that statepersons, politicians, military commanders, strategic 
thinkers and public intellectuals are at the core of the production of scripts, they are at 
the top end of social networks within which representations are exchanged. 
Consequently, a genealogy of scripts must look into the circulation of representations 
within and across military, political, social and economic networks.  
This thesis is concerned with the practical geopolitics of the UP genocide, or the 
narratives put forward by political, economic, and social elites (and institutions) that 
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permeate different worldwide networks of spectators who have ended up ignoring or 
denying the destruction of UP. Such is the result of conveniently displaying Colombia 
both as closely linked but also detached from the overarching imagery of the global. 
As some social networks resist the imagining of this global geography, the thesis is 
also concerned with what Routledge (2003) calls anti-geopolitics, or the assemblage 
of discourses whereby some NGOs, social movements, trade unions, and political 
parties contribute to the (re)writing of the global. In the case studied here, such a re-
writing occurs by making public the UP genocide. However, this thesis approaches 
the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide as a discursive/material matrix, where flows 
of resources, goods, and people accompany the micro- and macronarratives of a fluid 
transnational civilian network which seeks to challenge the scripting of Colombia as a 
genocide-free locale in the writing of global politics. Global human rights Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have played a part in such a network. Recalling 
that global human rights NGOs sometimes reify power relations, by making visible 
some dramas and no others, the thesis assesses their role in the anti-geopolitics of the 
UP genocide. Nevertheless, as global human rights NGOs are only the top end of the 
struggle involved in the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide, the analysis unveils how 
the struggle evolved from the UP leaders‘ early attempts to break the indifference of 
broader sectors of social networks by igniting sympathy for their struggle and 
antipathy towards the perpetrators. In this way, con-textualisation traces the 
(irregular) relationship between the practical geopolitics and the anti-geopolitics of 
the UP genocide. As the final section of this introduction discusses, a multi-method 
approach is necessary not only to trace such a relationship, but also to study the 
mobilisation, circulation, and colonisation of affect. Suffice for now to say that 
similarly to Pain‘s (2009) critical methodology to the study of emotional geopolitics, 
con-textualisation relies on semi-structured interviews, focus groups, archival 
research and discourse analysis. This enables to unearth the anti-geopolitics of 
genocide-victims, to unveil the practical geopolitics of various sectors of the 
perpetrator blocs, and to map the topologies of the genocidal geopolitical 
conjunctures in which perpetrator- and victim-networks intersubjectively clash.     
Put simply, con-textualisation is a method of disrupting the fantasy that genocide 
takes place in isolation from geopolitical interactions; it does so by exploring the role 
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that the intersubjective exchange of ways of imagining such interactions plays in the 
occurrence of genocide. In following con-textualisation this thesis (1) deconstructs 
the hyperreal writing of Colombia in US foreign policy and (2) maps the political 
economy of affective-dispositions upon which the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture 
crystallised, solidified and disintegrated. In consequence, the thesis complements 
Bloxham‘s (2007, 2009) and Levene‘s (2005) geopolitical lines of inquiry, at the 
same time that it challenges their epistemological and ontological assumptions. The 
focus on scripts, networks, and affective-dispositions questions traditional 
understandings of ‗the international‘ and therefore the idea that genocide occurs 
amidst a battle for power in an international system of states. The study suggests that 
it is more fruitful to question the very assumptions that ‗drive‘ the actions of a 
multiplicity of actors in the ‗space of the international‘, hence the focus on the 
political economy of affective-dispositions. Only then would researchers be better 
able to deal with the genocide script, which not only helps to create international 
boundaries but also, and mainly, allows for the reproduction of the very abstraction of 
a world divided into multiple Insides and one Outside. Furthermore, the findings of 
the study suggest that by following con-textualisation new genocide research could 
contribute to subvert dichotomies, such as inside/outside, self/other, private/public, 
and discursive/non-discursive. Overcoming them has been the main challenge of this 
thesis. The thesis should therefore be judged not only by the contribution it makes to 
Shaw‘s (2009: 9) call for ―a more structural emphasis on macro-historical contexts 
(regional as well as global) … [so as] to look at the dynamics involved in clusters of 
cases in particular periods and regions,‖ but also by placing a (post)structuralist 
emphasis on con-textualising genocide into the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture 
unfolding upon the polarisation of a political economy of affective-dispositions. 
Con-textualising the political economy of affective -dispositions 
The writing of the global constantly refers to local dramas. Therefore, intellectuals of 
statecraft‘s representations of the processes part of the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture, within which the destruction of the UP occurred, served to reinforce the 
boundaries between sovereign national states in the Americas. Since the UP was not 
only singled out by a perpetrator bloc and allowed to perish ‗within‘ the boundaries of 
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Colombia but was also portrayed as part of the wider communist threat to the 
hemisphere during the 1980s, military and political leaders in the region were able to 
advocate strengthening the borders of the states to contain the circulation of the threat. 
Thus, to paraphrase Campbell, ―[t]he very domain of inside/outside, self/other, and 
domestic/foreign [we]re constituted through the writing of a threat‖ (1998b: x). 
Although the threat of communism vanished at the turn of 1990s, violence against 
UP strongholds continued. From the mid 1990s until the early 2000s Colombia was 
depicted as a failed state, in which new non-state actors were challenging the 
sovereignty of the state within its own boundaries. In this context, a large number of 
actors in Capitol Hill, the Pentagon and the White House depicted it as impossible for 
the ‗weak‘ Colombian state to protect the UP from the right wing paramilitary groups. 
Such groups continued legitimating the massacres by stressing the link UP-FARC. 
During the first decade of the new millennium, hundreds of UP survivors were 
assassinated;
42
 structural violence, stigmatisation, and forced detention were some of 
the violent practices that accompanied selective assassinations. In the post-9/11 
world, counterinsurgency and counter-drug efforts merged in a state (re)building plan, 
largely funded by the US.
43
 The demobilisation of paramilitary groups and the 
weakening of FARC have allowed influential think tanks in the realm of 
Washington‘s foreign policy, such as the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, to disregard the involvement of security forces and other state institutions in 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Colombia is thus portrayed as a successful 
story of state building that sheds light on how to proceed in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(DeShazo, Meldenson Forman, and Phillip 2009).  
In contrast to these shifting representations, the continuity of the inside/outside 
dichotomy has been the referent object of the grammars of identity/alterity for both 
victims and perpetrators during the last 30 years. This has allowed, ignited, and 
reproduced the multiple narratives that form the axis of the political economy of 
affective-dispositions upon which Colombian identity politics has unfolded since the 
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 According to REINICIAR and the Colombian Commission of Jurists between 2002 and 2006, 136 
former UP members had been murdered, 38 disappeared and 28 have been suffered assassination 
attempts, and hundreds of families have been forcedly displaced (REINICIAR 2006c: 75). 
43
 ―The United States has provided more than $6.8 billion in assistance to Colombia since the approval 
of the emergency supplemental in support of Plan Colombia in July 2000‖ (DeShazo, Meldenson 
Forman, and Phillip 2009: x). 
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1980s. Such representations have been intertwined with three long-term processes. 
First, the development of mindsets that regard the destruction of certain social groups 
as the path to follow; the materialisation of such mindsets is what I elsewhere call 
genocidal mentalities (Gomez-Suarez 2007). Second, the spread of sovereign-subject 
power relations that seek to bring about a national identity able to reproduce 
hegemonic narratives, which materialise, paraphrasing Mann (2006), modernity‘s 
legacy of creating a ―we the people‖ like ‗us‘.44 Third, the instrumentalisation of 
geography that in a discursive event allows for the bordering of social processes and 
the creation of policies of intervention or non-intervention. Geography, a 
power/knowledge that produces specific power relations and hence a central part of 
geopolitics,
45
 provides scope for human beings to detach from or attach to social 
processes that are represented as someone else‘s business.  
The convergence of these three processes suggests that genocidal mindsets, at the 
core of which there was an antigrammar of genocide that enabled various actors to 
regard the destruction of the UP as the path to follow, were entangled with the 
modern process of state formation and the unfolding of narratives representing 
geography as a natural given that needed to be mapped out in order to secure the 
survival of a fictive Colombian self. It was in this flux of social processes that 
sympathy/antipathy came to reinforce from within and without the idea of a nation-
state and where from sprang the grammars of identity/alterity. 
During the latter part of the twentieth century, the (re)production of a particular 
Colombian identity was to borrow Neumman‘s (1993: 350) definition of identity 
politics a ―struggle to form the social field in the image of one particular political 
project.‖ One of the multiple origins of the historic specificity of late 20th century 
Colombian identity can be traced back to the Frente Nacional (FN). From 1958 
onwards capitalist-democratic values were, according to political elites, the 
cornerstone of national identity. This politico-moral figuration enabled, paraphrasing 
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 Mann (1993) argues that the modern state is a place and an actor at the same time. However, it can 
only be so thanks to discursive practices depicting it as a place with a given geography. This discourse 
is central part of state-subject power relations. The centrality of the state as a place was to dominate the 
late 19
th
 century political imagination. This was so, in part, because as Mann correctly demonstrates the 
‗science‘ of geopolitics emerged as part of the expansion of the infrastructural power of the state. 
45
 ―The texts of geopolitical discourse are not free-floating… but are rooted in what [Foucault] calls 
‗power/knowledge‘, serving the interests of particular groups in society and helping to sustain and 
legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations‖ (Hepple 1992: 139). 
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Campbell (1998b: 136), the image of ―a ‗fictive self‘… to perform the regulative ideal 
of domesticating contingency and enframing identity.‖ In token of such a fictive self, 
the FN solved the dispute between the Conservative and Liberal Parties, but excluded 
other political ideologies. Political elites thus attempted to carry on with a nation-
building project based upon excluding people who did not support the bipartisan 
agreement.
46
 Since ―Identity is inconceivable without difference‖ (Ibid.), otherness 
was needed to reinforce the similarities between the members of Colombia‘s 
‗imagined community‘. The first writing of the ‗other‘ in the early stages of the FN 
was the labelling of certain leftist social constituencies as safe havens for bandits (cf. 
Sánchez and Meertens 2001). This attempt at depoliticising the other was hampered 
by the emergence of communist guerrillas in the early 1960s. In this context, the other 
was installed within the battlefield of ―the Schmittian friend-enemy politics; and 
became the absolute enemy challenging the sovereignty of a supposedly completed 
nation-state‖ (Orozco 2006: 34-64). 
A central mechanism in the ‗apparatus of security‘47 of the FN was the explicit 
delegation of public order management to the military. This not only produced the 
simulation of Colombian territorial space as an organism under threat but also 
produced a particular idea of how to treat it. The military, usually represented as the 
guardian of national borders in modern societies,
48
 was to become after 1958 the 
nucleus of the officers of the law. The outcome of a radicalised military mindset was 
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 What defines a national identity is contested. However, according to Balivar (2002: 68), ―there are 
two basic ideological themes: (a) fictive ethnicity: no nation rest historically on a ‗pure‘ ethnic base, but 
every nation, through its institutions, constructs a fictive ethnicity which distinguishes it from others by 
perceptible (visible, audible, etc) marks … (b) patriotism -tranhistorical mission- … having as its 
corollary the duty of each individual to ‗hand on‘ from generation to generation a symbol which is the 
country‘s ‗own‘.‖ In the Colombian case, the traditional political parties played the transhistorical 
mission to hand on patriotic values to the next generation. This only started to change in the mid 1980s 
when following the UP example various political movements started opening up the political system.  
47
 The emergence of societies of security occurred at the turn of the 18
th
 century. Foucault argues that 
in this time apparatus of security emerged which replaced discipline as a mechanism prescribing what 
needed to be done in order to complement reality.  Instead of prescribing, security focused on 
regulation: allowing things to happen. It does not do away with a threat; it actually regulates it so as to 
cancel it out (Foucault 2007). In a recent work Giorgio Abamben (2009: 8, 20) argues that the term 
‗apparatus‘ is a central technical tool in Foucault‘s thought. ―The term certainly refers… to a set of 
practices and mechanisms (both linguistic and non-linguistic, juridical, technical and military) that aim 
to face an urgent need and to obtain an effect that is more or less immediate… Apparatus, is first of all 
a machine that produces subjectifications, and only as such it is also a machine of governance.‖  
48
 The scripting of the army as an exclusive mechanism of foreign policy is highly problematic. As 
Foucault (1991: 168) argues, ―[p]olitics as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement 
the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment 
in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises. In the great eighteenth-century states the 
army was a technique and a body of knowledge that would project their schema over the social body.‖ 
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the militarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity, in which communism embodied 
a dangerous other. The emergence of communist guerrillas allowed a discursive shift, 
whereby the other was written as an assemblage of local violent entrepreneurs 
cemented by a foreign ideology. In this context, the struggle against the Soviet 
Union‘s ‗grand strategy‘ was framed within the imaginary boundaries of Colombia, 
which resembled in the military‘s gaze a legitimate and uncontested sovereign nation-
state. Thus, McCarthyism became a central feature of the FN‘s ‗law officers‘. This 
resulted in the institutionalisation of the State of Siege as part of the apparatus of 
security that enabled the military to control public order and hence to crack down on 
communism. By 1978, when the Colombian military had adopted and adapted the 
National Security Doctrine (NSD), the representation of ‗that one that is not like us 
has to be domesticated or destroyed‘ came to dominate not only the first line of 
command of the armed forces and most of its body of conscripts and lifers, but had 
also permeated the civil service. 
Once the FN‘s political project tolerated exceptional levels of violence against the 
non combatant-other, a murderous process of producing and reproducing 
differentiation based on sympathy/antipathy was set off. At first, traditional 
politicians‘ sympathy for the other sought to offer opportunities of assimilation. In 
this context, the UP was launched. However, as the UP was influenced by ‗foreign 
ideologies‘ the military not only thought of it as unwilling to integrate to Colombian 
politics but also saw with distrust the (re)integration of some of its members into 
society. The UP, then, was essentialised as a fixed ahistorical entity unable to change 
and hence disentitled to sympathy or assimilation. With the radicalisation of antipathy 
and the deepening of the crisis of legitimacy of the political system, the destruction of 
the UP by military means came to inform various social groups, which colluded with 
collective violent actors. In some regions, the military were implicitly given a carte 
blanche to deal with those who were not worthy of assimilation. This was possible 
because the geopolitics of the second cold war had succeeded in fixing 
representations in the Colombian and US civil societies‘ mindsets. Such 
representations had reinforced antipathy towards the UP allowing a violent 
crackdown against it. During the 1990s, Bogotá exploited feelings of sympathy by 
playing up the price paid by ‗Colombian society‘ in the war against the international 
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‗scourge‘ of drug trafficking. US administrations‘ sympathy for the Colombian 
tragedy downplayed the links between politicians, security forces, and paramilitaries 
in genocidal massacres against the UP. Antipathy was thus replaced by indifference. 
Throughout the Uribe administration the UP was portrayed as a past experience; 
during George W. Bush‘s years, Washington overlooked the atrocious human rights 
record of the security forces. Sympathy for the government was the norm and 
indifference was supplanted by oblivion. Sympathy, antipathy, indifference, and 
oblivion are part of the complex set of mechanisms upon which geopolitical 
interactions are (re)produced. Consequently, in con-textualising the destruction of the 
UP within a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, each chapter of this thesis helps to 
unveil how amidst a political economy of affective-dispositions various 
(trans)national networks colluded to target a fluid civilian social network, which also 
utilised affective-dispositions to resist the destruction.  
Outline 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters trace the topology of 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the UP genocide unfolded. The 
chapters analyse various processes that led to the escalation of the armed conflict in 
Colombia; how, because of such an escalation, the conflict flowed into a genocidal 
process of sociomaterial reordering in which a perpetrator bloc materialised and 
waged war on a fictive self, projected on civilian social networks, and how 
genocidists and genocide-victims intersubjectively constructed and reconstructed 
themselves, otherness and third-parties (bystanders) by relying on different grammars 
of identity/alterity. Such grammars were based upon a political economy of affective-
dispositions polarised by the state leaders‘ constant affective preaching and thus 
coexisted with unfolding antigrammars of genocide present in the narratives and 
scripts circulating in the geopolitical con-text of the second cold war in the Western 
Hemisphere. Chapter 2 critically maps the complex dynamics within the UP. It 
follows a twofold strategy. First, it looks into the circulation of affective-disposition, 
scripts, and narratives between the UP and the Colombian administrations from 1985 
to 2002. Second, it connects the transformations in the UP‘s grammars of 
identity/alterity with the genocidal practices of which the group was target. Chapter 3 
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is a topology of the perpetrators. It traces the materialisation of various regional 
coalitions for violence, how they amalgamated in a perpetrator bloc, and the structural 
transformations of the perpetrator bloc from 1985 to 2006. 
 Whereas chapters 2 and 3 unveil the transformations taking place in processes of 
victimisation, resistance and identity formation thereby offering some insights into the 
changing dynamics of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the next three chapters 
seek to con-textualise the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within the geopolitics of 
the Western Hemisphere. In so doing chapters 4-6 are a topology of the transnational 
circulation of narratives and resources between military, political and criminal 
networks. The analysis focuses on how narratives, which reproduced the imagery of a 
continent divided into segments needing to follow the blueprint model presented by 
the US, contributed to the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture by encouraging the teaming up of legal and illegal actors in 
an attempt to control contingency in the hemisphere. Chapters 4 and 5 mainly 
concentrate on the circulation of scripts within and amongst military and political 
networks, while chapter 6 looks at the circulation of narratives and resources within 
transnational criminal networks. All three chapters roughly deal with the same time-
span from the early 1980s to late 2000s. Chapter 4 analyses how the transnational 
circulation of scripts informed the participation of various sectors of the Colombian 
security forces into the perpetrator bloc; it connects some transformations within the 
perpetrators with the geopolitics of military networks in the Western Hemisphere. 
Chapter 5 engages with the transnational scripting of Colombia by political networks; 
it deconstructs the narratives that enabled the free circulation of the perpetrator bloc, 
its collusion with politicians, and informed some transformations within the bloc. 
Chapter 6 maps the transnational connections between legal and illegal actors and 
links them with the perpetrator bloc. Moreover, it explores how the scripting of 
transnational criminal networks as security threats contributed to solidify the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.  
 After con-textualising the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by mainly focusing 
on the dynamics of the perpetrator bloc, the next two chapters turn to con-textualise 
the transformations within the UP and to integrate such con-textualisation with the 
previous chapters. Chapter 7 is a topology of the transnational efforts of the UP to halt 
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the genocide and bring the perpetrators to justice; it looks at the role the UP played in 
bringing about a fluid transnational network of NGOs, political parties and social 
movements so as to resist the genocidists and challenge the narratives put forward by 
military, political, and criminal networks. Chapter 8 returns to the critique of the 
genocide script presented in chapter 1; it brings to the fore the transnational 
dimensions of the intersubjective violent clash between the perpetrator bloc and the 
UP thereby emphasising that genocide is a complex geopolitical process. It outlines 
the implications of the research methodology for future genocide research. 
Methods  
Methods and research design are a central part of this thesis for at least four reasons. 
First, the case study lacks external validity; no Anglo-American genocide scholar lists 
the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide. Second, there are few accounts of the 
UP genocide and victims have mainly produced them. Third, most genocidists deny 
their involvement in the destruction of the UP. These two reasons raise reliability 
issues. Fourth, one of the main contributions of the thesis is to propose a new method 
to study genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. These four particular reasons explain 
why methodology matters, but in a more general sense methods are important so as to 
critique macro- and micronarratives that hinder our understanding of how genocides 
unfold. 
 The primary research in this thesis comes from two visits to Colombia and archival 
research conducted in Washington. The thesis had three research stages. First, at the 
Library of Congress, Congress Hearings on Colombia (1978-2002), State Department 
Reports on Human Rights Practices (1984-1998), School of the Americas‘ Magazine 
‗Adelante‘ (1987-1991), and the New York Times (1985-2008) were reviewed. 
Second, during the first fieldwork visit to Colombia, semi-structured interviews with 
UP survivors and perpetrators were conducted. Ten national leaders were selected and 
four demobilised paramilitaries were randomly chosen for semi-structured 
interviewing. Focus groups were also part of this stage; six sessions in total were 
carried out: three with second-generation survivors in Bogotá and three with women 
survivors in the Meta County. The final part of the fieldwork was dedicated to the 
newspaper review of El Espectador and El Tiempo (1984-2002) in the Luis Angel 
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Arango Library in Bogotá. Third, during the second visit to Colombia, semi-
structured interviews with ten selected UP survivors (former regional leaders) and a 
focus group with UP leaders in the Nariño County were conducted. I also accessed the 
personal archive of Boris Cabrera. As part of this stage of the research, I visited Aida 
Avella in Geneva and carried out two sessions of informal interviewing and studied 
her personal archive.  
 Some of my interviewees requested not to be named; only public figures who 
consented to being named are directly quoted throughout the thesis. The aim of 
carrying out semi-structured interviews was to gather information on regional 
differences in terms of resistance strategies and experiences of genocidal violence. 
The reason for using this kind of interview was to access narratives by allowing a 
more natural interaction with the interviewees. Informal interviewing, on the other 
hand, was used to obtain the former UP president‘s personal account; therefore it 
followed the natural flow of our conversations. Focus groups were used to explore 
how survivors interpret various social groups‘ sympathy/indifference/oblivion vis-à-
vis the UP genocide, what groups or institutions they identify as the perpetrators, and 
what reasons they believe motivated the perpetrators. The resort to focus groups 
sought to explore how group characteristics and dynamics were constitutive forces in 
the construction of meaning of the UP genocide and the practices stemming from it. 
Finally, because of the post-structural stance of the thesis, which focuses on the 
deconstruction of scripts through the analysis of primary sources (i.e., official 
documents, UP press releases and bulletins, military magazines), archival research 
was also part of the multimethod approach used not only to trace the genealogy of 
ideas, allowing hidden voices to emerge, but also to interpret the role of documents in 
shaping a dominant outlook in a given context.
49
 
 In order to deal with validity and reliability issues (i.e., the partiality of the 
archives, the noncomparability of interviewees‘ responses, the credibility of the 
documents, and the small number of participants and the selection process which 
makes focus groups an insecure basis for generalisation), the three research methods 
were triangulated during the data collection process. To be sure, by resorting to 
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 For semi-structured and informal interviews this section relies on the works of Britten (1995) and 
DeWalt and DeWalt (2002), for focus groups on Kamberelis and Kimitriadis (2005), and for archival 
research on Gidley (2004). In dealing with documents‘ reliability and validity concerns the techniques 
proposed by Finnegan (1996) were considered. 
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triangulation the thesis does not attempt to capture an objective reality; rather it aims 
to ensure an in-depth understanding of the complex social processes that converged in 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture studied here.
50
 Focus groups were used to 
collect data on cultural mindsets, supporting the information that eventually emerged 
from the semi-structured interviews. The archival research data on governmental 
statements and its relationship with other perpetrators was validated against 
interviews with key informants. Finally the focus groups‘ data was validated against 
data collection on the nationwide media accounts of the destruction of the UP. 
Furthermore, internal triangulation complemented external triangulation. However, 
triangulation was also used in different ways: first, as a technique to reinforce a 
sceptical stance towards the new data generated during the three stages of the research 
and as a multidimensional approach to study complex social phenomena. The aim was 
to account for continuities and discontinuities in social processes and to avoid falling 
into a ‗teleological trap‘ by paying attention to multiple realities as socially 
constructed and historically embedded. Second, triangulation helped to unveil 
different ‗realities‘ that converged during the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The 
different data collected through these different methods enabled the mapping of the 
complexity of multiple social dynamics converging in episodes that were unique and 
at the same time part of structural dynamics.
51
 Despite the author‘s efforts to enhance 
the quality of the research, the reader should be aware of various methodological 
caveats, thus most chapters introduce the data collection method and the analysis 
technique.  
 Genocide scholars have been mainly concerned with genocide prevention. This 
demonstrates the normative drive behind genocide scholarship. Thus, even though 
ethical concerns vary when carrying out historical, anthropological, sociological, and 
other kind of genocide research, the importance of ethics is, at least amongst genocide 
scholars, taken-for-granted. However, this link between research ethics and normative 
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 According to Flick (2002: 229), ―The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical 
materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is… a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, 
complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry.‖ 
51
 Triangulation is understood in different ways. Denzin (1970) prompted qualitative researchers to 
deploy different methods to validate findings. Later, Denzin (1978) developed four types of 
triangulation (diverse sources of data, multiples observers in the field, several hypotheses in mind, and 
different research methods). In Denzin‘s post-modern turn triangulation is about using more than one 
interpretative practice in order to account for complex social realities (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 4; cf. 
Richardson 2005).  
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claims is problematic: genocide research can be ethical without making normative 
claims. Ethical concerns are at the core of this thesis, not only because of the 
ethnographic work conducted, in which victims sensibilities and collective memories 
were an important element for consideration and to which the thesis tries to be 
faithful, but also because the attempt has been made to understand how it was that 
outrageous levels of violence were (and are) carried out, observed and legitimated by 
human beings like us. This does not mean however that the thesis suggests how a 
genocide-free world should look like. Instead, the thesis proposes a method for 
scholars to approach the study of genocide. Understanding the geopolitical complex 
processes should inform the ethical decisions of human beings in concrete historical 
conjunctures in which civilian social networks are written as an ‗other‘ who must be 
destroyed for us to survive. This would avoid large numbers of human beings siding 
and complying with/circulating dominant narratives that fuel hyperreal 
sympathy/antipathy enabling genocides to unfold. 
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2 A  TOPOLOGY OF THE UNIÓN PATRIÓTICA:  CIVILIAN SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENOCIDE-
VICTIMS  
The genocide script, as chapter 1 argues, has reinforced the essentialisation of 
genocide-victims. Decontextualised (and apparently) innate characteristics, such as 
ethnicity and nationhood, underpin macronarratives that rely on the UNGC to 
examine genocide (i.e, Kiernan 2007). Even when scholars deal with targeting of 
political or other social groups, the result is that the identity of belonging to the group 
becomes essentialised (i.e, Harff and Gurr 1988; Jones 2006). This contributes to the 
misleading portrayal of social groups as passive victims rather than actors who resist 
the perpetrators and the genocidal policies/narratives. This chapter attempts to 
overcome such a shortcoming. Instead of focusing on demonstrating the political 
affiliation of the victims, the chapter looks at how the different interactions between 
various actors allowed for the emergence of a fluid idea of a collective self. This 
empowered civilian social networks to participate in politics in the con-text of the 
second cold war, when antipathy/sympathy were polarised. Consequently, ‗a 
communist-other‘, who at the same time was the source of antipathy and its target, 
was construed. Against it, various actors built up alliances to wage a war through 
which they recreated their own collective self. The endurance of these alliances 
resulted in the solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which 
the destruction of the UP occurred. 
 As the sections below show, the UP was the materialisation of political 
representations through which various actors interacted creating a solidarity-bond. In 
Latin America, social networks‘ concrete interactions were not restricted to politics. 
Yet they were scripted as radicalised political interactions, for, then, US foreign 
policy makers were creating the border between two hyperreal collective selves: 
capitalist-freedom-loving people/communist-non-freedom-loving people. These 
scripts aided neoconservative US elites to colonise narratives circulating in political 
networks, which polarised sympathy/antipathy forcing various groups to re-imagine 
their selves vis-à-vis the battle between capitalism and communism. The writing of 
countries in Western Hemisphere as battlefields thus polarised a political economy of 
48 
 
affective-dispositions upon which multiple social actors intersubjectively interacted 
(see chapter 5). 
 The foregoing calls for reassessing Cepeda‘s (2006) claim that the membership to 
the UP was the defining feature of the genocide. This is not to say that the genocide 
was apolitical: all genocides are political. Nevertheless, as shown later, the social 
interactions between a broad network of leftist activist sympathisers, and their 
relatives, as well as acquaintances and allies allowed for the consolidation of a social 
power that gained political positions at the local, regional and national level. It was 
the fabric of such social power –based upon the historical presence of communist 
ideas and the leadership exercised by the PC and the FARC from 1984 to 1987– 
which was the first target of destruction. Security forces, who construed themselves as 
part of the ‗freedom-loving people‘, framed UP politics within the geopolitical con-
text of the second cold war. In so doing they scripted the UP as part of the ‗non-
loving-freedom people‘ opening up the path for genocide (see chapter 4).  
 Although the foregoing supports a sociological understanding of the UP as a 
civilian social network, it must be noted that the UP was a formal political party. But 
political parties can be understood as networks.
1
 At first glance, political parties are 
defined by individuals‘ membership to the collectivity. The decision to join a party is 
widely regarded as a consciously and rationally made. When a political party is 
created, regulations are established in order for the party to be legally recognised 
within a political system. The party‘s members are those who are obliged by such 
regulations. In this formal sense, a political party can be seen as a hierarchical and 
closed network. However, the party‘s proposals always transcend its members 
bringing together other sectors of social networks, who are labelled as supporters, 
sympathisers, or militants. This ‗informal‘ diffusion of the political-bond brings about 
a complex, open network that encompasses individuals and social groups that identify 
with a particular political representation. Thus, in the case of the UP, belonging to the 
political platform was reinforced by a group-identity represented in an ‗imagined 
                                                 
1 
 Although Knoke (1990) introduced a network theory analysis of politics, his discussion of political 
networks is based on an implicit distinction between political parties and political networks. However, 
the argument here is that one can better understand the ‗internal‘ dynamics of political parties when 
approaching them as hierarchical dynamic networks in which the links between different sectors and 
the centrality and prestige of different positions induce transformations in the structure of the party 
itself. 
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community,‘ which, paraphrasing Anderson (1983: 15-6), recreated a deep, horizontal 
comradeship in the minds of people who would never meet and ―yet in the minds of 
each, live[d] the image of their community.‖  
However, the unfolding sense of community around the UP was not the product of 
exclusive intra-network relations. Rather, it was the result of a dynamic process of 
intersubjective interactions embedded in the geopolitical con-text of the second cold 
war, within which other collective selves were also targeted for destruction in the 
hemisphere (see Feierstein 2007). The mutual identity-building process that took 
place in this con-text was structured upon various grammars of identity/alterity. 
Although identity-building processes often take place through representing ―the 
materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries … [and] discursive borders 
between an idealized Self and a demonized Other‖ (Ó Tuathail 1996: 14-5), these 
seldom end in the annihilation of one of the social groups. However, when the 
relationship between self and other is not regulated by grammars of identity/alterity 
but by an antigrammar that construe the other for destruction, the identity building 
process becomes genocidal (Baumann 2004).  This was the case in the destruction of 
the UP: grammars of identity/alterity unfolded alongside an antigrammar of genocide. 
Since the reproduction of an antigrammar of genocide does not eliminate the 
grammars of identity/alterity, the (anti)grammars coexist, entwining apparently 
distant subjects, objects, and relations within a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (see 
chapter 1). In the case of the UP, grammars of identity/alterity allowed for the 
creation of political alliances with other parties and establishing communication 
channels with opposite sectors of Colombian society. At the same time, nevertheless, 
the transnational military cadres‘ circulation of an antigrammar, which represented 
the UP as a threat to the survival of an ideal Colombian collective self, was slowly 
permeating other social networks (see chapter 3). Such an antigrammar put violence 
at the centre of politics both in urban settings and in the countryside. Moreover, it 
hampered the consolidation of the grammars of identity/alterity put forward by the 
Betancur administration, which was seeking to accommodate the ‗other within‘ by 
integrating it into politics.  
The previous paragraphs show the importance of exploring ―how the dynamics of 
mass violence are influenced by… the construction of identity‖ (Hinton 2002b: 16; 
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see also Hinton 2002a) and vice versa. This chapter aims to contribute to such an 
exploration. However, it moves away from research that exclusively studies how 
genocide-victims are constructed by the perpetrators (i.e., Dwyer and Santikarma 
2003). Instead, the chapter shows that because UP leaders were actors; they mobilised 
affective-dispositions within increasingly polarised grammars of identity/alterity. 
Thus, they attempted to reinforce sympathy for the UP and antipathy for the 
perpetrators. UP leaders thereby challenged the (geopolitical) scripts legitimating 
violence against the group and put forward different narratives that (re)presented the 
UP as a collective self, contesting the Colombian administrations but able to accept 
difference within. This brought about structural transformations on the political 
platform throughout the eighteen years it was formally recognised in Colombian 
politics. Moreover, as chapter 7 shows, such transformations shaped the transnational 
dimension of the grammars of identity/alterity that informed the development of an 
informal transnational network of resistance to genocide.  
This chapter sets the basis to con-textualise the UP‘s complex dynamics into the 
geopolitics of the second cold war and the ‗new world order‘ in the Western 
Hemisphere. Since the analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with former 
UP leaders and an extensive newspaper review from 1984 to 2002, revealing complex 
dynamics within the core of the political platform through the production of different 
narratives, the chapter may be judged as one of the first attempts at writing a topology 
of the UP.
2
 Although both official and UP political statements cannot be taken at face 
value, it is through them that narratives circulate aiming at influencing particular 
audiences. The chapter is divided into five parts. First, the emergence of the UP and 
the exchange of narratives within the UP, and between the UP National Board 
(UPNB) and Colombian administrations, are discussed. Second, the chapter looks into 
the narratives circulating during the process leading to the first democratic election of 
mayors. Third, it explores how new narratives circulating in the grammars of 
identity/alterity started to create a division within the UPNB in the late 1980s. The 
fourth part analyses 1990 as a year of internal turmoil within the UP. Finally the 
chapter discusses the reconfiguration of the UP‘s grammars of identity during the 
1990s. 
                                                 
2
 Stephen Dudley (2004) completed the first ethnography of the UP.   
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The Birth of the UP (1984 – 1987) 
In twentieth century Colombian politics the affiliation to a political party was highly 
influenced by family tradition.
3
 Liberals ‗were born‘ Liberals and Conservatives 
‗were born‘ Conservatives. In the same vein, the Communist Party based its survival 
on the peasants‘ land struggle, which developed a sense of collectivity that could be 
passed on to next generations (Viera's interview on Harnecker 1988: 10). Such a focus 
enabled the PC to create communist strongholds in scattered rural areas across the 
country. In regions, such as Urabá, second and third generations inherited the 
communist ideology because of peasant colonization led by the PC in the 1960s (see 
García 1996: 50-2). Nevertheless in regions, such as Tolima, the strong link between 
the PC and peasant‘s self-defence movements resulted in the constitution of the 
Marxist-Leninist FARC. In these regions there was a horizontal and vertical spread of 
communist ideology. The former occurred alongside FARC‘s growing territorial 
power, whilst the latter took place within the FARC. In order to create a support 
social network, family ties served as communication channels between peasant 
communities. This is not to say that people within this communist-led political 
network were actual members of the PC, rather their sense of belonging and identity 
was strongly influenced by communist beliefs.  
In 1985, when FARC launched the UP, the political network expanded from 
communist-led nodes to a more inclusive and broader network in which different 
political and social sectors could interact. The Uribe Agreements
4
 between the 
Betancur administration (1982-1986) and the FARC served as the cornerstone for the 
FARC to propose the creation of a political front. Such agreements accomplished a 
bilateral ceasefire and established ―a year period for the FARC to organise itself 
politically, economically and socially‖ (Arenas 1985: 65-8). The openness of the 
political party was stated by FARC‘s commander Manuel Marulanda: ―it is not clear 
whether the PC would have a central role in the new political movement‖(El 
Espectador 1984a: 15A). A few months later, FARC publicly made official the 
intention of becoming a ―national pluralist political movement‖ and said it was 
                                                 
3
 This can still be seen today in socio-political victims‘ movements, which recreate the previous 
political struggle in order to demand justice, truth, and reparation (Personal interviews with Colombian 
victims, August 2008) 
4
 Agreement signed on 28 March 1984. 
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seeking to form ―alliances with other parties and democratic leftist movements,‖ 
willing to support the democratic election of mayors and governors, an agrarian 
reform and a campaign against the proliferation of paramilitary groups (El Espectador 
1984b: 10A). The broader scope of the UP was confirmed when FARC called 
―liberals, conservatives, communists, socialists‖ to join the UPNB (El Espectador 
1985c: 9A). 
The UP was officially launched on 31 March. Although FARC‘s move was 
welcomed by a wide sector of Colombian population, the Betancur administration 
coined the term ‗armed proselytism,‘ adding a dose of mistrust to the peace process. 
Armed proselytism became a common script amongst government officials, military 
officers, political entrepreneurs, and cattle ranchers. They used it to differentiate 
themselves from the UP and highlight a threat to Colombia‘s stability. This early 
accusation of combining arms with votes became the script circulating during the 
1986 electoral campaigns; such a script also shaped the grammars of identity/alterity 
upon which the UP was construing its own image. The UP thus crafted a counter-
script based on what Otto Morales called the ‗enemies of peace‘. The UP linked such 
enemies to militarism, capitalism and oligarchy (see Herrera 1985). The broader 
character which FARC attempted to give to the UP was constrained by this binary 
script-counterscript. This was unsurprising because the narratives of Colombian 
participant-interpreters were trapped in geopolitics of the second cold war infused 
with a polarised grammar construing ‗others‘ as enemies. 
Since FARC could not organise a political party without disarming and 
demobilising most of its fighters, the PC called a national leftist convention and 
offered to work with demobilised FARC soldiers in the creation of UP grassroots 
political committees, Juntas Patrióticas. The political campaigning of demobilised 
FARC leaders gave great hopes to the Betancur administration of the group‘s 
complete reintegration to society. This miscalculation quickly led to disillusionment. 
President Belisario Betancur gradually shifted towards a realist approach, equating 
peace with demobilisation, disregarding political reforms (Ramírez and Restrepo 
1988). In this context, the UP remained in political turmoil, not only represented as 
combining arms and votes but also as being a façade of the PC (Ibid.: 193). A FARC 
delegate in the UPNB, Braulio Herrera, contributed to reinforcement of the FARC-UP 
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script when stating that ―the UP did not mean the burial of the FARC but its 
projection as a political movement‖ (El Espectador 1985e: 11A). 
Up until March 1986, the UP carried out a successful campaign. Discursive 
practices played a central role in reaching a broader audience (cf. Giraldo 2001: 28). 
For instance, UP narratives favouring multi-party alliances won support from 
intellectuals. Nevertheless, in an increasingly polarised con-text, in which sectors of 
society construed an ‗us‘ without-guns-and-for-democracy and an ‗other‘ with-guns-
and-for-communism, UP leaders started to be a target of violence. Colombian and US 
administrations actively participated in the creation of this climate; Decree 1560 of 
1985, for instance, authorised mayors to close down political headquarters in which it 
was thought terrorist training was taking place; whilst, the ‗narcoguerrillas script‘, put 
forward by US Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs, contributed to solidifying 
radicalised ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ representations upon which violence against the UP 
escalated (see chapters 4 and 5). 
Ironically, the Ricardo Franco guerrilla, a dissident group from FARC, carried out 
the first assassination attempts against UP national leaders (El Espectador 1985b: 1A, 
13A). The Colombian government‘s lack of will in pursuing this group allowed the 
proliferation of violent actions against the UP. The break-up within the FARC was 
exploited discursively in several ways. On the one hand, the UP argued that the 
dissident group was product of a military infiltration aided by reactionary political 
sectors (El Espectador 1985d: 15A). On the other hand, some military officers hastily 
stated that the real threat to the peace process was coming from the same guerrilla 
groups. Thus, both the evilness of communism, recreated by the military, and the 
antipathy between the FARC and the military, circulated by the PC, added to the 
polarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity regulating the interactions between 
the UP and traditional sectors of Colombian society. 
When FARC‘s commander Jacobo Arenas was publicly designated as the UP 
presidential candidate FARC asked for an extension of the truce agreement. The 
beginning of the presidential campaign was marked by allegations of an intimidation 
campaign carried out by the UP in Huila County. Such claims were made by 
traditional politicians (i.e., Senator Héctor Polanía) and supported by members of the 
clergy (i.e., Bishop of Garzón Ramón Mantilla). The claims opened the path for 
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Bishop of Manizales Monsignor José Jesús Pimiento to state that the UP was a threat 
to Colombian democracy (El Espectador 1985a: 7A). As a result, alliances between 
the UP and other political parties were questioned. At the same time, FARC divulged 
a persecution campaign against the UP. FARC delegate in the UPNB Iván Márquez 
contended that the campaign was part of a strategy to impede the approval of the 
democratic election of mayors due to the UP‘s high levels of popularity; he also 
denounced the army‘s harassment of UP sympathisers in Arauca, Guaviare, Casanare, 
and Meta.  
In this climate of mistrust, assassination attempts and murders against UP members 
marginally escalated. As a consequence, a sector within the UP saw the need to 
emphasise the distinction between the UP and FARC: ―the UP is not FARC‘s political 
party‖ (Behar 1985: 386). This distinction allowed the UP to launch its political 
campaign regardless of the government‘s decision to extend the truce. Despite the 
efforts made to highlight UP‘s civilian character, violence continued. El Espectador 
reported the assassination of four UP members in Huila.  
A few days after Betancur indefinitely extended the truce with FARC, the army 
killed 23 FARC soldiers, and the PC headquarters in Bogotá suffered a terrorist 
attack. These incidents, together with the take-over of the Palace of Justice by the M-
19 and the army, affected FARC‘s decision to withdraw Arenas from presidential 
candidacy. The take-over became central in UP and anti-UP narratives. While UP 
leaders focused on underscoring the army‘s disproportionate reaction to the Palace 
takeover, the Betancur administration emphasised the M-19‘s actions: if a diminished 
guerrilla group, had been capable of carrying out such an action in the middle of 
Bogotá, what would a strong guerrilla group  be capable of if allowed to act freely in 
politics?  
Such narratives radicalised actors moving amongst military, economic, political 
and social networks. By contenting that militarism was at the core of the Colombian 
establishment, the UP stepped up circulation of antipathy towards the military, and by 
putting the responsibility of the bloodshed on the M-19, the Betancur administration 
not only propagated demonisation of the guerrillas put forward by the military but 
also adopted and reinforced US narratives, whereby guerrilla groups were portrayed 
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as the drug traffickers‘ mercenaries (see chapter 5). Thus, mistrust towards the M-19 
spread onto FARC and the already weakened peace process. 
Despite the distrustful relation between FARC and Betancur, in February 1986 the 
UP presented ex-magistrate Jaime Pardo Leal as its presidential candidate and 
announced alliances with liberal sectors in various counties. To reinforce FARC‘s 
commitment to a peaceful electoral debate, Arenas indicated that after ―20 years of 
armed confrontation the FARC were seeking to conquer public opinion‖ by 
supporting UP candidates (El Espectador 1986e: 12A). But the violence against the 
UP continued. Yet, Arenas claimed that albeit more than ―200 deaths occurred since 
the Uribe Agreement‖, FARC was ―determined to defend the space gained in 
Colombian politics‖ (El Espectador 1986d: 11A). Thus, when Betancur formally 
ratified the ceasefire, it was ruled that  
 
the government will give the UP and its leaders the guarantees and security measures 
needed for them to carry out political activities in equal conditions with other political 
groups. The government will use its authority to prosecute citizens or authorities 
denying this right. It will also give guarantees and freedom to FARC members to 
reintegrate themselves to the legal political activity (El Espectador 1986g: 12A).  
 
1986 parliamentary elections saw the UP become the third political force in the 
country with 14 MPs and 21 County Representatives, and the first political force in 
peripheral counties such as Arauca, Guaviare and Caquetá, where 38 UP councilmen 
were elected. The presidential campaign solidified the UP as a national political force. 
Pardo‘s role in reinforcing the civilian character of the group and his constant 
denouncements of the security forces‘ harassment and paramilitary violence gained 
the UP four percent of votes. This, however, contrasted with uncertainty of FARC‘s 
move once elections were over and FARC‘s demobilisation seemed further than ever 
from realisation.  
The Fourth National Plenum assessed UP performance in both elections, stating 
that ―FARC‘s honesty and clarity regarding the peace process brought together 
different sectors‖ (UP 1986: 7). Moreover, it reinforced the UP‘s antipathy towards 
the military by circulating a narrative of the country as ―invaded and occupied by its 
own army and other forces‖ (Ibid.: 16). This melodramatic representation of 
Colombian reality aimed at exposing the central role of the army in the regional 
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coalitions for violence responsible for assassination of 184 UP members, dozens of 
disappearings and hundreds of tortures. Relying on these figures, the report reinforced 
sympathy for FARC‘s decision to remain armed: ―the government asks a schedule for 
FARC‘s demobilisation but there is not a schedule for the disintegration of 
paramilitary groups and deactivation of military plans‖ (Ibid.: 20). However, in order 
to consolidate the UP‘s political power, civilian character and seek unity with 
traditional parties‘ democratic sectors and leftist groups, the report called for the 
creation of more Juntas Patrióticas. By resorting to an encompassing grammar that 
enabled bringing others within the self, the UP sought to neutralise the geopolitical 
scripts reinforcing the hard notion of self that construed the other for destruction in 
the military mindset (see chapter 4). Yet the UP‘s affective power did not break the 
military power, which was subtly consolidating the hard power of the perpetrator bloc 
bringing together security forces, outlaws, and paramilitary and self-defence groups 
(see chapter 3). 
Soon after the plenum the UP headquarters in Bucaramanga were targeted. In 
Rojas Puyo‘s view ―these terrorist actions were not targeting guerrilla groups but the 
pluralist political process consolidated in the last elections‖ (El Espectador 1986b: 
5A). Thus, after the 1986 elections, UP members started to disassociate the violence 
from a degenerate war against the FARC. In this con-text, the UPNB saw Pope John 
Paul II‘s visit to Colombia as an opportunity to expose leaders/sympathisers‘ 
victimisation. This early step to internationalise their struggle came in tandem with 
Amnesty International‘s (AI) report on the Colombian ‗dirty war‘. Yet the violence 
against the UP escalated. Systematic attempts aimed at killing the UP members 
elected for public offices started in earnest with the assassinations of UP MPs 
Leonardo Posada and Pedro Nel Jiménez on 30 August and 1 September 1986 
respectively, and ended up with Pardo‘s murder in October 1987.  
As a reaction to the first MPs assassinations, UP leaders started meeting members 
of the incoming Barco administration (1986-1990). In a meeting with Minister of 
Government Fernando Cepeda, they denounced the assassination of 14 members in 
less than two months and accused Middle Magdalena Valley paramilitary groups as 
the perpetrators of such assassinations, which they argued were part of the broader 
‗Plan Cóndor‘ (El Espectador 1986j: 13A). Following Senator Jiménez‘s murder, UP 
57 
 
MP Braulio Herrera claimed that Gen. (r) Fernando Landazábal was leading the 
extermination campaign, named by the perpetrators as ‗Plan Baile Rojo‘. Although 
these denouncements weakened the already debilitated peace process, FARC leaders 
asked all 27 fronts to honour the truce agreements. Arenas said FARC ―were to take 
preventive measures to defend the lives of those participating in UP politics‖, yet he 
emphasised the need for mass mobilisation in order to halt the assassinations (El 
Espectador 1986i: 10A). It was common practice, thereafter, for UP members to call 
for regional or even national strikes (see REINICIAR 2006a: 73-80).   
 UP national leaders identified the MAS (Death to Kidnappers) paramilitary group 
as part of the perpetrators. The UP claimed the institutionalisation of paramilitary 
groups was the army‘s counterinsurgency strategy. Since the UP had been stigmatised 
as the political party with an armed force, counterinsurgency included incitement to 
kill its members. Hence, inside the UP, the FARC started to marginalise itself: in 
public statements FARC sought to show its influence within the UP reduced to 
solidarity between them (El Espectador 1986a: 11A). Outside the UP, FARC‘s 
gradual marginalisation was interpreted as confirmation of the continuation of the 
armed struggle. The latter clashed with Barco‘s exigency for a gradual 
demobilisation. As his peace policy was overshadowed by a national security policy, 
which mainly relied on the constant use of the State of Siege, wider political sectors 
began to talk about the likeliness of the breakdown of the truce agreement. 
In November 1986, after the attempted assassination of the President of Meta 
County Assembly, Eusebio Prada, and discovery of plans to kill Pardo and Herrera 
UP MPs indefinitely left Congress. Thus, they sought to press for the protection and, 
for the first time, warned that the upsurge of terrorist attacks and the proliferation of 
paramilitary groups were jeopardising the truce agreement (Murcia 1986: 14A). Still, 
the assassinations continued. By mid December, 350 members had been killed. 
Therefore, the UP resorted to a new narrative calling for the organisation of a ‗broad 
self-defence unity‘ to stop the political and physical annihilation of the group (El 
Espectador 1986c: 11A). Notwithstanding Pardo‘s clarity that it was a call for civilian 
resistance, the message was used by rightwing sectors to reinforce the circulation of 
the armed proselytism script. 
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 In early 1987 the distance between FARC and some sectors within the UP 
increased. When FARC took over Mutatá (in Northeastern Antioquia), the UP mayor 
denounced that the guerrilla sought to clash with the police (Herrera 1987: 10A). 
Rojas Puyo used this episode later to show that the UP and FARC were two different 
entities: ―the UP works within Colombian law; UP mayors cannot be seen as allowing 
a mini-state within the state‖ (Silva 1987: 10A). On 22 February the UPNB released a 
public statement formally reiterating its independence from FARC. It restated the 
UP‘s right to remain an institutional force in Colombian politics regardless of 
developments in the peace process. Yet Liberal sectors reassessed their alliances with 
the UP: a wider range of politicians became reluctant to continue working together. 
This attitude exemplifies, first, the widespread consensus amongst Colombian civil 
society that the UP‘s separation from FARC was only part of the PC‘s long-lasting 
political strategy: ‗the combination of all forms of struggle‘ and, second, the failure of 
the UP to influence the grammars of identity/alterity so as to be recognised as the 
other that could be accommodated within the Colombian self.  
 The latter point is of foremost importance because the violence against the UP 
shaped a grammar of identity that excluded FARC as a legitimate actor. Therefore, 
the FARC slowly moved to the margins of the UP. The ambiguous narratives put 
forward by Colombian and US administrations (supported and reinforced by military 
networks) contributed to the circulation of scripts that were used by rightwing elites, 
military officers and paramilitary groups to legitimate armed actions against UP 
leaders. Over time, as part of its efforts to circulate counter-scripts, UP‘s civilian 
resistance incorporated national strikes, advocacy with AI and international leaders, 
and public denouncements of paramilitary leaders and their alliances with military 
officers. In this context, the violence against the UP escalated. As a result, some 
fronts of FARC started carrying out isolated military actions, thereby weakening the 
solidarity-bond bringing together different sectors into the UP. Thus, the UPNB 
declared independence from FARC.  
The UP as the Offspring of the Peace Process (1987 –  1989) 
After the UP-FARC break-up, the Barco administration demanded the UP make a 
public pronouncement condemning FARC‘s armed struggle. The UP‘s reaction to 
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government‘s pressure, however, did not match Barco‘s expectations: UP publicly 
stated that the armed struggle ―was legitimate in a restrictive democracy‖ (El 
Espectador 1987e: 10A), wherein, ―the ‗Operación Exterminio‘5, carried out since 
mid 1986 has sought to wipe out UP public officers‖ (El Espectador 1987f: 10A). 
Therefore, in contrast to Barco‘s wishful thinking, the UP demanded the creation of a 
National Tribunal of Guarantees and contacted Colombian ex-Presidents to circulate a 
declaration of its independence from FARC (El Espectador 1987c: 10A). In this 
context, Barco described the UP to the British magazine South as ―the guerrillas‘ 
party‖ (El Espectador 1987a: 9A). The UP rejected Barco‘s statements: ―claiming that 
the UP is the guerrilla‘s party implicitly justifies military actions and assassinations 
against our leaders‖ (Murcia 1987: 10A). Indeed, the assassinations intensified; by 
late April, 20 more UP leaders had been killed. 
In early May, in another attempt to halt the ‗Plan Baile Rojo‘, the UPNB released a 
list of army officers responsible for attacks and UP assassinations. It also exposed 
drug trafficker Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha as an active sponsor of paramilitary groups. 
Even though Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio refused the accusations, 
Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos designated a civilian Armed Forces Attorney 
in order to guarantee impartiality in the investigations. Hoyos‘s decision –informed 
by the UP‘s advocacy (Gómez 1987: 3)– showed that the UP grammars of 
identity/alterity had managed to create sympathy amongst some sectors of the judicial 
system. Thereafter the UP continued circulating antipathy towards the perpetrators. 
Pardo extended his denunciations of the army‘s complicity in UP assassinations in 
eight more counties. 
On 22 June 1987, Barco publicly declared the truce broken after a FARC attack 
killed 26 soldiers in Caquetá. This toughened up Barco‘s peace policy. The new 
context left the UP in an awkward situation. Barco‘s decision meant escalation of 
military operations in UP strongholds. Since FARC members were previously 
working within the UP in some regions, UP sympathizers were easily linked with 
FARC supporters, even more so after Gen. (r) Landazábal‘s assertion: ―in Colombia 
the guerrillas are legalized because the Betancur and Barco administrations 
recognised the FARC as the PC-UP‘s armed branch‖ (El Espectador 1987d: 3). 
                                                 
5
 Operación Exterminio and Plan Baile Rojo were used interchangeably by UP members.  
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Minister of Government César Gaviria sought to clarify the government‘s position by 
pronouncing that the Barco administration recognised the UP and FARC as different 
entities and by announcing undergoing investigations into crimes against the UP.  
A new political battle between the UP and the Barco administration began after 
Minister of Defence Gen. Samudio publicly supported paramilitary groups. In a 
strong public statement the UPNB asked for his dismissal. UP leaders insisted that 
self-defence groups were outlaws hampering the party‘s political activities. During 
the political dispute Attorney General Hoyos took sides with the UP claiming that 
self-defence groups were illegal. UP leaders started then to denounce publicly 
politicians‘ sponsorship of self-defence groups. Yet, since mid August the 
assassinations escalated to one UP public official being killed every day. When 
human right defenders started to being assassinated as well, Pardo argued that the 
―dirty war had broadened to leaders and intellectuals beyond the UP‖ (El Espectador 
1987j: 10). These narratives seeking to bring different leftist sectors together under 
the UP grammars of identity/alterity were complemented by the UP‘s call for a 
national strike. 
On 11 October a paramilitary group assassinated UP President Pardo, by then, 
according to UP estimates, more than 470 UP members had been assassinated. During 
the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, UP public officers had 
mainly been the target of violence; nevertheless, new and broader genocidal 
campaigns were about to set off.  
Senator Bernardo Jaramillo was elected as UP President amidst this climate of 
violence. As PC member Jaramillo had played a central role in consolidating Urabá as 
UP stronghold. In his inaugural speech Jaramillo stated that violent actions ―had not 
weakened UP political power.‖ Unfortunately, he said, Colombia is close to a civil 
war ―much more bloody and longer than in El Salvador‖ (Prada 1987: 7A), and he 
reiterated that despite UP‘s independence from the FARC, it respected the armed 
struggle carried out by the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolivar (CGSB).
6
  
Pardo‘s assassination and Jaramillo‘s designation gave rise to two dynamics within 
the UP. Firstly, many political leaders, such as Diego Montaña Cuellar, joined the UP 
as a demonstration of solidarity with the political project (Vanegas 1991). Secondly, 
                                                 
6
 This platform was an attempt to bring ELN, FARC, M-19 and EPL together. 
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the UPNB hardened its position against the armed forces by asking the government 
for the designation of a civilian Minister of Defence and demanding the proscription 
of the principle of National Security and the ‗contra-guerrilla manuals‘, based on 
America‘s doctrine of ‗low-intensity warfare‘ (El Espectador 1987b: 5A). By publicly 
linking a degenerate counterinsurgency strategy with US military institutions, the UP 
reproduced allegations made by human rights NGOs and other sectors of civil society 
in Central America, namely that in order to halt the spread of communism, US 
interventionism had aided the establishment of military cadres, which were 
responsible for gross human rights violations. In fact, as chapter 4 demonstrates, the 
counterinsurgency warfare delegated to private actors in Colombia was part of a 
larger trend characterising the 1980s western hemispheric military network. 
Even though Barco‘s security strategy did not change, the legitimacy of the UP 
was restated. Barco claimed to have assumed responsibility for protecting UP leaders 
and for carrying out judicial investigations to bring perpetrators to justice. A few days 
later, Minister of Justice Enrique Low Murtra pointed to Gacha as the ‗intellectual 
author‘ of Pardo‘s assassination. Murtra‘s intervention marked a turning point in the 
Barco administration‘s narratives; for, as María Jimena Duzán pointed out, it let the 
administration argue that  
 
a great number of the UP members assassinated are the result of a battle between leftist 
groups and drug traffickers in search for control of territories in the Meta and Guaviare 
Counties (1987: 2A).  
 
This shift in the administration‘s narratives –supported by US pressure to step up 
counternarcotics operations– shows that the UPNB‘s attempts to bring an end to the 
assassinations were interpreted as a zero-sum political battle, in which to recognise 
the armed forces violence against the UP meant deepening the ongoing ‗crisis of 
legitimacy‘. Thus, thereafter, the polarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity 
enabled political networks to create another ‗other‘ who could be blamed for the 
violence, overlooking the actions of military and rightwing political networks. 
The government inaction against the perpetrators contributed to the escalation of 
violence against the UP that followed. On 24 November 1987, in Medellín the first of 
many massacres took place, killing five JUCO youths (and injuring three more); the 
perpetrators entered and left the heavily guarded JUCO headquarters without being 
62 
 
noticed. As a consequence, JUCO representative in the UP José Antequera sued the 
Colombian state. When the second assassination attempt on Vice-President of 
Antioquia County Assembly Gabriel Santamaría took place, the UPNB demanded a 
serious investigation into the Intelligence Service Agency of the Army Brigade in 
Medellín. Alongside the first perpetration of massacres, the UP adopted a new tactic 
in its resistance strategy by announcing, for the first time in December 1987, that it 
was contacting the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to 
denounce ―the complicity of the Colombian government in the extermination 
campaign of the UP‖ (El Espectador 1987k: 13). This, as chapter 7 shows, was part of 
an evolving and fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide, which 
materialised as a result of the anti-geopolitics of the UP and followed the example set 
by Argentinean human rights organisations in the late 1970s. 
 For the first popular election of mayors (due March 1988), the UP focused on 
consolidating the 1986 political success, which had resulted in what Patricia Pinzón 
labelled as the ‗leftist regionalisation‘ (1988: 3B). The UP political campaign 
continued to be centred on reform of the National Constitution through a 
Constitutional Assembly including all political parties and social organisations. This 
was an attempt to create consensus with other sectors. Furthermore, the UP criticised 
Barco for issuing the Statute of Defence of Democracy (or Decree 180), which created 
‗terrorism‘ as a new crime. Thus, during the 1988 elections, the UP grammars of 
identity/alterity were constantly traversed by narratives seeking to balance the 
antipathy towards militaristic sectors and the need to build up sympathy with other 
political parties. The latter sought to halt the violence against the group. 
In February 1988, after UP Spokesman to Latin-America Carlos Gómina was 
assassinated, the UP withdrew from the Tribunal of Electoral Guarantees. The UP‘s 
withdrawal coincided with the second massacre in the extermination campaign. In the 
La Negra-Honduras Massacre, more than 30 banana workers were killed; while the 
killings were taking place, the perpetrators kept shouting ‗viva la paz abajo la Unión 
Patriótica y el Frente Popular‘, hence the UP claimed that the massacre sought to 
prevent peasants from voting in the forthcoming elections (Atehortúa 1988: 1A, 3B). 
After the massacre the UP Regional Board in Urabá demanded the replacement of 
Brigadier General Manuel Sanmiguel Buenaventura (Calle 1988: 3). Instead of 
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bringing the perpetrators of this massacre to justice, the Barco administration blamed 
the violence on the guerrillas‘ influence in the region, neglecting that a paramilitary 
group had claimed responsibility for the massacre. 
By the time the first popular election of mayors took place, 14 UP candidates had 
been killed. ―The physical annihilation of UP‖, as Restrepo (1988: 8A) contends, 
―limited the political reforms aiming at opening up the political system‖. This was 
demonstrated in the results of the polls in which the UP suffered a setback: of 23 
mayoralties given by Barco, it only got 15 by direct election. The UP‘s defeat in the 
polls was very much affected by ten percent of its candidates having been 
assassinated in the last two months.  
 The more than 500 assassinations of UP members and Barco‘s decision to 
militarise Urabá, prompted UP President Jaramillo to argue that ―the number of 
massacres were to increase if the government was to decide to militarise regions in 
which massacres were carried out by extreme right groups.‖ Jaramillo‘s statements 
were pronounced after the Seventh UP National Plenum in which general consensus 
was that due to the fact that the military forces could not protect citizens‘ lives, ―no 
Colombian can decline its right to face the aggressors, denounce the violence and 
demand protection, or even acquire a gun for their personal protection‖ (El 
Espectador 1988f: 7A). By resorting to a narrative that argued for self-defence against 
militarisation, UP members implicitly continued reproducing antipathy towards the 
army and sympathy for the armed struggle against the terror inflicted by some state 
institutions.  
 The UPNB thought that the militarisation of Urabá would lead to the spread of 
violence to other regions. Indeed, in May UP Mayor of Remedios was assassinated by 
the Muerte a Revolucionarios del Nordeste (MRN) paramilitary group, which days 
later painted various graffiti walls in Segovia and Remedios (Northeastern Antioquia), 
announcing the execution of UP mayors elected on March 1988. Violence also 
escalated in Meta, where the President of Meta County Assembly Carlos Kovacs was 
assassinated the same month. Although the foregoing demonstrates that the UP was 
correct in fearing the militarisation of its regional strongholds, the Supreme Court of 
Justice (SCJ) ruled in favour of military rule in some regions. The SCJ‘s decision 
epitomises the limited effect of the UP‘s attempts to mobilise affective-dispositions 
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amongst different state institutions, as sympathy for the UP was eclipsed by national 
security matters which political and military elites had long before successfully 
equated to public order (see chapter 4).  
The UP‘s political pressure against militarisation was met by the Barco 
administration with a harder discourse against armed proselytism. Peace Advisor 
Rafael Pardo made this clear: 
 
Disarticulating the combination of all forms of struggle is a responsibility of peasant, 
popular movements, and political parties... It is responsibility of the Frente Popular, as 
a political organisation, to state whether it has links with EPL and if it publicly supports 
the armed struggle. The same goes for the UP in relation with FARC… The 
government considers guerrilla groups as different from political organisations. 
However, it is the duty of these political organisations to unleash themselves from 
guerrilla groups with concrete statements against the armed struggle (El Espectador 
1988b: 11A). 
 
Thus, the Barco administration‘s narratives continuously passed some of the 
responsibility of the violence to the UP and to other political movements. The 
narratives legitimated the extermination campaign. It allowed for arguing that 
tolerance with FARC and its political project had created a vicious circle in which the 
Barco administration was not to blame for the violence inherited from Betancur, who 
had legitimated the combination of politics and arms.  
 Such narratives allowed the massacres to continue. On 4 July 1988 the First Caño 
Sibao Massacre in the Meta County took place. The perpetrators killed 17 people, 
among them seven women and four children. The massacre was reported as a 
mistaken attempt to kill the UP Mayor of El Castillo. Following the massacre, the 
UPNB asked Barco to participate in what they called the Democratic Coexistence 
Commission. UP members were well aware that their survival depended on the 
revival of the peace process with the CGSB. Paradoxically, FARC commander 
Arenas began criticising the UP. This quickened the process of the UP separating 
from the FARC; the UPNB thus decided in late August 1988 to apply to become 
member of Socialist International (SI). 
Despite positive developments in Barco‘s peace plan with CGSB, a FARC attack 
on the army on 4 October finally put an end to the Uribe Agreements. Shortly after, 
Minister of Government Gaviria delivered a speech asking Colombian people to 
isolate all guerrilla groups. In this context and despite discrepancies within the UPNB, 
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Jaramillo‘s commemoration speech of the first anniversary of Pardo‘s assassination 
showed that the UP was not ready yet to condemn ―the heroic struggle for freedom of 
Colombian guerrilla fighters‖ (El Espectador 1988d: 1A). The Barco administration‘s 
narratives sought to convince Colombian public that continuation of the armed 
conflict depended on the existence of guerrilla groups and the political groups that did 
not criticise armed struggle. Meanwhile UP narratives aimed at legitimating an 
uncompromised position vis-à-vis FARC by presenting themselves as experiencing a 
‗different‘ form of violence, as the target of genocidal massacres.  
The UP‘s national and regional responses to Barco‘s pressure and to the 
extermination campaign differ at this moment in time. At the national level the UPNB 
called for Parliamentary debates. Whereas in Urabá, for example, UP members 
opposed the implementation of ID cards –central policy of the military administration. 
The challenge posed by UP members was in most of the cases interpreted by army 
officers as a demonstration of FARC‘s military strength; hence it was almost certain 
to expect the escalation of violence. The Segovia Massacre on 11 November 1988 
demonstrates that the UP challenge was to be wiped out in North-Eastern Antioquia, 
where the MRN paramilitary group killed 43 people while the Bomboná Battalion 
standing-by did nothing to halt the slaughter. This time, as part of the (trans)national 
efforts to halt the massacres, the UPNB did not only ―demand the dismissal of 
Minister of Defence but also the intervention of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and United Nations‖ (El Espectador 1988g: 9A). Nevertheless, on 5 
December, the MRN carried out the Puerto Valdivia Massacre, which, according to 
survivors‘ accounts, followed the same patterns of the Segovia Massacre and was 
aimed at ―killing those civilians who voted for the UP‖ (Correa 1988: 16A).  
 Although the PC had worked within the UP and at times seemed both as one 
political force, the changes in the international system brought about by Gorbachev‘s 
Perestroika together with Barco‘s isolationist discourse against the guerrillas started 
to create divisions within the PC and the UP. The internal debate took place during 
the PC‘s XV Congress in December 1988. The orthodox view of supporting the 
combination of all forms of struggle won over the reformist view of condemning 
armed struggle. Such a decision disappointed the Barco administration and leftist 
sectors of the public, according to Duzán (1988: 2A) for instance, after the Congress 
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―what remains to be seen is the role the UP will play in the combination of all forms 
of struggle now that the armed struggle has been prioritised.‖ The perpetrators 
interpreted the PC‘s decision as legitimating the need to carry on with the 
extermination campaign. 
In early 1989 the UPNB saw, in the Barco–M-19 peace talks, a new opportunity to 
push forward its political agenda of peace and reconciliation. However, after a 
paramilitary group carried out the Rochela Massacre,
7
 the UP released a public 
statement and sent a letter to the Armed Forces Attorney denouncing that paramilitary 
groups had set up training schools in the Middle Magdalena Valley and that 
―witnesses of massacres are assassinated after travelling to Bogotá to give their 
statements‖ (El Espectador 1989j: 14A). Notwithstanding attempts to show unity 
against the perpetrators, the internal division in the UP was about to transcend its 
members.  
 In sum, the narratives circulating during the process leading to the first democratic 
election of mayors contributed to the polarisation of sympathy and antipathy. This, 
which aided the escalation of rightwing violence against the UP and other sectors of 
el pueblo, maintained UP narratives that legitimated FARC‘s armed struggle and 
called for popular resistance against the militarisation supported by the US 
administration. Such narratives reinforced the military‘s interpretation of the UP 
posing a threat to the fictive Colombian self and conflated regional political, 
economic, and social networks with violence entrepreneurs. As a result, ten percent of 
UP candidates were killed during the 1988 electoral campaign, opening the path for 
massacres to mushroom. In this context the UP stepped up its transnational resistance 
strategy. However, the bloodshed and the reformist ideas reinforced by the 
Perestroika affected the grammars of identity/alterity within the UP, thus a slow 
process of differentiation started between those for and against the armed struggle. As 
both sides were concerned with halting the extermination campaign, which was 
draining the socio-political power of the platform, they managed to accommodate 
themselves within the UP collective self. However, as the next section shows the UP 
grammars of identity/alterity were to be centred upon the idea of two others staying 
together. 
                                                 
7
 The massacre did not target UP members, but 13 judicial officers investigating assassinations 
perpetrated by paramilitary groups. 
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The UP Revolt against the PC (1989 – 1990)  
Although the reformist view emerged in February 1989, the process that brought it 
about started around April 1988 when Alvaro Salazar, Bernardo Jaramillo and other 
UP members visited Europe. Jaramillo‘s tour focused on meeting parties affiliated to 
the SI in Western Europe but he also visited the Soviet Union and most Eastern 
European countries, where he realised the importance of the Perestroika. Back in 
Colombia he decided to affiliate the UP to the SI and to moderate the UP political 
discourse by getting closer to a socio-democratic one (Vanegas 1991: 108-9). Even 
though there was some support for Jaramillo‘s reformist views in the UPNB, 
especially among the independent sectors that had joined the UP after Pardo‘s 
assassination, traditional communists felt uneasy with such a proposal.  
In view that the PC had become the core of UP, Jaramillo‘s room for manoeuvre 
was rather limited to the politics within the PC. Therefore he decided to open up the 
debate by publicly criticising the guerrillas and then taking it to a PC Plenum in which 
he won the support of few members. Next, the UPNB condemned terrorism, 
kidnapping, and extortion as forms of political struggle and asked the guerrillas to 
reflect on their tactics. The foregoing sought to reinforce the UP‘s independent and 
democratic character. Jaramillo‘s strategy was effective because some sectors of the 
public interpreted the shift in UP narratives as demonstrating that two different 
positions were at the core of the Colombian left ― the orthodox view that prioritises 
the armed struggle… [and] the UPNB‘s view that prioritises the political struggle‖ 
(Duzán 1989b: 2A).  
The UP President‘s moderated narratives did not, however, manage to halt the 
extermination campaign. Within 10 days, UP national leaders Eduardo Yaya, Teófilo 
Forero, and José Antequera were assassinated. The UP reaction was again to demand 
real guarantees from the government while the PC called for international public 
opinion to send repudiation letters to the Barco administration and the UNCHR. 
However, after Antequera‘s assassination the UPNB withdrew from the Barco-M-19 
peace talks. These assassinations brought together the PC Central Committee (PCCC) 
and the UPNB to design a new strategy for political action. By then, the number of 
UP members assassinated was uncertain; according to El Espectador, the death toll 
was well over seven hundred people (see El Espectador 1989d: 11A). In this context, 
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PC members sought to reinforce the idea that there were some differences between 
the PC and the UP but that overall both entities were part of the same political project. 
PC member Carlos Lozano‘s letter to María Jimena Duzán stated that 
 
the UP has received all the support from communists and, among other things, it is the 
product of communists‘ work... A different matter is that the PC, as an autonomous 
organisation, goes further in some arguments because the UP and the PC have different 
structures (see Duzán 1989a: 2A). 
 
A month after Antequera‘s assassination the Barco administration started to 
reassess its policy against paramilitary groups. Barco set up a meeting between the 
UPNB and the Commander of the Armed Forces, from which emerged a joint 
statement condemning violence. Next he made public various measures to tackle 
the rise of rightwing terrorist groups. In May 1989 the PC gave the Minister of 
Government a secret document describing the networks, activities, key actors, 
places, vehicles and people involved in criminal organisations led by drug 
traffickers Gacha and Carranza. The document demonstrated military complicity. 
The secrecy of the document was part of the cooperative effort with the Barco 
administration, which was only to continue if prompt actions were carried out to 
dismantle the paramilitary groups.  
In light of these developments (though the assassination of UP members 
continued), the UPNB decided to publicly ask the ELN to end terrorist attacks on the 
oil pipeline. It argued that such actions affected the national economy and the 
environment (El Espectador 1989b: 13A). The UP move was welcome by Barco, so 
much so that on the day commemorating its fifth anniversary, he greeted the UP. 
 
The process of opening up democracy in Colombia has been interpreted by some 
minorities as a threat. Parallel to the consolidation of the UP, violence against its 
leaders escalated to a level never seen before in our history. This demanded from the 
government a new security strategy. Through the violence of which it has been victim, 
the UP continues working on democratic politics (El Espectador 1989f: 10A). 
 
Although Jaramillo had left Colombia few days before Antequera‘s assassination 
due to threats on his life, he returned as recognition of Barco‘s efforts to crack down 
on paramilitary groups. Despite this, violence against the UP resumed shortly. 
Terrorist attacks against PC headquarters were to follow as well as assassinations in 
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Bogotá and Meta. As a response, the UPNB occupied the Ministry of Government, 
demanding the administration set up a commission to report on dismantling 
paramilitary groups and to explain why ―the perpetrators of the dirty war against the 
UP had not been captured yet; since they were well known people who were even 
interviewed by the media at their homes‖ (El Espectador 1989e: 13A). The fluidity of 
UP narratives was closely linked to the fact that Barco narratives were not 
accompanied by policies able to bring to an end the extermination campaign. 
Therefore, Barco narratives only managed to calm down UP animosity against the 
armed forces and traditional elites for a short while.  
Although the UPNB soon resorted to previous strategies, its narratives oscillated 
between acknowledging Barco‘s efforts to dismantle paramilitary groups and 
denouncing his lack of action on the matter. This was seen by the UPNB as the only 
strategy left. Doing otherwise would have allowed undecided sectors of the army and 
traditional elites to ally with the perpetrators. In fact, such alliances were proliferating 
in regions such as the Middle Magdalena Valley, in which, according to UP Vice-
president Montaña,  
 
army air strikes and MAS violent actions had forcedly displaced some 2000 peasants 
allegedly linked with guerrilla groups; in addition to the targeting of UP members by 
drug traffickers led by Gacha (Luna 1989: 13A). 
 
In August 1989, when Liberal Senator Luis Carlos Galán was assassinated, Barco 
stepped up measures against drug traffickers by issuing among others the Extradition 
Decree. The UP saw Galán‘s assassination as the consolidation of a broader dirty war, 
therefore it firmly criticised Barco‘s actions;  
 
It is not time to announce new measures. It is time to act. It is not time to issue decrees. 
The country is overloaded with them. It is time to apply the decrees issued before. It is 
time to apprehend the warlords and get to their strongholds: Pacho, Puerto Triunfo, and 
Puerto Boyacá (El Espectador 1989a: 5A). 
 
The UPNB resolution not to yield to the intimidation of drug traffickers meant that the 
UP was to become a direct target for destruction again. When Jaramillo was elected as 
presidential candidate, the UP decided to support Barco‘s crusade against drug 
trafficking. The following months, drug traffickers‘ terrorist attacks increased. One 
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such action targeted the DAS headquarters, attempting to force the Barco 
administration to derogate the Extradition Decree. Barco‘s disregard of the alliance 
between some army officers and drug traffickers made it a flawed campaign because, 
according to the UP, a special emphasis was needed on disarticulating drug 
traffickers‘ military groups, instead of resorting to extradition and the State of Siege. 
In representing itself as challenging militarism and US interventionism, the UP 
showed its mistrust in some members of the Barco administration as much as in 
President George H. W. Bush‘s ‗counternarcotics strategy‘. In fact, as chapter 5 
demonstrates, such strategy was not only contributing to hide away the involvement 
of state institutions in genocidal violence under the script of narcoterrorism, but also 
providing the materiel and economic resources for the military‘s counterinsurgency 
campaign, which, in tune with the Central American experience, targeted the alleged 
social networks supporting the guerrillas. Because of the antipathy for US and 
Colombian administrations and the crisis of the communist bloc, the UP and the PC 
increasingly asked for sympathy from international organisations –in December 1989 
for instance, they called for United Nations (UN) verification in the forthcoming 
presidential election.  Although differences between some members were extant and 
stronger than ever, members clung to a solidarity-bond by prioritising Jaramillo‘s 
presidential campaign (El Espectador 1989c: 5A). 
In January 1990, after the UP had supported the social movement calling for a 
Constitutional Assembly, the FARC said it would create a new political group if the 
plebiscite were to take place. Minister of Government Carlos Lemos was among the 
members of the administration who opposed such an idea. His opposition was 
strongly criticised by Jaramillo who claimed that FARC‘s aspiration was legitimate. 
FARC‘s decision allowed the UP to finally demonstrate to its critics that if FARC was 
to have a political party, it was not the UP. Therefore, Jaramillo asked for electoral 
guarantees in various regions. 
 However the violence against the UP continued. In early February, Fidel Castaño‘s 
paramilitary group kidnapped more than 50 UP members, nine of the bodies were 
found days later. Later in the month two UP councilmen (in Norte de Santander and 
Cauca) and UP Mayor of Apartadó Dana Cardona were assassinated. Although facing 
a climate of fear in these regions, UP members in Meta accepted the guarantees 
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offered by military officers and handed in a list of gunmen operating in the county. 
But, the violence in Urabá escalated further. On 1 March 1990, the Unguía Massacre 
took place. In despair, because of the impossibility of halting the assassination of UP 
members and as a reaction to Barco‘s claim that the assassination of UP leaders was a 
tactic of the party itself, Jaramillo gave an interview to the Spanish newspaper La 
Vanguardia in which he stated that Colombia had the most imperfect democracy of 
the Americas and that President Barco had been compliant with the extermination 
campaign against the UP: ―either Barco is an imbecile, and he does not really know 
what is going on in Colombia, or he is accomplice to what has happened in the last 
four years‖ (Escorcia 1990: 6A).  
The regional extermination campaigns against the UP were mirrored in the 
elections of March 1990 in which the UP lost six seats in Parliament. Nevertheless, 
Jaramillo‘s renovation discourse identified internal problems as another cause of the 
UP‘s defeat. According to him, the poor results in Bogotá, Huila and Valle were the 
result of the political and organisational limitations of the party, whereas in Meta, 
Córdoba and Santander the results were the product of the dirty war. As a 
consequence of the poor results and Jaramillo‘s critique, members of the UPNB 
started challenging further the PC‘s orthodoxy which still maintained a ‗revolutionary 
myth‘. Rojas Puyo therefore argued that the time had come to ―start a process of 
integration with all the leftist groups in a new party propelling a democratic and 
humanist socialism‖ (Murcia 1990b: 5A).  
 While the UP and the PC were clashing internally, and National Board members 
were defending the new democratic project legitimated few months before by Barco, 
Minister Lemos reinstated the FARC-UP script. 
 
I think there is a link between FARC and UP. This link has always been there. See 
Braulio Herrera, a FARC member elected as UP MP that goes back to FARC … how 
strong or weak is this link? It is for the UP to answer … [by] condemning FARC‘s 
actions… as long as such a declaration is not made, I will recur to the evidence (El 
Espectador 1990f: 11A). 
 
Although Jaramillo‘s interviews underscored the fact that UP assassinations were 
legitimated by the recreation of the link UP-FARC, sectors of the government and 
Colombian society had continued circulating the UP-FARC script. That the 
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extermination campaigns against the UP went beyond its actual link with FARC was 
corroborated on 22 March when Jaramillo was assassinated, just after giving an 
interview in which he stated: 
 
People still link us with FARC. We have agreements on different issues, about 
democracy and peace, but disagreements when they attack civilians. It is one thing to 
have agreements on some issues and another is to be at their service (El Espectador 
1990i: 8A). 
 
Jaramillo‘s assassination was, according to a heading of El Espectador (1990e: 12A), 
―the 1385th UP member to have been killed in four years of extermination‖. The mass 
killings were central in the material expression of the radicalised antipathy towards 
the UP. The reaction from the National Trade Union (CUT) and other social 
movements and public institutions was to call for a 48-hour national strike, while the 
UPNB demanded Minister Lemos be discharged. Jaramillo‘s murder deepened the 
political turmoil within the UP. PC orthodox members saw Jaramillo‘s assassination 
as demonstration of the need to continue supporting the armed struggle, whereas the 
UPNB reformist members –labelled as ‗Jaramillists‘– saw it as showing the need to 
reinforce condemnation of any use of violence. Although the dispute to control the 
UPNB ended in April 1990 when most Jaramillists had withdrawn from the UP and 
PC members had taken the presidency, what was at stake in such a dispute was not 
only a political line but the very survival of the people associated with the UP. Indeed 
many people left the UP to avoid assassination, yet it would be remiss to disregard the 
role that political differences played among some national, regional and local leaders 
who decided to withdraw from the party –as the cases of Montaña, Garzón, and others 
exemplify
8– carrying on their resistance by joining forces with the M-19 in the newly 
created leftist coalition AD-M19 (Archila 2005: 296). 
Throughout 1989, the PC and the UP showed themselves as different others but 
part of the same collective self. This was closely related to the crisis of communism, 
which brought a bitter debate between reformist and orthodox communists around the 
world. While the UP‘s new leadership followed the reformist trend and decided to 
step up criticism of the guerrillas and to support some official narratives, the PC 
                                                 
8
 In personal interviews with this author (June, 2009) UP members in Pasto said they left the party 
because of the disagreements with PC politics at the national level. 
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constantly recriminated the lack of willingness of the establishment to halt the 
violence. The UP‘s move influenced Barco narratives for a short while: recognising 
the stigmatisation and violence suffered by the UP. As violence increased, the UP 
resorted to PC narratives circulating antipathy towards the military and some sectors 
of the Barco administration. Since, after the broadening of the dirty war, Barco 
conveniently submitted to US pressure by portraying drug traffickers as the source of 
Colombia‘s tragedy, the UP distanced further from the administration and focused on 
circulating proofs of army-drug traffickers alliances. This resulted in a further 
escalation of violence. This time, however, due to the polarised relationship between 
the administration and the UP, Barco blamed the violence on the UP and the UP 
blamed him for the extermination campaign. Although the UP had resorted to the PC 
narratives, it was not willing to uncritically support the armed struggle; the cost of this 
was further internal debate. Seeking to benefit from it, the Barco administration 
recycled the armed proselytism script and this, instead of immediately deepening the 
division, furthered violence. In this context various leaders left the party, 
demonstrating that the grammars of identity/alterity within the UP were not decided 
by the undergoing transformation in the geopolitics of communism but mainly by the 
genocidal violence. However, as the next section shows, the grammars of 
identity/alterity continued to be a space of contestation for at least another year. 
Post-traumatic months:  in re-search of a self (1990 – 1991) 
The bulk of the members that remained in the UP were peasants in peripheral regions 
of Colombia and PC leaders in urban areas. Although violence had already targeted 
UP‘s strongholds in Meta, Urabá and Arauca, UP activists stayed in the party 
because, contrary to the turmoil taking place in the UPNB, UP membership was 
almost the only possible expression of social mobilisation. Furthermore, as the UPNB 
between April 1990 and November 1991 was mainly constituted of PC members  and 
affirmed to be defending ―the political ideals of Pardo and Jaramillo‖ (El Espectador 
1990g: 11A), people in peripheries carried on their activism within the UP.  
Despite the UP‘s withdrawal from the presidential contest, violence against the 
remaining UP members did not stop. UP President Oscar Dueñas announced in June 
1990 that he had survived 3 assassination attempts since April (El Espectador 1990h: 
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12A). Furthermore, in regions such as Urabá, where FARC were still a powerful 
military actor, assassination campaigns against the UP continued; such campaigns had 
a complex connection with the armed conflict and the consolidation of a ‗peace 
mentality‘ that had resulted in ‗regional dialogues‘ between guerrilla groups and local 
governments –regional dialogues had been taking place since 1988, when massacres 
and assassinations against UP members skyrocketed.
9
  
 The results of the 1990 presidential polls gave some hopes of renovation in 
Colombian politics. In this context, and because President César Gaviria (1990-1994) 
did not completely close the door for peace talks with the larger guerrilla groups, UP 
members in FARC strongholds continued campaigning for peace and in some cases 
publicly legitimating the armed struggle.
10
 Paradoxically, in November 1990, Gaviria 
and the UPNB met to clarify a disclosed security forces report which attested that the 
UP had received orders by the FARC to infiltrate militants into official positions 
(Murcia 1990a: 5A). As a result, the UP received authorisation to visit FARC 
headquarters. The army‘s surprising military engagement against FARC Secretariat, 
at the time of the meeting reinforced the UP‘s distrust of Gaviria‘s policy regarding 
peace talks with the Coordinadora National Guerrillera (CNG).
11
 In fact, its ambiguity 
lasted almost until 1994; as such, the army‘s attack on Casa Verde in December 1990 
was only the beginning of the ‗integral war‘ that took away the belligerent character 
of FARC (Orozco 2006). Gaviria‘s integral war did not weaken the FARC, but 
contributed to continue targeting of the UP, which the perpetrators still scripted as 
FARC –not only because of its geographical closeness to FARC strongholds and their 
campaigning for human rights and peace talks, but also because of the PC‘s 
opposition to openly criticizing the combination of all forms of struggle. What made 
                                                 
9
 For an analysis of the evolution of the movement for peace in Colombia see Garcia-Duran (2006).  
10
 The complexity of the relationship between peasants and armed groups, in which the former support 
the latter but are not actually soldiers, has been recently studied for the Salvadorian case under what   
Elizabeth Wood (2003) suggestively calls ‗insurgent campesinos‘. Similarly, in the case studied here 
UP members and sympathizers, who were not FARC members, recognised the validity of the armed 
struggle. This should be analysed as part of a broader trend; for instance, according to a former human 
rights activist (working as a consultant for an international agency) interviewed by Tate ―The leaders of 
the local committees quickly learned about denuncia… In the foros, they gave really fiery speeches. 
There was nothing propositivo, nothing. Some would go so far as to give speeches in favour of the 
armed actors‖ (2007: 95).   
11
 CNG was an umbrella organization created between the FARC and ELN in the early 1990s to carry 
out negotiations with the Gaviria administration. There were two rounds of negotiations in Caracas and 
Tlaxcala, but the peace process broke down and the CNG disintegrated (see García-Durán 1992). 
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the integral war more dangerous for the UP was that it was connected with a ‗new‘ 
counterinsurgency strategy supported by the CIA and the Pentagon (see chapter 5).  
Although many communist parties were revisiting the maxims of cold war 
communism, the PC continued for quite some time avoiding the reassessment of 
Soviet communist dogmas. This, however, did not impede the PC building electoral 
alliances with democratic sectors within the UP platform. The UP‘s close relationship 
with human rights organisations brought respected human rights defender Alfredo 
Vázquez Carrisoza into the political formula for the elections of the National 
Constitution Assembly that was to draft the 1991 Constitution. However, a 
diminished UP only succeeded in getting two members elected. During the sessions of 
the Assembly, UP members asked the plenum to create a commission to investigate 
political crimes in Colombia, which according to their statistics had, during the first 
two months of 1991, reached 50 UP assassinations. Entire families continued to be 
targets of violence, exemplified by the massacre of Rosalba Camacho‘s family –UP 
councilwoman for Prado (Tolima) whom together with her husband and 5 children  
were killed by a paramilitary group (El Espectador 1990a: 10A). The appeal to the 
Assembly was a last resort after publicly stating: 
 
our denouncements and demands of guarantees have never been met. The investigations 
hardly started. And they never concluded. We live in the kingdom of impunity. The 
mechanisms to protect our lives are everyday more precarious… In this context, the 
government shows the incapacity or its lack of interest in protecting the UP leaders‘ lives. 
This has meant the reactivation of the dirty war… We demand to be allowed to live and 
demand to tell the country the truth about the extermination of the UP (El Espectador 
1990d: 5A). 
 
The Assembly did not take on board the UP‘s request, albeit some UP leaders 
agreed the New Constitution offered a renewed political system. Not everyone agreed 
with such a reading of history; this together with the poor results in the constitutional 
polls brought back the old debate between ‗democratic pluralism‘ (Jaramillists) and 
‗dogmatic communism‘. Thus, a new confrontation developed within the framework 
of the XVI Congress of the PC in August 1991; as a result UP President Carlos 
Romero was excluded from the PCCC. Such a confrontation had internal effects, 
which recreated the division in the UPNB, resulting in the UP and PC running 
separately for the first time in the parliamentary elections of November 1991. It also 
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had external consequences because Minister of Government Humberto de la Calle 
reissued the UP-FARC script. This had negative consequences for the UP, not only 
because it contributed to re-ignition of massacres against the UP (El Espectador 
1991a: 12A; 1991c: 12A); but also because the internal dispute was to be resolved in 
the parliamentary polls in favour of the PC, whose candidate was elected as MP, 
enabling the PC to claim victory over Jaramillists. Hence, by December 1991, when 
the Third National Congress of the UP met, the PCCC had expelled dissenters from 
the UPNB. Thereafter, the PC was to control the UPNB and, as such, play a dominant 
role in the grammars of identity/alterity informing self-identification of the UP. 
Therefore, in the years to follow, participant-interpreters and observer-interpreters 
alike saw genocidal campaigns against the UP as the product of close contact between 
PC and FARC. Moreover, as the early days of the post-cold war geopolitics informed 
Gaviria‘s modernisation reforms, which were seeking to consolidate Colombia as a 
free-market democracy, official narratives interpreted the PC‘s decision to stick to the 
communist orthodoxy as a demonstration that the UP could only push for outdated 
policies. Such narratives aided not only the criminalisation of UP politics but also the 
circulation of sympathy for the perpetrators, antipathy towards the UP and 
indifference for the genocidal targeting of UP strongholds. 
From the Communist Party’s dominance to the shadow UP 
National Board (1992 – 2002) 
By the time the UP elected a new national board with Aida Avella as president, there 
had been for quite some time narratives circulating that put most of the blame of the 
recent genocidal campaign against the UP on FARC. As the PC-FARC script had 
been reissued, the fantasy circulating was that the UP was targeting the UP. There 
might have been cases in which FARC‘s military actions affected UP sympathizers 
but, certainly, they were isolated cases and not a policy of the Secretariat, as some 
micro- and macronarratives suggested. Another narrative linked the UP directly with 
urban cells of FARC; just as Mayor of Medellín Omar Flórez did (see El Espectador 
1991b: 5A). Both macro- and micronarratives contributed to maintaining the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, and were used by US policy makers to define 
Colombia in foreign policy space (see chapter 5). 
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 In June 1992 the second and third Caño Sibao massacres unleashed the last 
outbursts of violence which completed the diminishing of the UP in Meta. In this 
context, the Constitutional Court ordered People‘s Ombudsman Jaime Córdoba 
Triviño to enquire ―the actual development of the investigations regarding the 
disappearing, killing, and other crimes against UP members.‖ Córdoba committed 
himself to identify the ―perpetrators of the genocide of the Unión Patriótica‖, which 
had since its creation ―experienced the annihilation of its most important leaders‖ by 
not ―only one, but many perpetrators‖ (El Espectador 1992b: 5A). His report was 
released in October and not only became, as chapter 7 demonstrates, a central event in 
the transnational efforts carried out by UP President Avella, but also showed that the 
1991 Constitution had created new mechanisms within the Colombian political 
system that could be used by UP members to seek the protection of the UP. 
Notwithstanding the fourth Caño Sibao Massacre and the assassination of UP 
President for Meta José Rodrigo García sealed the cleansing of UP political power in 
Meta, except for the UP Mayor of El Castillo, who left the town in January 1995 after 
various assassination attempts. 
  Throughout 1993, UP leaders‘ assassinations continued. In November, Miller 
Chacón, who was documenting army officers‘ involvement in violence against the 
UP, was killed. By then, according to UP figures, more than 2000 UP members had 
been murdered (El Espectador 1992a: 5A). However, the UP went on to participate in 
the 1994 electoral contests. Although the political campaigns were marked by similar 
levels of violence against UP candidates as in previous elections, the UP obtained a 
MP and various mayoralties in Urabá. Senator Manuel Cepeda was murdered on 10 
August, a few days after President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) had come into office. 
Cepeda‘s assassination consolidated the genocidal campaign aimed at wiping out the 
remnant UP national leaders. In 2009, the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (IACHR) condemned the Colombian government for complicity of army 
officers in his murder. Many UP national leaders were murdered the following years 
as part of the ‗Plan Golpe de Gracia‘. UP Councilman Josué Giraldo was one of the 
many assassinated in 1996. By the late 1990s, few UP members, such as Hernán 
Motta and Aida Avella, had managed to escape death by going into exile. 
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 The Plan Golpe de Gracia unfolded alongside another genocidal campaign in 
Urabá: Plan Retorno. This campaign was carried out between 1994 and 1996, taking 
the lives of more than 350 UP members –the bloodiest campaign to be carried out in 
an UP stronghold in the 1990s (REINICIAR 2006a). Puzzlingly, UP members thought 
Samper (because of his historic militancy on the left of the Liberal Party and amicable 
connection with leftist sectors) was to guarantee a safer environment for the UP than 
other administrations. However, as chapter 5 argues, the Clinton administration‘s 
scripting of Colombia as a narcodemocracy during Samper‘s presidency contributed 
to shape an inconsistent internal policy regarding the armed conflict, which resulted in 
the re-legalization of paramilitary groups, re-branded this time under the name of 
‗Convivir‘. Convivir units were part of the coalition for violence that carried out the 
Plan Retorno (see chapter 3). 
 Yet the Samper administration not only contributed to consolidation of sectors of 
the perpetrator bloc but its narratives also allowed for the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture to continue. In the climate of tension between US and Colombian 
administrations, Samper saw the indictment for the UP genocide before the IACHR as 
further weakening its position in US foreign policy space, therefore his administration 
argued that it had taken ―measures to protect UP members‘ lives‖ and as such it was 
―confident that the IACHR would not admit case No. 11227‖ (Cardona 1995). 
Indifference against the UP circulated upon this narrative. Thus political 
entrepreneurs, such as Governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe, prioritised the creation of 
Convivir in Urabá, aiding the consolidation of a regional coalition for violence that 
had as its target the UP, which in their view was not only challenging the traditional 
regional political structure but was also the socio-political network of FARC (see 
chapter 6). 
 During the Samper administration‘s final months massacres against the UP in 
Urabá were complemented by various types of harassment, in particular by set-ups, 
such as judicial processes supported by faceless witnesses. Thus, public officers in 
Urabá were imprisoned because of apparently participating in massacres against 
Esperanza Paz y Libertad members (they were released years later because 
investigations proved they had not participated in such actions). In this context, PC 
members on behalf of the UP distributed a press release arguing that there were no 
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guarantees for ‗the Left‘ to take part in the political contest because they were 
―equated to the guerrillas and drug trafficking‖ (El Espectador 1997a: 5A). This press 
release showed a shift in UP narratives. After the UP President Avella left the 
country, PC members started referring to UP-PC as separate entities again, to the 
extent that they talked of the genocide of UP and PC members. In this con-text, a 
broad Left collective self became the object of self-reference integrating both parts. 
 The Plan Golpe de Gracia continued targeting communist leaders throughout 1998. 
The United Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) was at the core of the perpetrator 
bloc in this conjuncture. According to the PCCC, one of its commands was in Bogotá 
ready to kill PC General Secretary Jaime Caycedo and other PC leaders because 
paramilitary leaders saw the guerrillas ―as the armed arm of the PC and the national 
secretary as the coordination board‖ (El Espectador 1998a: 7A). During the 
consolidation of the AUC in the early months of 1998, PC leaders stepped up their 
criticism of state policies vis-à-vis paramilitary groups and strongly opposed peace 
talks with paramilitary groups. While paramilitary narratives circulated antipathy 
towards the UP by describing them as civilian insurgents (see chapter 6), the UP 
narratives sought to depict paramilitary groups as the exclusive product of state 
policies, thus circulating antipathy towards the AUC (El Espectador 1998b: 7A).  
 UP narratives were to match incoming President Andrés Pastrana‘s narratives 
(1998-2002). Pastrana, elected on the basis of his promise to bring to an end the 
armed conflict with the guerrillas, again illegalised Convivir and constantly presented 
his administration as fighting the AUC. Although Pastrana recurrently resorted to 
narratives that recognised the wrongdoings of previous administrations so as to 
maintain the peace talks with FARC, in practice army officers‘ distrust for the peace 
process sided them with AUC blocs, which proliferated during Pastrana‘s presidency 
(see chapter 4). History repeated itself: both Betancur and Pastrana administrations 
intended negotiated solutions but covert coalitions for violence, made up of the same 
security forces that they were meant to direct, carried out the assassination of civilians 
who were regarded as the socio-political network of the guerrilla groups. In both 
conjunctures the unwillingness of American administrations to support the peace 
processes –during the Clinton years, in particular, after the killing of three American 
indigenists by FARC– contributed to reinforcement of radicalised antipathy towards 
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civilian networks framing a constant battle against criminal communist insurgencies 
(see chapter 4). 
 This time, however, the target was not necessarily labelled as ‗UP‘ but ‗the Left‘. 
In fact, there were few people identifying themselves as UP by then. The extent of the 
genocide against the UP-PC, evident in the XVII Congress of the PC held in October 
1998, meant that apart from Jaime Caycedo and two letters sent from exile by Avella 
and Motta no more than 70 people attended the first national communist congress in 6 
years. But assassinations continued, as in the case of 72 year old Julio Poveda in 
February 1999. Parallel to this process, though, former UP members who had 
withdrawn from politics were carrying out their resistance struggle through human 
rights grassroots NGOs, working in former UP strongholds (see chapter 7). 
 The beginning of the Pastrana-FARC peace talks produced ambiguous 
interpretations by UP members and the media. During 1999, for example, some public 
statements of UP leaders seemed to suggest that the future of the UP was linked to 
developments of the peace process. El Espectador interpreted such statements as a 
demonstration that the UP was to become the political arm of FARC. In December, 
after FARC announced the creation of the Movimiento Bolivariano (MB), the UP 
called the Fourth National Congress, the first in 8 years, to which more than 400 
people attended. The main topic for discussion during the event was what role the UP 
was to play in this new context. PC members argued that it should become again the 
political platform joining different leftist groups, such as the Frente Social y Político 
that was about to be launched by the CUT. However, at the time, the UP did not have 
the political structure to bring together other political actors. The narrative that 
supported such an idea was more the product of the PC‘s imageries, which aimed at 
circulating sympathy among different leftist sectors so as for them to gather around an 
old political project. 
 In 2000, when FARC officially launched the MB, UP leader Jahel Quiroga and PC 
Secretary General Jaime Caycedo quickly moved to point out the difference between 
the UP and the MB. According to Quiroga,  
 
The FARC has got the political and ideological control of the MB, this is the great 
difference with the UP, whose political platform was built in tandem with other social 
movements; another difference is that the UP continues to legally work for changes in the 
Colombian political system (Castrillón 2000). 
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Caycedo considered the MB an interesting experiment, joining most leftist forces 
under Bolivar‘s heritage, and acknowledged that the MB‘s political platform 
coincided with the UP‘s and the PC‘s ideals. He underscored, however, as Quiroga 
did, that the methods of doing politics were different, especially if it were taken into 
account that the FARC decided the MB was to be a secret political movement so as to 
avoid extermination. These efforts did not manage to stop the killings; in 2002 a few 
months before the Uribe administration (2002-2010) formally withdrew the legal 
recognition of the UP, UP Councilman for Arauca Octavio Sarmiento was 
assassinated. 
 The coming to power of Alvaro Uribe was traumatic for the UP. Not only was its 
legal recognition withdrawn, forcing the few UP members left to create a shadow 
UPNB, but violent patterns also intensified against the survivors during the first years 
of his administration. The geopolitical narratives of the war on terror, as chapter 5 
shows, have fuelled antipathy towards civilian networks allegedly close to the 
hyperreal security threat posed by ‗narcoterrorist guerrillas‘. This contrasts with 
Pastrana‘s attitude; it has only been during the Pastrana administration that an 
amicable solution between the victims of the genocide of the UP and the Colombian 
government has been on the table. Chapter 7 discusses in detail the developments 
since 2002, suffice to say for now that the grammars of identity/alterity that circulated 
around the idea of the UP since its creation in 1985 have not disappeared. They have 
been transferred to the next generation, daughters and sons of the socio-political 
network once (self-)identified as UP. 
Conclusion 
The periodisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture presented above 
demonstrates that the grammars of identity/alterity upon which the idea of the UP was 
performed were not only determined by the official narratives put forward by the 
various administrations, but also by the genocidal campaigns. However, such 
campaigns and grammars were both influenced by geopolitical narratives, which 
shaped not only the perpetrators (and the involvement of important sectors of state-
institutions) but also a fluid identity of genocide-victims (and their resistance 
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strategies). The junctures discussed here therefore mark important moments in the 
dynamic convergence of affective-dispositions and narratives. Because chapters 4 to 7 
will con-textualise the destruction of the UP into the geopolitics of the second cold 
war and the post-cold war, this chapter laid the basis for mapping the links between 
the changing character of the UP and geopolitical narratives. By resorting to a soft 
concept of identity the chapter de-essentialised the UP and moved beyond the 
genocide script thereby exposing the complexity surrounding the UP grammars of 
identity. Accordingly, it identified five moments in the destruction of the UP. 
From 1985 to early 1987, sympathy/antipathy circulated within the UP around the 
idea of demobilising FARC. During this first moment FARC and the PC, at the core 
of the political platform, sought to bring other sectors of Colombian society closer. 
Alliance building was part of the strategy to create sympathy between the UP and 
traditional parties‘ democratic-progressive sectors. The relation with the other was 
structured in what Baumann (2004: 25) calls ‗an encompassing grammar‘ through 
which the UP was displayed as a broad space for all Colombian people to participate. 
However, the narcoguerrillas script pushed by the Reagan administration and the 
violence it fuelled against disarmed FARC members and other sectors of the UP 
contributed to marginalising FARC from the UPNB. Thus, a collective self, bringing 
together different sectors started to be less cohesive.  
In the second moment (1987-1989) UP narratives turned to highlight the 
distinction between the political platform and the guerrilla group. The UPNB 
continued nevertheless supporting the armed struggle. Assassinations and massacres 
reinforced the UP narratives that continued reproducing sympathy for FARC and 
incriminating high ranking officers as the headmasters of the extermination campaign. 
The aim was to break the indifference of broader sectors of Colombian society by 
reproducing antipathy towards the perpetrators. The lack of solidarity from 
Colombian social, political, and economic networks, informed by Barco‘s blaming the 
guerrillas for the climate of violence in Colombia and drug traffickers for the violence 
against the UP, facilitated a gradual shift in the genocidal campaigns, which no longer 
targeted UP members but anyone identified as UP. The military rule in various 
regions of the country, which constantly resorted to the armed proselytism script 
circulated by political networks, solidified the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture; 
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thus massacres targeting the UP proliferated weakening the UP‘s transnational efforts 
to halt the slaughter. In this context, an internal division –informed by the 
transformations in the communist bloc and concrete violent campaigns– brought 
about a grammar of ‗reverse mirror-imagining‘12 for structuring relations between 
different sectors within the UP. Thus, the reproduction of the collective self was based 
on a relative sympathy/antipathy tension between orthodoxs and revisionists.  
During 1989 and 1990 the UPNB directly criticised the guerrillas‘ armed struggle. 
In response, Barco‘s narratives circulated sympathy for the UP. Although this brought 
both collective selves together for a short while, the continuation of violence in urban 
and rural settings reignited the UP recrimination of the administration. This together 
with UP narratives circulating antipathy towards drug traffickers and paramilitary 
groups made the UP the target of further violence. Barco‘s myopic imaginary of 
paramilitary groups as unrelated to the armed forces and his submission to Bush 
senior‘s counternarcotic policies fuelled some UP leaders‘ incendiary rhetoric. Some 
members of both administrations met this by returning to the UP-FARC script. The 
UP‘s ‗internal identity struggle‘ was put aside until the second UP president was 
assassinated. This event not only deepened the internal division but also confirmed in 
the minds of many citizens that cutting the links with the UP was the only way for 
survival. 
The UP‘s internal turmoil, experienced from 1990 to 1992, was a fourth moment in 
which various sectors close to the PC attempted to continue Jaramillo‘s idea of 
bringing non-communist sectors into the UP. This earned the UP a place in the 
drafting of the new constitution. However, poor results in the polls and the 
consolidation of narratives portraying a post-communist world of triumphant free-
market capitalism re-ignited bitter divisions. The segmentary grammar
13
 of 
structuring the relationship between both parts resulted in the expulsion of most 
dissenters to the PC political line. This had a rather limited effect regionally because 
many people‘s affiliation to the UP passed through the Communist Party. Moreover, 
regional coalitions for violence were a more dangerous ‗other‘, because they were 
carrying out genocide. As the UP time-space inevitably intersected with FARC‘s, the 
time-space framework of rural settings greatly differed from urban settings where UP 
                                                 
12
 This term refers to Baumann‘s orientalizing grammar of identity (2004: 20). 
13
 See Baumann (2004: 21). 
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leaders could decide on a different basis whether to support the armed struggle or not. 
Gaviria‘s ambiguous narratives enabled public circulation of regional dwellers‘ 
sympathy for the armed struggle, because although a US-financed integral war against 
drug trafficking and guerrillas was waged, Gaviria did not close the door for peace 
talks with FARC. 
For ten years (1992-2002), the PC dominated the UPNB. As alterity had been 
solved within, the UP grammar of identity/alterity turned in the next years exclusively 
against the alliance between the army and paramilitary groups, which were the core of 
the perpetrator bloc carrying out a twofold genocidal campaign. Colombian 
administrations, on the other hand, enabled the legal proliferation of paramilitary 
groups and produced narratives circulating indifference against the UP; such 
narratives were later recycled by the covert (para)military alliance to circulate 
antipathy towards what they saw as the socio-political networks supporting FARC. 
The re-issuing of the UP–FARC and the narcoguerrillas scripts reignited genocidal 
campaigns. As a result the UP‘s regional power faded away. In this context, its legal 
recognition was withdrawn and Uribe narratives slowly started to obliviate the UP 
genocide. Against this, new generations have brought the history of the UP back into 
the contested grammars of identity/alterity upon which the Colombian fictive 
collective self is recreated.  
Understanding these five moments during which the UP resisted and re-imagined 
itself vis-à-vis official narratives offers a glimpse into the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture. However, to fully grasp its complexity there is a need to complement the 
analysis by studying the perpetrators‘ interpretation of the UP, how such 
interpretation framed an antigrammar of genocide which shaped the narratives of 
different actors and how such narratives were translated into genocidal campaigns 
against the UP. The next chapter turns to do so. 
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3 A  TOPOLOGY OF A PERPETRATOR BLOC:  A  CRITICAL MAPPING 
OF GENOCIDISTS  
The genocide script has not only essentialised victims, which, as chapter 2 demonstrates, are 
constituted through complex processes of social interaction, but also simplifies, as chapter 1 
argues, the dynamics that materialise genocidists. Such a simplification is due to the 
dominant discourse of what Moses (2008) calls ‗the liberal theory of genocide‘, which until 
recently focused on the kind of regimes that were more prone to commit genocide and hence 
highly relied on a hierarchical understanding of the perpetrators (see Harff and Gurr 1988; 
Harff 2003). This chapter challenges the traditional representation of the perpetrators in the 
genocide script, namely that non-democratic states are the perpetrators of genocide. By 
studying the perpetrators of the UP genocide, it problematises three common assumptions: 
(1) the centrality of the state as the perpetrator, (2) the portrayal of perpetrators as 
hierarchical actors/structures, and (3) the static character usually ascribed to the perpetrators. 
The chapter thus sets up the scene to con-textualise the complex dynamics bringing together 
various collective (non)violent actors  into the post-détent geopolitics in the Western 
Hemisphere; in this con-text, such actors interpreted the emergence and consolidation of the 
UP through scripts that eventually structured an antigrammar of genocide, which translated 
radicalised antipathy into genocidal practices. More generally, the chapter contributes to 
remedy some of the shortcomings of the study of the perpetrators of genocide, which, albeit 
less so, still suffers of the unwillingness of scholars to embark on an ethnographic or other 
form of field study of the genocidists. This is not meant to deny, however, that in recent years 
new research, in particular into the Rwandan genocide (Straus 2006) and currently into the 
Bosnian Genocide (Clark 2009), has started to address the issue; and that also Browning‘s 
Ordinary Men triggered a whole new line of investigation, which has sought to understand 
the role of ordinary people in the perpetration of the Holocaust and other genocides 
(Szejnmann 2008). Nevertheless, as Clark contends,  
 
notwithstanding the existence of valuable perpetrator-focused research… overall the 
marginalization or neglect of perpetrators –specifically perpetrators of war crimes and 
genocide– is a broad phenomenon (2009: 422). 
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This chapter differs from Clark (and most of the recent perpetrator-literature) substantially in 
one point, that is, the central role that scholars ascribe to the state in the organisation of 
genocidists. Insofar as what one may call the ‗hierarchical syndrome‘ is kept intact in 
genocide studies, the understanding of the variation over time of the significance and forms 
of vertical/horizontal organisation of genocidists is to remain obscure. To be sure, the claim is 
not that state agencies do not play a definitive role in genocide. In cases such as the Nazi 
genocide, for instance, a strong bureaucratic apparatus did so. However, as recent research 
shows, what brought different actors together was not so much the strong bureaucracy but the 
networks that linked multiple actors (with multiple interest) to a political project from which 
all benefited, either socially, economically, or politically (Feldman and Seibel 2005). Thus, 
quoting Christian Gerlach (2005: 17), ―some dimensions of the problem of mass involvement 
in the Holocaust can hardly be understood if one does not take these beneficial effects into 
consideration.‖  
 Yet to take the focus away from the state and pay attention to the networks and the 
polarisation of sympathy/antipathy upon which various actors converge, eventually 
consolidating a hard power that regulates the way they interact with ‗others‘, calls for a 
radical reinterpretation of the typologies of genocidists. This poses important questions: if the 
state is not the cohesive force bringing a mass of perpetrators together, what then enables 
their alliances? Are economic, political, and social benefits sufficient to bridge group 
differences? Is national (ethnic) identity –the referent object that different groups seek to 
protect from ‗others‘– what brings different groups with different interests together? But 
then, how do these groups deal with different ideas of the ‗same‘ identity? And finally, how 
is their identity constructed (and reconstructed) during the perpetration of genocide? 
 Few genocide scholars have considered issues related to such questions; Gerlach 
summarises the reasons for this:  
 
genocide studies tend to focus on ethnic or racial issues instead of multi-causality, on the state 
instead of society, on long-term ‗intent,‘ planning and centralization instead of a process and 
autonomous groups, on one victim group instead of many. Structural mechanisms of the 
genocide model work toward simplification and against contextualization (2006: 466).  
 
The lack of contextualisation informs indeed the approach of genocide scholars who 
following (and reinforcing) the genocide script disregard questions associated with the 
multiplex identity of the perpetrators. Either because, along the line of Goldhagen‘s (1996) 
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simplification of Nazi perpetrators as anti-Semitic Germans, they take for granted the identity 
of the perpetrators or because, in line with Browning‘s (1998) psycho-sociological approach, 
they are more interested in answering why ordinary people commit genocide. Amongst the 
latter, debates usually spring from siding with personality or circumstances as the defining 
triggers for participating in genocide; what is at stake in these debates is the structure/agency 
dichotomy, which recently is resolved by arguing that is not one or the other but both (see 
Clark 2009: 430-438). However, Bloxham is categorical in stating that 
 
The very evidence of mass participation in most genocides shows that the context is generally 
more important than the disposition and beliefs of the individual perpetrator, since in the ‗right‘ 
situation so many people of demonstrably different characters and values participate (2008: 
187). 
 
Bloxham‘s call for a focus on contexts opposes psychological approaches that seek to unveil 
the innate (individual) affects informing the perpetrators of genocide. However, the post-
structuralist approach followed here aims to map the circulation of affective-dispositions 
informing the participation and collaboration of multiple actors in genocidal campaigns. In 
exploring the context-affect nexus this chapter shows that alongside the crystallisation of a 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, different perpetrators come together in alliances forming 
a bloc that deploys hard power against the social fabric of a civilian network they construe as 
a threat. Hence, in order to understand how a perpetrator bloc materialised, the chapter con-
textualises, that is, traces the fluid system of relations connecting actors not only within the 
perpetrator bloc but also sectors of the perpetrator bloc with broader transnational networks. 
As such a system comes into being through the circulation of narratives (and affective-
dispositions), the argument underlying the chapter is that in the geopolitical con-text of the 
second cold war, a genocidal conjuncture crystallised enabling multiple actors to gather in a 
perpetrator bloc against the UP.  
 The focus on con-text suggests the need to understand the links between the various 
perpetrators of genocide. Moreover, by proposing a flexible understanding of the relationship 
between different geopolitical con-texts and the many ways in which various perpetrators 
come together, the term ‗perpetrator bloc‘ challenges the state-centrism prevailing in the 
genocide script. To be sure, state agencies are always cliques within the perpetrator blocs; 
however, the intensity, directedness and connectedness with other cliques and clusters always 
vary. More importantly, the links between various cliques and clusters are not contained 
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within the artificial boundaries of nation states. Rather they cut across different polities. This 
chapter thus shows that the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide surpassed Colombia‘s 
domestic politics and international borders.  
 The perpetrator bloc conceptually shares many similarities with Gerlach‘s (2006) 
‗coalitions for violence.‘ First, both see perpetrators as dynamic actors and recognise alterity 
within the very institutions that are part of the alliances. Second, both recognise that a 
multiplicity of motives bring different social forces with diverse interest for violence 
together. Third, both expose the connections between hands-on perpetrators and broader 
social, political, and military networks. The main difference is that, perpetrator blocs are 
understood here as the genocidal materialisation of ‗transnational hegemonic blocs‘ that in an 
attempt to deal with contingency allow the free flowing of antigrammars of genocide.
1
 The 
emphasis that Gerlach places on individual‘s decision to join the coalitions, enables one to 
argue that a perpetrator bloc encompasses various coalitions for violence which materialise 
clusters and cliques of the perpetrator bloc regionally. 
 
 This chapter maps the relations between collective violent actors, government officials, 
state enforcement agencies, political entrepreneurs, big land owners, and other sectors of 
society. No doubt various state-institutions and bureaucrats played important roles throughout 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Yet the chapter shows that in processes of 
privatisation of violence, paramilitary groups and other collective violent actors consolidate 
enough coercive power enabling them to autonomously commit genocidal acts against 
civilians. The chapter is divided into five parts. First, it shows how during the crystallisation 
of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture the army played a leading role in the constitution of 
the perpetrator bloc. Second, it analyses the processes through which violence entrepreneurs 
took an important role in solidifying the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Third, it argues 
that because of the tension between the UP‘s sympathy networks and anti-UP networks 
within the state apparatus new dynamics emerged within the perpetrator bloc; this deepened 
contradictions between the different actors thus bringing about transformations in the bloc‘s 
structure. The last two parts look into the different shapes of the perpetrator bloc since 1990; 
despite vertical-hierarchical structures were part of most sectors of the perpetrator bloc, these 
sections show that horizontal relations constituted the top-end interactions between multiple 
leaders who were part of an ever-changing acephalus network of genocidal violence.  
                                                 
1
 Robinson and Harries (2000) use the concept of transnational hegemonic bloc to link discursive and 
nondiscursive practices allowing for the production of a global ruling class. 
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 In contrast to the extensive literature on the Colombian armed conflict, this chapter unveils 
the links of various actors in the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. Therefore, two caveats 
related to the ongoing narrative-clash for and against referring to the destruction of the UP as 
genocide should be noted. Firstly, perpetrators assert that the violence did not target the UP; 
they claim that the murders aimed at FARC. Secondly, military officers have been acquitted 
of the crimes charged. Although the prosecution of paramilitary leaders in public hearings 
has advanced the understanding of the genocidists, future ethnographies could contribute to 
map the micro-processes of genocidal practices in peripheral regions and the convergence of 
various coalitions for violence into the perpetrator bloc. For now, the chapter‘s contribution is 
to analyse critically the data collected through semi-structured interviews, a newspaper 
review of national media and secondary sources. 
The armed forces’ targeting of communists: the crystallisation of the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (1980 – 1987) 
The unintended constitution of the perpetrator bloc was the product of the intended targeting 
of communists, which had started before the creation of the UP. From the late 1970s to 1987, 
a military gaze dominated by a strong anticommunism meant that the army not only directly 
targeted communists but also contributed to polarise broader legal and illegal networks, 
which slowly gathered together eventually singling out the UP for destruction. The army had 
intensified harassment against communism during the Turbay Administration (1978-1982), 
when the NSD was implemented in earnest. By 1983, some army generals‘ and Minister of 
Defence‘s anti-communist public statements demonstrated that the NSD was informing the 
military gaze, which opposed President Belisario Betancur‘s (1982-1986) peace policy. The 
NSD had also helped to amalgamate different sectors of Colombian society in order to fight 
(international) communism. The alliance between drug traffickers and some army officers 
was exposed by Attorney General Carlos Jiménez Gomez in February 1983, when he named 
59 army officers who were part of Death to Kidnappers (MAS), the largest illegal private 
army at the time (see Ramírez and Restrepo 1988). Although drug traffickers had created the 
MAS, its tactics matched the NSD. This was linked with the production of secret contra-
guerrilla manuals. According to UP member Manuel Cepeda, Army Document 1689 of 1981 
allowed for the organisation of ‗Self-defence groups‘ (1986: v-vi). The success of the NSD 
meant that the early stages in the continuum of violence against PC and UP members took 
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place in the midst of the militarisation of Colombian national elites. Twenty-odd years of 
armed conflict allowed the military organisation and its values to influence Colombia‘s social 
structure; because paraphrasing Shaw  ―in… periods of intense war-preparation… the logic of 
war… become[s] the driving force of social change‖ (1991: 20).  
Traditionally the armed forces and the civilian government were considered as two 
different spheres in Colombia‘s political system. This division had been promoted in the late 
1950s by President Alberto Lleras Carmargo (1958-1962) and became a civil doctrine on 
military affairs thereafter (see chapter 4). As a result of the ‗civilian government-armed 
forces separation‘, army members had, by the 1980s, embraced an esprit de corps, which 
prevented high rank officers to recognise the gravity of some members‘ excesses and 
misconducts within the framework of the armed conflict (Cubides 2005: 92). The polarisation 
of sympathy amongst army officers reinforced antipathy towards communism, which was 
construed as a dangerous ‗other‘ –resembling the dominant narratives of the cold war. This 
circulation of affective-dispositions, which shaped the frames to interpret reality, not only 
explains why the Military Penal Justice System acquitted the aforementioned 59  army 
officers, but also the lack of flexibility within the armed forces to revaluate the traditional 
framing of the armed conflict once the peace process with the guerrillas started. The military 
gaze was to prevail over the Betancur administration‘s peace policy.  
 At first glance, the Colombian experience seems to entail a triple paradox for the process 
of militarisation materialised during (1) the peace process between Betancur and various 
guerrilla groups, at a time when (2) European militarism was being dismantled, and (3) while 
the demilitarisation in the Southern Cone was taking place. Chapter 4 deals with the latter by 
discussing the role of the liberal western hemispheric military network in the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP unfolded. Suffice to say for 
now that UP members saw a close link between militarism and US foreign policy; hence, the 
process of militarisation in Colombia was seen as the continuation of the war against Soviet 
imperialism started in the Southern Cone (see Cepeda 1986). This representation, part of the 
UP anti-geopolitics, was backed up by other narratives circulating in broader sectors of 
Colombia‘s political networks, as Liberal Senator Iván Marulanda‘s (1987) statements 
demonstrate:
  
 
The Armed Forces...  are an active body in the anti-communist enterprise… This is so, to great 
extent, due to the influence of international propaganda and their training by international anti-
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communist institutions. And because the Armed Forces have found support in the structure of 
the country‘s economic power, which share the anticommunist enterprise and see in it a way to 
defend its properties and economic and social position. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, a considerable number of Colombian army officers were trained at 
the SOA, a US military institution spreading counterinsurgency as part of the geopolitical 
struggle against communism (Gill 2004). High-ranking officers trained at SOA went back to 
Colombia to fight communism and because of their radicalised antipathy also disseminated 
the anticommunist hatred among socio-economic elites. The military‘s privileged position in 
influencing traditional Colombian social-political networks enabled them to circulate 
narratives that copied the anticommunist script learnt in US training schools thus mobilising 
antipathy towards the civilian social networks challenging the traditional political system. 
The interaction between military and socio-political networks shows that military tactics 
sought to halt the expansion of ―Soviet imperialism‖, which according to Gen. Fernando 
Landazábal ―was a new form of colonialism administered by Cuba in the Western 
Hemisphere‖ (1980: 138); but such interaction also aimed to ‗appease‘ Colombian society by 
adopting the tactics of the Argentinean Military Junta.
2
 Marulanda‘s words are again telling 
in this regard: 
 
in Medellín, for some years now, army officers organize meetings with Antioquia‘s 
businessmen and socio-economic elites, so as to show propaganda in which they seek to 
demonstrate that the country is on the brink of a revolution and the takeover of power by the 
Communist Party… Civilians wearing military uniforms also participate in these meetings… 
large companies‘ directors wearing military uniforms stand up and give a military salute to the 
army officers who organize and lead the meeting. This is a campaign… to create a particular 
psychological state of mind: an anti-communist paranoia and a fanatism of socio-economic 
elites that allows for the use of violence against whom they consider to be part of the 
communist threat. 
 
The paradoxical relationship between the weak peace process and the rapid militarisation 
of national elites –both reinforced by the geopolitical narratives circulated as part of US 
military and political networks‘ anticommunism (see chapters 4 and 5)– was one the con-
texts which converged to crystallise the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. In fact, the 
precarious peace process allowed for two ambiguous reactions. On the one hand, some social 
groups supported it; they saw it as a momentum for change in Colombian politics. On the 
other hand, other groups opposed it; they saw it as the breakdown of Colombian institutions. 
                                                 
2
 Attorney General Jiménez Gómez deemed necessary to prosecute military officers in order to avoid the 
‗Argentinization‘ of the country (El Espectador 1986f: 1A). 
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Amongst the latter, military sectors feared Colombia was to become the next Nicaragua; 
national socio-economic elites and rightwing political entrepreneurs, who advocated for the 
militarisation of politics, shared their fear. In a battle against Soviet imperialism in the midst 
of social unrest, ‗FARC‘s political platform‘ became the enemy embodying politicians and 
military‘s fears. They amalgamated in a rather small ‗coalition for violence‘ against those 
pushing for social change. The target of PC and UP members under, what Cepeda (1986) 
named, the ‗Plan Cóndor‘ was the central part of the unveiling ‗dirty war‘.  
According to Cepeda‘s account, the Plan Cóndor started shortly after the UP was launched 
in May 1985 and went on until late 1986. It was carried out in three phases. First, it started 
with the selective assassinations of trade unions‘ communist leaders and the terrorist targeting 
of UP-PC headquarters. Then, violence spread to peasant regions, in particular targeting UP 
strongholds for the forthcoming elections. Finally, once UP members took public offices on 
20 July 1986 they became the main target. By December 1986, three UP MPs were amongst 
the 300 UP-PC members murdered in the unfolding of a plan that sought to weaken the 
structure of the UPNB (Cepeda 1986: vi-xii). The first two stages of Plan Cóndor were, 
according to UP Senator Braulio Herrera, aimed at FARC and UP leaders; this sought to 
―prevent the extension of the truce agreement with the government‖ (El Espectador 1986h: 
3). The last stage developed into the ‗Plan Baile Rojo‘, which attempted to assassinate and 
kidnap UP leaders elected to public offices (Cepeda 2006).  
The Plan Baile Rojo evolved beyond a military plan of the Colombian army. Rather, it was 
shaped by a complex process of paramilitarisation unfolding in various regions where the 
army was weaker due to the poor military build-up to face the growing challenge posed by 
the guerrillas. Regional elites‘ previous pacts with guerrilla groups were dismantled by 
incorporating them into the counterinsurgency warfare (see Medina 1990). Such enterprise 
was the cornerstone of the NSD: regional elites were needed to fight against the ‗internal 
enemy‘ –a script borrowed from the geopolitics of the second cold war which blurred the 
distinction between social movements, leftist political parties, guerrilla groups, and 
communism. Such a script brought together regional elites and shifted the military‘s target 
from guerrilla groups to civilians. 
To counterbalance the spread of the communist ideology in the Middle Magdalena Valley 
Generals Daniel García Echeverri and Faruk Yanine Diaz focused the military strategy on 
‗winning the hearts and minds of the population‘ (Ibid.: 162-3). The success of the strategy 
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was to be measured by two interdependent variables: (1) the supply of information regarding 
guerrillas‘ tactics and organisational structures and (2) the creation of ‗self-defence‘ groups 
ready to ‗protect‘ Colombia‘s traditional institutions. The latter was a central part of contra-
guerrilla manuals which induced regional elites to collaborate with paramilitary groups. In 
this context, those sectors of the population identified as ‗allies‘ of the guerrillas, namely 
communists, were trapped in the midst of the flowing of information for military intelligence 
and an unfolding process of privatisation of violence.  
The proliferation of paramilitary groups and the implementation of the NSD played a 
central role in the cleansing of communists in the Middle Magdalena Valley. In this region 
the selective assassination of political leaders and the cleansing of guerrilla-controlled areas 
were carried out by an alliance of military officers and so-called ‗self-defence‘ groups. At 
this stage, economic elites (cattle ranchers and big landowners), such as Henry Perez, had 
taken on board the army‘s doctrine of self-defence, leading the arming of peasants in order to 
fight the FARC. The same process was replicated in other regions; hence paramilitary groups 
mushroomed in nearby counties. The foregoing reinforced the decision made by some 
farmers to organise self-defence groups to face the increasing practice of kidnapping for 
ransom (see Rubio 2008). In this context, some traditional political entrepreneurs also 
decided to promote the constitution of self-defence groups as a response to the challenge 
posed by the democratization process started by Betancur which had allowed the UP to get 
hold of various mayoralties across the country (Carroll 2000).  
The process of (para)militarisation reinforced rightwing regional and national elites‘ 
power; thus they managed to protect their interests. The military, which had a weak coercive 
power in some regions, played different cards at regional and national levels with the same 
goal in mind: defeating communism. Therefore, Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio 
publicly supported the unfolding process of privatisation of violence and in some cases 
legitimated violence against the UP. Although the military and rightwing political and socio-
economic elites were the driving forces behind the violence against the UP in the early and 
mid 1980s, the alliance of some of them with drug traffickers was to be central in the 
assassinations of UP members under the Plan Baile Rojo. The alliances spread throughout 
various regions because of the unwillingness of the Military Penal Justice System to 
prosecute the officials involved. It was feared that otherwise the ‗enemy within‘ would have 
been strengthened and the unity within the military institution weakened. 
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In 1981, drug traffickers, enriched by the access to the US cocaine market and advised by 
US officials (see chapter 6), created the MAS. Its aim was to kill guerrilla members, or 
capture them and hand them over to enforcement agencies, in order to force the return of their 
kidnapped relatives and to protect their social network from kidnapping. The MAS cleansed 
the Antioquia County of some guerrilla groups, prompting other drug traffickers to create 
their own gangs in other regions (López 2007a: 418). This episode converged into the 
crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture for it circulated an antigrammar of 
genocide that framed a new way to deal with the guerrillas. Furthermore, it enabled drug 
traffickers to build up violent groups which became part of coalitions for violence of the 
perpetrator bloc. Such was the case of Fidel Castaño who consolidated between 1982 and 
1987 a standing army in Northern Antioquia and Córdoba known as Death to North-eastern 
Revolutionaries (MRN). The proliferation of these private armies was facilitated by 
Colombian elites‘ and the Betancur administration‘s complacency with drug traffickers‘ 
socio-economic expansion.  However, after Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla‘s 
assassination in 1984, Betancur decided to crack down on drug trafficking. The extradition of 
nationals to the US thus became a central policy of Betancur‘s war on drugs. This helped to 
solidify the drug traffickers‘ militarisation because fighting the state meant better training and 
equipment in order to succeed.  
Yet the conflictive relation between the Betancur administration and drug traffickers was 
resolved at the regional level, where drug traffickers‘ private armies created alliances with the 
army and self-defence and paramilitary groups in order to secure economic and military 
gains.  Drug traffickers‘ economic investment in the Middle Magdalena Valley gave them 
social legitimacy amongst landowners and army officers. This reinforced the armed solution 
adopted by socio-economic elites to oppose FARC and the contra-guerrillas tactics 
implemented by the army (Rementería 2007: 350). Thus, drug traffickers‘ militarisation 
proved to be more fatal for the UP than to the establishment: drug traffickers had found in the 
army and economic elites new allies to win the dispute for land control with FARC. In late 
1987, when the FARC-Barco peace talks broke down, this coalition for violence committed 
the assassination of the first UP President and new violent practices emerged against the UP. 
Although the UP had named army officers and policemen involved in more than 400 
assassinations no perpetrator had been brought to justice (El Espectador 1987g: 12A). The 
impunity surrounding UP murders; the shoulder-shrugging indifference of broader social 
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networks which, as chapter 5 shows, was reinforced by the circulation of scripts amongst US 
and Colombian political networks; and the consolidation of transnational criminal networks 
that was under way, opened up the path for the massacres that were to follow. 
The genocidal geopolitical conjuncture crystallised during the transition from Plan Cóndor 
to Plan Baile Rojo, but it solidified through the proliferation of massacres. This signalled a 
metamorphosis of the perpetrator bloc: narco-paramilitary groups consolidated a powerful 
position in leading the genocidal campaign. The proliferation of massacres also meant a new 
phase in the destruction of the UP for remaining regional socio-economic networks 
supporting the UP became the target of destruction. The shifting point between the 
crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal conjuncture was connected with geopolitical 
narratives: the anticommunism of the second cold war materialised in the plans that aimed at 
the internal enemy. SOA graduates recreated the ‗internal enemy‘ script circulated in their 
military training, therefore military cadres ended up seeing drug traffickers as partners to 
protect a fictive Colombian self from Soviet imperialism. Thus, a hyperreal sympathy started 
to bring together legal/illegal private/official security forces. The rightwing interpretation that 
Betancur had nourished the communist threat by holding peace talks with FARC had put in 
place regional coalitions for violence that circulated a radicalised antipathy towards the 
unfolding socio-political power of the UP. 
Paramilitarisation overtakes militarisation: ‘a counterinsurgency 
warfare delegated to private actors’ (1987 –  1989) 
By the mid 1980s, some paramilitary and self-defence groups had teamed up with the drug 
traffickers‘ private armies in the Middle Magdalena Valley. A financial crisis within the 
political structure of the self-defence groups and the increasing wealth of drug traffickers, 
such as Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar, contributed to merge a mutually 
convenient alliance. The leading role of drug traffickers meant the modernisation of 
weaponry and the transnationalisation of the private armies training methods (Gutiérrez and 
Barón 2007: 290). Thus, from 1987 to 1989, the coalitions for violence of drug traffickers 
and violence entrepreneurs materialised in powerful paramilitary groups cutting across 
various regions. The intensity, directedness and connectedness of the relationship between 
paramilitary groups and the security forces (in particular the army and the police) increased 
due to a polarised political economy of affective-dispositions, based on the circulation of a 
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hyperreal sympathy amongst the perpetrators and a radicalised antipathy towards the UP. A 
perpetrator bloc, empowered by the monies of drug traffickers, thus shaped the geography of 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture: only in those regions where paramilitary groups did 
not take root, the violent campaign of the army did not escalate into genocidal violence. 
However, by 1988, the increasing power of drug traffickers brought about disagreements that 
started weakening the connectedness between security forces and paramilitary groups, 
thereby transforming the geography of the genocide and the structure of the perpetrator bloc. 
Private armies‘ violent practices against the UP changed along with the transformations in 
the perpetrator bloc. Fidel Castaño‘s MRN paramilitary group exemplifies it so clearly. While 
the group was emerging scattered violent actions selectively targeted trade unionists, by late 
1986 however the group intensified and systematised the killing of trade unionists involved in 
labour negotiations within the Banana Industry in Urabá. The important role the UP played in 
such negotiations allowed for the MRN to represent all of Sintrabanano union members as 
UP-FARC (El Espectador 1987i: 14).
3
 Thus, paramilitaries and army officers equated the 
assassinations of trade union members to UP-FARC‘s assassinations. This would explain 
why, according government statistics, 51 out of 55 political murders were UP members 
(Bejarano 1988). Nevertheless, MRN‘s violence against UP members was not restricted to 
Urabá. In 1987, the group had already committed more than 50 assassinations in Remedios 
and Segovia (El Espectador 1987h: 16A). Since Remedios and Segovia were UP strongholds, 
the violence was directly linked with the UP‘s political success (López 2007b: 136).    
The viciousness of Castaño‘s actions was to be demonstrated in the massacres that 
followed after November 1987. These massacres also evidenced the deployment of 
sophisticated methods of military planning which were related to Castaño‘s and some of his 
subordinates‘ participation in transnational training courses run by international mercenaries, 
such as Yair Klein. The JUCO massacre was the first of many massacres carried out by the 
Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Nacional Socialista –a command of the MRN (El Espectador 
1988e: 1A). The lack of response of the Colombian government, the passiveness, and in most 
cases complicity, of police and military officers allowed Castaño‘s to replicate similar 
massacres throughout 1988.
4
  
                                                 
3
 Trade unions signed a framework agreement with the government, which was to a great extent the result of the 
UP‘s and the Frente Popular‘s joint efforts (see REINICIAR 2006a).  
4
 Bejarano (1988) shows that businessmen supported by drug traffickers and military and civilian authorities 
(the Voltígeros Battalion in particular) aimed at those seen as linking guerrilla groups and trade unions. The 
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Fidel Castaño‘s anticommunism stemmed from his father‘s assassination by the FARC. 
Castaño‘s antipathy informed the process of building up his private army. He circulated a 
radicalised grammar of identity/alterity that represented the UP as dangerous other 
(undistinguishable from FARC). This enabled Castaño to cultivate a solidarity-bond with 
Middle Magdalena Valley anticommunist leader and deputy Pablo Guarín and drug 
traffickers. In Córdoba, for example, he teamed up with drug trafficker César Cure so as to 
‗clean up‘ the region from communists. As a result, more than 50 UP militants were 
murdered in the first four months of 1988 –most of the bodies were dumped into the Sinú 
River. However, Castaño‘s anticommunist actions in Córdoba were not an isolated private 
campaign against communism; the assassination of UP councilman Alfonso Cujavante and 
the Mejor Esquina Massacre coincided with the creation of the XI Brigade of the Army (see 
Romero 2003: 142). Indeed, according to the 1988 AI report, the systematic extermination of 
UP members, local leaders and human rights defenders seemed to show that death squads 
were operating under the authority of high rank army officers (El Espectador 1988a: 1A).  
By 1989 it was clear that Castaño‘s grudge with the UP had no limits. Pablo Escobar had 
made it clear in an interview with UP member Alvaro Salazar (Dudley 2004: 144). It was 
such the scale of UP assassinations ordered by Castaño that ―one of the nicknames Escobar 
gave Fidel was ‗2000‘, for the number of UP members he‘d allegedly killed‖ (Ibid.: 149-50). 
Albeit the unreliability of Escobar‘s statements (because of the conflictive relationship 
between kingpins); the massacres, assassinations and displacement in Castaño‘s controlled 
regions account for a very large number of UP victims during the crystallisation and 
solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.  
A similar process was developing in the Meta County where the Revolutionary Peasant 
Front (FRC) paramilitary group was carrying out assassinations of UP leaders. A flier 
distributed by the group in May 1987 in Villavicencio, after the assassination of three UP 
leaders, shows the circulation of antipathy that informed the systematic targeting of UP 
members in the region:  
 
The FRC openly recognises that it will continue with the military campaign to wipe out the 
UP… As true contra-revolutionaries and as an independent self-defence organisation, we are 
forced to save our country of those unpatriotic people that only seek to destroy our already 
weakened democracy (El Espectador 1987i: 14).  
                                                                                                                                                        
massacres committed in early 1988 sought to destroy this link and to generate terror in the wider population (see 
chapter 2). 
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Such a narrative exemplifies how different cliques of the perpetrator bloc inscribed with 
hyperreality the grammars of identity/alterity in the region. Thus, they turned to an 
antigrammar of destroying the UP in order to protect the fictive collective self that brought 
the perpetrators together: ‗a Colombian democracy-driven national identity‘. Upon this 
imagery, outlaws, such as Gacha and Víctor Carranza (an emerald dealer and cattle rancher), 
legitimated the alliance that allowed them to control most death squads in Meta and to secure 
economic benefits. The consolidation of this paramilitary alliance and the narratives it 
(re)produced also reinforced the decision made by military officers and rightwing political 
elites to exterminate the UP. UP leader Josué Giraldo‘s testimony is revealing in this regard: 
 
In San Martín, in the Hacienda Maputa… Senator (L) Hernando Durán Dussán, Meta‘s political 
entrepreneurs (L) Jorge Ariel Infante Leal and (C) Leovigildo Gutíerrez, and other traditional 
politicians met, in late 1986, with the Commanders of the IV Division and the VII Brigade of 
the Army to decide the social and political extermination of the UP (Giraldo 1997: 255). 
 
By 1987, the UP had been wiped out from San Martín, but the ‗clean up‘ of Vista Hermosa 
followed. Between 1987 and 1988 more than 300 murders were perpetrated in Vista Hermosa 
and El Castillo; according to Giraldo, the extent of the slaughter was such that UP members 
were forced to create a self-defence group and to request protection from the FARC (Ibid.: 
256). This developed into a war of positions between the UP-FARC‘s allies and a regional 
coalition for violence of the perpetrator bloc in which UP members were the target. What is 
worth noting is that the targeting of UP members was part of the ‗Plan Esmeralda‘, which 
aimed at wiping out the UP-PC‘s influence in Caquetá and Meta, two of the counties in 
which the UP superseded the Liberal and Conservative parties in the 1988 municipal 
elections (Cepeda 2006). This in fact developed into a genocidal campaign characterised by a 
series of massacres and the establishment of death camps associated with Carranza‘s 
paramilitary training schools. 
The proliferation of paramilitary groups in Meta reached its peak in early 1989 when there 
were, according to DAS estimates, at least 12 paramilitary groups operating.  DAS estimates 
contradicted the 1988 Human Rights Presidential Council Report, which contended that there 
was only one paramilitary group with various branches, one central command unit and many 
cells set up by army battalions. Yet, the fact is that the Carranza-Gacha alliance had spread 
the army officers‘ and political entrepreneurs‘ anticommunist campaign throughout the 
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county. In some cases the relationship was so close that, according to former paramilitary 
Camilo Zamora Guzmán‘s declaration, VII and X Brigade army officers and policemen were 
at the same time paramilitary soldiers (ASFADDES et al. 2000: 200). Gacha and Carranza 
financed the constitution of a network of death squads in various municipalities, such as San 
Martín, Vista Hermosa, and Mesetas. Carranza also built up a powerful standing private army 
headquartered in Puerto Lopez; his soldiers were trained in a paramilitary-training site known 
as the ‗60‘ school. Set up in the premises of Carranza‘s Hacienda San Juan, the school was 
one of the spaces in which geopolitical scripts circulated amongst il(legal) and trans(national) 
actors legitimising the radicalisation of antipathy towards the UP (see chapter 6). The school 
was also a detention and torture centre that eventually developed into a death camp. El 
Espectador‘s coverage of DAS Democracy Plan is significant in unveiling the genocidal 
practices: 
 
between 80 and 100 people, most of them UP sympathisers would be buried in the Hacienda 
San Pablo. The school had been functioning for three years and since then not only hundreds of 
individuals had been trained there… but many victims had been buried in mass graves… The 
victims were kidnapped in different zones in the Meta County and then taken to the Hacienda… 
then they went through monstrous experiments, such as acid-burning and chopping-off fingers, 
arms, and legs before being shot death and their bodies threw into mass graves (El Espectador 
1989i: 1A, 10A). 
 
Mayor of Puerto López Ricardo Bravo Contreras‘ attitude demonstrated the lack of 
‗political will‘ amongst regional elites to halt the slaughter, and their complicity, in many 
cases, with the genocidists. Because perpetrators widely publicised the persecution of UP 
members, it would have been almost impossible for the civil service not to notice the 
activities carried out in the hacienda. Even more so when Carranza had financed Bravo‘s 
political campaign (ASFADDES et al. 2000: 200). 
Although the consolidation of private armies in Meta, Córdoba and Urabá, Gacha‘s 
financial contribution to the Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defence Groups (AMMs) made 
it by far the most powerful army. The ‗profesionalisation‘ of private armies demanded 
sophisticated training centres. Gacha‘s hacienda ‗Las Galaxias‘ became the Middle 
Magdalena Valley‘s paramilitary training school. By 1988, the alliance between paramilitary 
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leader Henry Pérez and Gacha had materialised in a strong network of death squads,
5
 which 
became a regional private army capable of protecting the drug industry and fighting 
communism. In fact, between 1985 and 1987 former FARC member and paramilitary 
commander Alonso de Jesus Vaquero carried out the assassinations of hundreds of UP 
leaders in the Middle Magadalena Valley. Dudley‘s account is telling about the most vicious 
practices of the genocidal campaign: 
  
The men gathered their prey, brought them to designated areas, and massacred them. They then 
frequently dismembered their victims… and removed the intestines in a process they called a 
picalesco or ‗glutting‘. In this way, the corpses would sink to the bottom of the rivers, where no 
one would find them (2004: 66).  
   
AMMs effectiveness in cleansing the region from communists prompted political 
entrepreneurs in other regions to hire their services. I have discussed elsewhere how, for 
instance, when Cesar Pérez saw threatened his political power by the UP in Segovia, he 
turned to the MRN and AMMs for help (Gomez-Suarez 2007: 641-2). However, Gacha‘s 
alliance with political leaders was not free of conflict. This is demonstrated by his decision to 
order Guarín‘s assassination in order to accommodate the AMMs to his interests. Such 
actions also confirmed that political elites and the military were no longer able to exercise the 
same influence over paramilitary activities.
6
 Therefore, after 1987, Gacha‘s increasing power 
resulted in a rather instable alliance because self-defence leaders, such as Ramón Isaza,
7
 felt 
that their original interests were not been met (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 291).  
In this context, the DAS started to chase Gacha‘s AMMs. The first blow to the 
organisation occurred in April 1988 when DAS officers raided the headquarters of the 
Campesino Self-defence Force (CSF) paramilitary group. According to El Espectador, the 
documents confiscated demonstrated that Gacha was financing the CSF in order to protect his 
personal interests under a so-called war against communism. What is noteworthy to mention 
is that the CSF statutes claimed that (1) communism was to be annihilated, (2) that in the 
                                                 
5
 In the early 1980s, Henry Pérez established a contra-guerrilla group which also opposed drug trafficking, 
however, by 1985, a convenient alliance between Pérez and the Medellín DTOs started to grow (El Espectador 
1989g: 10A). 
6
 The autonomy AMMs gained from the military did not bring about the army‘s effort to pursue paramilitaries. 
On the contrary, according to a 1989 Attorney General report, the Army Brigade V and Division II overlooked 
AMMs‘ activities in the region. Furthermore, according to dwellers‘ accounts, the Del‘huyer Battalion protected 
paramilitaries responsible for one of the largest mass graves in the region (El Espectador 1989h: 1A, 13A).  
7
 Isaza formed a self-defence group in 1979. He gathered landowners and farmers and requested help from the 
Battalion to start killing ‗the supporters of guerrilla groups‘ in the Middle Magdalena Valley (Duncan 2006: 
246-7). 
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controlled regions, country dwellers had to join the group, and (3) that the organisation had to 
be kept secret (El Espectador 1988c: 13A). Thereafter the DAS campaign against Gacha 
intensified. By late 1988, the Democracy Plan had been drawn and had started to be deployed 
against his paramilitary group. Moreover, a secret report had been issued uncovering the 
relationship between military officers and the AMMs (see chapter 2). However, the apogee of 
the DAS campaign occurred from January to December 1989. This matched up with the drug 
traffickers‘ unfolding war on the Colombian establishment, which can arguably be seen as 
evolving from mid January (when the Rochela Massacre happened) and reaching its climax 
from August (when Galán was assassinated) to November (when DAS headquarters were 
bombed).
8
 Indeed, as a reaction to the Barco administration‘s decision to resume extraditing 
drug traffickers to the US, some members of Medellín drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) 
publicly declared a war on the Colombian government.
9
 This deepened the division within 
the perpetrator bloc. As a result, some groups, such as Castaño‘s, slowly started to set up an 
ambiguous alliance with Cali DTOs to distance themselves from Escobar, at the same time 
that some demobilised paramilitaries started to cooperate with enforcement agencies to hunt 
down Gacha and Escobar. The circulation of antipathy within some sectors of the perpetrator 
bloc brought about new dynamics in the regional coalitions for violence; such dynamics were 
also related to the transition from Reagan‘s geopolitics of the second cold war to Bush‘s 
geopolitics of a new world order, in which transnational narcoterrorism started being used as 
the script embodying the threat previously posed by Soviet imperialism (see chapter 5). 
Gacha was finally gunned down in December 1989 after a genocidal campaign against the 
UP which had not only taken the lives of hundreds of its members,
10
 but had also targeted the 
social network associated with it. 
Gacha had at least three reasons to wipe out the UP: (1) (and shared with other members 
within the perpetrator bloc) the UP had made public denouncements of the drug traffickers -
paramilitary groups alliance which forced the Barco administration to take some action 
against drug traffickers; (2) Gacha was fighting FARC for land control in coca-growing 
regions, and as the UP was represented as FARC‘s political party he turned against the easiest 
target: unarmed civilians; (3) (and borrowed from other members within the perpetrator bloc) 
                                                 
8
 For the Rochela Massacre see chapter 2. 
9
 Barco issued various Decrees after Galán‘s assassination, which sought to the crackdown of drug traffickers 
overwhelming power and to ban paramilitary groups (see Medina 1990). 
10
 Dudley contends that Gacha was responsible for roughly 25% of the UP assassinations carried out between 
1985 and 1989 (2004: 142).  
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the destruction of the UP meant to win the anticommunist campaign which had motivated 
other groups to ally with drug traffickers. The affective-dispositions behind these reasons 
show the complex polarisation of the political economy of sympathy/antipathy. By 
reproducing an anticommunist narrative Gacha was able to recreate a hyperreal sympathy 
with actors that in principle should have been chasing him. This allowed him to reinforce the 
circulation of a real antipathy towards FARC and to forge alliances to win the territorial 
dispute against it. His involvement in massacres against the UP was not the product of 
anticommunism; instead, it resulted from the reproduction of the FARC-UP script, which 
informed his decision to transfer the frontline of his battle against FARC to unarmed 
civilians. This matched Gacha‘s antipathy towards UP national leaders whose public 
statements had become a hindrance for him to smoothly run his illegal business.  
Notwithstanding the focus on these three regional cases similar patterns occurred in 
regions where the UP had some socio-political power; such was the case in the Magdalena 
County (see Zúñiga 2007: 236-8).  Nariño, however, followed a different dynamic. Although 
enforcement agencies saw with disregard UP members and sometimes illegally imprisoned 
some of them, assassinations, torture and displacement rarely occurred during the 1980s. This 
was so because (1) drug traffickers and paramilitaries were latecomers, only after 1990 they 
started entering the region; (2) the relationship between some regional elites and UP members 
was based on political collaboration rather than political competition, the system of alliances 
designed by the regional board succeeded in gaining municipal, departmental and national 
public seats, which armoured UP members against an elite-driven violence; furthermore, (3) 
FARC presence in the region was rather weak and within the peace process the commander 
of FARC‘s 8th Front –operating in Cauca and northern Nariño– was seen as a legitimate 
actor whom many traditional politicians visited.
11
 After 1987, when the peace process broke 
down, FARC‘s military strategy in the region focused on controlling southern Nariño. This 
brought about the creation of the 29th Front in 1990. The stepping up of FARC presence 
coincided with the incursion of paramilitary groups as well as with the rise of violence 
against the UP. Unlike in the case of Nariño, in southern counties such as Putumayo, the UP 
was the target of socio-political destruction. More research is needed in Putumayo, albeit the 
cases discussed here demonstrate that genocidal practices against the UP took place in 
regions in which (1) a multiplicity of interests was at stake and (2) the UP had been 
                                                 
11
 Interviews carried out in 2008 with former UP members in Nariño support this part of the analysis. 
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represented as a serious contender to the various actors‘ intention to gain and/or protect 
economic, social and/or political interests. Thus, in regions such as Nariño, where the 
narratives stemming from the armed conflict did not radicalise the grammars of 
identity/alterity, the circulation of sympathy for UP members succeeded in halting the 
mobilisation of antipathy. This avoided the establishment of a coalition for violence that 
could have polarised narratives seeking to secure the survival of a fictive collective self by 
resorting to an antigrammar of genocide. Put simply, although the army was central in 
circulating a radicalised antipathy towards the UP, it was only when coalitions for violence 
materialised that genocidal traps solidified and were integrated into the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture by the perpetrator bloc. 
Although drug traffickers played a central role in the solidification of the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture, the materialisation of regional genocidal traps cannot be understood 
in isolation from the circulation of the geopolitical scripts which contributed to forge regional 
coalitions for violence. Since the internal enemy was the script allowing actors with different 
interest to target the civilian social networks, they interpreted it as posing a threat to their 
interests. The multiplicity of interests and the changing geopolitical narratives, which 
chapters 4 to 7 explore in detail, made these coalitions instable but deadly. Although security 
forces put an end to some of these coalitions, new coalitions emerged, amongst which some 
sectors took advantage of the new geopolitical scripts in order to continue fighting the old 
hyperreal threat of (inter)national communism. 
1989 – 1991: The turmoil years within the perpetrator bloc  
After Gacha‘s killing Barco put forward the narrative that the violence against the UP was 
over. Such a simulacrum denied that regional coalitions for violence were still in place and 
that the UP was represented as a threat by different sectors of the perpetrator bloc. The war 
against the UP continued because sectors of the perpetrator bloc identified sectors associated 
with the UP as powerful actors, which were a hindrance to materialise their interest, would 
they be land appropriation, political power, or ideological homogeneity, in the context of an 
armed struggle.  
In the Middle Magdalena Valley, Gacha‘s death was the expression of conflicts between 
drug traffickers and paramilitary leaders. Yet, it helped to consolidate an ‗anti-Medellín 
Cartel alliance‘ between Cali DTOs and some paramilitaries, which speeded up paramilitary 
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leaders‘ search for autonomy from Medellín DTOs (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 292-3). This 
regional coalition for violence continued targeting UP leaders as part of their contra-guerrilla 
campaign. Although Gacha‘s death prompted the demobilisation of some paramilitary groups 
in Cundinamarca (El Espectador 1990c: 12A), the regional coalition for violence continued 
because of  
 
a range of intersections, product of alliances and ruptures between violent agents, political elites 
and inhabitants, which… end[ed] up generating an explosive mix of private and collective 
interests (Garzón quoted in Duncan 2006: 249).  
 
Nevertheless, an important part of the Middle Magdalena Valley coalition for violence was 
finally dismantled in January 1992, when paramilitary leader Ariel Otero was gunned down.
12
 
By then most of the 1980s paramilitary commanders had been killed by emerging 
paramilitary leaders or incarcerated and a new process of reorganization amongst new 
violence entrepreneurs started (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 294). 
In Meta, Victor Carranza remained at the top of paramilitary groups. The Macetos, in the 
Ariari region, and the Carranceros, in eastern Meta expanded their control from Puerto López 
and Puerto Gaitán to El Dorado and San Martín, former Gacha‘s strongholds. The 
consolidation of Carranza‘s network of death squads was so successful that it gave rise in the 
late 1990s to the Campesino Self-defence Force of Meta and Vichada. By the turn of the 
1990s, however, the Macetos were not only operating in Meta but were also expanding to 
Casanare with the financial support of big landowners. This gave rise to the Campesino Self-
Defence Force of Casanare, which carried on with wiping out the UP (González 2007: 318).  
In Córdoba, Fidel Castaño continued the cleansing of the UP. As a result, by early 1990, 
the UP participated in the polls as a rather small force within a broader coalition; this 
contrasted with the growing political power the UP had shown in the 1988 elections (Romero 
2003: 145). In March 1990, the second UP President was assassinated by a suizo trained by 
Fidel‘s brother: Carlos Castaño. Suizos, as Dudley explains, ―were mostly trouble teenagers 
who were lured into the Mafia by a short pep talk and the prospect of earning some fast 
money‖ (2004: 154). They were trained to carry out assassinations without knowing that they 
were most probably to be killed during the execution of the plan. Jaramillo was assassinated 
in Bogotá airport and, as it occurred with previous assassinations, Barco immediately blamed 
                                                 
12
 Ariel Otero had replaced Henry Pérez in the leadership of the AMMs. Pérez had been gunned down in mid 
1991.  
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the Medellín Cartel. Blaming Escobar allowed Barco (1) to continue to wage a war against 
the Medellín DTOs, (2) to protect Fidel Castaño who was joining forces with the government 
and the Cali DTOs to dismantle Escobar‘s drug empire, and (3) to protected DAS officers 
who had been involved in Jaramillo‘s assassination and many other plots against UP national 
leaders.
13
 The circulation of antipathy towards drug traffickers and sympathy for security 
agencies fuelled the indifference of broader sectors of social networks vis-à-vis the suffering 
of the UP because what was at stake was the very survival of Colombian institutions. 
However, at the regional level sympathy amongst the perpetrator bloc and antipathy towards 
the UP continued to maintain an antigrammar of genocide that enabled to secure multiple 
benefits to various legal/illegal, private/public, armed/unarmed actors.  
Shortly after Jaramillo‘s assassination, some warlords announced their intention of 
dismantling their armies. By November 1990, Fidel Castaño announced that he had 
disintegrated his private army operating in Córdoba and Antioquia and that had distributed 
land among peasant communities (El Espectador 1990b: 13A). His rather surprising decision 
had been informed by two events at the regional level. On the one hand, during 1990, the 
EPL discussed with Castaño the possibility of an eventual demobilisation (Romero 2003: 
146). On the other hand, as the UP‘s political power in Córdoba and Antioquia had been 
broken down, traditional political entrepreneurs recovered control of public offices making 
unlikely the prosecution of actors involved in the regional coalition for violence. Fidel 
Castaño‘s short-term decision allowed his younger brother Carlos to slowly start taking over 
the paramilitary project. This, together with a CIA-Pentagon advisory commission formed by 
the US government to develop a set of national security recommendations for Colombia‘s 
Ministry of Defence (see chapter 4), meant yet another metamorphosis of the perpetrator 
bloc. By the mid 1990s, ACCU had started concentrating coercion (Romero 2007a: 417).  
Late 1990 and 1991 was then a turning point in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. 
Firstly, the UP‘s political power had been almost extinguished (see chapter 2). Secondly, the 
perpetrator bloc had started to transit from an acephalous to a more hierarchical network, in 
which there was still chance for decentralized decision-making. The transformation unfolded 
because the weakening of Middle Magdalena Valley paramilitary groups and Carlos 
Castaño‘s takeover of the paramilitary project in Cordoba and Urabá converged. This 
reinforced Castaño‘s ambition to expand the paramilitary project to Meta and to build up a 
                                                 
13
 http://www.elespectador.com/node/187096/print  (retrieved 31 May 2010) 
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national paramilitary network. During this transition Cali DTOs played an important role 
within the perpetrator bloc which enabled the creation, in 1992, of ‗Los Pepes‘ (People 
Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), an experience that, as Duncan (2006: 276) recalls, would 
strengthen Castaño‘s self-defence project.  
More important, regarding the genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá throughout the 
1990s, was the consolidation of the Gaviria-EPL peace talks. As a result of poor 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policies, a dissident EPL faction 
created the Comandos Populares (hereafter Comandos). This militia group sought apparently 
to protect former EPL soldiers from the FARC; the anti-FARC discourse and the UP-FARC 
script allowed them to ally later on with Carlos Castaño‘s paramilitary groups. They were the 
core structure of the regional coalition for violence which annihilated the last UP stronghold. 
Before turning to this issue, it needs to be emphasised that during the consolidation of George 
H. W. Bush‘s new world order geopolitics and the disintegration of the communist bloc some 
guerrilla groups demobilised; this created a con-text for some ‗anticommunist drug 
traffickers‘ to disarm their private armies and to attempt to legalise their socio-economic 
power by siding with the international efforts to dismantle the Medellín Cartel. Such temporal 
alliance based on hyperreal sympathy enabled a two-front war: against subversives who had 
not demobilised and drug traffickers unwilling to submit to Colombian traditional elites. 
The reconstitution of paramilitary groups: toward a more hierarchical 
perpetrator bloc (1992 –  1997) 
Although Fidel Castaño disarmed large part of his paramilitary structure in Córdoba, death 
squads continued sporadically operating in the region under his orders during 1991. 
Furthermore, between 1992 and 1993, Fidel and Carlos Castaño participated in Gaviria‘s 
campaign to hunt down Pablo Escobar. This put them in contact with other rich drug 
traffickers, high ranking army officers, national political and social elites, and big land 
owners who agreed that after Escobar, FARC was the largest national security threat. The 
Castaños‘ twofold campaign: against ‗FARC supporters‘ in Córdoba and against Escobar in 
the cities matched with Gaviria‘s ‗integral war‘, which was publicly declared in 1992 but had 
as precedent the attack to FARC‘s headquarters in December 1990 (see chapter 5). Gaviria‘s 
war on two fronts, against drug trafficking (exclusively, the Medellín Cartel) and insurgency 
(mainly, FARC), allowed a multiplicity of legal/illegal alliances that brought together 
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different political, economic and social cliques and clusters under one solidarity-bond once 
Escobar was gone: an anti-FARC mentality. In this polarised context, and because of the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, FARC turned to drug trafficking to increase its 
finances and to strengthen its military might. In 1994, partially because of FARC‘s 
unprecedented military build up, but also thanks to their participation in the alliance against 
Escobar, Fidel and Carlos Castaño decided to (re)build a cohesive hierarchical 
counterinsurgency to bring down the FARC (cf. Romero 1999). The ACCU theatre of 
operations was Urabá. 
In 1994, Urabá was the last UP stronghold (see Suárez 2007: 140). Although the UP had 
been the target of vicious violent campaigns between 1992 and 1993, its socio-political 
network still survived. The constitution of the ACCU, however, brought about a 
transformation both in the genocidal campaign and the perpetrator bloc. By 1997, the ACCU-
led coalition for violence had destroyed the UP‘s political power and its social fabric. As the 
UP and FARC were represented as part of the same collective self, the UP genocide and 
FARC‘s retreat to other regions was represented as a successful counterinsurgency campaign. 
Nevertheless, what in fact occurred was that a socio-political order had been reconstituted 
benefiting transnational companies, traditional socio-political elites, drug traffickers, and 
emergent socio-economic elites. Therefore, between 1995 and 1996, the genocidal campaign 
against the UP was not only a side effect of the ACCU‘s war on FARC, as most scholars and 
the national media interpret it. Instead, it was mainly a campaign that targeted a civilian 
social network because multiple actors saw its socio-political power as an obstacle to achieve 
(or maintain) economic, political and social benefits (cf. Romero 2003: 205-11). The 
campaign was scripted by sectors of the perpetrator bloc as counterinsurgency; therefore 
victims were represented as FARC supporters. However, to reduce the UP genocide to the 
anticommunist ideology (re-branded as anti-FARC) shared by army officers and paramilitary 
leaders alike is to simplify the complex motives that brought other groups into the perpetrator 
bloc. 
 The massacres, assassinations, and other violent actions carried out by the Comandos 
between 1992 and 1994 did not follow an anticommunist logic. Rather, these assaults were 
related to the demobilisation of a large sector of the EPL and the creation of the political 
movement Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (hereafter Esperanza), in March 1991. As the Gaviria 
administration (1990-1994) portrayed the political reintegration of EPL members as a 
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solution to the conflictive tensions in Urabá and reinforced the simulacrum that Fidel Castaño 
had completely disarmed his paramilitary structure, the decision was made to dismantle the 
military rule, which had been in place since 1988 (see chapter 2). Gaviria also offered public 
posts to Esperanza members and the possibility to join security agencies to ex-EPL fighters. 
However, as the demobilisation of the EPL had not exclusively been the product of 
insurgency-government talks, but Fidel Castaño played an important role in it, FARC and 
UP-PC members observed the process with distrust; such distrust was reinforced by the 
resettlement of a considerable number of EPL social networks in Castaño‘s illegally 
appropriated territories. Moreover, UP leaders interpreted the administration‘s backing of 
Esperanza as a way of weakening the UP‘s political power. Although FARC did not publicly 
target Esperanza members (hereafter Esperanzados), most scholars contend that FARC‘s 
Milicias Bolivarianas and the 5th Front started harassing Esperanzados soon after they 
disarmed (i.e., Romero 2003; Ortíz 2007; Suárez 2007). However, in early 1992 violence 
escalated when Francisco Caraballo‘s EPL dissident front started carrying out assassinations 
and kidnappings of Esperanzados together with FARC (Ramírez 1997: 99-101).
14
 Such 
actions were legitimated through a narrative that portrayed Esperanzados as betrayers 
because of their relationship with the police, the army, and the DAS. In fact, Esperanzados‘ 
statements in reintegration workshops show that security agencies sought to integrate them 
into intelligence operations so as to strengthen the counterinsurgency campaign against 
FARC (López de la Roche 1999: 170).  
The success of the UP in the 1992 elections contrasted with a rather poor performance of 
Esperanza. This political failure, together with the lack of coherent DDR policies (Ibid.: 171), 
placed (many) Esperanzados in an awkward situation, thereby having to choose between 
marginalising themselves from society so as to show that they were not betraying the 
revolutionary ideal or collaborating with state agencies so as to show their willingness to be 
part of Colombian society. Having decided to reintegrate into society, Esperanzados sided for 
cooperation with security agencies. However, such a decision was not free of ambiguity for 
some Esperanzados decided to rearm and join the Milicias Obreras de San José. This gave 
rise the Comandos Populares –a mix of urban militia and paramilitary group that teamed up 
with DAS and regional elites until 1994 and targeted UP-PC regional leaders who were 
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 The EPL dissidence and FARC sealed a pact during the CGSB-Gaviria peace talks. Once the peace process 
broke down, all guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN and EPL) escalated violence against the establishment. As 
Esperanzados were linked with security agencies, they became military targets in the eyes of the guerrillas. 
Gaviria‘s ambiguous peace policy contributed to the radicalisation of guerrilla groups (see Medina 2009: 81-6). 
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represented as the FARC‘s socio-political network (Ramírez 1997: 120). The suspension of 
the Gaviria-CGSB peace talks in March 1992 contributed to FARC‘s escalation of violence 
against the Comandos and its ‗civilian support network‘ (namely Esperanza), at the same 
time that the security forces‘ incapacity to protect Esperanzados from violent actions 
contributed to their radicalisation. The rearming of some Esperanzados and the violent 
campaign against the UP fuelled with callousness FARC‘s grammars of identity/alterity; this 
produced a violent campaign against the ‗EPL‘ which reached its peak in January 1994, when 
FARC committed the Chinita Massacre. This massacre became a central episode in the 
circulation of antipathy towards the UP, by both the Comandos and state institutions. The 
Comandos‘ response was to further escalate violence against the UP, whereas biased judicial 
investigations were carried out against UP regional leaders while being victims of illegal 
imprisonment –about hundred UP leaders in the region were victims of illegal imprisonment 
between 1994 and 1997 (REINICIAR 2006a: 122).  
Although the Comandos justified their existence as the last resort to avoid and neutralize 
the violence carried out by the dissident EPL group against Esperanza, it made clear, since 
April 1993, that two UP-PC members would be killed for each Esperanza‘s member 
assassinated.
15
 The political enmity between Esperanza and the UP produced thus a genocidal 
reaction of the Comandos, which was legitimated by the FARC-UP script that circulated 
through the narrative that ―UP public statements were not critical enough of FARC‘s actions‖ 
(Suárez 2007: 145). This was exploited further by security agencies in their campaign to 
clamp down on the links between FARC and civilian networks. UP public officers denounced 
the vicious levels of violence, yet the slow pace of the judicial investigations contributed to 
the proliferation of death squads such as ‗Urabá‘s Pacifying Army‘ which were too keen on 
targeting the UP.
16 
In December 1993, when the Comandos committed the Cativos and Ceja 
massacres, it was clear that any person associated with the UP was a target. In this context, 
the Chinita Massacre in an Esperanza-influenced neighbourhood reinforced the political 
enmity between UP-PC and Esperanza, which allowed observer-interpreters to continue 
representing the violence in Urabá as an ongoing degenerate war between EPL and FARC. 
According to El Tiempo, for example,   
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 http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/Por-lo-menos-sus-nombres-8 (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
16
 Only up until August 2006, the Public Prosecutor‘s Office started investigating into Los Cativos Massacre 
(http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/pag/divulga/noticias2006/DH/DhPatrioticaAgo31.htm retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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every time a group of workers is killed, Mario Agudelo, on behalf of the Esperanza, or Luis 
Antonio Tapias, on behalf o the PC-UP, claim that they are sympathizers of their 
organizations… this demonstrates that there is a dispute between the political groups and the 
guerrillas for the control of the region… therefore, [businessmen] call for the re-militarisation of 
Urabá and to cancel the 1994 polls.
17
  
 
Notwithstanding both the UP and Esperanza argued for carrying out the political contest as a 
demonstration of resistance against the perpetrators, the national and regional media 
presented Esperanza as the victim of a strong UP-FARC alliance. This circulation of 
antipathy towards the UP weakened the political manoeuvre of the group and legitimated the 
violence against it. Moreover, judicial investigations weakened further the capacity of the UP 
to design political strategies to halt the violence. Although the UP and Esperanza (and other 
political groups) reached a political agreement to elect the Mayor of Apartadó, the violence 
against the group did not stop. In 1994, the Castaños‘ death squads started entering the region 
and sided with the Comandos in their war against FARC. Though paramilitary leaders‘ 
statements are far from reliable, it is telling that Hébert Veloza (alias H.H.) declared in a 
public audience in July 2008 that the reason why so many people were killed in Urabá when 
they were entering the region was that 
 
we used former EPL members as informants and teamed up with the Comandos Populares. We 
based our actions in black lists they gave us and without verifying whether they were guerrilla 
fighters or not we ordered their assassinations. Then we found they were innocent.
18  
 
Such a narrative shows the anti-FARC mentality that legitimated the violence against 
civilians, but hides away the use of terror as a mechanism of controlling the population and 
imposing new norms of behaviour and forcing new solidarity-bonds. H.H. however 
recognised later in the same interview that the asymmetrical military might between the 
ACCU (at the time under formation) and the FARC was such that the ACCU resorted to 
terrorising the population so as to force them to stop supporting FARC. 
 The return of Castaño‘s death squads to the region can be traced back to April 1994, when 
100 paramilitaries killed and burned down the houses of ‗FARC supporters‘ in Turbo. Next 
they gathered the survivors and threatened those they considered as FARC‘s civilian 
networks. This became a widespread practice in traditional communist strongholds because 
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 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-272247 (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/L/la_verdad_no_se_cuenta_en_un_dia/la_verdad_no_se_c
uenta_en_un_dia.asp (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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of the circulation of the PC-FARC script. However, in early 1994, different groups, such as 
the ‗Profesionales‘ and ‗Hijos del Pueblo‘, were also targeting the UP. After September 1994 
Carlos Castaño had partially set the ground for establishing a hierarchical structure to control 
the various death squads operating in the region and to integrate them into one line of 
command. Thus, Castaño‘s Tangueros became the structure around which different death 
squads amalgamated. By late 1995, the Comandos had also been subsumed under the ACCU. 
The Comandos‘ political enmity and the paramilitaries‘ anti-FARC discourse created a script 
that became the signifier of their antigrammar of destruction: ‗civilian guerrillas‘. Hence, 
military power was not used to directly attack FARC; instead, it was used against the UP, as 
the Aracatazo,19 Los Kunas and Bajo del Oso massacres demonstrate (see Suárez 2008: 60). 
 The consolidation of the ACCU in 1995 was not exclusively related to the centralisation of 
coercion and finance within the network of death squads operating in the region. Instead, it 
was linked with the counterinsurgency strategy of Army Brigade XVII (Romero 2003), 
which under the command of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río stepped up its operations against 
FARC. The tough stand against the guerrillas was shared by the military cadre in the region 
and forcefully supported by Governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe who invested Gen. del Río 
with the control of public order. This together with President Samper‘s constant concessions 
to the military due to the scripting of Colombia as a narcodemocracy in US foreign policy 
(see chapter 5), allowed the consolidation of the perpetrator bloc that finished off the social 
fabric of the UP in Urabá. The perpetrator bloc operated in a genocidal conjuncture which 
lasted roughly from 1995 until 1997. The army played an important role in the materialisation 
of such a conjuncture not only because of the counterinsurgency campaign against FARC but 
also because Gen. del Río decided to protect Esperanza‘s settlements leaving the UP-PC 
without protection (Romero 2003: 180). After all, in Gen. del Río‘s and military cadres‘ view 
the UP and FARC were the same. Commander of Armed Forces Gen. Harold Bedoya, for 
example, circulated the UP-FARC script in public statements by arguing that ―those who are 
against zones under military rule cooperate with guerrilla groups‖ (Yarce 1996: 8A). The UP 
was thus an easy target for the military campaign of the ACCU (Suárez 2007: 165). Army 
officers‘ circulation of sympathy for Esperanza and antipathy towards the UP reinforced the 
structuring of the antigrammar of genocide that produced in 1996 the largest number of 
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 http://www.verdadabierta.com/nunca-mas/40-masacres/202-masacres-el-modelo-colombiano-impuesto-por-
los-paramilitares- (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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displacement and mass killings of UP socio-political networks (cf. Ortíz 2007: 160; Suárez 
2007: 169). 
From 1994 to 1997, the core of the regional coalition for violence was the ACCU. It 
carried out the first massacres against the UP in Turbo and then moved slowly towards 
Apartadó, Chigorodó and San José de Apartadó (Eje Bananero). Once the ACCU 
accomplished the destruction of the UP in the Eje Bananero and defeated the three remaining 
EPL dissident blocs, many former guerrilla fighters joined the paramilitary group (see 
Aranguren 2002: 229-32). Then, the ACCU and Army Brigade XVII continued the targeting 
in the Uraba-Chocoano. The alliance between the ACCU and the army was evident in the 
Operación Génesis, in which 12 paramilitaries guided the air strike carried out by the Army 
Brigades IV and XVII against FARC 57
th
 Front and its ‗social strongholds‘.20 According to 
Carlos Miguel Ortiz (2007: 160), the reason for the genocidal campaigns in the Urabá-
Chocoano was that the FARC had lost the war in Apartadó and had to retreat to Riosucio. If 
this is one of the motives, it does not suffice to understand the cruelty of the campaign, which 
produced the largest cleansing in the region with more than 10.000 people expelled. The 
political dimension has to be taken into account, if only because the Mayor of Bojayá was 
part of a political coalition of which the UP was a central actor. Even though families 
resettled in Paravandó so as to survive the violence; they did not escape paramilitary attacks, 
as Operación Cacaria continued until March 1997.
21
 The convergence of paramilitary-
military operations sealed the expelling of the UP-PC from the Urabá-Chocoano –in August 
1997 the few survivors left Bojayá (REINICIAR 2006a: 173).  
By mid 1997, the ACCU had won the dispute for territorial control in Urabá. The ACCU 
directly targeted what was represented as the socio-political network of FARC, thereby all 
those broadly labelled as ‗UP‘ were the target of violence. The extent of the genocidal 
campaign that included diverse plans, such as Plan Retorno, Plan Golpe de Gracia, and Plan 
Nudo Negro, overlapped spatially and temporally with the aforementioned army operations 
and paramilitary campaigns. The perpetrator bloc was then a network of multiple groups in 
which the ACCU had established a powerful position. The targeting of the UP was to 
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 The levels of violence in the region are telling: 2950 homicides between 1995 and 1997, 39105 internally 
displaced people between 1995 and 2005 (Suárez 2007: 238). For Operación Génesis see 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/justicia-y-paz/2129-doce-paramilitares-fueron-guias-del-ejercito-en-la-
operacion-genesis (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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 http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/54-generales/2294-corte-suprema-no-juzgara-a-rito-
alejo-del-rio (retrieved 18 April 2010) 
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continue, but with the political cleansing of Urabá the new task was to build a new socio-
political network so as to legitimise the economic benefits they had achieved by the 
destruction of the social fabric of the civilian social network that had challenged traditional 
social structures in the region.  
Although dislocated communities attempted to isolate themselves from politics, they 
continued to be targets of violence. In order to avoid the annihilation, the few communities 
remaining in Urabá resigned to their political identity and sought to rebuild a social fabric 
around the idea of establishing ‗peace communities‘ highlighting their unarmed character and 
neutrality vis-à-vis the illegal and legal armed actors of the conflict. The decision made by 
the fragmented civilian social network was followed by the decision made by the UP regional 
board to withdraw from the political contest in July 1997. This finally broke the regional 
social fabric that the PC had built since the late 1960s and that had flourished during the 
1980s and early 1990s. Contrary to Suárez‘s (2007: 177) claim that the UP‘s decision aimed 
to avoid ‗total politicide‘, one may argue that such a decision was the very expression of the 
ongoing genocide, whereby the perpetrator bloc (1) had succeeded in destroying the social 
power of the UP and (2) was putting into place the grammars of identity/alterity needed for 
the construction of a new social fabric of the regional body politic. The ACCU‘s genocidal 
campaign had set the foundations for a new social fabric, which was to be shaped by the 
paramilitarisation of economic, political, and social networks led by the newly founded AUC. 
In this context, those remnants who did not want to comply with the new body politic and had 
been once associated with the UP continued to be the target of destruction. Not only through 
assassinations and massacres against the peace community of San José de Apartadó the UP 
genocide continued. It also continued by the targeting of less organised peasant communities 
throughout the country which were stigmatised as guerrillas because of their previous 
sympathy for the UP. To analyse the coalitions for violence of such episodes turns the last 
part of this chapter. Before doing so, it is worth noting that, geopolitical narratives were 
aiding the continuation of the genocide in a conjuncture in which, paradoxically, the first 
Clinton administration was institutionalising the human rights discourse at the centre of US 
geopolitics. Because sectors of the administration sought to counterbalance what they 
depicted as a narco-state, they circulated sympathy for the very military cadres that were 
teaming up with the ACCU. Washington and Urabá were thus linked together by a foreign 
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policy that helped the free circulation of il(legal) sectors of the perpetrator bloc (see chapters 
4 and 5). 
The rise and fall of a narcoparamili tary-led perpetrator bloc (1998 –  
2006)  
The ACCU‘s consolidation in Urabá encouraged Carlos Castaño to propose to various 
paramilitary groups operating in different regions of the country, such as the Self-defence 
forces of the Eastern Plains, the Self-defence forces of Casanare, and the Self-defence forces 
of the Middle Magdalena, to form a national umbrella organization. In April 1997, the AUC 
were created. Although the paramilitary structures maintained a large degree of autonomy, 
the attempt was twofold: first, to coordinate the violent campaigns against FARC and its 
network of supporters at the national level and second, to consolidate a dominant position 
within the international drug trafficking industry so as to finance the war against FARC and 
benefit from immense economic revenues (see Aranguren 2002: 199-203; chapter 6 discusses 
this in more detail). This is not to say, however, that there was not competition between the 
different paramilitary structures; the uneven concentration of coercion and capital made the 
AUC a rather instable alliance. Hence, violent disputes between paramilitary groups regularly 
emerged. On 6 June 2001, Carlos Castaño left the military leadership of the organization and 
became with Ernesto Baez the ‗political‘ leader of the AUC. This demonstrated internal 
disputes which escalated the following years and ended in Castaño‘s disappearance in mid 
2004 (Romero 2007a). 
Nevertheless, between 1997 and 2001, the coordination between paramilitary groups and 
the army in ‗counterinsurgency operations‘ was widespread –paramilitary leaders‘ statements 
in public audiences in the framework of the Justice and Peace Law have largely documented 
this. One of the many joint counterinsurgency operations carried out across the country shows 
that the target continued to be the social fabric of a civilian network closely associated with 
FARC –the UP. In July 1997, the ACCU with help from the army carried out the Mapiripan 
Massacre in Meta. The massacre in which more than 60 people perished occurred because 
peasants were portrayed as guerrillas for they had been UP sympathizers.
22
 Although the UP 
had been wiped out from Meta in the mid 1990s, the antipathy towards civilians continued 
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circulating among the military because of FARC‘s military build-up in the region. Thus, they 
portrayed the social fabric of civilian social networks as a threat that had to be dealt with and 
saw the ACCU as an ally in securing a particular collective self.
23
 
 The collusion between state institutions and narcoparamilitary groups was not restricted to 
the army, the police, and the security agencies. New intelligence units were created thanks to 
the processes of re-legalisation of self-defence groups that started in 1994 (see chapter 5). 
This contravened the legislation that Barco put into place to outlaw paramilitary groups (see 
chapter 2). However, it matched with the recommendations issued by the 1991 CIA-Pentagon 
advisory commission to the Ministry of Defence. The creation of ‗Convivir‘ was supported 
by US security agencies and intellectuals of statecraft. A 2001 Rand report for example 
argued that 
 
Convivir… based on the neighborhood watch concept, was deliberately set up to avoid the 
appearance of the outlawed paramilitary groups. Convivir was a way of involving people in the 
struggle against the subversive organizations without organizing them as militias. These groups 
performed intelligence functions for the security forces and became the targets of guerrilla 
attack… the Convivir groups were not allowed to carry rifles or heavier weapons needed to 
defend themselves effectively against guerrilla attacks. They could carry only side arms… The 
Convivir groups were declared illegal, allegedly on the grounds that some of them had begun to 
arm themselves unlawfully and had morphed into ―illegal‖ self-defense groups (Rabasa and 
Chalk 2001: 54). 
 
 However, the genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá shows that the 13 Convivir, 
created in April 1997, became part of the perpetrator bloc even before ‗allegedly arming 
themselves‘. If only because Convivir allowed the circulation of ‗counterinsurgency‘ 
information that aided the reproduction of the idea that all the multiple legal/illegal actors 
belonged to the same hyperreal collective self who was at war against an ‗other‘ whose 
power was represented in the social fabric of civilian social networks which enabled the  
FARC‘s military build-up. The extent to which Convivir contributed to organise the finances 
of the AUC while were still legal was first made public when former paramilitary commander 
H.H. stated that ―convivir were a legal figure used by the AUC to collect protection 
rackets.‖24 Thus, the AUC laundered the contributions of various economic groups, including 
transnational companies. Raúl Hasbún, a businessman in the banana industry and 
paramilitary commander ‗Pedro Ponte‘ in 1997, confirmed H.H.‘s statements. According to 
                                                 
23
 http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/secreto-militares/84643.aspx (retrieved 20 April 2010). 
24
http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/L/la_verdad_no_se_cuenta_en_un_dia/la_verdad_no_se_c
uenta_en_un_dia.asp (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
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Semana‘s transcription of Hasbún‘s confession, Government Secretary of Antioquia Pedro 
Juan Moreno told him to create twelve Convivir. When these units started operating they 
consisted of 150 people each, 800 radios, cars, and weapons. Moreover, in order to finance 
them, 
 
Carlos Castaño had many meetings with companies working in the banana industry, and he was 
able to reach an agreement where the companies would pay CONVIVIR three percent of every 
box of bananas exported... These payments continued until 2003 in cases such as that of 
Chiquita Brands.
25 
 
Castaño‘s interest in financing Convivir was not only related to gathering intelligence 
information on FARC for the army and the police, but mainly to support the ACCU‘s war on 
‗FARC‘.  
 
Without sacrificing the image of a respectable businessman, Hasbún became the head of a 
bloody and ambitious paramilitary group that worked under the guide of Vicente Castaño. 
Hasbún used information that he gathered from CONVIVIR units for the purposes of the 
paramilitary group. He said that the twelve CONVIVIR groups in Urabá worked as a network. 
The information that they gathered was sent directly to him, as a paramilitary head, at the same 
time that it was sent to the military and police.
26 
 
These very same units, which had been made illegal in December 1997, collected the 
intelligence information that informed Hasbún‘s decision to commit the San José de Apartadó 
Massacre of 1998.
27
 Convivir units armed themselves and then carried out the destruction of 
the peace community of San José de Apartadó as part of the UP genocide (cf. Suárez 2007: 
247). Even though the Samper administration created a special military unit to pursue them, 
the unit‘s poorly structured operations enabled these illegal self-defence groups to remain 
armed (Leal 2002: 139). 
 Suárez (2007: 175) argues that the establishment of Convivir just before the ending of the 
war of reciprocal-extermination was central in securing the victory of paramilitary groups: 
Convivir became the apparatuses that allowed the gathering of information giving them an 
advantage against FARC. Although one may partially agree with Suárez: Convivir 
contributed to the expulsion of FARC from Urabá, one might argue that to see the violence 
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 http://www.semana.com/noticias-proceso-de-paz/confesiones-hasbun/116205.aspx (retrieved 18 April 2010). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Hasbún ―ordered the massacre because the town was so secluded... that it wasn‘t worth it to make an 
incursion just to kill one or two people;‖ therefore, ―they killed the largest amount of people that could possibly 
be associated with the FARC‖ (Ibid.). 
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against the UP as part of a degenerate war between FARC and an EPL-Paramilitary alliance 
gives some hints of the viciousness of the ongoing armed conflict in Colombia, but it does 
not actually allow to understand the different logics behind the violence.
28
 Thus, Convivir 
were part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which the UP genocide occurred; they 
articulated different subjects, objects, spaces, and times in multiplex violent campaigns aimed 
at the destruction of the social power of a civilian network scripted as ‗FARC-supporters‘.29 
This explains why the UP genocide continued through the targeting of communities, 
regardless if they attempted to create mechanisms of resistance or not so as to give meaning 
to their political identity. In the case of the peace community of San José de Apartadó, four 
massacres were carried out; altogether, more than 100 members were assassinated between 
March 1997 and December 2001 (Ibid.: 184). The mass killings did not reach larger numbers 
if only because international humanitarian agencies provided shelter for the community (see 
chapter 7). 
 If, by 1997, the genocidal campaign in Urabá had enabled the return of traditional parties 
to public offices, after 2002, when the peace community had been diminished, the AUC 
started to exercise a direct socio-political control in the region by creating strong alliances 
with emergent political forces (López 2007b). The consolidation of the rising power of the 
AUC since the mid 1990s –when the ACCU expelled FARC from el Eje Bananero– had, by 
the late 1990s, transformed Urabá from a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture into a ‗peaceful 
space‘ in which a new body politic could emerge upon a paramilitary-politician alliance –
which indeed elected senators up until 2006 (Ibid.: 163-181). The ‗Urabá territory of peace‘ 
script circulated among political, economic, and social actors nationwide thus contributing to 
spread the project from Antioquia to other regions of the country. In this con-text, the AUC-
Uribe negotiations not only aimed to disarm the paramilitary groups but to finish 
institutionalising the new body politic. Romero‘s (2007b) edited volume is an excellent 
attempt to unveil the processes of forming the ‗body (para)politics‘ during Pastrana and the 
first Uribe administrations (1998-2006), which cannot be discussed in detail here. Suffice it 
to say that the institutionalisation of the body politic and the Uribe-AUC negotiations (which 
                                                 
28
 This line of argumentation reproduces the narratives of the perpetrators. Thus, Suárez argues that ―there is no 
need for the victims to be combatants and the availability of reliable information supporting such a claim, but 
what is needed is for the perpetrator to represent his victim as a combatant‖ (2008: 65). This neglects the 
importance of the social power that victims have, product of their position in social networks. 
29
 One needs, therefore, to be sceptical of Steele‘s (2009: 423) suggestion of using the idea of ‗collective‘ 
targeting in order to explain the violence against the peace community. 
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led to the demobilisation of 30000 paramilitary fighters in 2006) converged with the formal 
withdrawal of legal recognition of the UP as a political party. Although assassinations of 
survivors rose during the first Uribe administration, the violence was to be represented by the 
government as episodic and the perpetrators as criminals acting purely for circumstantial 
reasons. 
 It is not surprising that the violence against the survivors of the UP genocide escalated 
during the early days of the Uribe administration; Uribe continuously circulated the UP-
FARC script and laid it over former UP members.
30
 As his administration matched with 
George W. Bush‘s geopolitics of the war on terror, the narcoterrorist guerrillas script became 
the empty signifier through which sympathy for the security forces, antipathy towards former 
UP leaders, indifference for the survivors, and the oblivion of the UP genocide circulated. 
What seems surprising, however, is that as this section shows, during the second Clinton 
administration and Pastrana‘s presidency the destruction of the remnants of the UP took place 
silently despite both administrations represented themselves as protecting both human and 
victim rights. This was possible because sectors of transnational military, criminal, economic 
and political networks imagined themselves as part of a collective self able to deal with 
alterity amongst them but continued construing former UP members as a threat to their 
interest which needed to be destroyed. Thus, the different coalitions for violence that 
integrated the perpetrator bloc from 1986 to 2006 interlinked various locales in a complex 
system of temporal relations that materialised a genocidal conjuncture.  
Conclusion 
The perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was a complex structure in which a multiplicity of 
motives allowed various social groups to ally and wage a war against a fictive collective self 
they all construed as enemy. The armed conflict was a central factor that facilitated this. A 
hyperreal interpretation of the conflict let the military, some governmental officials and 
political entrepreneurs to opt for radical solutions and ally with outlaws. It was because of 
this instable alliance, and the continuous political pressure from UP members, that sectors of 
the Barco administration acted against factions of the perpetrator bloc, bringing to an end 
some of the genocidal practices. Nevertheless, US foreign policy representations and the 
                                                 
30
 Because of the massacre that followed Uribe‘s accusation against San José de Apartadó members of being 
FARC supporters, PDA MP Iván Cepeda is pressing charges against Uribe before the International Criminal 
Court (see http://elespectador.com/node/219594/print retrieved 29 August 2010). 
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involvement of sectors of the army into the perpetrator bloc kept in place the antigrammar of 
genocide that solidified the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Thus, as foreign and domestic 
representations prompted legal and illegal actors to project the image of the UP as the internal 
enemy, which had to be destroyed, new alliances emerged which carried out the UP genocide 
throughout the 1990s.  
 The perpetrator bloc went through various transformations, in which state institutions and 
enforcement agencies played contradictory roles. Such discrepancies were the product of 
domestic processes and geopolitical narratives circulating amongst military and political 
networks. Hence, while the UP genocide was unfolding, the cores of the regional coalitions 
for violence were SOA-trained army officers, policemen, and some rightwing politicians 
reproducing US neoconservatism. Later, when drug traffickers succeeded in building strong 
private armies, the core coalitions, in most regions, included army officers, political 
entrepreneurs and drug traffickers. The latter had, by then, resorted to the scripts fuelling 
antipathy towards the UP as a means of maximising their benefits, thus consolidating their 
role in the coalition. Towards the late 1980s, when drug traffickers‘ military power 
challenged the survival of the Colombian establishment and the US stepped up the war on the 
Medellín Cartel, enforcement agencies tried to break down drug baron‘s private armies but in 
doing so allied with other sectors of the illegal drug industry. Some of these drug traffickers 
became the core of the perpetrator bloc in the 1990s.  
The changing dynamics within the perpetrator bloc also affected the different patterns that 
the genocidal practices followed. Up until 1987, the systematic assassinations of UP members 
were mainly carried out by gunmen and low rank army officers under the orders of high rank 
officers. Between late 1987 and 1989, paramilitary groups started carrying out massacres 
against UP strongholds in which the target was the UP‘s social network. Furthermore, private 
armies training camps, financed by drug traffickers, political entrepreneurs and economic 
elites, became death camps in which hundreds of UP members were tortured and their bodies 
thrown into mass graves. From late 1989 to 1991, the combination of massacres and selective 
assassinations brought about the extermination of the ‗national‘ socio-political power of the 
UP, few strongholds remained which became targets of destruction throughout the 1990s. 
Regional variations in the genocidal practices and the loose line of command of the 
perpetrator bloc allowed most of the crimes to go unpunished. The US administrations‘ lack 
of pressure to seek the prosecution of perpetrators (and their excessive pressure on fighting 
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narcoguerrillas) contributed to the proliferation of the spread of violence throughout the 
national geography. As both Betancur and Barco did not enforce adequate measures to tackle 
the anti-UP campaign, ingrained in some army brigades and other enforcement agencies, 
most state institutions overlooked the genocidal practices against the UP. The Attorney 
General Office was one of the few institutions demanding investigation into the charges 
against the armed forces. As a result, the DAS conducted a tough campaign to break the links 
between drug traffickers and army officers. Paradoxically, some DAS officers teamed up 
with paramilitaries in urban plots against UP leaders. DAS stepped up its campaign against 
paramilitary groups, meanwhile ‗other‘ paramilitary groups finished off cleansing entire 
regions of UP members. This was a mortal blow to the UP because many members resigned 
their identity or flew the country to survive the genocidal campaign by a more hierarchical 
perpetrator bloc. 
The constitution of a more hierarchical perpetrator bloc took some time however. Between 
1991 and 1994, various death squads and urban militias backed up by security agencies and 
the narratives put forward by the CIA-Pentagon‘s new security strategy carried out 
massacres, torture, disappearings, and cleansing of UP members. Political enmity and 
anticommunism were important motives in the violence against the UP. The radicalisation of 
political enmity was central in Urabá, where a genocidal antipathy towards the UP was put in 
place by directly linking the lives of UP sympathizers to the security of other political 
contenders. In this context, former guerrilla groups teamed up with paramilitary groups and 
the army in a joint counterinsurgency campaign against FARC. The UP was thus also target 
because of the FARC-UP script. By 1997, the ACCU had become a semi-hierarchical 
structure that centralised finance and was the core cluster in planning actions against ‗FARC‘. 
They called for the constitution of the AUC paramilitary national umbrella organisation, 
which, together with the army formed the core of the perpetrator bloc thereafter. Geopolitical 
narratives were central for this to happen because since 1995 the narcodemocracy script had 
sided the first Clinton administration with the army and the police, thus allowing the free 
circulation of outlaws within the perpetrator bloc.  
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, the Pastrana-FARC peace talks and Clinton‘s narratives 
demanding better human rights records forced the army to continue a counterinsurgency 
campaign through covert coalitions for violence. Thus, at the turn of the century 
narcoparamilitary groups had assembled the military-political power needed to solidify 
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radicalised grammars of identity/alterity that construed FARC as the other in different 
regions. In this con-text, all those who had been UP, in FARC strongholds, became the target 
of destruction. Former UP sympathizers were thus easy targets, regardless of being active in 
politics or not. The social power of their positions within civilian social networks allowed 
various actors to radicalise narratives that interpreted its social fabric as the base for FARC 
military might. The anti-FARC discourse enabled the cooperation between narcoparamilitary 
groups and security forces, evident in the co-option of the Convivir units created by the state 
to deal with security threats. This increased the perpetrator bloc‘s effectiveness in the 
multiple violent actions against the UP, which were products of the multiplicity of interest 
bringing together different actors. By the early 2000s, Uribe‘s presidency allowed for the 
dismantling of an important sector of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. However, 
under Uribe the legal recognition of the UP was also withdrawn. This converged with a 
radicalised grammar of identity/alterity that until today reproduces antipathy towards ‗FARC 
supporters‘; thus the targeting of the civilian social networks pushing for social change 
continued. Amongst them, UP survivors were until then target of violence, however, the 
Uribe administration portrayed the perpetrators as a loose structure. 
In sum, by mapping the topology of the perpetrator bloc this chapter has shown how some 
actors interpreted the UP, how other actors borrowed such interpretations and how this 
translated into genocide. The predominance of scripts which simplified the complexity of the 
UP, which chapter 2 discussed, resulted in the immobility of broader social networks. This is 
not to say, however, that the perpetrator bloc was restricted to the interaction of Colombian 
army officers, drug traffickers, and politicians. On the contrary, as the next chapter analyses 
in detail, the connectedness of Colombian military cadres with military clusters in the liberal 
hemispheric military network shows that the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was the 
materialisation of broader transnational interactions.  
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4 MAPPING GENOCIDE-PERPETRATORS TRANSNATIONALLY:  A 
TOPOLOGY OF THE MINDSET INFORMING THE PARTICIPATION OF 
COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE PERPETRATOR BLOC  
Genocidists are constantly transforming. Such transformations, however, are not only the 
product of the intersubjective asymmetric clash between perpetrators and victims; but also the 
consequence of other processes in which perpetrators are immersed, such as the accumulation 
of capital or the military build up for national security reasons (see Chapter 3). Thus, in order 
to understand the transformations experienced by the perpetrators, and, in turn, the dynamics 
of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures more broadly, what is needed is to unveil the 
connections between the broader processes in which the various perpetrators are immersed 
and their participation in genocidal violence. This means to move away from the genocide 
script which reinforces the idea that genocide can be grasped exclusively by untangling the 
concrete social interactions in which it occurs (see chapter 1); by decontextualising, 
disconnecting, and isolating genocidal traps from the sociomaterial networks within which 
they take place, scholars end up representing perpetrators‘ mindsets as the product of innate 
evilness or, at best, as the result of the circulation of ideas circumscribed to fixed 
geographical locations. Goldhagen (1996), for example, considers the circulation of somehow 
unchanging anti-Semitic narratives in Europe, but in particular in Germany, as the main 
reason for the targeting of European Jewry. However, this kind of interpretation misses the 
point that perpetrators‘ mindsets are not fixed and are constantly (re)constructed in 
intersubjective interactions, which overpass the concreteness of the genocidal conjunctures 
they contribute to crystallise and solidify. In a world imagined as divided into nation states, 
perpetrators‘ mindsets materialise due to the geopolitical circulation of narratives amongst 
actors who regard themselves as sharing a particular role in (trans)national networks. Military 
networks are at the centre of the reproduction of national boundaries. Thus when studying the 
participation of the military in genocidal geopolitical conjunctures, it is not enough to explore 
their role within perpetrator blocs. What is also needed is to understand the connections with 
the broader military networks that shape the mindsets that inform the targeting of the social 
fabric of civilian networks. 
This chapter traces the connections between the circulations of narratives amongst various 
military clusters integrated into a military network that saw as its mission the protection of 
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the (liberal) Western Hemisphere and the mindset informing the military‘s participation in the 
perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. The tracing of these connections shows that in the UP 
genocide objects, events, and places deemed distant were actually close together. Following 
this relative conception of space, it can be seen that the intensity of Colombian and US 
militaries‘ interactions not only linked military-perpetrators, genocidal episodes, and US 
military training institutions, but also that the circulation of narratives amongst them 
produced the imagining of a flat geography in which Bogotá and Washington were brought 
closer together, whereas regional genocidal traps were distanced apart. This contributed to 
put Colombia in different places within US foreign policy space (see chapter 5).  
 The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, to con-textualise the Colombian 
military sector of the perpetrator bloc within the liberal western hemispheric military 
networks and to describe how the military‘s narratives intermingled, bringing into play 
scripts that allowed the UP genocide. It does so by deconstructing the scripts that supported 
the hyperreal writing of Colombia by security cadres; such scripts were constitutive part of 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. As chapters 2 and 3 discuss in detail the various roles 
of the military in the perpetrator bloc and the exchange of narratives between military 
generals and UP leaders, this chapter focuses on the transnational interactions of military 
clusters in the last 60 years. The reader is referred to the previous two chapters for a more 
comprehensive picture of the connections between genocidal episodes and the narratives 
circulating within the liberal western hemispheric military networks. 
Although this chapter shares the thesis underlying most of the contributions contained in 
the edited volume State violence and genocide in Latin America, according to which, ―[t]he 
initiation of the US National Security Doctrine radicalized preexisting local, long-standing 
internal conflicts while providing the ideological pretext to eliminate political opposition‖ 
(Esparza 2010: 5), it differs from the idea of understanding states as units and thus as the 
perpetrators of genocide. As modern state apparatuses are complex assemblages of networks 
that seek to govern populations and their milieu (Mann 1993); it is more insightful  to look at 
particular actors, their interactions in clusters, the links between clusters, and the networks 
that materialise of such complex web of relations. Thus, contrary to the valuable accounts 
contained in the first scholarly book dealing with genocide in Latin America, this chapter 
contends that military networks were an important sector of the hegemonic bloc, but only one 
sector. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the uneven and fluid connections within political and 
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criminal networks so as to show how the materialisation of the perpetrator bloc in Colombia 
was the concrete genocidal expression of a transnational historic hegemonic bloc in the 
hemisphere.
1
 Thus the imagining that genocides were carried out by states in a hemisphere 
divided into nation states is supplanted by a multiplex topology of sociomaterial networks 
that materialised victims and perpetrators in different geopolitical con-texts. 
The chapter is divided into six parts. First, it discusses the circulation of anticommunist 
narratives and the transfer of military materiel between US and Colombian militaries from 
the early 1950s to the late 1960s. Then, it looks into the 1970s and the adaptation of the 
National Security Doctrine by the Colombian military. The chapter next analyses the 1980s; 
it shows how the low-intensity conflict syntax (re)produced a narrative based on the UP-
FARC script, which enabled the embodiment of the ‗internal enemy‘ in the UP and thus to 
target it for destruction. This analysis is complemented by assessing the influence of the 
School of the Americas in the fifth section. Finally, the chapter outlines the geopolitical 
narratives circulating since the 1990s; these have ingrained in the military mindset the idea 
that FARC and its ‗network of collaborators‘ are the largest threat to a fictive collective self 
written as ‗we the Colombian people‘. 
The making of an anticommunist military mindset (1950 –  1970) 
Interaction between Colombia‘s military and other countries‘ has taken place since the early 
days of the republic (Brown 2004; Leal 1989).
2
 Throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, 
however, there was no formal set of procedures to coordinate military actions in a long-term 
perspective. In fact, the first formal set of agreements was signed between Colombia and the 
US in 1952. Thereafter, and beyond the Korean War (1951-4), a regular contact was 
established between military institutions in Colombia and the US (Coleman 2006).
3
 This 
                                                 
1
 Paraphrasing Robert Cox (1993: 56-7, 62-3), ideas and material conditions are always bound together building 
a transnational historic bloc. Hegemony plays a central role in such a bloc. Following Cox it could be argued 
then that a transnational historic bloc usually allows not only for co-opting counter-hegemonic ideas, in the 
manner of transformismo, but also reducing the chances of resorting to extreme levels of coercion (genocide) to 
maintain dominant classes‘ benefits. However, when such a bloc is imbued with instability due to the scripts 
circulating in the dominant classes‘ grammars of identity/alterity various actors ally and resort to the destruction 
of those others who have been construed as unassimilable and menacing in an antrigrammar of genocide. Thus 
perpetrator blocs could be seen as the materialisation of an instable transnational historic bloc.  
2
 In the early 20
th
 century, countries such as Chile, Germany and Switzerland sent military missions (see Leal 
1989: 196). 
3
 ―[B]etween 1953 and 1957, to help the Colombian military government, the United States‘ relaxed oversight 
of military aid, provided arms, engineering equipment, and other materiel to the Colombian military; helped 
train specialized Colombian counterinsurgency units; participated in revising the Colombian recruit training 
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contact allowed a first exchange of doctrines, which had at its core the anticommunism 
inherited from the Korean War. The close bond between both military institutions meant that 
Colombia was one of the first recipients of military aid in South America.
4
 In fact, 
Colombian military carried out the first counterinsurgency operation in the continent in the 
early 1960s under what was known as Plan Lazo.
5
 This civilian-military operation was aimed 
at dismantling peasant movements in the Tolima County and put into motion President 
Kennedy‘s approach to Latin America (Muller 2006).6 Plan Lazo also demonstrated how US 
military narratives had permeated the Colombian military, in the sense that communist 
strongholds were represented as reluctant to comply with the requirements posed by the 
‗natural‘ development of a western society. The military, then, portrayed Colombia as a 
western nation threatened by insurgents allied with the ‗Soviet Empire‘.7 The representation 
of Colombia as belonging to the ‗West‘ neglected the cultural diversity at the core of the 
unfinished processes of nation and state building, but came to reinforce the FN political 
elites‘ narratives that regarded as central the implementation of exceptional measures in order 
to strengthen Colombia‘s liberal democratic project. Although Plan Lazo was presented by 
Colombian militaries as a successful operation which demonstrated the consolidation of the 
state‘s sovereignty over its internal frontier, an organised guerrilla movement emerged from 
the survivors of the campesino self-defence group. The FARC was to epitomise the threat 
posed by communism to western values.  
During the 1960s, with the FARC in the background and the anticommunist struggle at the 
forefront, a particular military mindset that regarded military institutions as the ‗true‘ 
                                                                                                                                                        
program; and contributed technical and materiel assistance to assorted Colombian military state-building 
projects‖ (Coleman 2006: 376). It is also important to note that in 1951 the General Command of the Armed 
Forces was created, this unified the command of the Police and the Army under the direction of the Ministry of 
War (Leal 1989: 214). As a result a joint campaign against liberal and communist insurgencies was well 
underway when the US-Colombian military relations began. 
4
 According to Leal (2002: 23) only Brazil and Chile received larger military assistance during the 1950s and 
1960s.   
5
  ―In 1962, A U.S. assessment team concluded that lack of planning, coordination, poor utilization of resources, 
lack of equipment, reliance on static outposts, sporadic collection and untimely dissemination of intelligence, 
patchy civic and psychological action programs, and poor Army-Police coordination, combined with the 
country‘s systemic problems of underdevelopment, put the Colombian military on the defensive. The U.S. 
response included a $1.5 million security package, including vehicles, communications, and helicopters; 
Military Training Teams to instruct Colombians on counter-insurgency; training soldiers and police at the 
School of the Americas in Panama; a revamping of both the military and police intelligence structure; and the 
creation of special operations units‖ (Porch & Muller quoted in Muller 2006: 28-9). These reforms culminated 
in Plan Lazo. 
6
 The combination of development (Alliance for Progress) and counterinsurgency (Military Assistance 
Programs) was seen as the most effective approach to fight international communism.  
7
 Gen. Alberto Ruiz Novoa was the first high ranking officer who operationalised the new role of the military 
during the cold war and merged ‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ politics (Leal 1989).  
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guardians of Colombian society reinforced a certain degree of autonomy that the military had 
gained as part of FN agreements.
8
 Such autonomy was evidenced by (1) giving away the 
command of defence and public order to the military; (2) the lack of control mechanisms to 
look over the military cast; (3) the absence of dialogue between political elites and military 
commanders; and (4) the development overtime of a self-referential military outlook based on 
the principles of the NSD and thereby in constant clash with democratic ideals (Pizarro 1995: 
163-4). The military‘s autonomy allowed them to merge public order and counterinsurgency 
operations to fight communism. Such autonomy contributed to secure the FN political 
system; FN dissenters were not only portrayed as disruptors of the public order but also as 
communists (Leal 1989: 268). To deal with public order, a constant state of siege was put into 
place in the 1950s, allowing the military to repress political opposition and to disband rural 
and urban social movements (Pearce 1990).  
Unlike the rest of South America where the US doctrine of the National Security State 
merged into the NSD and prompted a process of militarisation which ended up in the 
dictatorships of the 1970s, in Colombia, militarisation was not a linear process and was at 
times contested by some political elites. As the FN secured itself by giving carte blanche to 
the military in matters of public order, the overall result was a further militarisation of 
‗internal‘ security. Yet military-civil relations between 1958 and 1994 varied in five different 
moments: 1958-65 when the military were implicitly subordinated to political elites but were 
developing certain autonomy, 1965-77 when they were explicitly subordinated but gained 
autonomy to repress social movements, 1977-82 when the military experienced a minimum 
subordination to political elites and therefore consolidated their autonomy, 1982-89 when the 
government enforced subordination upon the military but they retained a clandestine 
autonomy; and 1989-94 when there was an objective subordination of the military to political 
elites but they retained their autonomy in specialised military areas (Dávila quoted in Leal 
2002: 40). Throughout the first two moments, the training of high-ranking military 
commanders under the US International Military Education and Training program produced a 
military cast imbued with a strong anticommunist ideology. Gen. Ayerbe Chaux, a graduate 
                                                 
8
 President Alberto Lleras Camargo‘s speech on 1958 is usually interpreted as the turning point for an increased 
military autonomy within the FN system. However, scholars‘ opinion is divided between those who see 
military‘s autonomy as a contractual outcome at the core of the FN and the ones that regard it as one of its 
unexpected development (see Pizarro 1995). In my view, although military‘s autonomy unexpectedly allowed 
for a concentration of political power in terms of dealing with public order, this would not have been possible 
without tacit consent from political elites. In a word, is not one or the other but both. 
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of the US-run USARCARIB military training school in Panama, wrote in 1966: ―today we 
can affirm, without doubt, that communism is the principal source of the subversion in 
Colombia and Latin America‖ (Leal 1989: 253). 
The struggle for autonomy came to reinforce the military mindset under formation which 
not only overemphasised traditional values such as patriotism, honour, discipline and order, 
but also generated feelings of superiority, disdain and above all distrust towards civilians 
(Ibid.: 258). The gradual embeddedness of the military in this mindset resulted in 
representations amongst military cadres that regarded the army as the institution called to 
save ‗Colombian society‘ from political and non-political threats alike.9  These narratives 
allowed the military to put themselves beyond politics, at the very moment when they were 
actually taking over a central role in politics by having the right to name some political 
contenders as absolute enemies. Because the Colombian military mindset was evolving 
within a constant exchange of ideas produced by the US military doctrine, which had for long 
time been influenced by Clausewitz‘s theorisation of war, the principle that ‗pure enmity 
leads to absolute violence‘ silently informed the notion that there was only one way of 
dealing with absolute enemies: through military means.
10
 Thus, political contenders became 
military targets. By putting into motion a radicalised antipathy towards populations regarded 
as the FN‘s enemies, military cadres were colonising affective-dispositions and polarising the 
grammars of identity/alterity of broader social networks. Thereafter, conservative members of 
society and various social networks were to portray social movements and PC members as 
the ‗other within‘; against the threat they represented, these sectors of society advocated for 
the military‘s autonomy to protect the ‗social body‘. Thus, radicalised antipathy towards the 
PC was accompanied by the circulation of sympathy for the military. 
As a result of the constant negotiation of an open-ended autonomy in dealing with public 
order, the military did not regard a military coup as a viable option for engineering 
Colombian society. However, it was precisely this settlement, which enabled the Colombian 
military to be part of the Inter-American military regime (IAMR). The IAMR saw as its 
principal function not the protection of the national borders against so-called ‗external 
                                                 
9
 This was symptomatic of  ―new continental doctrine [which resulted in the fact that] large sectors of the armed 
forces across Latin America began to view themselves as holy warriors in an apocalyptic East-West conflict‖ 
(McSherry 2005: 32).  
10
 The influence of Clausewitz in the US military is ongoing today. Colonel Darley (2006: 75) argues that 
Clausewitz‘s theorisation is being used to politicise the plain kinetic approach that some militaries propose to 
win the war on terror. This, in his view, will avoid falling into a war that seeks the ―total destruction of the 
adversary and his civilisation.‖  
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aggressors‘, but the protection of a body politic from its ‗internal aggressors‘; this reinforced 
the bond bringing various military clusters together: their commitment ―by vocation to fight 
against their societies‘ underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty, and national fragmentation‖ 
(Roniger 2010: 26). As a result, the security agenda in the Americas was to militarise police 
cross-borderly: the alliance between the militaries in the region made unlikely a war between 
the armies of ‗liberal nations‘. In a geopolitical discursive turn, the exterior –that is the idea 
of a Western Hemisphere– was depicted as the realm of order and peace, while the interior –
that is the idea of a territory controlled by a nation state– was portrayed as an anarchic space 
in need of order and discipline. 
These hyperreal narratives solidified the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy which had 
been underway since at least the mid 1950s across the Western Hemisphere. This resulted in 
the militarisation of public order in Colombia, which aided to concretise a military mindset 
that construed political enemies as military targets. Thus, the scene was set for the 
consolidation of the NSD in Colombia. 
The national security doctrine: Southern Cone dictatorships and 
Colombia in the 1970s  
Colombian elites allowed increased military autonomy in order to (1) secure their own 
autonomy in running Colombia‘s economy and (2) consolidate their exclusive use of public 
offices.  As narratives depicted military and political affairs as two distinct realms, the 
military was presented as an apolitical actor. Yet since the military implicitly supported the 
two traditional parties; the simulacrum of an apolitical military cadre naturalised the social 
order imposed by the exclusivist FN system. Under the state of siege, military control over 
political activities was legitimised by the need to save the nation from chaos. Chaos was 
perceived by the military as the disruption of the politico-economic project of the FN. This 
explains why the consolidation of the NSD in the Southern Cone ended up in dictatorships 
and occurred at the turn of the 1970s, while in Colombia the NSD shaped the apparatus of 
security that maintained the FN. The climax of the NSD at the turn of the 1980s in Colombia 
thus took place under a civilian government that overlooked the military‘s atrocities.  
By the mid 1970s, the NSD had enabled the establishment of various regimes of terror 
throughout Latin America. For example, cross-border counterinsurgency operations carried 
out by the Southern Cone dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay), 
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approved at least by one US secretary of state (Henry Kissinger) and with logistical support 
from US intelligence agencies, became a coordinated activity widely known as Operation 
Condor (McSherry 2005). This operation was set up in 1975 in Santiago, Chile, in the midst 
of the first Inter American Working Meeting of Intelligence. By then, the military in 
democratic and non-democratic regimes alike –Colombia to a lesser extent– had ―dismantled 
democratic and populist structures and expanded organisations for surveillance, intelligence, 
and repression‖ (Ibid.: 34). Thereafter, according to McSherry, the organised destruction 
carried out by ‗the transnational Condor system‘ was genocidal: 
 
Condor was an organized, coordinated system focused on the elimination of key individuals 
and groups that had escaped the dictatorships of their own countries… Condor operations, and 
the larger campaigns of state terrorism, reflected intent to destroy. The violence was not 
isolated, random, or sporadic. It was planned, coordinated, and executed with military 
discipline, and guided by ideological categorizations of large groups of people (2010: 119). 
 
Although there is no evidence showing Colombian military‘s participation in Condor, by the 
late 1970s Colombian military leaders began to quash democratic pressures from below. This 
was in tune with ―the continental counterinsurgency regime‖ of which Condor was ―a crucial 
component‖ (Ibid.: 107). The turning point for the consolidation of the NSD in Colombia was 
the Presidency of Julio César Turbay (1978-1982). The minimum subordination of the 
military to political elites during this period materialised into a counterinsurgency based on 
the principles of the NSD in the Southern Cone and the US National Security State. The 
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Battalion (Binci) became a central institution within 
military agencies, which sought to colonise affective-dispositions by circulating narratives 
that described the PC as the ‗internal enemy‘ and the source of guerrilla movements, disorder 
and crime (see Leal 2002: 25).  
The Security Statute (Decree 1923 of 1978) was at the centre of other legal mechanisms of 
the apparatus of security developing under the consolidation of the NSD. Because it 
―established media censorship, criminalized social protest, and allowed civilians to be tried in 
military tribunals‖ (Blair quoted in Dugas 2005: 233), the Statute came to complement 
previous measures put in place in the 1960s
11
 –the Military Penal Justice system,  the right to 
arm and train civilians as paramilitary forces, and the militarisation of police. It also 
reinforced Decree 1573 of 1974, which was the first norm to specifically mention the concept 
                                                 
11
 Decree 3398 of 1965 and Decree 893 of 1966 institutionalised such changes (see Leal 2002: 47-8).  
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of ‗national security‘ and to bring with it various NSD principles that advocated for ―a nation 
in arms to defend itself‖ (Leal 2002: 54). The consolidation of the NSD occurred at the same 
time that a new generation of military officers were taking hold of the leadership of the armed 
forces. The new approach introduced to deal with public order was evident in Gen. Luis 
Carlos Camacho‘s efforts to repress social movements as means of securing law and order. It 
was the repression of communism, however, that was at the centre of Gen. Camacho‘s 
security strategy –then Commander of the Armed Forces.  
Low Intensity Warfare: a post -Vietnam counterinsurgency in the making  
Even though, by the late 1970s, the NSD had galvanised rightwing political regimes 
throughout Latin America, two events weakened the institutionalisation of the IAMR. First, 
the Revolution in Military Affairs pushed aside the strong reliance of US military cadres on 
Latin American security forces when it came to ensuring the protection of its sphere of 
influence (Ibid.: 11). Second, in part as a consequence of US failure in Vietnam, the Carter 
administration‘s (1977-1981) focus on human rights had diminished the power that US 
military could exercise in counterinsurgency operations throughout the hemisphere (Metz 
1995). The administration‘s neglect of the IAMR did not mean that US military interaction 
with Latin American militaries was to stop; it rather meant a covert interaction in most South 
American countries and a direct military intervention in Central America.  This shift 
engendered yet another turn in geopolitical narratives. 
Soon after 1979, when the Sandinista revolution broke out,
12
 two scripts emerged. On the 
one hand, Central America was depicted as a quagmire in need of direct external intervention 
by US security forces; this part of the hemisphere needed to be pacified. On the other hand, 
South America was portrayed as a realm of consolidated nation-states; sovereignty, then, had 
to be respected and direct intervention was deemed impossible. The latter script came to 
reinforce the US military‘s sympathy for South American security forces; after all, South 
American military cadres were playing an important role in the ‗natural‘ historic process of 
                                                 
12
 The interaction between US and Nicaraguan military institutions between 1929 and 1979 demonstrates the 
fabric of the Inter-American Military Regime (see Grossman 2005). The IAMR did not seek US direct 
intervention in Latin America; its objective was to create a cross-border military network of intelligence, 
surveillance and counterinsurgency able to operate throughout the hemisphere.  
131 
 
state building.
13
 In this context, it was considered a matter of internal evolution for these 
societies to transit from dictatorship to democracy, as in the case of Southern Cone societies, 
or to deal with subversion and the emerging drug kingpins, as in the case of Andean societies. 
South American security forces thus continued to be trained at the SOA and other military 
training schools in the US. Furthermore, some Latin American military officers were the 
instructors of the new form of warfare that was to replace counterinsurgency operations: Low 
Intensity Warfare.  
The idea of a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) started to circulate in US military academies in 
the early 1980s. LIC was coined as part of the geopolitical narratives that emerged to deal 
with the Central American ‗quagmire‘ (Sandinista Nicaragua, the FMNL in El Salvador, and 
the communist uprising in Guatemala, in particular). As a result of the emergence of LIC as a 
military concept, the subject of counterinsurgency, which had been suppressed from the US 
army after Vietnam, was reintroduced. And military training institutions, such as the Army‘s 
Special Warfare Center, the SOA, and the Air Force‘s Special Operations School expanded 
their offerings on counterinsurgency attempting to integrate lessons from Vietnam. The 
emergence of post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, which was to dominate 
military thinking in Central America, Colombia and Peru throughout the 1980s, was thus the 
result of 
 
[t]he explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity conflict… [As a] number of serving 
and former government officials, retired officers, and analysts at government-related think-tanks 
began to write on low-intensity conflict[,]… [a]rticles on counterinsurgency returned in force to 
military publications such as Military Review, Parameters, and Marine Corps Gazette after a 
decade-long hiatus (Metz 1995: 11). 
 
The post-Vietnam counterinsurgency doctrine, which was implemented in earnest in El 
Salvador, was based in two principles: (1) the US must not assume control of the conflict and 
(2) military activities should be subordinate to economic, political, and psychological 
activities designed to augment the legitimacy of the government (Ibid.: 15). The emphasis put 
on counterinsurgency as a ‗domestic‘ enterprise and US support for the UK in the Falklands 
War (1982) demonstrated that the IAMR had been superseded by the consolidation of a North 
Atlantic Military Regime. From the first Reagan administration (1981-1984) onwards, 
                                                 
13
 This contradicted the Carter administration‘s relationship with Pinochet and Videla, which sought to exercise 
some pressure on Chile‘s dictator and Argentina‘s junta due to the international campaigns of denunciation of 
human rights violations, but softened the path for Reagan‘s quiet diplomacy toward Chile (Roniger 2010: 34-6).  
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military relations in Latin America were to be carried out through bilateral agreements, 
depending on the needs of each country. The US military‘s shift weakened military rule in the 
Southern Cone dictatorships, contributing to processes of demilitarisation and 
democratisation. The opposite, though, was the case in countries in which the military had 
taken on board the idea of a LIC. In Colombia, for example, the process of militarisation 
started in the mid 1960s was only partially dismantled in 1991, when a new Constitution was 
signed.  
Importing Salvadorian counterinsurgency warfare into 1980s Colombia  
Throughout the 1980s, Colombian military institutions with the support and advice of US 
military, and thanks to learning about the Central American experience at the SOA, carried 
out low-intensity warfare that resembled Salvadorian counterinsurgency operations. During 
the 1970s, Salvadorian military forces integrated a large right-wing paramilitary and vigilante 
branch (Organización Democráctica Nacionalista) to the sophisticated state-security agencies 
(Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia) created in the 1960s; this displacement of the state‘s 
repressive functions to intermediaries was the distinctive element of the low-intensity warfare 
and the cornerstone for the proliferation of death squads in 1980s (Lauria-Santiago 2005: 97-
9). The emergence of privately controlled death squads did not mean however ―that the 
violence came from fringe elements on the left and right‖ as the Reagan administration 
contended (Ibid.: 100); it rather demonstrated that, similar to the Colombian case, various 
collective violent actors were amalgamating into a perpetrator bloc of terror-sponsored 
violence to crumble opposition movements. Massacres in the countryside were not only 
autonomously carried out by death squads, but were also part of the counterinsurgency 
practices of the army; counterinsurgency instructed by the US military and the CIA focused 
on identifying and eliminating rebel leaders and sympathizers.
14
 The Salvadorian experience 
allowed for the emergence of ‗a counterinsurgency war delegated to private actors‘ (Guerrero 
1999: 245), which was to be followed in the US fight against Sandinista Nicaragua and would 
have ―an organic nexus with the proliferation of paramilitary groups that took place 
throughout the 1980s in Colombia‖ (Gomez-Suarez 2010: 158). 
                                                 
14
 According to Lauria-Santiago, the counterinsurgency program in El Salvador was based on the Vietnam-era 
Phoenix Program; as a consequence, the ones that suffered violence were the ―Peasants who had not left a rebel-
controlled zone during the early years of the war [and hence] were perceived by the military to be actual or 
potential FMLN supporters‖ (2005: 101). 
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 Between 1982 and 1993, the Colombian military sometimes openly, but most of the times 
covertly, contravened presidential plans that attempted to bring to an end the armed conflict 
with different guerrilla groups. In the case of President Betancur, the army openly disagreed 
with the peace talks between the government and FARC. The military maintained that the 
only possible way of securing public order was to do away with communism. This is evident 
in the writings of Gen. Fernando Landazábal (1980), who was to become Commander of the 
Armed Forces during the first part of the Betancur administration. Furthermore, as the quote 
below shows, Gen. Landazábal‘s view demonstrates that contrary to Betancur‘s attempts to 
see leftist guerrilla groups as relative enemies, the NSD continued to inform the military 
perception of subversion as an absolute enemy and, even more dangerous, the PC as the 
mastermind behind the guerrilla uprising. 
 
Guerrilla groups have only been pawns… [of] the Colombian Communist Party [which] has 
been the instrument that sustains, feeds and encourages pawns‘ moves… and Cuba, sometimes 
as the intermediary but always the champion of Russian doctrine and strategy in Latin 
America… ensures the Soviet Union‘s success (Landazábal 1985: 194). 
 
Gen. Landazábal opposition to Betancur‘s peace policy forced his retirement in 1984. Before 
he stepped down, however, the military had decided to carry out an undercover battle against 
communism. Following the example of El Salvador in the 1970s, and thanks to Colombian 
legislation (Decree 893 of 1965 was still in place), the army started to arm peasants to 
support its counterinsurgency operations with a right wing paramilitary structure (see Reyes 
2007: 356). The military formed death squads, as part of the first operations carried out 
against opposition movements, which were seen as enemies not only for being sympathizers 
of the guerrillas but also because they were ‗communist‘. During these operations, some 
Colombian SOA graduates managed regional intelligence networks, which had at its core 
right wing paramilitary groups but had also allied with privately controlled death squads (Gill 
2004: xv-xvi). In 1985, when the UP was launched, a military mindset deeply influenced by 
the NSD, immediately regarded the group as the ‗internal enemy‘ embodying an existential 
threat to the nation:  
 
The recent launching of the [UP] party obeys, amongst other things, to the need to make come 
true FARC‘s last decision of becoming the People‘s Army… the whole party, in a given 
moment will take arms… and an important and definitive step would have occurred towards the 
takeover of power (Landazábal 1985: 233). 
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 Put simply, the last two sections show that the military mindset played a central role in 
polarising the grammars of identity/alterity informing the idea of a Colombian collective self. 
Since the mid 1970s, military institutions construed the PC as the internal enemy. This, 
together with the circulation of narratives portraying it as the mastermind behind the guerrilla 
uprising, had by the mid 1980s set up the basis to interpret social unrest as a battle between 
‗us‘ without-guns-and-for-democracy and an ‗other‘ with-guns-and-for-communism. By 
framing the emergence of the UP in this con-text, the long-lasting antipathy of military 
sectors towards the PC was automatically transferred to the UP.  
The School of the Americas: the exchange and production of scripts 
amongst hemispheric security forces (1980 – 2000) 
Scholars working on state-sponsored violence in Latin America and human rights NGOs have 
demonstrated the central role the SOA played in the training of hundreds of military officers 
who during the 1980s went back to countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia 
to carry out a counterinsurgency warfare that disregarded human rights (i.e., Menjívar and 
Rodríguez 2005; Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2010; Nelson-Pallmeyer 1997; Gill 
2004). This is not to blame the US military alone; human rights violations in Latin America 
can only be understood as the product of an intersubjective interaction between various 
clusters of military officers.
15
 Therefore, perhaps, Human Rights Watch (HRW) Deputy 
Director Anne Mannuel stated that the school played an important role not because it was 
simply training officers to become murderers and dictators, but because ―it gives them more 
prestige and gives them more power when they go home‖ (quoted in Schmmitt 1995: A8). 
However, her statement misses the important point that the US military anticommunist 
ideology allowed for a further radicalisation of Latin American militaries. This explains the 
similarities between Gen. Landazábal‘s statements and those of Lt. Col. Donald M. 
MacCay‘s –commander of the US Army Jungle Operations Training Center at Fort Sherman 
in Panamá:  
 
why should we let what America considers its greatest opponent –communism– get a foothold in 
                                                 
15
 It is worth noting that the school did not represent itself as an altruistic institution. As Col. Michael Sierra, the 
school commander during the 1980s, bluntly put it ―the school is an extension of our foreign policy […] And 
our foreign policy tries to influence people in a manner beneficial to the United States‖ (The Chigago Tribune 
1984: A24). 
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the region, when we can rip it in the bud when it‘s still at the early stages of guerrilla warfare?  
(The Christian Science Monitor 1984: 1).  
 
Such similarity shows that the narratives shaping the Colombian military mindset were to a 
great extent shaped by the interaction with US militaries in training courses at the SOA (and 
other military schools) and also by direct military collaboration. Notwithstanding the 
importance of US military academies, the American Military Summits were another 
important source of NSD conceptions for the Colombian military. This was evident in a 
Summit held in Argentina, as late as 1987, in which it was argued that the army still had ―an 
important role [to play] in ‗internal defence‘ and therefore the fight against international 
communism could involve the armed forces in ‗an intervention in all areas of power‘‖ (The 
Wall Street Journal 1989: A10). 
 Public criticism against the SOA first surfaced in 1990. The involvement of Salvadorian 
SOA graduates in the assassination of six Jesuit priests ignited a series of demonstrations at 
Fort Benning, Georgia, demanding that the school stop training Latin American militaries 
(Gill 2004: 200). In the years to follow evidence of former SOA students involvement in 
human right abuses was to pile up. In 1996, Rev. Roy Bourgeois, Head of SOA-Watch, in a 
letter to The New York Times, argued that 73 percent of the soldiers cited for atrocities by the 
Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador were trained at SOA (Bourgeois 1996: 
A18). Soon after, a huge controversy started because of the training manuals being used at 
the SOA; the excerpt that follows, from an article that appeared in The New York Times, gives 
an account of the magnitude of the issues raised by the disclosure of the manuals. 
 
Training manuals... recommended bribery, blackmail, threats and torture against insurgents… 
The manuals –written in Spanish and carrying titles like ‗interrogation‘ and ‗revolutionary war 
and communist ideology‘– advocated tactics that the Pentagon said violated American policy 
and principles… The tactics included ‗motivation by fear, payments of bounties for enemy dead, 
false imprisonment, executions and the use of truth serum‘.  
Army intelligence officials compiled the manuals in 1987 from lesson plans that had been in use 
since 1982. The Pentagon said ‗as many as a thousand copies‘ of the manuals had been used at 
the School or distributed by the US Southern Command's training units in Colombia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. 
... the Pentagon and the US Southern Command... defended the School‘s as ‗an important 
strategic asset‘. The Pentagon said the mistake was based on the use of ‗old fashioned‘ 
reflecting policies of the 1960s. 
The US Southern Command notified governments in Latin America that the ‗manuals contained 
passages that did not represented US Government policy‘ (Myers 1996: 13). 
 
What seems important to note in regards to these manuals is that, as chapter 2 discussed, from 
136 
 
the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the UP campaigned against the contra-guerrilla manuals 
used by the Colombian army. In the political struggle to press the government to force the 
army to get rid of these manuals, the UP argued that the manuals were an adaptation of US 
counterinsurgency manuals; this was an important narrative in the anti-geopolitics of the UP 
(see chapter 7). For the time being, suffice to say that the extract above shows that UP 
members were quite right in their claims.  
 Throughout the 1990s, as a reaction to the strong criticism against the SOA, Pentagon 
officials and the US military saw the need to defend the school. Pentagon officials argued that 
the school was important because it forged ―closer ties between American military personnel 
and their Latin American counterparts, and helps Washington‘s goal of instilling the concept 
of civilian control in emerging democracies‖ (Schmmitt 1995: A8), while the School‘s 
commander, Col Roy R. Trumble, showed how it had adapted to ‗transformations in the 
international system‘ by stating that ―clearly, there is more attention paid to human rights 
than there was 5 years ago‖ (Ibid.). In order to defend the school, militaries, such as Maj. 
Jaime F. Lilinet, went as far as arguing 
 
Maybe we don‘t have to send American forces to Latin America because of the students who 
came here… If we close the school, maybe we‘re going to have to go back to the interventionist 
policies of Teddy Roosevelt, because when there is a security threat in Latin America, you know 
we‘re going to be there (The New York Times 1999b: A18). 
 
Nevertheless, the strong opposition to the SOA forced the military to change its name in 2000; 
it was renamed as the Western Hemispheric Institute of Security Cooperation.
16
  
 The narratives that Pentagon and military officials used were part of a new geopolitical 
discursive ensemble, which articulated human rights and democracy as the axes of the US and 
Latin American militaries‘ interaction in the hemisphere. In the Colombian case, in particular, 
counter-narcotics training was represented as the path to follow to secure democracy. 
Although Colombian militaries accounted for half of the trainees during the 1990s, their 
human rights records improved slowly.
17
 What makes even more difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of the courses is that while the security forces‘ human rights record improved, 
                                                 
16
 ―The House voted this year effectively to shut the school by eliminating the money for students‘ scholarships, 
but the financing narrowly survived in September [1999] when the Senate sided with the Army… The Army 
would still provide combat training, especially for commanders of small units, which… are critical to dealing 
with countries‘ security threats, specially from drug traffickers‖ (The New York Times 1999a: A22). 
17
 ―More than 150 Colombian SOA graduates have been linked to human rights abuses and paramilitary death 
squads during the1980s and 1990s‖ (Leech quoted in Dugas 2005: 240). 
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human rights abuses by rightwing paramilitary groups skyrocketed. It has been reported that 
in order to improve their human rights records various units and brigades of the Colombian 
army and national police overlooked paramilitary activities.
18
 
 Because of the UP-FARC script the UP was trapped in the ‗dirty war‘ carried out by the 
military sector of the perpetrator bloc, within which it was singled out as the ‗internal enemy‘ 
to be destroyed. Although during the 1980s there were nationwide genocidal campaigns 
against the UP, throughout the 1990s regional genocidal campaigns were carried out to wipe 
out the few UP strongholds that remained. In both periods the military mindset –shaped by 
NSD principles and their legacy– saw the UP and FARC as indistinguishable (see chapter 2). 
What explains the different scope of the campaigns is that during the 1980s the US military 
anticommunist ideology allowed Colombian militaries to carry out counterinsurgency 
operations –based on SOA‘s training manuals– against ‗communist subversives‘ without 
restraints on the use of violence; this enabled various military units to be central to regional 
coalitions for violence. As a result, by 1991 the UP‘s national socio-political power had faded 
away. Thereafter, military involvement in the genocidal campaigns against the UP was less 
visible; the consolidation of the human rights discourse and the strong disapproval of SOA‘s 
counterinsurgency training propelled Colombian security forces to improve human rights 
records, which slowly started to do so. However, as Dugas points out, 
 
strong ties continue[d] to exist between the armed forces and the paramilitaries… By 2000, 
Human Rights Watch had documented abundant and compelling evidence linking at least half of 
Colombia‘s brigade-level army units (excluding military schools) to paramilitary activity (2005: 
237). 
  
Between 1995 and 1997, the ACCU-led coalition for violence not only carried out the last 
genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá without any attempt from the security forces to 
bring it to a halt, but it also teamed up with some militaries to bring about the destruction of 
the group. In other regions, the military, in fact, deployed narco-paramilitary units, which 
wiped out former UP strongholds represented as FARC strongholds.  
 The military mindset had, and it still has, at its core an anticommunist ideology that feeds 
militaries‘ antipathy towards social movements and leftist political leaders associated with 
                                                 
18
 In September 2009, the Historical Memory Committee part of the National Reconciliation and Reconstruction 
Commission released a report on the Salado Massacre demonstrating the passivity of the security forces in the 
assassination of 61 persons by a paramilitary group in Northern Colombia in February 2000. See 
http://elespectador.com/impreso/articuloimpreso161054-esa-guerra-no-era-nuestra (retrieved on 6 October 
2009). 
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the FARC; therefore, the war on drugs –increasingly militarised during the 1990s– was in the 
mind of Colombian militaries a continuation of the war against Marxist-narcoguerrillas. 
Thus, instead of helping to combat drug trafficking, the training of Colombian cadres at SOA 
and US military funding strengthened both the hyperreal sympathy between military clusters 
in the liberal western hemispheric military network and the fabric of an alliance between 
paramilitary death squads, drug traffickers‘ private armies, regional political entrepreneurs, 
and security agencies, which in fighting the FARC circulated a radicalised antipathy towards 
the UP. As in the military mindset the UP was (and still is) equated with FARC,
19
 the UP 
genocide was disguised as being the outcome of a clash between right wing paramilitary 
groups, FARC, and security forces. Disguising the UP genocide under the complex 
intertwinement of multiple violent collective actors, the Colombian and US militaries aided 
the transnational reproduction of indifference against the UP, which came to inform the US 
Congressmen‘s scripting of the ‗Colombian tragedy‘. 
Narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorism: scripting existential threats to 
Colombia’s survival (1984 –  2010)   
Chapter 3 explains in detail how various units of the security forces colluded with various 
violent actors throughout the 1980s and 1990s so as to bring down the socio-political power 
of the UP. So far, this chapter has discussed how the military mindset, which contributed to 
the formation and consolidation of the perpetrator bloc, was intertwined with the Inter-
American military cooperation since the 1950s. This assemblage of interactions came about 
in a specific historical (discursively produced) moment: the outset, unfolding and end of the 
cold war (Campbell 1998b). In this con-text, the anticommunist struggle, produced, 
reproduced and reinforced by political leaders –advocates of realpolitiks– was the middle 
ground between military institutions. In the late 1980s, however, with the collapse of 
communism the US military mindset started to move towards global police-related 
operations. The first move was the militarisation of the ‗war on drugs‘. This move was quite 
straightforward in Andean states because since the early 1980s a link between insurgency and 
drug trafficking had developed. Colombia was at the centre of the merger between 
counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations.  
                                                 
19
 The militaries disregarded the complex processes taking place within the UP, thus they played a central role in 
creating a script that allowed for simplistic representations of reality, which resulted in the stigmatization of the 
UP across socio-economic and political networks. Chapter 2 discusses the complexities of the UP. 
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 1984 was an important year for new representations that started to circulate amongst US 
drug enforcement officials and militaries. Two important events prompted the consolidation 
of these new narratives. First, on 10 March the Tranquilandia cocaine-lab owned by Gacha 
was discovered in Caquetá and a FARC camp was found just about half mile away from it. 
The raid of the lab was the result of a joint effort between the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) and Colombian National Police (CNP). The importance of this event is that the 
proximity of FARC camp to the lab demonstrated, in view of US and Colombian 
enforcement agencies, that Colombia was in fact fighting narcoguerrillas (see US House of 
Representatives 1984: 16). This concept had been an implicit signifier defining US foreign 
policy towards Colombia since the early days of the Reagan administration; however, it 
became the central script defining US-Colombian political and military relations thereafter. 
US military thus emphasised their distrust for the Betancur-FARC peace talks not only by 
arguing that it was part of FARC‘s strategy of power takeover, but also by stressing its 
organic link with the consolidation of narcotics cartels. The script allowed the US embassy in 
Bogotá to legitimate violent practices against the UP and social movements by stating that 
these actions were taking ―place in rural areas where armed forces were fighting guerrilla 
groups. In such cases persons wounded or killed may have been engaged in guerrilla or 
criminal activity‖ (US Department of State 1986: 465). Second, on 30 April, thugs apparently 
hired by drug traffickers assassinated Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. According to 
media reports and police investigations, the assassination was Gacha‘s revenge for the close 
cooperation between Lara and the DEA. The significance of this event is that, after Lara‘s 
assassination, US military and enforcement agencies started to see drug trafficking as the 
main source of criminal and political violence in Colombia. Thus, Colombia was actually 
threatened not only by narcoguerrillas, but also by narcoterrorists. This was to become an 
important script throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, the assassination of UP leaders, 
such as Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo, were, according to the accounts of the 
Military Group of the US embassy, carried out by the drug traffickers‘ attempts to destabilise 
the country (see US Department of State 1988, 1991).  
 Nonetheless, narcoterrorists and narcoguerrillas were dynamic scripts that at times 
blurred together, such as during and in the immediate aftermath of the Palace of Justice 
takeover by the M-19 in November 1985, when Colombian military restated that an implicit 
alliance between guerrilla groups and drug kingpins threatened the survival of ‗Colombian 
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democratic society‘. These scripts, initially dominating the military mindset, permeated other 
social networks in Colombia and across the Atlantic; hence US media statements, such as  
 
the United States has trained 13500 Colombian officers and non-commissioned officers since 
1950. But the Colombian army… is disintegrating in the face of terrorist insurgents and cocaine 
traffickers (The New York Times 1988: 17), 
 
became a common account of the violence in 1980s Colombia, allowing US military to assert 
that Colombia‘s stability depended on the continuation of US military training. Other times, 
one of the two main scripts would be emphasised, positioning it as the largest threat to 
Colombian society. This was the case after Galán‘s assassination in August 1989. Then, 
narcoterrorists declared ‗war‘ on the establishment, becoming regarded by the military-
politico-socio-economic Colombian ruling class as the enemies of Colombian society. 
 During the 1990s, US military cooperation with Colombia‘s security forces was based on 
narcoterrorists script, and the US military could continue to train Colombian armed forces.  
However,  some political leaders in the US Congress questioned the cooperation because of 
the appalling human rights record of the CNP and the army. Only in 1998, when the Pastrana-
FARC peace talks were on the horizon, both Colombian and US security agencies started 
shifting emphasis towards the narcoguerrillas script again. In less than three years Colombia 
went from being depicted as a narcodemocracy to be portrayed as a quasi-failed state (see 
chapter 5). The US military reloaded the narcoguerrillas script based on the rapid military 
build up of the FARC and created the failed state one because of Colombian political elites‘ 
unwillingness to increase military expenditure to reform the army. This put some pressure on 
President Pastrana, who commissioned Minister of Defence Rodrigo Lloreda with designing 
a modernisation program for the armed forces. This became a central part of Plan Colombia, 
a priority of the second Clinton administration‘s foreign policy in the hemisphere. By 2002, 
when the peace talks broke off, the narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorists scripts merged into 
what the military regarded as narcoterrorist guerrillas. The script was taken on board and 
became central part of the geopolitics of the war on terror supported by the Uribe 
administration since 9/11. 
 Throughout the last 25 years, these scripts played different roles in the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture that saw the unfolding of the destruction of the UP. During the mid 
1980s the hyperreal threat of the narcoguerrillas helped to generate antipathy towards the UP. 
The military portrayed the UP both as part of the FARC‘s political strategy and as a 
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mechanism that allowed the FARC‘s involvement on drug trafficking in peripheral regions. 
The generalised impression of the UP as untrustworthy spread by the military was to prevail 
amongst wider sectors of urban populations. From the late 1980s until 2002 the hyperreal 
narcoterrorist threat helped to unify some sectors of urban populations under the fear of the 
collapse of the state. As the UP had continued challenging the Colombian Establishment, the 
military portrayed the UP as unpatriotic group and a threat to the survival of the Colombian 
state; this created widespread indifference to the hardship suffered by UP members. Broader 
sectors of Colombian society relied on military accounts of the genocidal massacres against 
UP members in Urabá, which were presented as the product of a war declared by the ACCU 
against the enduring UP-FARC alliance. Since 2002, the hyperreal narcoterrorist guerrilla 
threat has been instrumentalised by the military so as to impose a state of exception. In this 
con-text, the past and present genocidal practices against the UP have been relegated to 
official oblivion. Up until 2010, the hyperreal global war against terrorism allowed not only 
the rewriting of history but also the neglect of events such as assassinations, disappearances, 
tortures and forced displacement of UP survivors. 
Conclusion 
The intense interaction between the Colombian and US militaries between the early 1950s 
and the late 1960s not only allowed the circulation and reproduction of an anticommunist 
ideology, but also enabled the Colombian military to inscribe its autonomy regarding public 
order with antipathy towards anyone challenging the ‗traditional‘ social order. This antipathy 
informed the polarisation of the encompassing grammar of identity/alterity through which the 
relationship with the PC and other leftist political groups was to be structured. By the late 
1970s, the Colombian military had escalated the targeting of PC and other leftist political 
groups. The genocidal character of the transnational Condor system had by then started to 
shape the tactics of the Colombian military. This converged with the generation and 
circulation of the LIC syntax in US military academies.  By rebranding counterinsurgency as 
a military-led domestic enterprise indirectly supported by the US, militaries across the 
continent were allowed to step up the campaigns against communist subversion. This 
solidified the links between military clusters in Central America, the Andean Region, and the 
Southern Cone, as demonstrated in ―the mission of [Argentinean] military advisors training 
counterinsurgency forces in El Salvador and Central America between 1978 and 1982‖ 
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(Sheinin quoted in Roniger 2010: 36) and the importing of the Salvadorian counterinsurgency 
model by the Colombian military at the turn of the 1980s. 
 The covert counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the Colombian military from 1982 
to 1986 targeted dissidents and subversives alike, however once the UP was publicly 
launched, the military‘s antipathy towards dissidents (PC) and subversives (FARC) allowed 
for the specific targeting UP leaders. Military leaders recreated and circulated the idea that 
the UP was part of FARC‘s conscription strategy, surreptitiously directed by the PC. The 
imaginary that Colombia was to turn into another Nicaragua, resulted in the proliferation of 
paramilitary groups and deaths squads. Through military trainings at SOA and other US 
military institutions and American Military Summits, military networks continued circulating 
the narratives of the NSD and imagining the nation as a self, whose identity was under threat. 
By the mid 1980s, the antigrammar of destroying the ‗internal enemy‘ had been instilled in 
the Colombian military mindset, and the segmentary grammar of identity/alterity came to 
structure the military relations with outlaws. This created a rather loose perpetrator bloc 
which contributed to the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Thus 
military and drug traffickers‘ death squads entered into conflict and/or cooperated according 
to context. As the military‘s counterinsurgency strategy was the engine of the dirty war 
during these years, and this was supported by the liberal western hemispheric military 
network, the participation of the army in death squads and the orchestration of military plans 
aimed at the UP was quite open. During the 1990s, the military covertly supported 
paramilitary groups to carry out the genocidal campaign against the UP, this was so because 
(1) the Salvadorian counterinsurgency tactics were still informing CIA, Pentagon and 
Colombian military interactions and (2) the liberal western hemispheric military network had 
come under strong criticism because of the human rights violations uncovered in the mid 
1990s.  
 Since the early 1980s the three scripts (re)produced by US and Colombian militaries, 
namely narcoguerrillas, narcoterrorist, and narcoterrorist guerrillas, have circulated and 
shaped a fluid military mindset that knitted together (with more or less intensity) 
communism, drug trafficking, and terrorism according to the geopolitical con-text. The 
criminalisation of ideological struggles not only permitted the participation of the Colombian 
military in the emergence of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide but also aided to 
maintain the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The US military‘s sympathy for the 
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Colombian military‘s struggle against the existential threats to the nation has been since then 
an important source of indifference for the suffering of broader social sectors associated with 
terrorist insurgencies, such as the UP. Moreover, radicalized antipathy of the Colombian 
military towards the UP has to some extent continued because of the solidarity between US 
and Colombian militaries. In this vein, today‘s denial of the genocide needs to be understood 
as an expression of the close tie bringing together a US-Colombian military alliance at the 
core of a partially reinvigorated liberal western hemispheric military network, which aims to 
secure a fictive collective self from the threat posed by a conglomerate of rouge states, 
terrorist organisations, and criminals. 
 To conclude, anticommunist narratives circulating in the liberal western hemispheric 
military network aided to shape a Colombian military mindset that construed political 
contestants as military targets. Contrary to the ‗domestic-perpetrator‘ fantasy supported by 
the genocide script, this chapter thus demonstrates that the central role Colombian military 
cadres played in the crystallisation of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was to a large 
extent the materialisation of the western military clusters‘ (re)production of hyperreal 
geopolitical threats. However, as the next chapter discusses, this was only possible because 
such threats had been written in tandem with dominant political networks. 
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5 THE HYPERREAL WRITING OF COLOMBIA:  CON-
TEXTUALISING THE UP  GENOCIDE IN US  FOREIGN POLICY SPACE  
Genocidal geopolitical conjunctures are space-time convergences that crystallise 
when narratives are (re)created within transnational military, political, social and 
economic networks enabling the production of genocidal violence in locales 
connected with other sites in which the reproduction of the social relations of such 
networks takes place. Military networks, as chapter 4 shows, circulate narratives that 
shape mindsets that allow the targeting of civilian social networks depicted as 
geopolitical threats to a fictive collective self. By representing themselves as the 
guardians of social orders, different military clusters manage to deal with 
contingency, thus shaping the space of politics. In totalitarian regimes and 
dictatorships politics are openly intermixed with military affairs; hence, when 
genocides unfold the perpetrator is commonly abstracted as the state and the 
genocidal sites as contained within the territories it controls which are represented as 
disconnected from the realm of western liberal democracies. This is how, as chapter 1 
discusses, the genocide script aids to write off genocide from the milieu in which 
liberal social relations are reproduced. This chapter challenges the genocide script by 
con-textualising the UP genocide within US foreign policy space. 
 The chapter shows that despite Colombia and the US being liberal democracies in 
which politicians presented themselves as the defenders of life, individualism and 
freedom, genocide unfolded amidst narratives that created others who were located 
outside the realm of liberalism. The threat the other posed to liberalism allowed for its 
violent destruction. However, as liberalism is a biopolitical governmentality that lies 
on the idea of letting live (Foucault 2007), political networks legitimated the violence 
within the encompassing grammar of identity/alterity. This is not to say that the 
antigrammar of genocide was exclusively circulating amongst military networks; 
Congress hearings show otherwise: US political elites constantly detached themselves 
from the suffering of those trapped in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by 
simplifying reality and portraying themselves as the saviours of Colombian 
democracy. In so doing they advocated for the destruction of hyperreal threats, which 
were discursively connected with civilian social networks.  
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 In regulating relations with the other, however, some politicians were more 
flexible than transnational military cadres and traditional US-Colombian political 
networks construing other collective selves as fixed entities unable to change. 
Encompassment allowed dialogues between some politicians and groups labelled as 
others, yet the ambiguity at the core of political networks‘ narratives backfired, for the 
military based their interpretation of reality on some of the scripts persistently pushed 
by the ‗transnational political network‘ to explain reality. This allowed the military to 
play an important role in the perpetrator bloc, which was paradoxically targeting the 
UP, which was brought into the political process by previous Colombian 
administrations. Thus the genocidal violence by the military was legitimated by 
narratives circulating in the grammars of identity/alterity of political networks, which 
advocated for exceptional measures to protect the space of a liberal social order. 
 US foreign policy was the space in which Colombia was written as the oldest 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere. As such, Colombia was slowly brought closer 
from the periphery to the core of US foreign policy. Paradoxically, the closer 
Colombia moved to the core, the larger the number of human rights violations carried 
out by the alliances between state agencies and outlaws. Politicians‘ narratives 
accommodated the unfolding genocidal conjuncture within the space of liberalism by 
resorting to the reproduction and circulation of hyperreal threats that polarised 
affective-dispositions. Thus, such narratives (1) made invisible to larger sectors of 
social networks (bystanders) the suffering of those who had being regarded as others 
with who it was possible to coexist, (2) fuelled the radicalisation of violence 
entrepreneurs‘ antipathy towards the ‗enemy within‘, (3) instrumentalised sympathy 
amongst polarised sectors of the hegemonic bloc as a tool to overlook the genocidal 
practices in which various clusters of political and military networks were involved, 
and (4) recently enabled political networks to write a history in which there was not 
space for the UP genocide. 
 To con-textualise the UP genocide within the space of US foreign policy entails 
then to carry out a genealogy of the institutionalised ways of seeing and displaying 
Colombia as a particular locale in the Western Hemisphere. Because statespersons, 
politicians, military commanders, strategic thinkers and public intellectuals are at the 
centre of the production of scripts in the space of US foreign policy, the chapter looks 
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into their cross-border ‗dialogues‘ between the late 1970s and 2008. The analysis is 
based on US Congress reports and hearings, which show that, Capitol Hill has been 
one of the concrete sites where from the liberal global space has been written about in 
the last twenty-five years. The overall aim here is to unveil the scripts that have 
produced the hyperreal writing of Colombia and the US as interrelated segments of 
the global space and which allowed for the UP genocide to happen. 
 The chapter is divided into four parts. First it discusses the late 1970s; it shows 
how the emergence of neoconservative public figures in the US was interpreted by 
some Colombian political elites as legitimating a tough stance against social 
movements. The second section analyses how through the Reagan years 
narcoguerrillas were depicted as the largest threat to Colombia; this hyperreal imagery 
weakened the Betancur-FARC peace talks and hid away the slow amalgamation of 
various actors into a loose perpetrator bloc. Third, it looks into how during the Bush 
senior administration the narcoterrorists threat enabled to blame the ‗Colombian 
drama‘ on outlaws who were responsible for weakening the state. Finally, the chapter 
briefly considers the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush years so as to illustrate how 
the hyperreal writing of Colombia allowed for indifference vis-à-vis the UP during 
the 1990s and oblivion at the turn of the millennium. 
From Carter to Reagan: US neo-conservatism and the 
consolidation of the national security doctrine in Colombia  
The close relationship between Colombian and US political elites, which started with 
President Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-1921), was an important source of stability for 
the Colombian political system throughout the 20
th
 century. It was not until the late 
1970s that some disagreements between Bogotá and Washington emerged. Although 
US-Colombian relations went through ups-and-downs between 1978 and 1986, the 
relations between both countries had never before nor have ever since been as strained 
as they were between 1994 and 1998, as it would be clear later. What it seems 
important to note however is that throughout these years the UP genocide was 
disregarded. This is unsurprising, for as Ó Tuathail argues ―US foreign policy is 
typically a mix of both ‗idealism‘ and ‗realism‘, with strategic [and idealist] 
simulations and fantasies… existing side by side‖ (1992: 165). In the case of 
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Colombia, the strategic simulations revolved around the perils posed by insurgency 
and drug trafficking for the Western Hemisphere, whilst the idealist fantasies centred 
on seeing Colombia as the oldest democracy in the continent. Both simulations 
contributed to simplify Colombia‘s reality and to put Colombia in different places in 
US foreign policy space.  
The scripting of Colombia as the oldest democracy in the Americas in need of 
dealing with drug traffickers can be traced back to 1977, when President Jimmy 
Carter asked Congress to send a political mission to South America. The mission 
reported that 
  
[1] The Colombian military has been and will continue to be very supportive of the 
democratic system. [2] The nation is no longer threatened by a serious insurgency 
problem as it was ten years ago… [3] President Lopez is establishing a highly trained, 
well-paid, elite organization to combat the drug traffickers (US Congress 1978: 3-4).  
 
Despite the Carter administration‘s early attempts to strengthen US-South American 
relations, Colombia occupied a marginal place in US foreign policy until the mid 
1980s.  Colombia‘s peripheral role in Carter‘s foreign policy had to do with his focus 
on human rights, which were part of the administration‘s attempt to position the US 
above the ideological dispute in a post-cold war scenario.  
 By placing the US as the guardian of humanity, Carter carried on the confrontation 
with the Soviet Union without escalating animosity. By 1979, however, a sector of 
neoconservative thinkers and politicians had managed to ascend to powerful positions 
in the US government. This, together with the Soviet Union‘s invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, and the establishment of Sandinista Nicaragua 
enabled to recreate in the mind of the American public opinion the neoconservative 
representations used to produce and secure a particular US identity. Such 
representations were masterly condensed by Georgetown University Professor Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, who was to become US ambassador to the UN during the Reagan 
administration. In her attack on Carter, she put forward four realist simulations: first, 
she represented the world as a space in need of counterinsurgency rather than 
democracy. The US was thus called to be an interventionist force instead of being 
―the world‘s midwife to democracy when the birth [was] scheduled to take place 
under conditions of guerrilla war‖ (Kirkpatrick 1979: 38). Second, President Carter 
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was portrayed as an ally of Communism: ―Carter is, par excellence, the kind of liberal 
most likely to confound revolution with idealism‖ (Ibid.: 41-2). Third, rightwing 
dictatorships were represented as defenders of human rights: 
 
there is a damning contrast between the number of refugees created by Marxist regimes 
and those created by other autocracies: more than a million Cubans have left their 
homeland since Castro‘s rise… as compared to about 35000 each from Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile (Ibid.: 44). 
 
Finally, Kirkpatrick described those opposing US policies not only as false democrats 
but also as real enemies: 
 
If… revolutionary leaders describe the United States as the scourge of the 20th century, 
the enemy of freedom-loving people, the perpetrator of imperialism, racism, 
colonialism, genocide, war, then they are not authentic democrats or, to put it mildly, 
friends. Groups which define themselves as enemies should be treated as enemies (Ibid. 
: 45). 
 
 This neoconservative shift matched with President Turbay‘s realist stand in 
Colombian politics. While Carter took some distance from militarised regimes, softly 
pushing for democratisation in Argentina and Brazil, Turbay recognised in 1978 that 
there were critical situations in which the military were called to govern in order to 
assure the survival of a given society (Leal 1989). Turbay‘s statements, which 
allowed the military to exercise an open repression against communism, coincided 
with US ambassador to Colombia Diego Asencio‘s acquiescent approach to extreme 
anticommunist tactics. This is evident in a 1978 cable to the Secretary of State, in 
which he reported that  
 
a disturbing development of recent date is the delineation of a plan… approved in late 
November 1978 by gen. Jorege [sic] Robledo Pulido, commander of the army… to 
create the impression that the American Anti-communist Alliance (AAA) has establish 
itself in Colombia and is preparing to take violent actions against Colombian 
communists. However, the activities thus far carried out in pursuit of this plan, e.g. The 
bombing of the Colombian Communist Party’s headquarters on December 12 with no 
casualties might be more appropriately characterized as dirty tricks than as violations 
of human rights… I feel that the GOC record is still relatively clean, if not as pristine as 
it was last year… in the mean time, I urge the department to exercise extreme caution in 
reacting publicly to any but confirmed reports it may receive concerning alleged human 
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rights violations.
1
  
 
Asencio was a hardline anticommunist who, after being hostage for 61 days in the 
Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogotá in 1980, was appointed as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs during the early days of the Reagan 
administration. Before going to support Washington‘s anticommunist crusade in the 
US capital, he helped pave the way for the Colombian military to envisage the 
possibility of importing Central American counterinsurgency doctrines to 
complement (the already adapted) Southern Cone NSD (see chapter 4). Moreover, he 
also reinforced Colombian rightwing politicians‘ fantasy that Colombia was 
complying with human rights standards.  
 The increasing repression against communists was eclipsed by the Carter 
administration‘s concern with drug trafficking. The discursive event that was to ignite 
the scripting of Colombia as the battleground to fight the war on drugs was the 1978 
Peter Bourne‘s memo  
 
charging that three prominent Colombian politicians had dirtied their hands in the drug 
trade, including Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, who was then the front-running Liberal 
candidate for president (Chepesiuk 2003: 60).  
 
This, allowed Washington to put pressure on Turbay to ―use chemicals for eradicating 
marijuana crops‖, and his preference for trying ―a frontal military offensive against 
drug traffickers,‖ resulted in an experimental fumigation (Tokatlián 2003: 8-9).  
 Whilst the Carter administration was busy imposing chemical fumigation, 
Turbay‘s hard-line approach to social unrest and crime was bringing about the 
consolidation of a rightwing mindset amongst traditional politicians who saw in the 
further militarisation of public order a means to continue securing their exclusive 
access to state institutions. This matched with the military mindset, which was 
merging public order with counterinsurgency (see chapter 4). Thus, the 
neoconservative scripting of reality had contributed to consolidate a hegemonic 
imagery upon which the military eventually became the axis of a covert apparatus of 
security integrating rightwing political, economic, and social networks‘ antipathy 
                                                 
1
 The cable was unclassified in 2007. A PDF copy of the document can be found at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB223/index.htm (retrieved 2 November 2009; capital 
letters in original, italics added). 
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towards communism. By 1981, when Ronald Reagan came into power, the time was 
ripe for politicians, both in Colombia and the US, to slowly begin merging the war 
against communism with the war on drugs. 
The Reagan doctrine and the Colombian dilemma: ‘peace is war’  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Colombia was depicted by both Carter and 
Reagan as one of the few democracies in the Western Hemisphere.  Fighting the war 
on drugs was rewarded ―with $16 million in additional anti-drug assistance‖ (Shifter 
and Stillerman 2004: 335). Nevertheless, by 1982, when Betancur assumed power, 
drug traffickers had thoroughly permeated social, economic and political circles in 
Colombia. Furthermore, dangerous alliances between drug traffickers, governmental 
officials and the army were proliferating in different regions of the country to fight 
guerrilla groups. When Vice President George H. W. Bush and President Reagan 
visited Colombia in August and December 1982, respectively, they scripted Colombia 
as a free society, which according to Reagan had a ―profound tradition of law and 
liberty,‖2 endangered by insurgents. In Bush‘s view it was necessary that ―the United 
States build a military base in Colombia to monitor the country‘s insurgents‖ (Shifter 
and Stillerman 2004: 336). 
 Paradoxically, Betancur had since the outset of his administration distanced from 
Reagan and developed a more independent foreign policy. He called Colombia to join 
the Non-Aligned Movement and created alongside Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama 
the Contadora Group as a counterbalance to ―the Reagan administration‘s hardline 
policies in Central America‖ (Bagley and Tokatlián 1985: 41). Betancur‘s shift in 
foreign policy reflected the changes he was to implement in domestic politics to 
―confront the regime‘s deepening legitimacy crisis and the problem of continuing 
political violence‖ (Ibid.: 35). Once in office, he opened negotiations with various 
rebel groups and proposed a package of political reforms. Betancur‘s alternative 
approach to Reagan‘s tough anticommunist strategies made it possible for the FARC 
to regard the creation of the UP as a means to access the political system (see chapter 
2).  
                                                 
2
 http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/120382d.htm (retrieved 28 March 2008). 
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 Notwithstanding the Betancur-FARC peace talks, Colombia continued to fall 
steadily into a deep socio-political and humanitarian crisis. This was because of (1) 
the strengthening of DTOs, which developed a twofold strategy of regional power 
consolidation: politisation and militarisation; (2) a weak and inefficient judicial 
system, which allowed extremely high levels of impunity; and (3) the unfolding of a 
‗dirty war‘ that enabled various social groups to collude with collective violent actors 
in waging a counterinsurgency war delegated to private actors. The strengthening of 
drug kingpins, the weakening of the judicial system and the ultraconservative 
anticommunism triggering violence against the UP were not new; rather these 
developments had been evolving since Turbay‘s opposition to Carter‘s detente policy. 
 Betancur‘s independent foreign policy came to an end in November 1985, when 
the M-19 takeover of the Palace of Justice was represented by US officials as an event 
that should ―solidify perhaps more than ever the government‘s resolve to crack down 
on narcotics-trafficking organizations‖ (US Congress 1986a: 51), thereby 
disregarding the political nature of the M-19 military action. Since then, the Reagan 
administration –unsupportive of the peace talks– began to pressure Betancur by 
pointing out the links between FARC and DTOs. According to Department of State 
official Jon Thomas, there were indications that the FARC was ―directly involved in 
some of its 28 fronts, with providing protection to narcotics trafficking and processing 
organizations‖ (Ibid.: 51). Yet, as the principle of sovereignty was to guide US 
relations with a regime in which the army was committed to fighting communism and 
the government engaged with the US war on drugs, US officials were constantly 
recurring to the inside/outside dichotomy. Thus Thomas argued: 
 
I wouldn‘t say that we support or don‘t support them in their truce with the FARC. That 
is an internal decision of the Colombian Government. We certainly support them in 
their antinarcotics operations and because of the truce or any type of peace negotiations, 
I have not seen any slackening off on the part of the Colombian Government against 
narcotics traffickers (Ibid.: 58). 
 
Yet in the remaining months of his administration Betancur completely submitted to 
US politico-military pressure, which demanded a hard-line approach to deal with the 
crisis of legitimacy in Colombia. 
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These developments were linked to the hyperreality dominating Reagan‘s foreign 
policy, which in an attempt to tackle the hyperreal threat of communism had, by 1985, 
encouraged alliances between the CIA, the contras in Nicaragua, Noriega in Panama, 
and the Medellín DTOs in Colombia.
3
 Such alliances were to be made public years 
later when the investigation into the Iran-contra scandal was carried out. From 1985 
to 1989, the scripting of Colombia as a democratic nation jeopardised by vicious 
outlaws followed the traditional realist/idealist simulation pattern at the core of US 
foreign policy. Such scripting was part of the geopolitical imaginary that allowed 
Reagan to carry out a covert operation against ‗communism‘ in Nicaragua and to 
overlook Andean nations‘ murderous anticommunist tactics, which were fed by the 
monies destined for the ‗war on drugs‘. This was possible because US Congress 
reports showed that  
 
the increased cooperation and collaboration between narcotics traffickers and terrorist 
groups constitute[d] a serious threat to US national security interests and to the political 
stability of numerous other countries (US Congress 1986b: 11). 
 
The findings were supported by DEA intelligence operations, which were reported to 
Congress in November 1985. According DEA Assistant Administrator for Operations 
David Westrate, although there was ―no information on any significant relationship 
between drug traffickers and terrorists in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay 
or Venezuela,‖ there was ―limited intelligence on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Bolivia‖ which demonstrated that ―FARC groups ha[d] considered international 
trafficking in cocaine, in exchange for weapons‖ (US Congress 1986a: 57-8) 
 DEA‘s reporting was in tune with Reagan‘s anticommunism; countries within 
which leftist insurgencies were operating were thus scripted as spaces where terrorists 
and drug traffickers were allied against the state. In the case of Colombia, this was 
complemented by US complacent attitude towards the early violence against the UP. 
This to a large extent had to do with the fact that the US embassy in Bogotá 
continually transferred to Washington uncritical accounts of Colombian politics based 
on rightwing political representations. As early as 1986, the embassy was reporting 
that the ―participation of the Patriotic Union, or FARC-UP, in the 1986 elections 
                                                 
3
 The complex relationship between drug traffickers and the contras is discussed in the Kerry Report  
(1989a: 36-61). 
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ha[d] generated a heated controversy over the possibility of ‗armed proselytizing‘ by 
the FARC-UP in rural areas‖ (US Department of State 1986: 470).  
 It was only after 1989, when the Kerry Report brought to light how during 
Reagan‘s war against communism that the drug cartels posed ―a continuing threat to 
national security at home and abroad‖ (1989a: iv), that the struggle against 
communism was relegated to a second place in US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 
report carried on using the common scripts in describing Colombia as ―the oldest 
democracy in Latin America‖ threatened by the alliance between drug traffickers and 
guerrillas (see, Ibid.: 25, 28).  
 What these representations of Colombia did not tell is that AI visited Colombia in 
1988 and found that since the election of President Barco, an increasing number of 
assassinations of political activists were taking place along with the ‗systematic 
extermination‘ of the UP. According to AI, paramilitary groups were not the only 
perpetrators, alongside them high rank army and police officers and drug traffickers 
had orchestrated violent actions and many government officials had colluded with 
them. After AI published the report Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio 
responded that the armed forces only acted in defence of Colombia‘s democratic 
institutions. Most Ministers of the Barco administration followed suit and supported 
Samudio‘s claims (Ramírez 1988).  
The disregard for the genocidal violence against the UP did not mean, however, 
that Washington was unaware of the situation. On the contrary, the Department of 
State Report on Human Rights Practices (HRP) partially recognised that ―1987 
witnessed an increase in the number of assassinations apparently motivated by 
politics‖ and that the ―Communist-supported UP party continued to be a principal 
target of such violence.‖ Yet in an attempt to downplay military and politicians 
involvement in the actions, the report added that  
 
Motives for the killings are difficult to establish, but probably include personal, 
narcotics related, and other criminal reasons in addition to political motives... various 
guerrilla groups, drug traffickers, organised bands of hired killers, paramilitary ‗death 
squads‘ and independent elements of the police and military acting outside the scope of 
their official duties escalated the already high level of violence, directly challenging the 
Government's ability to maintain order and preserve democratic institutions (1988: 426-
7, italics added). 
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US political networks scripted an incomplete reality as the overarching feature of the 
Colombian tragedy, in which Colombian elites and military commanders were 
represented as the helpless defenders of democracy. Uncommitted adverbs, such as 
‗apparently‘, were part of the rhetoric that allowed US statesmen to portray 
themselves as objective observers and to subtly offer support to the Barco 
administration while shedding some doubt on the actual involvement of some of its 
members on the violent actions. However, US politicians‘ scripting of Colombia often 
relied on hasty representations put forward by administration officials, as it was the 
case in UP President Pardo‘s assassination, when drug trafficker Gacha was blamed 
for the action (Ibid.: 429). The scripting of Colombia in US foreign policy had, at 
least since the late 1970s, been created by the cross-border interaction of politicians, 
militaries and intellectuals.
4
 In the reproduction of this interplay of representations, 
the hyperreal oldest democracy threatened by hyperreal narcoterrorists overshadowed 
the dirty war and the unfolding of the UP genocide. This implicitly supported the 
grammars of identity/alterity that reproduced the idea of a fictive liberal collective 
self, which encompassed both Colombian and US national identities. 
 By the time Reagan left office, the interaction between official US and Colombian 
political networks had firmly established the script that Colombia was the main 
battlefield in which the war on drugs was to be fought. Whilst the exchange of various 
representations through diplomatic channels allowed such scripting, the onset of 
massacres against peasant sectors of the UP had given way to a quick escalation of 
violence against the group (see chapter 2). The genocidal practices taking place on 
Colombian soil had been eclipsed by the realist fantasy of waging war against a social 
practice (drug addiction), which, because of its illegal character, had allowed 
immense profits to be made by rather marginal actors in Colombia.
5
 This is not to say 
                                                 
4
 The influence of public intellectuals became increasingly important after 1988. The proliferation of 
reports on Colombia forced political elites in the US to open up the space for inviting academics and 
journalist to discuss the drug issue. In 1989, for example, Professor Bruce Bagley was invited to a 
seminar in which he stated ―Though institution building has had a bad name from the Alliance for 
Progress era in Latin America, viable states are essential to the implementation of US policy‖ (US 
Congress 1989b: 19). The same year, Colombian journalist Fabio Castillo was invited to a hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, his statement reinforced the scripting of Colombia: the 
Medellín Cartel‘s ―only weapon is violence and their only aspiration is to undermine the oldest 
democracy in Latin America‖ (US Congress 1989c: 64). 
5
 Christian Allen‘s analysis touches the core of the drug issue: ―drug prohibition is the mechanism that 
transforms coca from cheap commodity to immensely valuable consumer product. Drug enforcement 
can be modeled as a tax that raises the supply curve and leads to higher equilibrium prices and greater 
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that the Colombian drug kingpins were not real people resorting to violence in order 
to defend their private interest. Instead, it is to say that the war on drugs had created 
the opportunity for drug lords to gather together and set up various collective violent 
actors, which regularly colluded with other social actors in violent campaigns aimed 
at the UP. Conveniently, these events had been hidden by a schematic narrative that 
was to allow the US to start playing a ‗police-role‘ in the changing international order. 
George H. W. Bush’s New World Order: the hype rreal writing of 
the Colombian drug cartels threat  
The International Narcotics Act of 1986 enabled US policymakers to envision a ‗new 
role‘ for the US vis-à-vis Latin America in the 1990s. This meant a slow 
reaccommodation of the whole region in the space of US foreign policy. A hyperreal 
threat coming from Colombia was a central part of redefining the setting of US-Latin 
American relations. In 1987, cross-border policing began to operate. This, according 
to US enforcement agencies, was a response to the alignment of Colombian DTOs 
with Mexican traffickers who attempted to take advantage of the Mexican‘s heroin 
and marijuana smuggling and distribution networks already in place in the US (see 
US Congress 1987). Over time, policing activities were complemented by bringing 
the military into the counter-drug strategy; two developments in Colombia during 
1988 and 1989 enabled to this to happen.  
 First, the assassination of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos in January 1988 
stepped up US Congress pressure to give the army a more prominent role in the war 
on drugs. US Congressman Christopher Smith (R-NJ), for instance, argued that in 
―Colombia the traffickers, the guerrillas… the NARC FARC and… all the little buzz 
words we use are winning... And we are losing… And where is the Army?‖ (US 
Congress 1988b: 38). Alongside Smith‘s call for the army to step in, Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Robert Gelbard stated  
 
Colombia faces an extraordinary challenge to the survival of its long-lasting democratic 
system.  The Medellín narcotics criminals have made a conscious decision to do whatever 
is necessary to save their lives and their lifestyles even if the result is the destruction of 
                                                                                                                                           
spending on drugs… corruption functions as an informal ‗tax‘ on smuggling and traffickers viewed it 
as a necessary business expense‖ (2005: 30-2). 
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the judicial foundation of that system (Ibid.: 57). 
 
This scripting of Colombia explicitly dismissed the unfolding genocidal campaigns 
against the UP and disregarded the fact that various government officials and military 
leaders had built up alliances with Medellín DTOs (and other illegal organisations) in 
an effort to destroy the judicial system and do away with ‗undesirable people‘ doing 
‗armed proselytising‘ (see chapter 6). The conclusion reached by US officials that 
more military assistance was needed was then unsurprising.
6
 However, as 
congressional hearings show, the time was not ripe to fully militarise the war on 
drugs,
7
 despite the fact that some members in Congress were advocating for doing so. 
Congressman Smith, for example, disagreed with the division of labour to fight 
guerrillas and drug trafficking, in his view ―the military could be used on fighting 
both fronts‖(US Congress 1988b). 
 The second event was Galán‘s assassination in August 1989. This was the turning 
point in bringing about a police-military strategy so as to fight the war on drugs. 
Barco‘s reaction to Galán‘s assassination was to cooperate thoroughly with the Bush 
senior administration. The most important action taken in relation to US-Colombian 
relations was to reinitiate the extradition of Colombian nationals to the US.
8
 Drug 
traffickers‘ reaction was made public by a communiqué stating:  
 
we declare total and absolute war on the government, on the industrial political 
oligarchy, on… all those who persecuted and attacked us. We will not respect the 
families of those who have not respected our families (Brooke quoted in Hinojosa 2007: 
17). 
                                                 
6
 In a following hearing Gelbard restated the importance of the militarisation of the war on drugs: 
―particularly in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia we need significantly greater infusions of military assistance 
and economic assistance in order to complement the ongoing anti-narcotics programs. Because of the 
close links intertwining of terrorist guerrilla movements and the drug traffickers, there is a clear 
necessity for the armed forces of those countries, particularly Colombia and Peru, to have significantly 
greater military resources to combat the insurgent movements‖(US Congress 1988a: 45). Gelbard 
mentioned the murder of Liberal journalist Guillermo Cano to demonstrate those who opposed drug 
traffickers were target of Medellín Cartel‘s violence; despite UP President Jaime Pardo being one of 
the toughest critics of drug trafficking Gelbard disregarded his assassination. 
7
 Although the militarisation of the war on drugs started in earnest in 1989, US enforcement agencies 
had already shown that the counterdrug strategy was going in this direction. In 1985, for example, a 
Miami based FBI-DEA Joint Drug Intelligence Group was put into place (US Congress 1989c). This 
process was however contested, as the following extract shows ―US role has expanded dramatically in 
the last 4 years... DEA is being thrust into essentially a paramilitary role for which it is ill-equipped‖ 
(US Congress 1989d: 1). 
8
 The US had been pressing for this measure to be reinstated from 1987 when the Supreme Court of 
Justice had declared it unlawful. 
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The scripting of Colombia in US foreign policy, which had, for at least 5 years, been 
anticipating reality; had finally created reality. Drug traffickers decided to spread fear 
in Colombia‘s main cities so as to press a settlement with the Barco administration. 
Narcoterrorism, as it had already been labelled, had to be fought by military means. 
Thus, within days of the communiqué ―President Bush ordered $65 million in 
emergency aid to Colombia and sent military trainers to the country.‖ Although some 
Colombian political elites and the UP contested the issue of military aid,
9
 by 
December ―the US announced plans to use its navy to provide surveillance for all 
flights and ships leaving Colombia‖ and Bush ―signed legislation authorizing $240 
million in aid for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru‖ (Hinojosa 2007: 18).  
 The fight against narcoterrorism made invisible the UP genocide during the Bush 
senior administration. Notwithstanding the fact that the administration was aware of 
allegations about human rights violations, the representations transferred to 
Washington by the embassy in Bogotá continued relying on biased rightwing 
fantasies and reinforced antipathy towards the UP. The 1988 HRP, which by then had 
gained importance as an instrument for assigning a place for a country in US foreign 
policy space, described the situation as follows: 
 
Colombia has recently been fighting threats from both political extremes as well as from 
enormously wealthy narcotics traffickers… The extreme right is made up of disparate 
groups, mostly civilians but at times including members of the security forces... less 
well organized than the left, these groups also practice assassinations, kidnapping, 
vigilante justice, extortion, and robbery, and have also engaged in narcotics trafficking 
… rightwing activists have resorted to intimidation and assassinations of leftwing 
politicians (some of whom are aligned in various degrees with the insurgents) and the 
civilian support networks of the guerrillas… The UP was formed by the largest 
guerrilla... and some of its leadership retain active ties with the guerrillas. Since its 
inception, the UP has suffered from a very high level of assassinations and intimidation 
there is little doubt that narcotics traffickers and individual members of the military and 
police have been involved… AI released a special report [warning of a] government 
campaign, run by the military high command to wipe out political opposition… it seems 
to rely heavily on CPHR and UP... However, great uncertainty exists about the extent to 
which the security forces are involved in aiding and abetting political killings by private 
vigilante groups (US Department of State 1989: 498-501, italics added). 
 
The importance of this excerpt does not exclusively lie in the reproduction of the UP-
                                                 
9
 Liberal presidential candidate Ernesto Samper and former Conservative Presidents Misaél Pastrana 
and Belisario Betancur made public interventions (see Hinojosa 2007: 18). 
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FARC script. Three other representations contributing to place Colombia in the space 
of US foreign policy throughout the 1990s are also found in the report.
10
 First 
representation: the incapacity of the Colombian government to deal with threats gave 
rise to privatization of violence. This portrayal of a weakened nation-state assumed 
that an uncontested nation-state had existed in the first place and disregarded the 
strategic military thinking behind the counterinsurgency warfare delegated to private 
actors. Second representation: drug traffickers and guerrilla groups had mapped 
Colombian territory into cooperation zones and battlefields. This fiction ignored the 
battle for space between guerrilla groups and drug traffickers; and the alliances 
between drug traffickers and security forces at the centre of which genocidal 
campaigns against the UP were unfolding.
11
 Third representation: Colombian security 
forces‘ involvement in aiding political killings and vigilante groups was contentious. 
This fantasy helped to dismiss AI reports showing alliances between security forces 
and vigilante groups against communities.  
 By the time President Barco left office in 1990, these representations underpinning 
the scripts of a hyperreal stable democracy weakened by real narcoterrorists and 
hyperreal narcoguerrillas
12
 had made genocidal episodes invisible. As a consequence, 
although the HRP mentioned the Segovia Massacre against the UP,
13
 it downplayed 
the collusion between the army, the police and paramilitary groups and disregarded 
the political nature of the action by dismissing the victims‘ affiliation to the UP and 
previous death threats made by the perpetrators (see Ibid.). As a result, US officials‘ 
                                                 
10
 Another report carried out at the time shows even more balanced representations, which nonetheless 
aimed to reinforce the hyperreal threat of narcoguerrillas to the already weaken oldest democracy: ―The 
linkages between traffickers and insurgents are neither clear no consistent... in some cases, traffickers 
and insurgents cooperate with each other, in others, they are engaged in pitched battles. In still others, 
some members of the Colombian military may temporally form alliances with traffickers to attack 
guerrillas, while in others the military directly attack both groups.‖ (US Congress 1989d: 24). 
11
 The conflictive relation between FARC and drug traffickers was presented to members of Congress 
by Diego Viafara, a former M-19 member infiltrated in the Campesino Self-Defences of the Middle 
Magdalena Valley (AMM): ―The rivalry between drug traffickers and the leftists of Colombia is 
evident from 1983... Their objective is to eradicate subversion in Colombia if possible… The war 
against the left in Colombia has been waged against the political arm of the FARC, the UP. Thousands 
of members of the Patriotic Union have been killed in Colombia. I personally know that all these 
killings have been carried out under the orders of the organization… I witnessed very many killings of 
the leaders of the Patriotic Union.‖ (US Congress 1989c: 80). 
12
 The same report that showed a sophisticated analysis of Colombia‘s situation contained sections in 
which simplistic representations reinforced the narcoguerrillas script: ―the growing strength and 
numbers of the largest insurgent group are attributable to their growing involvement in narcotics 
trade… The clearest evidence of involvement in narcotics exists regarding the FARC... the FARC 
could well become the next major Colombian Cartel‖ (US Congress 1989d: 22-3).  
13
 Chapters 2 and 7 discuss the Segovia Massacre; see also Gomez-Suarez (2008). 
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indifference grew.
14
 The mix of indifference towards civilian social networks and fear 
fuelled by real/hyperreal foes gives some hints to understand why it was 
unproblematic for the US Department of State to issue from 1989 until 1993 ―thirty-
nine licenses to U.S. firms to export small arms to Colombia, for a total value of 
$643,785.‖15 However, even though arms transfers were legitimated through the need 
to protect an old democracy, the transfers themselves were also part of the US 
security strategy for the Western Hemisphere.  This was so because 
 
[d]uring the Cold War, U.S. arms transfers were… both an instrument of influence and 
an indicator of US political support… The United States thus exported arms to friendly 
and often regionally dominant governments –democracies and non-democracies alike– 
that voiced opposition to communism… Therefore, during the Cold War years, human 
rights and democracy were likely overshadowed by traditional security concerns 
(Blanton 2005: 648-9). 
 
With the cold war finally ‗over,‘ the conditions were ripe to eventually replace the 
communist threat with the drug threat (see chapter 6). Thus arms transfers were bound 
together with Bush‘s ―Andean Initiative, a five-year, $2.2 billion plan designed to 
heighten the United States‘ war on drugs‖ (Shifter and Stillerman 2004: 338). The 
Andean Initiative did not exclusively aim at the US carrying out subtler interventions 
in the hemisphere; it was also designed to solve the ‗external threat‘ that drugs posed 
to US society.  
It is in this context that the rise on arms transfers since 1989 has to be understood; 
yet it would be remiss to neglect that it was closely related with the end of the FARC-
Barco peace talks. This had reinforced the central government‘s counterinsurgency 
narratives, opening the space for a new intelligence strategy to fight the insurgency. In 
1990, within the framework of the Andean Initiative, the US government formed an 
advisory commission of CIA and Pentagon officials to develop a set of national 
security recommendations for Colombia‘s Ministry of Defence. As a result, the 
                                                 
14
 Think tank Global Advisory Services director Lee Rensselaer‘s statement before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs demonstrates that US officials‘ simplification of Colombian reality was not the product 
of ignorance: ―[i]n Colombia, cocaine dealers have formed informal ententes with established groups 
such as rural landlords, right-wing politicians, businessmen, some military commanders to combat 
guerrillas and guerrillas‘ sympathizers. The alliances have succeeded in sanitizing vast regions of 
Colombia… Paramilitary death squads financed by such traffickers as Escobar and Gacha have become 
instruments of counterinsurgency warfare. They are on the cutting edge of Colombia's dirty war against 
the revolutionary left‖ (US Congress 1989b: 19). 
15
 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer6.htm#313th (retrieved 28 March 2008). 
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Colombian government issued Order 200-05/91, which was a plan to better combat 
―escalating terrorism by armed subversion.‖16 HRW demonstrates how, through Order 
200-05/91, paramilitary groups were incorporated into the armed forces‘ intelligence 
apparatus in order to carry out surveillance of opposition political leaders and attacks 
on dangerous individuals selected by the army‘s high command.17 The consolidation 
of this military intelligence network resulted in the proliferation of massacres against 
the UP in different regions of Colombia (see chapter 3).  
 The Andean Initiative and CIA-Pentagon security recommendations to Colombia 
were the product of the militarisation of the war on drugs which by then had managed 
to bring Latin American and US military forces into counter-drug operations. This 
had been possible because in both military and political networks a particular 
narrative had allowed them to portray drugs ―as a threat to the US coming from 
outside its borders‖ (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 4). In a discursive shift, US political 
networks no longer fearing communism eventually created new transnational security 
threats upon which US foreign policy towards Latin America was to be structured 
during the 1990s (cf. Ó Tuathail 1998: 18-9).  
 One of these new security threats that could, in the future, also be moulded to 
match human security concerns was based upon the powerful transnational 
narcoterrorism script, which reinforced traditional understandings of security, 
uncritically appropriated by the Bush senior administration. Cross-border criminal 
activities of the ‗Medellín Cartel‘ were used to simplify the social and economic 
processes at the core of the illegal drug trade. At the same time, the links between 
DTOs and enforcement agencies, both in the US and in the Andes, were downplayed.  
Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that without such a 
strategic alliance there would have been few chances for narcoterrorism to emerge. 
 The foregoing discursive shift determined Washington‘s realist approach toward 
Colombia which continued to be reinforced by the realist/idealist simulations and 
fantasies transferred by the US embassy in Bogotá. Until 1993, when Bush left office, 
the dirty war in Colombia was seen through a very particular set of lenses, whereby it 
was possible to contend that drug traffickers were the principal source of violence. 
According to the 1990 HRP, ―narcotraffickers… often propagated disinformation 
                                                 
16
 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer3.htm (retrieved 28 March 2008). 
17
 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killerapendixa.htm (retrieved 28 March 2008). 
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regarding official human rights abuses, hoping to undermine both domestic and 
international support for the government‖ and rightwing paramilitary groups often 
engaged ―in political violence at the direction of drug traffickers and power rural 
political elites‖ (US Department of State 1991: 548). By centering the source of 
political violence on DTOs, US Embassy officials in Bogotá not only showed support 
for Colombian political elites but also underpinned a common simulation that blamed 
the assassination of UP members exclusively on criminal actors. Thus, they reported 
that before  
 
the March elections there was an organised wave of assassinations of the leftist Patriotic 
Union... Both narcotraffickers and rightwing paramilitary groups were responsible for 
these killings (Ibid.: 550).  
 
Although the report acknowledged that ―[t]he UP charged that security forces were 
also involved in some of these assassinations and that the government was not 
providing it with adequate protection,‖ the report reinforced the view that the violence 
against the UP was carried out by ―narcotraffickers intent on destabilizing the 
country‖ (Ibid.). 
 HRPs did not continue exclusively relying on Reagan‘s hyperreal realist 
simulations; the reports slowly started to acknowledge that excessive ―responses by 
government security forces had resulted in scores of non combatant deaths‖ (Ibid.).  
However, these abuses were depicted as a minor part of the problem, for the 
weakening of the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence was what was at stake in 
countries like Colombia. Early attempts to carry out US state-building support 
operations relied on this imagery. However, a cross-border militarisation of the war 
on drugs was seen with distrust by some political and military sectors; the partial 
collapse of communism made the military unwilling to start taking over new tasks, 
which instead of focusing their attention on ―real enemies‖ were to force them to act 
as ―law-enforcement or police officers‖ (US Congress 1990: 9). This in part explains 
the unwillingness of Colombian military to stop fighting communism. To which it 
should be added that in fighting communism the military saw drug traffickers as allies 
who, after all, were financing some of the paramilitary groups that were bringing 
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down the communist insurgents.
18
 In contrast, President Gaviria‘s unwillingness to 
fight drug trafficking aimed to move his administration away from Barco‘s military 
strategy against narcoterrorism, which had demonstrated that the socio-economic cost 
of fighting the war on drugs was too high for Colombia.  
 In this context, Gaviria spun a narrative that distinguished between narco-
trafficking and narco-terrorism. The former was described as ―an international 
phenomenon that would only be solved through multilateral efforts and international 
cooperation,‖ whereas the latter was depicted as ―an urgent domestic crisis‖ and 
hence a sui generis Colombian solution was needed (Hinojosa 2007: 20). The 
discursive deployment of the outside/inside dichotomy allowed Gaviria to convince 
the Bush administration of the adequacy of carrying out a plea bargain with Medellín 
drug traffickers around the issue of extradition.
19
 This eased, at least for a short while, 
US pressure to militarise the war on drugs in Colombia; for doing otherwise would 
have meant for the US to recognise the failure of the war on drugs (cf. Matthiesen 
2000: 34). The 1991 HRP showed the Bush administration‘s complaisance with the 
Colombian administration by stating ―narcoterrorism continued to decline during 
1991 due in part to the surrender provisions of the Gaviria Administration‘s decrees 
providing immunity from extradition‖ (US Department of State 1992: 535). However, 
sections reporting on political violence were filled with ambiguity and inaccuracy. 
For example, even though narcoterrorism had been ‗weakened‘, paramilitary groups 
were presented as responsible for the ―sharp increase in the number of murders of 
members of the small leftwing Patriotic Union‖ (Ibid.: 536). Furthermore, acts of 
violence that were part of genocidal campaigns against the UP were reported as 
unconnected events. This was complemented with a new narrative, which was 
transferred from everyday-life simulations circulating in various sectors of Colombian 
society, namely that ―[l]eftist guerrillas were responsible for numerous extrajudicial 
                                                 
18
 Mississippi State University Professor Donald Mabry‘s words show that there was still a large 
degree of confusion on what the US was fighting in the war on drugs: ―[i]f we want to fight a war 
against leftist guerrillas in Colombia or Peru, we should say so from the outset… if we got involved in 
such a war, the narcotraffickers who hate leftist and kill them with great regularity, would be our 
natural allies‖ (US Congress 1990: 14). 
19
 In 1991, when Gaviria visited Washington he was warmly greeted by Bush. ―Despite Gaviria‘s 
already-public offer to negotiate the surrender of cartel leaders in return for promises of non-extradition 
and lenient sentences, Bush did not criticize the Colombian leader. On the contrary, he praised him as 
‗a man of courage‘ who is ‗devoted to law and to liberty‘ and for that you have our admiration and 
respect‘‖ (Hinojosa 2007: 21). 
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killings… including some UP leaders, whom they declared guilty of ‗crimes against 
the people‘‖ (Ibid.: 537). This recreated indifference towards the civilian social 
networks at the very moment in which they were being target of genocide. As such, 
the micronarratives of the Colombian tragedy in HRPs were part of the genocidal 
geopolitical con-text. 
 From 1991 to 1993 HRPs continued scripting Colombia in the same simple 
fashion. Yet Escobar‘s escape in July 1992 triggered an array of criticism over 
Gaviria‘s strategy, paving the way for a further militarisation of the drug war.20 This 
enabled the FN‘s legacy of delegating public order matters to the military to subtly 
continue, despite the fact that Gaviria had sought to reverse it in the early days of his 
administration. In 1993 militarised counterdrug operations took place alongside the 
escalation of guerrilla violence.
21
 In this context, Gaviria declared an ‗integral war‘ on 
both drug trafficking and guerrillas. Certainly by then ―the militarisation of politics 
and the criminalisation of war‖ were well underway (Sánchez quoted in Leal 2002: 
92).
22
 When Bush left office, mixed representations attempted to make sense of 
Colombia‘s reality: on the one hand, Escobar still incarnated the narcoterrorist threat, 
and on the other hand, paramilitaries were being described as the new ‗evil-doers‘, the 
exclusive source of non-insurgent violence in Colombia. Although the HRPs were 
paying more attention to the links between military and paramilitary groups, the 
reports usually portrayed the alliances as the result of individual commanders and in 
the worst-case scenario as the result of peripheral army units (see US Department of 
State 1994: 392-402; 1993: 359-66).    
 While paramilitary groups were consolidating military and economic power in 
regions such as Córdoba and Antioquia, and this could be seen as the criminalisation 
of the armed conflict, the government attempt to criminalise guerrilla warfare was 
part of a differentiated long-term effort to delegitimise the political character guerrilla 
groups regarded for themselves (see Orozco 2006). This had started in 1988 with 
Decree 180 (also known as ‗Antiterrorist Statute‘). In November 1993, the Gaviria 
                                                 
20
 The Bloque de Búsqueda Special Joint Task Force was created to hunt down Escobar. It was a unit 
made of 600 militaries and policemen, most of them trained at US military schools, and supported by 
US security agencies (see Leal 2002: 91). 
21
 FARC armed attacks proliferated after the army‘s attack on Casa Verde in 9 December 1990. 
22
 See Iván Orozco (2006) for an account of the politico-juridical processes through which guerrilla 
groups were, by the mid 1990s, no longer considered political offenders in Colombian jurisprudence. 
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administration released a new National Strategy against violence under the name 
Security for the People, in this document the government argued that the borders 
between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and common crime had blurred.
23
 Gaviria thus 
unified a punitive-police approach against all forms of violence. This scripting of 
reality had damaging consequences for rural dwellers in FARC-controlled areas, who 
were criminalised because according to ‗intelligence‘ accounts they were part of 
FARC‘s ‗support network‘. Those who suffered the most were the remnants of the 
UP. As the few strongholds that remained were in FARC-controlled zones criminal 
activities were associated with UP members. Because the UP‘s national socio-
political power had faded since the early 1990s, it was easier for government leaders 
to argue that some of the assassinations were part of local disagreements, and 
therefore part of the high levels of criminality in the countryside, to which the 
guerrillas and drug traffickers were contributing. This was instrumental in making 
invisible the genocidal practices against the UP to Colombian public opinion 
throughout the 1990s. In this way, the invisibility of the victims in US politics was 
complemented by the invisibility of the genocide in the very place where it was taking 
place. 
 What seems paradoxical on the side of the Gaviria administration is that even 
though it regarded the FARC‘s armed uprising illegal, before leaving office, in early 
1994, Gaviria issued Decree 356 making possible the re-legalization of self-defence 
groups. This Decree allowed the formation of Security Cooperatives later known as 
Convivir, which linked with Carlos Castaño‘s paramilitary group were to carry out the 
extermination of the UP in Urabá, the last remaining UP stronghold (see chapter 3).  
 The last two sections show that US foreign policy‘s scripting of Colombia from 
1981 to 1993 recreated the image of an old democracy under attack. Whereas Reagan 
circulated the idea that Colombia faced a narcoguerrilla threat, Bush turned to the idea 
of a narcoterrorist threat. In both cases the writing of Colombia had reproduced 
antipathy towards the UP, sympathy for Colombian political and military elites, and 
indifference for the suffering of civilian social networks. As Colombian 
administrations were complicit in the radicalisation of affective-dispositions, a 
political economy of sympathy amongst members of a fictive liberal collective self, 
                                                 
23
 Leal argues that ―as US withdrew from the anticommunist struggle, Colombian military openly 
criminalised guerrilla groups‖ (2002: 101). 
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and antipathy towards civilian social networks represented at its margins, informed 
the coexistence of transnational grammars of identity/alterity with an antigrammar of 
genocide. This led to the solidification and free circulation of the perpetrator bloc. Bill 
Clinton‘s foreign policy was about to portray Colombia as a narcodemocracy, the 
perpetrator bloc was to continue operating. This was so because the Clinton 
administration decided to side with the security forces.  
Clinton’s multilateralism, Bush’s war on terror and the neglect of 
the UP genocide 
President Clinton finally placed human rights as one of the central tools in defining 
the place of a country in US foreign policy.  This enabled the US government to 
decide whether or not to intervene in a domestic drama in the name of 
humanitarianism. In the case of Colombia, the decision was made that the genocidal 
practices against the UP and other atrocities were less urgent than cracking down on 
drug trafficking. The complacent attitude towards the UP genocide was the result of 
the simulation that regarded drug trafficking as the source of violence. This enabled to 
essentialise the perpetrators and decontextualise the genocide, thereby producing a 
shallow script that obfuscated the complexity of such a conjuncture. Thus, the alleged 
links between President Samper and drug traffickers allowed for scripting Colombia 
as a narcodemocracy in US foreign policy space, and ―Colombia went from being an 
ally of the US to be a victim of ‗coercive diplomacy‘‖ (Leal 2002: 101). US military 
officers described Colombian security forces as the true defenders of democracy at 
the very moment when they were involved in genocidal campaigns against the UP. 
This weakened Samper‘s capacity to govern. According to Department of State 
Assistant Secretary Robert Gelbard,  
 
Clinton denied certification to Colombia… because the efforts of Colombia‘s police, 
military, prosecutors, and other honest government officials were being undermined by 
corruption at the highest levels of the Colombian Government and Congress… We 
have proposed not only to continue, but to augment the US assistance to the Colombian 
police, military, and justice sector which are confronting the drug threat and the 
corruption it has engendered… The traffickers intend to make Colombia a drug-safe 
haven, and they have demonstrated their power to do so by successfully corrupting a 
President (US Congress 1996: 4). 
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Together with the narcodemocracy script, Colombian military generals started to 
circulate the narcoguerrillas script again. US Congress invited the Colombian military 
to hearings in which the military represented the FARC as the ‗the third cartel.‘ In this 
con-text, human rights concerns were rapidly overlooked by liberal fantasies, which 
imagined the establishment of the office of the UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights in Bogotá as bringing to an end the military‘s involvement in such violations 
(Ibid: 16). Put differently, the UN office was established in order to validate the 
Colombian military, at a time of sharply rising paramilitary abuses that were 
portrayed by US policymakers as fully autonomous actors, while even those instances 
of military‘s direct involvement in abuses was rendered invisible. 
 Although the destruction of the UP had almost been accomplished by the time 
Clinton came into power, the last genocidal episodes were still to come. The 
genocidal campaign, known as Plan Retorno, which took place between 1994 and 
1997, was completely disregarded by the 1994 HRP. The only reference found in 
regards of the UP was the assassination of the last UP Congressman Manuel Cepeda 
(US Department of State 1995: 352). Although the 1995 and 1996 HRP more 
explicitly referred to the more than ―2000 assassinations of UP members over the last 
ten years,‖ the reports portrayed the violence against the group as a domestic 
experience and principally highlighted ―UP‘s complaint… before the IACHR that 
charges the Government with ‗action or omission‘ in what the UP terms ‗political 
genocide‘ against the UP and PC‖ (US Department of State 1996: 364; 1997: 393). 
While UP leaders welcomed the report, they called on the US to specify the 
responsibility of US agencies in providing intelligence strategies and training to the 
Colombian security forces (El Espectador 1997b: 5A). 
 Instead of addressing human rights violations, stepping up diplomatic pressure and 
investigating the multiple transnational connections of various sectors of the 
perpetrator bloc (see chapter 6), the Clinton administration carried on focusing on 
representing drug trafficking as a serious threat coming from Latin America. As 
Congressman Benjamin Gilman‘s (R-NY) words exemplify, the epicentre of such a 
threat was Colombia: ―Today, drugs and the narco guerrillas threaten to turn 
Colombia, South America‘s oldest democracy, into a full-blown narco state that could 
become a major regional threat‖ (US Congress 1998b: 1). The othering of the Samper 
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administration gave rise to narratives that reinforced a distinction between the 
Colombian government and the Colombian people who, according to 
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtienen (R-FL), were ―fighting with their daily lives 
against these narco traffickers‖ (Ibid: 5). These narratives imagined a country split 
into evil politicians and good cops. Such a simulation enabled the further 
militarisation of the war on drugs in Colombia and in the whole region. This was 
demonstrated by Clinton‘s decision to make ―a quiet shift in 1999‖ by transferring the 
Pentagon‘s office for Inter-American Affairs from the Bureau for International 
Security Affairs into the Bureau for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; 
under the reorganization, Latin America was at the time ―the only geographic area 
assigned to an office that deal[t] with issues like terrorism, drug enforcement, and 
other activities of Special Forces‖ (Isacson 2001: 1).  
 Ironically, this occurred at the same time that Clinton was supporting Pastrana‘s 
peace policy. In matter of months, US narratives had gone from bitter criticism of 
Colombian politicians to unconditional support for the Pastrana administration. 
Scholars‘ macronarratives, such as Mark Chernick‘s, helped to path the way for this 
shift in US foreign policy. In his address to Congress Chernick emphasised that 
 
With the election of President-elect Pastrana… the acrimonious and tense nature of the 
relationship between the two governments has already been left behind, and there‘s an 
opportunity to rebuild the traditionally strong relationship between the two countries. 
President-elect Pastrana… has made clear… that the very essence of his administration 
will be to address the issue of peace in Colombia, and in attacking illicit narcotic crops 
(US Congress 1998a: 2). 
 
In order to legitimate Pastrana‘s approach, Chernick argued against labelling the 
FARC as the third cartel. Instead, he represented the FARC as insurgent group 
exercising ―authority in parts of rural Colombia, particularly in these coca grown 
zones.‖ As such, he said to be 
 
convinced that if the FARC ordered the eradication of coca production tomorrow, and if 
they and the state could provide alternatives to the populations that live and depend on 
coca production, perhaps as much as 90 percent of coca cultivation would be eliminated 
tomorrow (Ibid.: 3). 
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That what was at stake in Colombia was US antinarcotics policy was evident by his 
final remarks: 
 
my advice to US policy, is that the US should support the peace process in Colombia. 
The major interest of the US and Colombia… are anti-narcotics. From what I can see, 
the most enlightening and effective US would be to support the peace process because 
the peace process is in fact, the most direct, effective, and efficient way for the US to 
be able to deal with the problems of illicit narcotics in Colombia (Ibid.: 5). 
 
Despite the fact that Amnesty International-USA‘s Advocacy Director for Latin 
America and the Caribbean Carlos Salinas pointed out the role of security forces in 
human rights violations: ―[t]he links between the paramilitary and regular security 
forces cannot be stressed enough, and have been amply documented‖ (Ibid.: 11), US 
politicians continued stressing the narcoguerrilla script as the main concern for the US 
when deciding the extent of the support for the Pastrana administration. According to 
Congressman Gilman ―The money that these narco-terrorists [FARC and ELN] 
collect on a monthly basis… exceeds the entire annual budget of the UN Drug 
Control Program‖ (Ibid.: 14). By then the narcoguerrillas script had been 
institutionalised in US foreign policy by designating the ELN and the FARC as 
foreign terrorist organizations by Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 2001. 
 By doing so the Clinton administration was able to continue supporting the 
military‘s ‗counternarcotics operations‘. Nevertheless, in order to conform with AI‘s 
concerns about the appalling human rights record of the Colombian military, which 
were related to the destruction of the UP (the civilian social network portrayed as 
supporting FARC), human rights training was provided to the Colombian security 
forces in the SOA (US Congress 1998a). Between 1999 and 2002 Colombia led the 
world‘s number of trainees by US military institutions with over 15,000 militaries and 
police officers (Vaicius and Isacson 2003: 3). The lack of US support for the peace 
process, the proliferation of paramilitary groups and FARC‘s ambiguous attitudes 
resulted in an utter failure. By 2001 the conflict had escalated, FARC had increased 
its military might, the army had been reformed and built up with Plan Colombia‘s 
monies, and paramilitary groups had aided to establish a vicious politico-military 
social order in most regions of the country. Despite the complicity of political elites 
both in the US and Colombia in bringing about such turmoil, US politicians continued 
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representing themselves as not only the champions of the ―second oldest democracy 
in the hemisphere‖ but a progressive South America. Senator Joseph Biden‘s (D-
DEL) words are telling in this regard 
 
when they ask me why I am so hung up on helping Colombia, I ask them to look at a 
map of South America and ask them how they can envisage a South America that is 
progressive, open, democratic in the next 20 to 30 years with Colombia not a 
democracy any longer, Colombia a narco-state (US Congress 2001: 2). 
 
These narratives allowed ruling elites to show themselves as objective and transparent 
actors and the drug trade as a dark force that had ―led to an assault on Colombia‘s 
very democracy, not only by drug traffickers but also by left-wing guerrillas and by 
right-wing paramilitaries‖ (Ibid.: 3). Such narratives had paved the way for the 
simplification of reality that was put forward after 9/11. In this con-text, the 
Colombian peace process initiated between Pastrana and the FARC broke off, and the 
path was clear for the new apotheosis of the principle of hyperreality pushed by the 
Bush-Uribe alliance in the Western Hemisphere: the regional variant of the global war 
on terror. 
 Although the modernisation of the Colombian army entailed the merging of 
counterdrug operations with counterinsurgency during the second Clinton 
administration, when Plan Colombia was designed, it was not until 2001 when the 
Bush junior administration merged both operations under the term counterterromism. 
As a result, ―with the stroke of a pen, billions of dollars of drug-war aid suddenly 
became ‗counter-terror‘ aid‖ (Vaicius and Isacson 2003: 13). This is nicely 
summarised in Congressman Cass Ballenger‘s (R-NC) words: 
 
Up until now, Congress has been reluctant to even address the… conflict in Colombia 
directly… The $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, approved by Congress in the year 
2000, limited US assets to counternarcotics operations only… The recent failure of the 
peace talks with the FARC, coupled with sharp increases in terrorist attacks in 
Colombia, is leading us to seek alternative solutions; and it only makes sense to apply 
the policies which now guide our worldwide war on terror to the scourge of terrorism 
in Colombia (US Congress 2002: 1) 
 
The war on terror fused terrorism with criminality. National security was no longer 
dominated by the realist paradigm but by the liberal one that did not see in other states 
as threats to the survival of society.  Instead, criminal actors were seen as attempting 
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to disrupt the protection of life. Even conservative politicians, who had supported 
Reagan‘s anticommunism, were rebranding the cold war struggle as a fight between 
the axis of evil and the axis of good. Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) argued: ―We 
should not be blinded by false ideological labels. There is no Left and no Right in 
Colombia, only competing bands of narcoterrorist criminals‖ (Ibid.: 5). Amidst the 
war on terror, UP social networks continued to be targets of destruction, exemplifying 
that in ―the context of Colombia… and the Andean border zone, counterterrorism 
seems to be little different from old-school, Cold War-style counterinsurgency‖ 
(Isacson 2005: 50). Since 2001, terrorism became a catch-all term used to describe 
internal opposition,
24
 resembling the cold war years when for some political elites 
social movements were allies of communism. Until 2010, President Uribe frequently 
referred to NGOs and other political opponents as allies of terrorism. As early as 
2003, he criminalised civilian social networks by stating that some of his critics were 
―human rights traffickers, who should take off their masks and show their political 
ideas.‖ 25  Such statements allowed the systematic persecution of human right 
defenders and the violent practices against UP survivors to continue (see REINICIAR 
2006b; Cinep and Cceeu 2004). 
 What US aid has done throughout the 2000s is to support the Colombian  security 
forces. Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, and Plan Consolidación have had at their core 
the build-up of army brigades involved in counterinsurgency operations so as to deal 
with what some members in Congress identified, in the mid 2000s, as a potential 
Andean quagmire (Isacson 2005: 51). Although these plans have been described as 
having a social component, the fact is that the military build-up has been unmatched 
by an ―increased aid to strengthen rural development, and other civilian governance 
needs‖ (Ibid.: 53). What the plans have successfully done is to relegate to oblivion the 
UP genocide and the survivors‘ struggle to find the truth. 
                                                 
24
 According to Rojas, ―the US has played a central role in the changing dynamics of the Colombian 
armed conflict by confusing a counternarcotics war with a counterinsurgency war in one single 
strategy, today identified as the war on terrorism‖ (2007: 41). 
25
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_3092000/3092222.stm (retrieved 1 November 
2009). 
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Conclusion 
The hyperreal writing of Colombia in US foreign policy allowed the crystallisation 
and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture until 2010. In the late 
1970s, the neoconservative turn amongst US political networks enabled the 
consolidation of a similar rightwing mentality amongst Colombian traditional political 
elites. The imagining that human rights violations against communist leaders was a 
legitimate tactic of weakening political contestants helped to create an alliance 
between ruling elites and a military cadre eager to define itself in terms of 
counterinsurgency. Upon this imagery, neoconservatives circulated the script that 
Colombia was a long-standing and stable democracy. Such a scripting framed the 
micronarratives enabling the materialisation of the perpetrator bloc of the UP 
genocide and the macronarratives aiming at explaining the complexity of the 
Colombian drama. 
  During the 1980s two scripts complemented the narratives mapping Colombia in 
the Western Hemisphere: narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorists. These scripts, circulated 
by US-Colombian political networks in an attempt to deal with contingency 
(discipline space) and to explain (simplify) reality, weakened Betancur‘s peace 
policy, which aimed to circulate sympathy for communism. Narcoguerrillas and 
Narcoterrorists soon became central to the micronarratives informing everyday-life 
representations and the flows of arms and resources. The merging of drug trafficking 
and communism in the geopolitics of the second cold war further radicalised 
anticommunism; thus, the narcoguerrillas script succeeded in fixing representations in 
Colombian and US civil societies‘ mindsets, which reinforced antipathy towards the 
UP allowing a violent crackdown against it. In the late 1980s, US and Colombian 
administrations started blaming narcoterrorists (drug traffickers) for the violence 
against the UP. Colombia was thus positioned as the battlefield to wage the war on 
drugs.  
  Throughout the early 1990s, Congress was a forum in which the Colombian drama 
was discussed in a constant dialogue held between military, political and intellectual 
networks. Yet, US foreign policy officials carried on (re)producing scripts that 
simplified complex conjunctures. This allowed for US agencies to issue intelligence 
recommendations that advised the continuation of a counterinsurgency campaign 
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delegated to private actors. Such a campaign prolonged the targeting of hyperreal 
narcoguerrillas and concrete civilian social networks considered to be the FARC‘s 
socio-political network of supporters. By then fighting narcoguerrillas and 
narcoterrorists had become a transnational affair. The US administration‘s sympathy 
for the Colombian tragedy downplayed the links between political entrepreneurs and 
security forces in genocidal campaigns against the UP. Sympathy coexisted with 
indifference. The indifference of US officials contributed to make invisible the UP 
genocide amongst Colombian public opinion.  As such, the genocidal campaigns 
continued mostly unnoticed or at least disregarded by the broader social networks 
who were spectators and protagonists of the concrete battlefield in which the war on 
drugs was being fought: the unseen genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. 
 In the mid 1990s the narcodemocracy script weakened Samper‘s capacity to 
govern. This put the administration at the mercy of the military so as to sustain itself 
in power. The Colombian military‘s anticommunism drove them to tighten up their 
cooperation with narcoparamilitary groups. The creation of Convivir by the 
administration sealed this alliance and showed the narrow scope of action that the 
civilians had in security matters. Although the involvement of high ranking military 
officers in the violence against the UP was widely known, the US army continued 
training Colombian security forces in courses that allegedly sought to improve their 
human rights records. The Clinton administration further weakened the civilian 
administration in Colombia by portraying security forces, the CNP in particular,
26
 as 
the true defenders of Colombian democracy. Despite Pastrana‘s presidency brought 
along a new peace process with FARC, diplomatic relations between US and 
Colombian administrations improved. Yet because of the FARC‘s firepower, 
conservative political networks increasingly represented Colombia as a quasi-failed 
state. The Colombian drama was no longer about drug trafficking but the very 
survival of the state. During these years Pastrana recognised the previous involvement 
of military officers in human rights violations and, as chapter 7 discusses, started a 
process of seeking a political solution with the UP. However, the violence against the 
                                                 
26
 In 1999 Gen. Rosso Jose Serrano, Chief of National Police, was considered by some US politicians 
and various high ranking police officers around the world as the best policeman of the world. However, 
as July 2009, paramilitary leader Mancuso accused him of supporting the AUC 
(http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/mancuso-senala-rosso-jose-operar-paras/125758.aspx 
retrieved 30 August 2010). 
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UP was at the time interpreted as the product of the violent clash between 
paramilitary groups and FARC which, in Clinton‘s eyes, a weak (corrupt) Colombian 
state could not halt. 
 At the turn of the millennium, FARC‘s military build up (materialised into a war of 
positions) and 9/11 facilitated the reemergence of the narcoterrorist guerrillas script 
which contributed to a sharp increase of violence against UP survivors. During the 
later years of the Uribe administration the UP was mainly portrayed as a past 
experience. This, together with the fact that George W. Bush overlooked the atrocious 
human rights record of Colombian security forces, allowed the consolidation of 
sympathy for the Colombian government, indifference for survivors‘ drama, and 
oblivion for the UP genocide. During the 2000s, scripts such as narcoterrorist 
guerrillas and resilient state have brought Colombia to the core in US foreign policy 
space; as such the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture has been ‗surreptitiously‘ 
connected with Congress. 
 Although the last two chapters demonstrate the centrality of transnational military 
and political networks in the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture in which the destruction of the UP occurred, it would be 
remiss to disregard the contribution of outlaws who colluded with security forces and 
politicians into the perpetrator bloc. The interactions between transnational criminal 
networks and the liberal western hemispheric military network are complex, entailing 
cooperation and conflict, as do the interactions between US and Colombian 
administrations and drug traffickers. To analyse the role of transnational criminal 
networks in the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal conjuncture turns 
the next chapter. 
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6 DRUG TRAFFICKERS ,  PARAMILITARIES AND 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES:  MAPPING IL(LEGAL)  
MATERIAL/DISCURSIVE FLOWS IN THE UNFOLDING OF THE UP  
GENOCIDE  
If the military mindset that allowed the participation of Colombian security forces in 
the perpetrator bloc was the product of it being part of a transnational network, which 
saw itself as the guardian of the (liberal) Western Hemisphere (see chapter 4), and the 
very idea of a Western Hemisphere threatened by hyperreal threats was reproduced in 
transnational political interactions, allowing the military to freely team up with 
outlaws in their attempts to control contingency by carrying out genocidal violence 
(see chapter 5), what remains to be explored are the transnational connections of 
various outlaws and how such connections enabled the consolidation of the 
perpetrator bloc in the concrete genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. This chapter 
offers a topology of the transnational criminal network colluding into the perpetrator 
bloc of the UP genocide. 
 Since the late 1980s, and especially since 9/11, transnational crime has been 
associated with new international security threats. Narratives put forward by 
intellectuals of statecraft promote the idea that poorly governed spaces provide fertile 
home bases for transnational crime, which in turn ―contributes to the ability of 
‗terrorists‘ to increase their involvement in crime‖ (Giraldo and Trinkunas 2010: 429, 
436). This narrative contributes to representations of outlaws as unconnected with 
institutions that exercise strong law enforcement, as in the case of the US. This 
misrepresentation not only allows for a simplistic interpretation of reality in general, 
but also reifies, in particular for our case study, the simulation put forward by political 
networks that depraved outlaws were the perpetrators of violence against the UP. This 
chapter con-textualises the transnational connections of the criminal sector of the 
perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide and the discursive production of transnational 
crime as a security threat. In doing so, it challenges the genocide script whereby the 
liberal international community is presented as disconnected from the perpetrators of 
genocide. 
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 Genocide studies lacks a serious study of the outlaws‘ role in the perpetration of 
genocide, and  as a result of the genocide script, scholars have  focused mainly upon 
the state, and therefore paramilitary groups, when taken into account, are at best seen 
as subsidiaries of the state (i.e., Erickson 2006). This chapter aims at complementing 
chapter 3 by showing that as transnational criminal networks‘ alliance with state 
agencies and private companies enable them to materialise in the first place, they 
become ideal partners in the targeting for destruction of civilian groups seen as a 
threat to a complex assemblage of political, military and economic networks. It 
focuses on unveiling the transnational connections of drug traffickers, paramilitary 
groups and transnational companies. First, it con-textualises the emergence of DTOs 
and the convenient alliance that eased tensions between competing racketeers during 
the most part of the 1980s. Then, it shows how, by teaming up with the military and 
paramilitary groups, some drug traffickers were able to access the legal arms trade. 
This militarisation sided them with anticommunist regional coalitions for violence, 
placing DTOs in a unique position to take a leading role in some genocidal campaigns 
against the UP in the late 1980s. The third section looks into the ambiguous 
relationship between state agencies and drug traffickers in the early 1990s and how 
this was related to transformations in the structure of the perpetrator bloc. The fourth 
part turns to analyse the scripts created in the space of US foreign policy which 
concealed the complex relations between drug traffickers, state agencies and private 
legal enterprises aiding to blur the distinction between drug-trafficking and 
insurgency, and thereby eclipsing the genocidal episodes taking place in mid-1990s 
Colombia. Finally, the chapter unveils the transnational connections between the 
newly empowered narco-paramilitary groups and legal actors, which enabled them to 
concentrate capital and coercion and surpass their own expectations of success at the 
turn of the new millennium. 
The rise of drug-trafficking organizations (1976 –  1984) 
The growth of DTOs in the early 1980s set the grounds for the militarisation of some 
racketeers who, in the mid-1980s, decided to team up with the army in 
counterinsurgency campaigns which had started to target the UP. DTOs‘ growth, 
however, was not a spontaneous process. Colombian historians have usually studied 
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the rise of Colombian DTOs as a domestic development (i.e., Palacios 2003). 
However, DTOs were the product of local processes evolving because of the need of 
politico-economic elites to insert the country into the international political economy; 
thus, as Allen (2005: 16) points out, the rise of DTOs has to be studied ―amidst 
Colombia‘s own economic liberalisation efforts, which encouraged cross-border 
flows of trade and investment.‖ Colombian administrations carried out these efforts in 
a historical context in which inter-state relations were regulating markets, 
reconstructing borders, and developing and enforcing prohibition regimes, all of 
which contributed  in defining the ‗illicit spaces‘ of economies (Ibid.). For this reason 
political elites had to adhere to US pressure to illegalise dynamic sectors of the 
country‘s economy, such as the cultivation of marijuana. The illegalisation of these 
sectors increased the profits that could be made by adventuring in the illicit drug 
trade. In a developing country, in which 54 percent of the peasants were in poverty 
(Palacios 2003: 296), many turned to drug-trafficking in search of fortune.  
 Although a marijuana boom occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, it was nothing 
more that another case of a short-term agrarian economy. This was the case because, 
as Camacho (2006: 391-2) explains, 
 
the irrationality of the actors, the technical difficulties of the hustle and bustle, the 
frequent imprisonment, and, particularly, the internal cultivation of marijuana in the 
US… which ensures larger productivity and quality, converged to bring about the 
decline of the Colombian smugglers‘ share in the marijuana business.  
 
Contrary to the experience of Colombian marijuana smugglers, the cocaine traffickers 
were soon to become a driving force of Colombian economy. By the mid-1970s they 
had managed to monopolise the cocaine trade from Peru and Bolivia to the US. 
Narcotics traffickers‘ cunning and risk-taking mentality were not the only keys to 
success. Colombian administrations had, at least since the early 1970s, contributed to 
it too. Thus, by the 1980s, thanks to the ‗Left-Handed Window‘, which had been 
created during President Alfonso López Michelsen‘s term (1974-1978), and allowed 
US dollars illegally earned to enter the economic system and be converted into pesos, 
―the drug trade was booming and cocaine… was starting to eclipse marijuana as the 
Colombian smuggler‘s drug choice‖ (Chepesiuk 2003: 60). Once narcotraffickers 
achieved a privileged economic status, they developed a twofold strategy of regional 
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power consolidation: politicisation and militarisation. This substantially affected 
almost every single social network existing under the evolving Colombian state 
building process.
1
  
 During the second half of the late 1970s, however, the largest impact of drug-
trafficking was that it  
 
allowed upward social mobility. Colombian society, in which social mobility had been 
quite blocked... suddenly offered a whole new set of prizes to individuals who had the 
skills and the resources to get involved in illegal activities (Gutiérrez 2009: 31). 
 
Although this came to shake the static traditional social structure reinforced by the FN 
agreements, upward social mobility –made possible thanks to immense fortunes 
amassed by the control over drug-trafficking transnational routes– enabled individual 
actors to permeate political and economic elites. This process was not free of 
conflict,
2
 and disputes between drug barons over trafficking routes, which ended in 
bloody vendettas, were common during the 1970s.
3
 However, a particular event 
which brought together the most powerful drug traffickers dispersed throughout 
Colombia eased tensions for about a decade. In 1981, drug trafficker Fabio Ochoa 
convoked a summit with Pablo Escobar, Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, Carlos Ledher 
and another 222 drug traffickers to join efforts in a campaign to seek the release of his 
daughter Martha Nieves Ochoa who had been kidnapped by the M-19. This event not 
only led to the creation of the drug traffickers‘ private military force MAS, but it had 
ramifications which were to shape DTOs throughout the 1980s. Thereafter, drug 
                                                 
1
 Following Charles Tilly and Norbert Elias, González, Bolívar, and Vázquez (2004) argue that the 
Colombian conflict has to be studied as part of an ongoing state building process rather than as a 
process producing a failed state.  
2
 This is not to say, to paraphrase Reuters (2009: 275-6), that ―illegality itself is sufficient to generate 
high levels of violence in a market,‖ although ―the drug-related wars in Colombia and Mexico have 
been prominently reported in the US press and have helped reinforce the view that drugs cause 
violence.‖ The foregoing should not, however, downplay the fact that ―criminal organizations are 
hindered in their internal as well as external transactions by the lack of accesses to civil courts… thus a 
dispute about responsibilities of a subordinate can quickly escalate to a violent conflict.‖ See also 
Naylor (2009: 241), who develops a compelling analysis demonstrating that ―[t]here is little or nothing 
in the inherent logic of illegal markets to lead to the expectation of violence in their conduct. To the 
extent violence does occur, the best place to look for its explanation is in the societal and political 
context. Violent societies produce violent criminals and violent police and military forces.‖ 
3
 What was known as the ‗1978 War‘, for example, allowed drug traffickers to consolidate control over 
distribution networks in Miami and New York (see Castillo 1987: 79-87). ‗Cocaine Wars‘, this time 
between Medellín drug traffickers and Cuban-American distributors, took place between 1979 and 
1981; through these wars the Medellín DTOs managed to control the distribution network in Florida 
(Bagley 1988-1989: 75). 
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traffickers began to consolidate alliances which resembled mafia-type organisations 
based on ―ritual kinship‖ (Paoli 2002). While ―there was no formal, hierarchical form 
of leadership that synchronized activities, prominent leaders did emerge in 
coordinating roles‖ (Lee quoted in Allen 2005: 59).  
By the late 1980s, the ‗Medellín Cartel‘ was amongst the most feared 
organisations. Its consolidation, according to some scholars, was the result of the fact 
that during the Reagan administration ―the struggle against communist expansion 
ha[d] always been given diplomatic priority over the war against drugs‖ (Bagley 
1988: 169).
 
This was demonstrated by the 1989 Kerry Report, which pointed out 
precisely that the strengthening of the Medellín Cartel between 1984 and 1986 was 
related with the fact that  
 
the supply network of the Contras was used by drug-trafficking organisations, and 
elements of the contras themselves knowing received financial and material assistance 
from drug traffickers. In each case, one or another agency of the US government had 
information regarding the involvement (US Congress 1989a: 36). 
 
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration disguised US security agencies‘ alliance with 
drug traffickers by creating the Commission of Organized Crime in 1983, which listed 
the Colombian cartels as some of the most powerful organised crime entities (Paoli 
2002: 56). This shaped the imagination of some conservative intellectuals of statecraft 
who, ten years later, were contending that  
 
Transnational criminal organizations, particularly drug-trafficking organizations, 
operate unrestricted across international borders. They are a very similar in kind to 
legitimate transnational corporations in structure, strength, size, geographical range, and 
scope of their operations‖ (Williams and Florez quoted in Ibid. : 57). 
 
The foregoing, as Paoli rightly points out, allowed not only the representation of 
transnational organized crime as ―the great threat,‖ but also drug-trafficking as the 
single most important menace to world order ―that, after the sudden disintegration of 
the USSR, sectors of American federal institutions, the public, and some scholars 
desperately seemed to need‖ (Ibid.). The scripting of Colombian DTOs by US 
administrations since the early 1980s as organised and powerful cartels does not 
withstand close examination. Paoli‘s comments on this regard are again telling, in her 
view the so-called Colombian cartels  
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were loose combinations of relatively small family-based cocaine manufacturing firms 
that merely joined forces in the early 1980s to transport and smuggle cocaine to the 
United States… Although the system appears to be well-organized, many of these 
partnerships do not last long and frequently change their composition; manufacturers 
who participate in one shipment do not have to participate in others… as the quick 
disintegration of the Medellín coalition after the death of its charismatic leader Pablo 
Escobar shows, the institutional organization of the cocaine industry is rather 
precarious… A similar process of disintegration has also affected the Cali ‗cartel‘ 
(2002: 68-9). 
 
The events behind the scripting of ‗Colombian cocaine cartels‘ would be best 
described as the consolidation of two somehow powerful economic alliances, which 
managed, to some degree, to monopolise the bulk of the illegal cocaine trade in the 
hemisphere and control the main distribution networks in the US. Between 1978 and 
1981, these consortiums had started to revolve around the entrepreneurship of two 
families: the Rodriguez Orejuela based in Cali and the Ochoa Vasquez in Medellín. 
New York and Miami respectively became their ‗spheres of influence‘ in the US 
(Castillo 1987: 41-66). Although the relationship between drug traffickers working 
within the two consortiums was amicable, the strategies to insert themselves in their 
respective regional societies were quite different. Whereas the Rodriguez Orejuela-led 
consortium decided to quietly penetrate the economic and financial sector of the Valle 
del Cauca County, some members within the Ochoa Vasquez-Escobar alliance opted 
for direct public intervention in politics (cf. Palacios 2003: 277). This difference 
explains the Medellín Cartel‘s direct involvement in the armed conflict throughout the 
1980s and contributed not only to the war that emerged between the Cali and 
Medellín DTOs after 1987,
4
 but also in sealing a convenient alliance between some 
                                                 
4
 Fidel Castaño‘s statements show the difficulty in finding an explanation of the war between the Cali 
‗Cartel‘ and Escobar.  In 1991, Fidel Castaño told scholar Alejandro Reyes ―I have never understood 
why the war between the Medellín and Cali cartels started. The fact is that there are many actors 
intervening in the conflict, the DEA, the DAS, the Police, the Government, industrialists, and 
politicians. One does not know where the bullets come from‖ (Reyes 2009: 91). However, Riley‘s 
account gets closer to explaining the origin of the war: ―By 1987 and 1988 almost any semblance of 
cooperation between Cali and Medellín had evaporated as the cocaine industry erupted into open 
conflict. The rancour developed over a number of issues, including Gacha‘s attempts to acquire a share 
of the lucrative New York City cocaine market controlled by Cali, and Jorge Ochoa‘s arrest at a 
roadblock outside Cali in 1986. Ochoa‘s arrest, suspicious because it occurred at the hands of a 
municipal police officer while Ochoa was under heavy guard, place him in some jeopardy… 
Medellín‘s grab sparked a violent conflict in both the United States and Colombia, which pitted the two 
organizations against each other… A bomb exploded outside one of Escobar‘s apartment buildings… 
Escobar… blamed Cali for the detonation. Medellín, in response, initiated a campaign of bombing the 
chain of pharmacies owned by the… Orejuela family. The government‘s intense efforts in 1988 to 
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Medellín drug traffickers and army battalions. Such an alliance was to prevail thanks 
to the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy, which enabled outlaws and security forces 
to negotiate in/formal grammars of identity/alterity so as to resolve their differences 
and to forge an antigrammar of genocide which resulted in genocidal campaigns 
against the UP in regions such as the Middle Magdalena Valley in the mid-1980s (see 
chapter 3).  
The Medellín conglomerate: the first narcotisation of paramilitary 
groups (1984 –  1989) 
Although US foreign policy makers and intellectuals of statecraft represented the 
Medellín Cartel as a transnational criminal network colluding with communism and 
thus posing a serious security threat to the liberal Western Hemisphere, evidence 
shows that the connections with US security agencies helped its consolidation. The 
Medellín DTOs‘ consolidation at the core of transnational criminal networks 
reinforced some DTOs‘ militarisation and positioned them at ‗the centre‘ of the 
perpetrator bloc targeting the UP. However, in US narratives this was incorporated 
and twisted, and as a result, the criminal character of the violence against the UP was 
overemphasised, and the political drive informing the connection between security 
agencies, politicians, and drug traffickers was downplayed. To expose the 
simplification of complex events which aided in solidifying the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture, the first question that needs answering is: why did the Medellín drug 
traffickers‘ politicisation strategy end up reinforcing the militaristic option propelled 
by the Ochoa‘s clan?  
At the beginning Escobar and Carlos Ledher invested large amounts of money in 
populist programmes and advertising campaigns for their ‗noble cause‘. This gained 
them some support amongst poor beneficiaries in cities such as Medellín and 
Armenia.
5
 Populist projects, such as ‗Medellín without slums‘, allowed Escobar to 
                                                                                                                                           
capture Escobar and leading Medellín cartel members intensified the enmity between the groups 
Escobar grew suspicious that Cali was providing the government with information it used in its 
manhunt‖(1996: 171-2). 
5
 ―In a survey carried out in schools in the Comuna Nororiental [a poor neighbourhood in Medellín] 21 
per cent of the students considered Pablo Escobar the most important national figure… 56 per cent of 
the survey participants expressed a positive opinion of Escobar‖ (Salazar and Jaramillo quoted in 
Rubio 1999: 88). 
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obtain sufficient votes in his 1982 campaign for Congress. Once he became a member 
of the House of Representatives for the Liberal Party, some traditional politicians and 
few members of the Betancur administration started a strong campaign to root out 
drug traffickers from public institutions. Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is 
perhaps for Colombia‘s hegemonic collective imaginary the person who embodied 
this fight. Lara realised that ―while Colombian judges were afraid of drug traffickers, 
drug traffickers only feared US judges‖ (Castillo 1987: 184), and his weapon was 
therefore to submit to US pressure to make effective the extradition treaty. In this 
context, Ledher‘s private advertising campaign shifted from calling for the creation of 
a widespread movement of ‗Los Secuestrables‘ against the guerrillas, to supporting 
and spreading communiqués of ‗Los Extraditables‘.6 Los Extraditables‘ motto ―we 
prefer a tomb in Colombia than a jail in the US‖ demonstrated that Lara was correct 
in his judgement. Although Lara did not manage to isolate drug-trafficking from 
politics, his assassination in April 1984 forced political-hungry drug traffickers to 
retreat into clandestinity. Medellín DTOs‘ last attempt at politicising their criminal 
activities came a few weeks later. In a secret meeting in Panama with former 
Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, they handed in a ‗unilateral 
memorandum‘ in which they  
 
[1] condemned Lara‘s assassination, [2] reiterated their political convictions in favour of 
the political system, [3] denied any links with the FARC-EP…  [4] underscored that 
their only ambition was to ensure the abolishment of the extradition treaty, and [5] 
pledged themselves to withdraw from the illegal enterprise, repatriate their capitals, 
dismantle all cocaine labs and sell, with prior government authorization, their aircrafts 
and chemical precursors (Palacios 2003: 278-9). 
 
Betancur refused to negotiate. Whether or not the US pressured Betancur into making 
this decision as Palacios suggests, the fact stands that after this point some drug 
traffickers within the Medellín consortium escalated violence against some state 
institutions.  
                                                 
6
 The Kidnapable Ones was the name chosen by drug traffickers after the 1981 summit. The name was 
widely publicised by Ledher through the dissemination of leaflets in football stadiums in the autumn of 
1981 calling for ―a paramilitary counter-kidnapping task force‖ that ―the Secuestrables were willing to 
finance‖ (in Salazar, quoted in Rubio 2005: 38). Once the Betancur administration started to persecute 
them, they changed their name to Extraditable Ones. 
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The creation of the MAS, which, according to the Kerry Report, was advised by a 
US government official to the members of the Medellín Cartel (Guerrero 1999: 237-
8), spurred the emergence of violence entrepreneurs, who had been at the core of the 
slow but steady process of militarisation of some DTOs. Once the possibility of 
accessing the legal social sphere was closed, drug traffickers such as Gacha and 
Escobar, turned to building up violence entrepreneurs‘ military capabilities so as to 
set up their own private military forces. They also allied with paramilitary and self-
defence groups operating in the Middle Magdalena Valley. The anti-guerrilla 
discourse and the immense flows of money put into the bribing of state officials  
forged a convenient alliance between military officers fighting ‗the internal enemy‘ 
and drug traffickers as the ‗private financiers‘ of the dirty war that provided 
paramilitary groups with a larger budget, better arms, and more mercenaries. The 
military‘s distrust of, and Escobar‘s hatred for, ‗Colombian oligarchy‘, had brought 
them together.
7
  
The involvement of the Medellín DTOs in the conflict moulded the way in which 
they were to connect with illegal and legal actors cross-borderly. Thanks to links with 
the Colombian army, Medellín DTOs established contact first with the CIA and then 
with Israeli and British mercenaries who supplied them with weapons.
8
 Medellín 
DTOs‘ use of the supply network of the Contras in exchange for financial and 
material support allowed not only the Ochoa family to consolidate a hegemonic 
position in the southern US cocaine market but also opened the path for Gacha and 
Escobar to access the international arms markets, ―such as those in Central America 
that were flooded with surplus weapons in the 1980s‖ (García-Peña 1999: 83).9 
                                                 
7
 For the military‘s distrust of Colombian oligarchy see chapter 4. As for Escobar‘s hatred, Fidel 
Castaño‘s statements are quite telling: ―none else hates oligarchs as much as Pablo‖ (see Reyes 2009: 
91). Escobar‘s own words reveal that it was a common discursive practice for him to legitimate his war 
on the Establishment based on a verbal attack of the oligarchy in favour of the popular classes (see 
Rubio 1999: 87-8). His hatred stemmed from some traditional elites‘ refusal to accept Escobar‘s 
upward mobility as part of the process of constituting a new emerging elite. 
8
 The alliance also allowed internal arms transfers; this explains why, as Garcia-Peña (1999: 90) 
contends, ―many weapons registered and legalized by the army for wealthy Colombians are later used 
to arm paramilitary groups.‖ 
9
 During the 1980s the arms trading system was undergoing an important transformation. Laurence, for 
instance, saw a tendency towards ―returning to its former merchants-of-death character, where the lack 
of governmental control resulted in private traders having a significant impact on conflicts and foreign 
policy.‖ This had reinforced ―the appearance of illegal arms exports in the 1980s,‖ which had to be 
understood in the context of ―a surge in U.S. arms production capabilities (spurred by increased 
defense spending), some problems with controlling commercial exports, and a decline in the 
international demand for legitimately traded arms.‖ In such a context, the collusion between state 
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Whilst both Gacha and Escobar saw in the procurement of weapons a means to 
protect the first stages of the chain of illicit activities associated with the production 
and domestic transportation of cocaine, each of them assumed different roles in terms 
of the military build up. Gacha, responsible for the domestic transportation, was to 
become deeply involved with the military-paramilitary counterinsurgency campaign 
against the FARC, whereas Escobar, godfather of a significant number of US cocaine 
distribution networks since the late 1970s, was to arm and command urban gangs so 
as to do away with competitors and state agents who did not submit to his bribes.
10
  
According to the US Department of Justice, the first significant export control case 
involving light weapons destined for the Medellín Cartel dates back to 1988 (Klare 
and Andersen 1996: 71-2). However, export control statistics are not a reliable source 
in discovering the extent of arms acquired by DTOs in the legal markets during the 
1980s, for as Greene (2000: 176) points out   
 
[m]any of the weapons came from the USA, where sophisticated firearms could be 
bought relatively easily due to its liberal gun laws. They could then be shipped to Latin 
American countries, often taking advantage of opportunities to divert legal exports of 
civilian firearms to unauthorised destinations. 
 
Moreover, even though it is difficult to attain accurate information regarding arms 
black markets, evidence seems to suggest that Medellín DTOs‘ kingpins had accessed 
the illegal arms trade long before 1988. Only this would explain the sophisticated 
arms transfer strategy whereby Gacha alone purchased 100 Mini Uzis (9 mm), 200 
Galils (5.56 mm), and 200 Galils (7.62 mm) in 1989 from the Israeli Military 
Industries (IMI).
11
 Various cases of illicit arms transfers demonstrate not only that 
drug traffickers had accessed the arms black market but also that the illicit drug trade 
                                                                                                                                           
officials and drug traffickers in the mid-1980s had brought about the most serious transformation in 
arms trading: ―the development of a supply network developed for the drug trade that is increasingly 
being used for arms… It is an efficient and clandestine supply network, capable of handling a large 
volume of goods‖ (Laurence 1992: 507, 525, 527). 
10
 It is difficult to establish with accuracy the extent to which the Gacha and Escobar military 
campaigns overlapped. However imprecise Escobar‘s words may be, it is worthy quoting them because 
these are somehow significant in highlighting the division of military tasks with Gacha: ―I have never 
belonged to the Right because it disgusts me. I have not had, I have not got, and I will not have 
paramilitary groups; for I have never defended oligarchs‘ and landowners‘ interests‖ (see Rubio 1999: 
87). 
11
 Israeli mercenary Yair Klein played a central role in Gacha‘s procurement of weapons. The largest 
part of the transaction took place within the legal arms market, however ―the weapons were 
clandestinely diverted to Rodriguez Gacha and the Medellín cartel‖ (for a complete account of the 
transfer see Klare and Andersen 1996: 62-5). 
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and the black-market arms trafficking had become heavily linked; therefore ―[g]un 
smugglers and drug traffickers often combine[d] operations and use[d] the same 
routes and transportation systems for both arms and drugs‖ (Klare and Andersen 
1996: 61). This is not to say, as US intellectuals of statecraft pretend to show, that so 
as ―to move arms or munitions in Latin America [at the time], the established 
networks [were] owned by the cartels‖ (Gorman quoted in US Congress 1989a: 11); 
rather the fact is that Medellín DTOs accessed the arms black market thanks to  ―the 
idea [supported by US policy makers] that drug money was perfect solution to the 
Contra‘s funding problems‖ (Ibid.: 41).  
However, in arms transfers, small arms were not the only ‗things‘ being 
transferred. Scripts exchanged between suppliers and DTOs shaped their perception 
of the war and thereby the techniques used in dealing with their enemies. In so doing, 
such scripts influenced the narratives circulating in the grammars of identity, allowing 
the accommodation of alterity within the perpetrator bloc and reinforcing a hyperreal 
construction of the UP as an ‗other‘ who could only be subjected to the antigrammar 
of genocide. The drug traffickers‘ multiplicity of enemies forced them to recreate 
hyperreal sympathy for the army; they were thus able to join Latin American military 
forces in their fight against communism as a way to secure their business. Put simply, 
a ‗convenient ideologisation‘ informed the antipathy some of them (re)circulated 
towards the internal enemy. In this context, to associate ‗local‘ violent practices with 
‗foreign‘ successful methods of crushing the other, whoever it was, was the logical 
step to follow. The know-how of the Israeli and British mercenaries was to become 
part of the tactics of a sector of the perpetrator bloc in dealing with enemies within 
Colombian borders. In other words, transnational cooperation shaped genocidal 
practices. Inhuman acts carried out by Israeli and British mercenaries‘ trainees 
complemented the already terrorising techniques implemented by drug traffickers and 
paramilitary groups in the Middle Magdalena Valley, Meta and Urabá (see chapter 3). 
All in all, the analysis of the 1980s shows that the hyperreal writing of the threat 
posed by the Medellín Cartel to international security eclipsed the structures and 
policies which were fuelling transnational criminal networks in the first place. After 
the mid-1980s, the narcoterrorists script –used until then to describe the Colombian 
drama– was given a transnational dimension, which allowed the Reagan 
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administration to allocate a place to Latin America in the space of US foreign policy. 
Although the US State Department was already issuing yearly Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, there was, as yet, no place for hemispheric human rights 
tragedies in the space of US foreign policy. Thus, the writing of the global was to 
privilege particular representations, which were then scripted and brought about 
particular realities. By 1988, the Medellín Cartel script used to domesticate 
contingency transnationally had come to complement the narcoterrorists script, which 
was also eclipsing Colombian officials involvement in the dirty war in general, and in 
the UP genocide in particular. In this con-text, it became a common practice, both at 
the ‗domestic‘ and ‗international‘ level, to blame the killings of UP members on 
paramilitary groups financed by the Medellín Cartel. Indeed, Gacha had financed 
paramilitary groups and ordered the killing of many UP members. Nonetheless, he 
had also colluded with high-ranking military officers, statesmen, farmers and ranchers 
in genocidal campaigns against the UP. That said, it needs to be emphasised that drug 
traffickers were not alone involved in genocidal massacres, threatening people to do 
as they wished or challenging the state to get away with their crimes; some 
politicians, military officers, and statesmen were co-opting drug traffickers  so as to 
secure particular interests and bring about the destruction of the UP.
12
 This pattern of 
interaction, which seems particular to the Colombian locale, was however possible 
thanks to the  
 
alliance between [US and Latin American] officials, who co-opt[ed] drug traffickers as 
means of carrying out ‗strategic international security plans‘, which gave the mafias a 
privileged place in Colombian politics (Guerrero 1999: 238).   
The Pepes and Cali drug-trafficking organizations: the disbanding 
of the Medellín conglomerate (1989 – 1993) 
The substitution of the Medellín conglomerate by other DTOs as the core of a 
transnational criminal network did not mean the dismantling of genocidal campaigns 
against the UP. Rather, the largest events in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture 
were still to come. These were the products of Carlos Castaño‘s siding with the 
                                                 
12
 ‗Clean‘ militaries, statesmen and politicians are for the purpose of this chapter those who were not 
involved in drug-trafficking.  Corrupted officials in my view are part of the structure of DTOs.  
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security forces in the war against Escobar, transferring his urban anti-communist 
crusade to the peripheries. This brought Castaño within the imagery of a collective 
self that, by resorting to the extreme use of violence, saw itself as protecting the body 
politics of ‗the Colombian nation‘. At the same time, however, his closer associates 
were consolidating key positions in the transnational networks dominating the illegal 
drug trade. 
 By 1989 Gacha and Escobar had achieved an economic-military build up, which 
they were using against the Colombian establishment. Small arms transfers and 
mercenary training had transformed the paramilitary groups into war machines able to 
cleanse entire regions of communists. After Galan‘s assassination, however, the Barco 
administration, with US financial support (see chapter 5), stepped up its campaign 
against Medellín DTOs and their paramilitary groups. Gacha was gunned down in 
December 1989. Because of the Barco administration‘s campaign against the 
Medellín Cartel, Fidel Castaño decided to dismantle the MRN paramilitary group in 
Córdoba and Urabá and the Self-Defence Forces of the AMM were severely 
weakened, bringing about another transformation in the perpetrator bloc (see chapter 
3).  
 In this context, Escobar bargained with the Gaviria administration to surrender. 
The end of terrorist attacks was exchanged for the abolition of the extradition treaty. 
In 1991, after a new Constitution was signed, declaring unconstitutional the 
extradition of Colombian nationals, Escobar gave himself up. ‗La Catedral‘, a ‗high-
security‘ prison, was built to lock Escobar in. While Escobar was detained the Cali 
syndicate and other smaller DTOs saw the opportunity to take over Escobar‘s routes. 
This intensified the ongoing war between Cali and Escobar, in which some of his 
collaborators turned against him (Camacho 2006: 397). As Escobar stepped up his 
war against competing DTOs, various drug traffickers allied against him. In 1992, 
Gaviria had decided to transfer Escobar from La Catedral because of the widely 
known irregularities taking place. He escaped before the order was carried out. His 
enemies, however, were determined to hunt him down. It is not clear whether or not 
Fidel and Carlos Castaño started an anti-Escobar alliance;
13
 the fact is, however, that 
                                                 
13
 In his first public interview in 1994 with weekly magazine Semana, Fidel Castaño explained the 
origin of his war against Escobar as follows: ―about fifteen months before Escobar imprisonment, 
Pablo had brought into the country a large armament destined to the ELN, this annoy me quite a lot. 
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the Gaviria administration created the Bloque de Búsqueda, which together with the 
Castaños‘ paramilitary force shot Escobar down in December 1993. The weakening 
of the Medellín syndicate hence occurred alongside the strengthening of some drug 
traffickers that were later to form the ACCU. This was not fortuitous; Fidel and 
Carlos Castaño and Diego Fernando Murillo‘s alliance with the Cali syndicate, 
publicly known as Los Pepes,
14
 opened up the path for a new period in which 
paramilitary groups started to rearm and fortify their military build up. According to 
Carlos Castaño, drug traffickers‘ money enabled him to substantially increase the 
procurement of small arms in the early 1990s: from 100 or 200 muskets bought in the 
arms black market to 4500 arms entering the country from Central America 
(Aranguren 2002: 205). This new period of paramilitarisation occurred in the context 
of state-sponsored protection rackets,
15
 for the Gaviria administration used Los Pepes 
in its campaign to hunt Escobar down.
16
  
 Los Pepes‘s attacks on Escobar occurred alongside Carlos Castaño‘s crusade 
against what he, and a powerful group of ―patriots‖, identified as ―active guerrilla 
fighters within leftist organisations‖ (Ibid.: 121), most of which were UP members. 
By that time, various national leaders had decided to withdraw from the party. While 
the UP remained in politics until 2002, the perception was that the PC had taken over 
it. However, the fact is, that the majority of leaders who left the UP were PC members 
                                                                                                                                           
We even had a strong argument and I did not talk to him never again. I felt like starting a fight against 
him, but... I feared him. Once in La Catedral, Escobar arranged the killing of Moncada and Fernando 
Galeano, and we the ones remaining alive saw ourselves obliged to fight against him; there was no 
other alternative left‖ (see, http://www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=54972, retrieved 
23 November 2009). 
14
 In the same interview with Semana, Fidel Castaño denied his links with the Cali Cartel and abstained 
from giving the names of his collaborators. He insistently stated that he was the founder of the Pepes 
and that his brothers did not have anything to do with the violent actions aimed at hunting down 
Escobar (Ibid.). 
15
 According to Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009: 254-55), state-sponsored protection rackets are 
―informal institutions through which public officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, 
enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organizations, in exchange for a share of the 
profits generated by the organization… [the provision of] information about rivals and [the] 
compl[iance] with certain behavioural expectations.‖ 
16
 New evidence demonstrates that during 1992 and 1993, the Colombian police joined forces with 
criminal actors in the battle against Escobar. According to one of the members of the Army Task 
Force: ―we decided to hold an interview with Fidel Castaño… In that meeting, apart from securing the 
support of Castaño‘s subordinates, we realised the need of talking to kingpins of the Cali Cartel… 
After the meeting in Cali, the Army Task Force received a message from the Middle Magdalena 
Valley, from Puerto Boyacá to be precise. Ariel Otero, commander of the AMM, decided to join the 
crusade against Escobar… Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano… together with Carlos Castaño decided 
to create a Paramilitary Task Force to target Escobar‘s contacts‖ 
(http://www.elespectador.com/node/37967/print, retrieved 23 November 2009). 
188 
 
  
too, so they also stepped down as PC members. What had been the backbone of the 
UP, the PC, was then the only structure left to defend the ideals of the party (see 
chapter 2). Because of the historic relationship between the FARC and the PC, 
Castaño used the division within the UP to argue that the leaders who remained in the 
UP were active guerrilla fighters. After a few years of an urban counterinsurgency 
warfare, which systematically eliminated regional and national UP leaders, Carlos 
Castaño moved its operations to the countryside. The ACCU were to carry on with a 
rural counterinsurgency campaign aimed at cleansing Urabá and Meta of ‗FARC-UP 
subversives‘ (see chapter 3). Carlos Castaño had learnt many of the irregular tactics 
applied in urban and rural counterinsurgency operations in a one-year course in Israel, 
where he realised that the key to win the war was ―to defend, invade and win 
territory‖ (Ibid.: 107-11). Castaño‘s contact with foreign violence entrepreneurs did 
not only give him the military training to knock down social movements and carry out 
some of the systematic assassinations of UP members, but it also helped to shape the 
very same representations that regarded particular sectors of the population as 
depraved allies of the guerrillas who should be exterminated. This, altogether, enabled 
Castaño to instrumentalise the antipathy towards FARC (recreated by a constant 
reference to the assassination of his father) and circulate an antigrammar of genocide 
that sought to do away with the UP, a central part of the civilian social networks that 
was seen as an obstacle to securing the immense economic benefits to be obtained by 
building up a strong private counterinsurgency apparatus able to exercise control over 
the production end of the drug-trafficking industry in peripheral regions.  
ACCU: The reconstitution of counterinsurgency strategies (1994 –
1997) 
From 1994 to 1998, the scripting of Colombia‘s drama in US foreign policy 
contributed to the weakening of the already fragile political system and the rising of 
powerful paramilitary groups, which, thanks to consolidating a privileged position in 
the transnational drug trade, gained the means to carry out the genocidal campaign in 
Urabá. The dismantling of Cali DTOs played an important role not only in US 
narratives, but also in the concentration of coercion and capital by an emerging 
smaller model of DTOs. 
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 In 1994, when President Samper stepped into the Nariño House, Cali DTOs were 
responsible for 70 percent of the cocaine circulating in the US market. The Orejuela-
led cocaine syndicate had taken over Medellín‘s routes without any attempt by the 
Gaviria administration at stopping them. Cali DTOs‘ non-confrontational strategy had 
made it easier for the Barco and Gaviria administrations to overlook their illicit 
activities.
17
 Although serious allegations about drug traffickers‘ subtle involvement in 
politics, the two leading contesters in the 1994 presidential race completely 
disregarded the issue and excluded it from the debate (Tokatlián 1999: 244).  
 In this context, President Clinton delegated to Barry McCaffrey the direction of the 
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. This appointment stepped up the Clinton 
administration‘s pressure on Samper, demanding the dismantling of the Cali Cartel 
and the capture of its leaders. Even though Bogota quickly succeeded in fulfilling US 
demands –in part because one sector of the CNP turned against the Cali kingpins 
(Camacho 2006: 399)–, US coercive diplomacy based on the circulation of the 
powerful narcodemocracy script (see chapter 5) and the corruption scandal over the 
financing of Samper‘s presidential campaign by Cali drug traffickers, rapidly eroded 
the rather limited legitimacy that the Colombian political system had gained in 1991 
after drafting a new Constitution. Around the same time, FARC and ELN‘s warfare 
went from the guerrilla stage to mobile warfare. As Samper saw in the traditional 
political structures the last resort for clinging to power, it accepted a ‗tough line‘ 
approach to deal with insurgency. Carrying on with the previous administration‘s 
measures attempted to defend Colombia‘s democracy, Ministry of Defence Fernando 
Botero put into practice Decree 356 of 1994 by allowing the creation of the first 
Convivir. The legalisation of paramilitary groups did away with five years of 
ambiguous efforts by the Barco and Gaviria administrations to dismantle self-defence 
groups.  
 The perverse effect for Colombian society, and the UP in particular, was that it 
came to reinforce the rearmament of drug traffickers‘ paramilitary groups, including 
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 Time magazine, for example, was stating by 1991 that Cali drug-trafficking organizations were ―the 
new kings of cocaine, patriarchs of a criminal consortium more disciplined and protected from 
prosecution than the Sicilian Mafia and now bigger than the Medellín cartel. The Cali combine 
produces 70% of the coke reaching the U.S. today, according to the DEA, and 90% of the drug sold in 
Europe‖ (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973285,00.html retrieved 30 November 
2009). 
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the ACCU. This enabled them to strengthen their role in the transnational illegal drug 
trade. Yet only until 1995, when the Cali syndicate was dismantled, ―more 
decentralized flexible networks incorporating greater members of smaller and more 
specialised DTOs‖ started to take over the cocaine trade. Paraphrasing Allen, this 
occurred because ―by emphasizing local flexibility and international complexity, the 
criminal economy adapt[ed] itself to the desperate control attempts by rigid, 
nationally bound state institutions‖ –a ―manifestation of ‗after-fordism‘‖ (2005: 26, 
61). The only organisation left which seemed somehow to resemble the mafia-type 
cocaine consortiums was, until recently, the Norte del Valle consortium (NVC),
18
 
which in the mid-1990s allied with the ACCU, and from 1997 to 2005 sided with the 
AUC in its fight against the ‗guerrillas‘. 
 The ACCU consolidated after Fidel Castaño was shot dead in 1994. Carlos 
Castaño took over his senior brother‘s paramilitary group. In Carlos Castaño‘s 
enterprise there was space for former guerrilla fighters to join in. This allowed 
demobilised EPL fighters to join the ACCU. In the context of a war between FARC 
and EPL, the ACCU saw an opportunity to establish a dominant position in Córdoba 
and Urabá. The EPL demobilised soldiers organised themselves under the Comandos 
Populares; this group together with the ACCU then targeted what they identified as 
FARC: UP members in Urabá. Contrary to the rest of the regions in which the UP had 
formerly exercised political power before assassinations, cleansing, threats had 
diminished its power, in Urabá the UP was a rising power (see chapter 2). This 
allowed the UP to carry on challenging capitalist structures of social reproduction. In 
retaliation to the diminishing of a social network of leftist activists, FARC targeted 
EPL strongholds. Within this context a war of mutual extermination started between 
the FARC and the EPL. The last genocidal episode against the UP occurred amidst 
the context of a dirty war between an ACCU-EPL-Army alliance and the FARC (see 
chapter 3). Most victims of a series of vicious massacres were UP members (Suárez 
2008: 64). The perpetrator bloc did not only reproduce the antipathy of broader 
sectors of the population towards the FARC, and take advantage of their indifference 
to the luck of the UP, but also drug traffickers within the perpetrator bloc became key 
                                                 
18
 According to Camacho (2006: 400), the NVC was a third party in the relations between Medellín and 
Cali. By 1995, it had gained control over various routes, which gave it the autonomy through which it 
could survive the dismantling of the larger cocaine syndicates.  
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actors in spreading an antigrammar of genocide against those civilian social networks 
that fell under the FARC-UP script. Thus, the grammars of identity/alterity bringing 
together the various clusters and cliques within the perpetrator bloc existed side by 
side with an antigrammar of genocide that reproduced a fantasy in which, to use 
Orozco‘s words,  
 
the perpetrators saw themselves as victims-perpetrators-innocent while represented UP 
members as perpetrators-victims-culprit; these representations fed by mainstream 
discourses allowed the perpetrators to transfer the guilt to the victims (quoted in Ibid. : 
70). 
The AUC: the second narcotisation of paramilitary groups and 
protection rackets (1997 – 2006) 
The emergence of the AUC in 1997 converged with a larger transformation in the 
structure of transnational drug-trafficking networks. On the one hand, whereas the 
Medellín and Cali syndicates sought to control drug-trafficking from production to 
distribution, post-1995 Colombian DTOs decided to drop distribution in the US. This 
had two effects. First, it allowed other drug traffickers –mainly Mexicans– to 
substantially increase their share of the profit. Mexican DTOs had been involved 
since the Escobar years; however, most DTOs collaborated with Colombian 
organisations so they were part of a broader network, and hence violence erupted 
when disagreements over whether or not to collaborate with ‗the foreigners‘ emerged. 
Since the emergence of smaller Colombian organisations, the Mexican DTOs have 
gained autonomy. This, together with the democratisation and anti-corruption reforms 
in Mexico, has created conflict; ―[v]iolence thus supplanted state-sponsored 
protection as the main survival strategy of [Mexican] drug traffickers‖ (Snyder and 
Duran-Martinez 2009: 267). Second, it dismantled the ‗control‘ over the flow of arms 
that Colombian DTOs may have had due to their presence at both ends of the drug 
trade. In this sense, Colombian drug traffickers became dependant on other actors 
offering security, which would explain their cooperation with both guerrillas and 
paramilitaries. So, in contrast to Mexico, violence has been perpetuated because a sui 
generis mix of state and non-state sponsored protection is the survival strategy of 
Colombian drug traffickers.  
 On the other hand, arms-traffickers became common intermediaries between the 
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production end and the distribution networks (Camacho 2006: 406). This, instead of 
weakening drug traffickers‘ position in the complex web of relations in the 
Colombian armed conflict, allowed them to take over a role as arms-brokers. Drug 
traffickers were in a position to offer arms to both guerrilla and paramilitary groups in 
exchange for protection in rural regions, at the same time that they could arm their 
own death squads to offer ‗security‘ services in urban areas. The case of drug-
trafficker Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano alias ‗Don Berna‘ –who owned the 
Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) paramilitary group operating in Antioquia and had 
―a vast criminal organization in Medellín known as ‗La Oficina‘ which employed 
hired killers to work on commission for whoever wanted to pay‖ (Oude and Rozema 
2009: 419)– demonstrates how Colombian drug traffickers took advantage of  
transformations in the drug trade at the local level. At the transnational level though, 
they also benefitted economically: as arms brokers assumed marketing roles in the 
drug trade, a reduction in the insurance paid by drug traffickers took place. Ensuring 
the supply in foreign markets became someone else‘s responsibility. The reduction in 
profits was then compensated by (1) cutting insurance costs and (2) developing 
profitable illegal enterprises related with socio-economic local processes. In the 
context of the Pastrana-FARC peace talks, ‗private counterinsurgency operations‘ 
carried out by regional coalitions for violence and bringing together the army and the 
AUC, were aided by conservative sectors of society that saw in the peace process a 
threat to Colombia‘s liberal socio-economic structure. Thus, ―various members of the 
City Council and industrialist played a leading role in the paramilitary death squads,‖ 
which targeted people ―suspected of left-wing views, but they were often innocent 
civilians‖ (Ibid.: 413, 406).  
Though there is some agreement amongst scholars in terms of the transformation 
in drug-trafficking networks, US politicians started to refer to FARC as the new 
cocaine Cartel in 1998. The narcoguerrillas script, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was 
widely used during the 1980s, and because of the military-economic power 
demonstrated by the Medellín syndicate at the turn of the 1990s, the Bush senior 
administration focused on ‗narcoterrorism‘. It designed the Andean Initiative and saw 
counterinsurgency as a matter that could be delegated to the Ministry of Defence, 
which issued order 200-05/91 to create a counterinsurgency network upon which few 
193 
 
  
paramilitary units could continue to operate freely (see chapter 5). The first Clinton 
administration‘s efforts to dismantle the Cali syndicate were somewhat related to 
domestic politics –heavily affected by the Lewinsky scandal. By 1998, however, 
when President Pastrana proposed to bring to an end the conflict through a political 
settlement with FARC, politicians both in the US and Colombia dusted off the 
narcoguerrillas script.
19
 The hyperreal FARC Cartel was fed by media reports on the 
use FARC was giving to the demilitarized zone –‗the size of Switzerland‘!– in the 
Eastern Plains. By 2002, even the commander of the AUC, Carlos Castaño, was using 
such a script so as to justify the involvement of drug traffickers in the national 
paramilitary umbrella organization; and to paraphrase him, ―it took 
narcoparamilitaries to fight narcoguerrillas‖ (Aranguren 2002: 206).  
Although there is no denying the fact that FARC‘s involvement in drug trafficking-
related activities had sharply increased since 1990 –when the Colombian army 
attacked FARC‘s headquarters–, calling it a ‗cartel‘ simplified the complex dynamics 
within Colombian insurgents (see Gutiérrez 2004). Furthermore, it contributed to 
eclipsing the fact that the AUC had managed to bring together various drug traffickers 
under a counterinsurgency campaign aimed at wiping out ‗the guerrillas‘. This not 
only helped drug traffickers to hide illicit activities and to establish better contacts 
with state agents (Gutiérrez and Barón 2008: 119), but it also allowed feelings of 
sympathy between outlaws and government officials to go unquestioned.  
Nevertheless, not even the AUC, closely linked with the NVC and bringing 
together other smaller DTOs, could be called a cartel in a strict sense; much less 
FARC, despite The Economist suggesting so by estimating in 2001 that the ―total 
annual drug related earnings for Colombia‘s guerrillas range[d] from 250-500 
million‖. Even if these estimates are correct, Allen‘s words seem to be worthy of 
consideration: 
 
estimates of the total annual value-added of the Colombian cocaine industry range from 
2 bn to 10 bn. Leftist guerrillas account for at most one-quarter, and perhaps as little as 
2-3% of Colombia‘s cocaine profits. The remainder is controlled by ‗traditional‘ DTOs 
and their associated paramilitaries (2005: 66). 
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 Ramírez (2004: 256) shows how while the Pastrana-FARC peace talks were taking place, 
Washington started denouncing links between FARC and the Tijuana Cartel. By the time the peace 
process reached a deadlock, the Colombia‘s Prosecutor General Office was pressing charges against 
FARC for drug-trafficking. 
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Through overemphasising the drug trafficking component of FARC, the 
Colombian government managed to bring together the governments of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) to sign the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives and their Component Parts in 1997. Although the agreement came into 
force in 1998, succeeding in circulating antipathy towards FARC, paramilitary groups 
continued obtaining arms in the black market. In 2000, for example, ―3000 AK-47… 
were delivered to the AUC‖ (Bromley 2009: 4). Paradoxically, this did not only occur 
amidst the Pastrana-FARC peace talks, a time when the Pastrana administration had 
publicly committed to dismantling paramilitary groups, but also in the context of Plan 
Colombia. As the modernisation of the army did not bring to an end the consolidation 
of narcoparamilitary groups, scholars rightly started questioning whether Plan 
Colombia sought to modernise the army so as to enhance US national oil security or 
to help solve the root causes of the armed conflict and its relationship with the global 
illicit cocaine trade (Allen 2005: 65). Looking back, it could be argued today that US 
involvement in Colombia was paving the way for the circulation of antipathy towards 
some terrorists. This has backed up the global war on terror that militarised counter-
terrorism by recreating hyperreal sympathy between a non-terrorist fictive collective 
self and radicalised antipathy towards terrorists who cannot be accommodated within 
the frames of a global fictive collective self.  
The foregoing explains why the US counter-drug component of Plans Colombia, 
Patriota and Consolidación did not weaken DTOs‘ activities. What brought the NVC 
down in 2008, for instance, was not the US assistance programs taking place since 
2000, but the dispute for international markets and domestic transportation networks 
between some of its affiliates. Similarly, what dismantled the cocaine empire of some 
warlords amalgamated in the AUC was not a US-backed counter-terrorist plan, but 
the bargaining agreement signed between the Uribe administration and some 
warlords. This time, impunity was exchanged for weaponry. The hyperreal 
demobilisation of narcoparamilitary groups has overshadowed the political 
agreements that brought their power into being in the first place. The extradition of 
some paramilitary leaders and drug traffickers has contributed to recreating the 
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fantasy that criminals cannot escape justice. Nonetheless, what has also taken place 
behind the scenes is that, just as what happened in 2008 when NVC drug trafficker 
Diego Montoya was extradited to the US, a large number of crimes against humanity 
and genocidal massacres –in which government officials, traditional politicians, 
ranchers, farmers, militaries, and policemen participated– are left untold, keeping in 
the dark the secret alliances and plans behind not only the genocide of the UP but also 
crimes against a whole social fabric of inconformity-led social movements.
20
 This is 
how oblivion has started to replace indifference for the tragedy of UP survivors. And 
even worse, it has been institutionalised by what some scholars today call ‗power 
crime‘, because of ―the presence of immunity which undermines effective strategies 
for detecting, prosecuting, and punishing those engaged in… an array of human rights 
abuses‖ (Ruggiero and Welsh 2009: 297). 
In the Colombian case, ‗power crime‘ takes on a different dimension when some of 
those engaged in human rights violations are TNCs. In recent years, a scandal came to 
the fore when Chiquita International recognised that it had paid more than $1.7 
million to the AUC for protection between 1997 and 2004. The payments made to the 
narcoparamilitary group took place at the very moment of consolidation of the AUC, 
just after the largest genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá was carried out. 
Chiquita‘s farms are located in this region so it claims that the payments were made to 
protect the company‘s employees. The fact, however, is that in 1997 a large number 
of UP survivors had to leave the region after, what Suárez (2007: 244) called, 
‗political cleansing‘. Although few survivors stayed aiming at ensuring their survival 
by downplaying their political identity and establishing links with international 
NGOs, (para)military violence against them did not stop (see chapters 2 and 7). 
Throughout these years Chiquita carried on making payments to the AUC.  As states 
can to some extent counter corporate ‗power crime‘, it would have been reasonable to 
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 By the late 1980s, Diego Montoya Sánchez controlled Trujillo, and together with the Urdinola 
brothers and Cali Cartel‘s drug trafficker Hélmer Pacho Herrera, extended his sinister power 
throughout the region. However, at the same time, the ELN guerrilla group also wanted to create a 
front in Trujillo. This ignited a bloody war between both sides which quickly spread to civilians. 
According to the IACH, in two years 107 civilians were viciously assassinated and many of their 
bodies were thrown into the Cauca River. Don Diego‘s involvement, together with army officers and 
policemen, has been documented. At the outset of the Uribe-AUC ‗peace talks‘ Don Diego attempted 
to bargain with the Uribe administration, but the US had already warned the Colombian government, 
so his name was not included as part of the AUC. The FBI calculated that 70 percent of the drug 
entering the US and EU markets had the same remittent: Don Diego (see, 
http://elespectador.com/node/98226/print retrieved 2 December 2009). 
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expect Colombian and US administrations to collaborate with each other in curbing 
the power of big businesses to commit power crimes and to bring those who colluded 
with the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice. However, as Holmes rightly 
points out,  
 
the fact remains that states, like corporations, frequently place their own vested interests 
ahead of those of either the collective or their own publics. This will sometimes result in 
collusion with miscreant big business in various forms of power crime. Neo-liberalism, 
with its emphasis on markets‘ unfettered freedom, deregulation, and the blurring of the 
boundaries between the state and the market, greatly increases the likelihood of such 
collusive power crime (2009: 396). 
 
The foregoing explains at least in part why for more than a decade Chiquita was able 
to bribe politicians and pay for illegal protection even though the company‘s 
financing of the AUC in the region was publicly known, and why today none of its 
employees have been prosecuted in Colombia or in the US. Chiquita however paid a 
$25 million criminal fine, making it the first major US Corporation ever convicted of 
financial dealings with terrorists. The full explanation for state-corporate crime has to 
do, however, with the fact that the AUC was becoming by the late 1990s a (private) 
security force to which many economic and political networks not only in Urabá, but 
in most regions of the country, were turning for protection. This occurred due to a 
particular political economy of affective-dispositions, in which polarised 
sympathy/indifference, inserted in the grammars of identity/alterity, circulated 
amongst social, political, and economic networks, and hyperreal antipathy/oblivion 
were recreated in an antigrammar of genocide circulating mainly amongst military 
and criminal networks but also permeating various cliques and clusters of the 
complex assemblage of networks reproducing the idea of being part of a larger 
collective self. Hence, to bring all those who colluded with the hands-on perpetrators 
of the UP genocide to justice would provoke a political turmoil, if only because ex-
President Alvaro Uribe was Antioquia County‘s governor between 1995 and 1997. 
Conclusion 
Drug-trafficking organisations became powerful outlaws that were able to create 
private armies and death squads because of the Reagan administration‘s geopolitical 
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narratives, which encouraged alliances with drug traffickers so as to support its 
campaign against communism in the Western Hemisphere. Anticommunism sealed a 
convenient alliance between outlaws and liberal Western Hemispheric military 
networks which consolidated the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture. Political networks hid away such alliances by resorting to the 
narcoterrorists and narcoguerrillas scripts during the 1980s and 1990s and to the 
narcoterrorist guerrillas in the 2000s. By blotting out the collusion of state agencies 
with outlaws, the criminal sector of the perpetrator bloc was allowed to freely access 
arms markets and in return carry out (private) counterinsurgency operations, which 
had as its target the civilian social networks represented as supporting FARC. 
 The competition for dominating illegal markets created fierce battles between drug 
traffickers during the 1970s. This dispute was resolved in the early 1980s when the 
creation of MAS paramilitary group allowed them to downplay their differences by 
circulating a hyperreal solidarity-bond based on the idea that collaboration would 
secure the fortunes to be made from their participation in the illegal drug industry. 
Alterity was thus accommodated in the drug traffickers‘ grammars of identity. 
However, differentiated processes of integrating themselves into regional societies 
broke such grammars and escalated violence between drug traffickers. By the late 
1980s Medellín DTOs had gradually become involved in the armed conflict, putting 
some drug lords at the forefront of some genocidal campaigns against the UP.  
 The militarisation of some Medellín DTOs was also the result of drug traffickers‘ 
convenient alliance with the army, which saw in DTOs‘ private armies a perfect 
complement for its anticommunist crusade. This opened the path for drug traffickers 
to access the transnational arms market and to establish connections with arms 
brokers and mercenaries. As a result of the interaction with transnational violence 
entrepreneurs, Colombian drug traffickers were dragged into a circulation of 
narratives that shaped their representations of the other and informed the terrorising 
techniques used to do away with it. This reinforced an antigrammar of genocide. In 
this context, drug traffickers instrumentalised affective-dispositions so as to expand 
their alliances from the military to broader legal actors seeking to maintain economic, 
political and social benefits. 
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 Yet the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the radicalisation of some Medellín DTOs 
against the Establishment, which brought about a division within the perpetrator bloc. 
By 1993, a network of drug traffickers working around Carlos Castaño had started to 
take over regional genocidal campaigns, previously carried out by some sectors of the 
Medellín conglomerate. His campaign against the UP was informed by the FARC-UP 
script which allowed him to reproduce and circulate antipathy against the civilian 
social networks he identified as the hidden social structure that allowed FARC‘s build 
up. In the mid-1990s, once the Medellín and Cali conglomerates were dismantled and 
Colombia‘s complex reality was scripted as a narcodemocracy, Castaño managed to 
rearm a strong paramilitary group siding with small drug traffickers who had accessed 
the transnational trade. This enabled him to toughen up his participation in the 
genocidal campaign against the UP. By reproducing an antigrammar of genocide that 
relied on the representation of victims as culprits, Castaño in particular, and other 
sectors of the perpetrator bloc in general, were able to rebrand the old antipathy 
towards communism as an antipathy towards narcoguerrillas. 
 By the late 1990s, the scripting of FARC as the new ‗drug cartel‘ hid away the 
complicit relationship between legal and illegal actors in the drug trade. Furthermore, 
international agreements aided in circulating the FARC cartel script but did not 
manage to halt the acquisition of arms by the narcoparamilitary sector of the 
perpetrator bloc. The script did not only consolidate the criminalisation of insurgency 
but was also appropriated by narcoparamilitary leaders to publicly legitimate their 
involvement in drug-trafficking. Their finances, however, also depended on 
transnational capital as TNCs contributed to fill the AUC‘s pockets. Thanks to a large 
budget the AUC acquired the military means to join the army in the ‗pacification of 
Urabá‘. This script supported by traditional politicians, such as Alvaro Uribe, 
legitimised the illegal tactics used by the army and the siding of the ‗civil society‘ 
with a rightwing narcoparamilitary project. Thus, Uribe‘s coming into the presidential 
office institutionalised ‗power crime‘, enabling the maintenance of the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture. Today, an antigrammar of genocide seems to have moved to 
construct sectors of the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) as the other within, 
which cannot be accommodated in the imagery of Colombian identity. This is not to 
say that there is a teleological continuum of victimisation (PC-UP-PDA), but rather 
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that in an unresolved process of state formation, civilian social networks unwilling to 
submit to the dominant project of some economic, social, political and military 
networks are represented as dangerous others, against whom any means can be used. 
Thus, drug traffickers continue playing a central role in the perpetrator bloc, and the 
money coming from their participation in the transnational drug trade are welcomed 
to secure the survival and (re)production of a fictive collective self, by inscribing with 
hyperreality the sympathy/antipathy/indifference/oblivion nexus of affective-
dispositions.  
 By showing how the participation of powerful Colombian outlaws in an evolving 
fluid transnational criminal network enabled them to collude with security forces thus 
aiding the crystallisation of the perpetrator bloc, this chapter complements chapter 4, 
and, by unveiling the cooperation between various administrations and outlaws, it 
supplements chapter 5. The three chapters altogether contribute to a better 
understanding of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by advancing what could be 
called a ‗geopolitical topology‘ of the perpetrator bloc. In so doing, they con-
textualise the ever-changing character of the perpetrators presented in chapter 3. What 
remains to be done then, is to map the transnational dimension of the UP‘s resistance 
struggle displayed in chapter 2. The next chapter does so. 
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7 ANTI-GEOPOLITICS :  THE UP  AS PART OF A TRANSNATIONAL 
NETWORK OF RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE  
The perpetrator bloc, circulating freely in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture 
thanks to the transnational links of legal and illegal actors and the scripts (re)produced 
by political and military networks, successfully crushed the socio-political power of 
the UP. However, the UP did not stand still vis-à-vis the perpetrators, rather, as 
chapter 2 discusses, it resisted violence in everyday grammars of identity/alterity by 
circulating narratives that reproduced antipathy against the perpetrators. Although 
such narratives were interpreted differently by the various perpetrators, the overall 
result was the escalation of violence. This brought perpetrators together in different 
regional coalitions for violence, which crystallised into a perpetrator bloc that targeted 
the socio-political power of the UP for destruction. However, insofar as the 
perpetrator bloc was the materialisation of the transnational connections of legal and 
illegal networks in the geopolitical con-text of the cold war in the Western 
Hemisphere, the UP‘s resistance also spread cross-borderly, attracting the attention of 
international organisations, other political parties and social movements. This chapter 
is a topology of the informal and relatively fluctuating transnational network of 
resistance to the UP genocide. 
 Although resistance is generally associated with the ―legitimate recourse to armed 
force for a just cause‖ (Semelin 1993: 23), it cannot be reduced to a military tactic to 
oppose domination. For as Foucault (1980: 142) rightly points out, ―there are not 
relations of power without resistances‖: resistance needs to be understood as a 
continuum of armed and unarmed tactics that enable the reproduction of social 
relations. As genocide destroys the reproduction of social relations of civilian social 
networks, resistance has had a marginal place in scholars‘ attempts to understand why 
and how genocides unfold. This in fact reinforces the genocide script, which recreates 
the fantasy that genocide is the product of the intent of the perpetrators whilst 
downplaying the intersubjective processes that produce the multiplex interpretations 
that shape an antigrammar of genocide. Notwithstanding when genocidal geopolitical 
conjunctures crystallise the possibilities of armed resistance decrease, therefore 
genocide-victims increasingly resort to limited forms of civilian resistance which seek 
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to maintain the integrity of the group, its cohesion, the defence of basic freedoms for 
it to act, the respect for individual rights and for social and political attainments (cf. 
Semelin 1993: 30). Against such actions the perpetrators toughen up their violent 
campaigns. The impossibility of armed resistance and the escalation of violence mean 
that victims resort to building up cross-border links by circulating sympathy for their 
struggle amongst broader economic, political and social networks and antipathy 
towards the perpetrators to halt the destruction. This chapter, then, goes beyond 
Semelin‘s effort of understanding resistance against Nazi domination by placing 
resistance at the core of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which the UP 
genocide occurred. Thus, it advances Shaw‘s (2007) call for a focus on the clash 
between perpetrators and victims.  
 Even though a detailed investigation into the connections between armed and 
unarmed forms of resistance to the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide would better 
the understanding of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, such an enterprise goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter in particular, and the research in general. The 
challenge for future research into the UP genocide is then to overcome the narratives 
reinforced by observer- and participant-interpreters, which have forced scholars to 
leave unexplored the forms of armed resistance so as to avoid reinforcing the ‗armed 
proselytism‘ script. Thus, two unavoidable questions guiding new research are: 
 
1. What were the connections between the armed struggle of the FARC and the 
UP civilian resistance to the violence of different sectors of the perpetrator 
bloc?  
2. How did such connections affect the developments of the armed conflict?  
 
For now, this chapter focuses on the unarmed (civilian) resistance unfolding since the 
early violent actions targeting individuals of the political platform. It complements 
chapter 2 by looking into the transnational efforts led by the UPNB in order to first 
bring to a halt the genocidal campaigns and then the perpetrators to justice. Despite 
the fact that these efforts did not succeed in bringing the genocide to a halt –the 
transnational connections of the perpetrator bloc ensured the continuation of 
genocidal campaigns– the transnational connections of the UP have ensured the re-
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writing of history, a struggle for memory that seeks to challenge some of the 
simulations underpinning the reproduction of a fictive Colombian collective self. 
Thus, the UP‘s resistance can be seen as epitomising what Routledge calls anti-
geopolitics, that is, ―an ethical, political, and cultural force within civil society that 
challenges the notion that the interests of the state‘s political class are identical to the 
community‘s interests‖ (2003: 236). 
 The chapter argues that the anti-geopolitics of the UP solidified a transnational 
network of resistance to genocide, which connected leftwing political parties, state 
agencies, trade unions, human rights NGOs, and social movements. This shaped the 
various resistance practices that have emerged not only from different sectors within 
the UP, but also from victims‘ organisations in the last 25 years. At the same time, 
international organisations, such as the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR), became central actors in the denunciations of military-paramilitary 
alliances or in researching the connections between regional coalitions for violence 
and US foreign policies, as in the case of Amnesty International. Although this 
informal network has gone through various transformations, from being a quite 
centralised network in the mid 1980s to be rather decentralised in the mid-2000s, the 
chapter shows that in essence it has been an acephalous network producing multiple 
forms of resistance, from awareness campaigns, political debates, and national strikes 
to scholarship efforts. The analysis is based on three different sources. The first part, 
from 1985 to 1989, mainly relies on a discourse analysis of various issues of the 
International Bulletin of the Unión Patriótica. The other parts, from 1989 until today, 
rely on a multiplicity of sources, mainly interviews with various participants-
interpreters, legal documents, NGOs reports, fieldwork notes, and secondary sources. 
Despite the insight offered by previously unresearched documents, the resort to 
triangulation so as to validate the findings, and the strive to maintain a high level of 
critical reflection, the reader should be wary that the chapter mainly relies on victim 
sources, and as such tries to be faithful to their accounts. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part looks into the early days of the 
UP transnational strategy. It explores how many UP members internalised various 
elements of counter-hegemonic narratives, which brought the UP together with other 
political parties in Latin America. Second, it discusses how the writing of anti-
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geopolitics brought it closer together with International Governmental Organisations 
(IGOs) and NGOs. The third part focuses on the unfolding of anti-geopolitics as a 
more coherent strategy to expose the state‘s collusion with outlaws in genocidal 
practices. Next, it outlines how during 1990 and 1991 the transnational strategy was 
sidetracked. The final part focuses on the post 1992 years. During this period, some 
UP survivors remained in the political struggle and others created grassroots NGOs as 
new form of resistance. This solidified a multiplicity of cross-border alliances through 
which UP survivors are still struggling for truth, reparation and justice. 
The UP’s early transnational strategies of containment (1985 – 
1987) 
In 1985 when the UP was created as a movement for the FARC to make a transition 
from war to peace, it was decided to create the figure of an International Affairs 
Officer within the UPNB. The director was to design the contact not only with other 
communist parties in the communist world but to create interaction with NGOs 
(Federación Sindical Mundial [FSM]), IGOs, such as the UN, and other parties 
particularly in Western Europe. Strong links with leftist trade unions in Latin America 
also allowed UP members to escape violence for a while before going back to 
Colombia to continue the political struggle. This strategy, however, was not very 
effective in halting the assassinations. By 1987, a considerable number of activists 
and sympathizers had been assassinated. Another strategy designed by the UP was to 
rely on the PC‘s extensive work on human rights solidarity movements. The PC had 
played an important role in the development of human rights activism since 1974 and 
over time had come to dominate the Permanent Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights, created in 1979, the year in which AI visited Colombia for the first time (see 
Tate 2007: 80-4). Thus, during the first years the UPNB‘s efforts focused on sending 
information to AI and calling for another country visit. 
Because of the sharp increase in assassinations after August 1986, the UPNB 
designed in early 1987 a new transnational effort to stop the assassinations, 
disappearances, tortures, illegal detentions, stigmatization, and the political cleansing 
that was taking place in some UP strongholds (see chapter 2). The UP‘s strategy was 
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to issue international bulletins.
1
 The first bulletin called for the international 
community to take action to halt the ‗dirty war‘ in Colombia.2 The publication was 
written both in Spanish and English. It mentioned the Plan Cóndor and listed 20 UP 
public officials and 265 UP activists who had been killed between 9 March 1986 and 
11 March 1987; all public officials had been killed by paramilitary groups, whereas 
38,5 percent of activists by paramilitaries and 29 percent by the army. The bulletin 
described the violence against the group as orchestrated from within the state 
apparatus, as the statement below demonstrates:  
 
Democratic peace and social rights desired by colombian people are impossible [sic] if 
the government would not depurate Colombian army of the members that conduct, 
adhere and/or support paramilitary groups that acts [sic] according to the ‗National 
Security Doctrine‘, designed in Washington, where all terroristic [sic] methods are 
accepted in the action against the ‗internal enemy‘. 
 
 After this first call for international solidarity, a formal first issue was officially 
released later in 1987. Guadalupe Nieves figured as editor, under the supervision of 
Alvaro Salazar,
3
 the UP International Affairs Officer at the time. The aim of the 
bulletin was to reach ―solidarity committees abroad, NGOs, democratic political 
parties and movements, diplomats and other world actors‖. It came out only in 
Spanish and gave an overview of the UP and its ‗foreign policy‘. As the UP was 
seeking to present itself as the unique popular alternative in Colombia, the bulletin 
highlighted how a variety of actors, such as the FARC, PC, ELN, trade unions, theatre 
companies and social movements were gathering in the UP. This enabled the UP to 
begin gaining political recognition amongst leftist groups in Western Europe (cf. 
Vanegas 1991). To consolidate sympathy amongst socialist parties in Europe, a 
particular emphasis was placed in portraying the FARC as honouring the peace talks 
and the government as breaking them. According to the bulletin, the unfolding dirty 
war showed that the Barco administration was unwilling to honour the Uribe 
Agreements; however, ―the FARC-EP… two ELN detachments and the ADO 
                                                 
1
 The policy of issuing international bulletins is related with the decision made by some UP members at 
the regional level to set up human rights committees. In 1987, for example, Jahel Quiroga, UP 
Councilwoman in the Middle Magdalena Valley, founded CREDHOS, which could report human 
rights violations to the UPNB. This information was then used in international bulletins to create 
consciousness-raising.  
2
 Bulletin without publication date; it was probably released in May 1987. 
3
 Former FARC member Salazar had demobilised to work in the UP. 
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continue honouring the truce and striving for bringing to completion the agreements‖ 
(UP 1987a: 2).  
 The UP also showed itself as an example of radical democracy, for various 
guerrilla groups and the PC were in constant contact with communal assemblies, 
grassroots organisations and independent activists. The distinction between the 
guerrilla groups and both political parties (the UP and the PC) was an important one, 
however, because as the bulletin restated, the guerrilla groups had not disarmed and 
had not lost their character of rebel groups. Thus, the UP‘s democratic experiment 
was radical in two ways. First, as a bottom up democratic exercise in which Juntas 
Patrióticas –the small cells around which peasants, students, women amongst others 
were to participate directly in the building of the party– played a central role. Second, 
as a movement in close contact (and supported by) leftist rebel organisations, which 
had not resigned to the armed struggle to bring about a structural transformation in 
Colombia. The bulletin therefore portrayed the UP as the driving force behind 
different resistance actions, such as ―strikes, popular demonstrations, land invasions, 
student discussions, indigenous‘ demonstrations, human rights struggles, [and] anti-
militarism campaigns‖ (Ibid.: 3), at the same time that the dirty war was described as 
the largest obstacle to consolidate a truly democratic exercise.  
 The UP‘s foreign policy also underwent an important transformation at the time. It 
sought to link the domestic struggle for radical democracy with emancipatory 
struggles taking place in Central America and other regions of the globe (e.g., 
Namibia, South Africa, Palestine, Nicaragua and El Salvador), at the same time that it 
supported particular regimes. By stating that  
 
social movements should be at the forefront of the struggle for the defence of the 
principles that are part of progressive states‘ International Law and of international 
relations that do away with war, injustice and misery (Ibid.: 4),  
 
the UP portrayed itself as an actor which recognised that radical transformations had 
to comply with the international legal framework. Sovereignty –still the ‗organising 
principle‘ of international relations at the time– was to be respected, and thus the UP 
managed to bridge the contradiction between emancipation and compliance with the 
status quo by favouring the principles of pacific coexistence and non-intervention. 
The foregoing allowed the UP to present its foreign policy as based on pluralist 
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ideology rather than dogmatic communism and so to structure it around the struggle 
for human rights, territorial integrity, equal sovereignty, non-alignment policy and 
proletarian internationalism. Hereafter, the UP strongly criticised US intervention in 
Nicaragua, not only because the Pentagon was carrying out a campaign to destabilise 
Nicaragua, setting the ground to defeat the Salvadorian movement, but mainly 
because ―the gathering of Central American peoples around democratic and 
nationalist alternatives to achieve peace in the region were being hampered by US 
interventionism‖ (Ibid.: 10). As a demonstration of resistance to coercive regimes, the 
bulletin highlighted the importance of social mobilisation against Pinochet‘s 
dictatorship. The UP‘s anti-Americanism was complemented by calling for a New 
International Economic Order. The UP –in tune with the dependency school theory in 
vogue– saw this as the only way for Third World countries to overcome poverty, at 
the same time that demanded the Colombian government to stop paying the external 
debt. 
 Together with such an internationalist approach, the UP sought to bring closer 
Colombian diasporas in Europe and the Americas. In so doing, the bulletin stated that 
UP Congressmen were working to push forward an Emigration Bill in Congress. The 
attempt was to enhance bilateral cooperation agreements between the Colombian 
government and other countries so as to set up aid programs for Colombian diasporas 
(Ibid.: 6). Although the bilateral agreements proposed did not oppose directly the 
extradition treaty between the US and Colombia, the UP stated that the extradition 
treaty weakened the Colombian judicial system and therefore the sovereignty 
principle. Even though many drug traffickers were involved in the assassination 
campaigns against the UP –as clearly demonstrated in the assassinations of UP MPs 
Pedro Nel Jimenez and Leonardo Posada– and the extradition of some of them was 
presented by the Barco administration as a way to halt the slaughter, the UP 
advocated against the extradition treaty. Perhaps, one could argue, the UP was too 
aware that extraditing drug traffickers to the US was an opportunity for the 
administration to use drug traffickers as scapegoats and conceal the participation of 
army officers, security forces, policemen, politicians, and government officials in the 
unfolding perpetrator bloc. 
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 Short after the Barco-FARC peace talks had broken down a third issue of the 
bulletin was released.
4
 Thereafter articles were to be published in both Spanish and 
English. Contrary to the previous issues, it focused on informing what the bulletin 
called the international public opinion of the charges presented by UP President Jaime 
Pardo against ―a general, three colonels (one of them in retirements) [sic], one captain 
and two majors‖ because of their involvement in paramilitary activities (UP 1987b: 
3). In order to consolidate its pluralistic ideological stand, the bulletin did not portray 
the army as responsible for the killings of UP members, rather it stated that  
 
the fraticidal [sic] action of some of its members who desire to transform the military 
institution into an aggressing [sic] group without respecting the Law, and folowing [sic] 
instructions of some obscure plans against the popular mouvement [sic] were 
responsible for the violence (Ibid.: 4). 
 
Although the UPNB knew that there were sectors within the army that were not 
colluding with paramilitaries, the distrust with the Military Penal Justice System was 
such that the UP formally asked Barco for a civilian investigation into the army and 
other security forces. Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos granted that a civilian 
ombudsman should carry out the investigation. The bulletin described Hoyos‘s 
decision as a victory of the UP. By demonstrating to international audiences that the 
UP was in tune with democratic sectors of Colombian society supporting political 
change, the UPNB sought to align itself with the wave of narratives supporting 
democratisation processes in the hemisphere. As democracy and human rights were 
starting to play an important role in the grammars of identity/alterity structuring 
cross-border relations, the UP was able to circulate sympathy for its struggle. The UP 
international campaign to end the dirty war did not stop there; in the next section the 
bulletin listed some of the perpetrators and their actions (see Ibid.: 7-15). 
 The fourth issue focused on explaining FARC‘s decision of attacking a military 
convoy on 16 June 1987, which brought to an end the truce between the Barco 
administration and the rebel group in Caquetá. The bulletin however started with a 
forceful criticism of Barco‘s neoliberal policies; which was followed by a direct 
                                                 
4
 Although Issue 3 is without date, because of the events discussed it is probable that it was released in 
July. Issue 1 and 2 may have, then, been released between May and June, and Issue 4 in August. 
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opposition to TNCs, most of which were involved in the oil industry. In this context 
the UP resorted to Bolivar‘s Pan-Americanism,  
 
the UP proposes to continue with the tradition of unity and alliance between the two 
countries [Venezuela and Colombia] and with the rest of Latin America as was shown 
by Bolivar, Girardot, Ricaurte, Sucre, Rondón, Córdoba and Melo and ratified by Uribe 
Uribe (UP 1987c: 4). 
 
The foregoing did not only attempt to appease the conflict between ‗Colombian and 
Venezuelan oligarchies‘, but also to highlight the transnational class consciousness 
existing between trade unions in both countries which, had in turn, resulted in 
solidarity actions with the UP in the Arauca region, because of the assassinations of 
various UP leaders. The strong criticism of the Barco administration helped to set the 
ground for the UP to explain to its international audience the difficult conjuncture in 
which the FARC was starting to move away from politics. The bulletin reprinted two 
letters
5
 by the FARC‘s Central Command in which it ―explained that the 14th and 15th 
fronts were forced to act as they did because of the permanent offensive against them 
by the army‘s specialised units of contraguerrilla‖ (Ibid.: 25-7).  
 The UPNB referred to the Barco administration‘s description of FARC‘s attack 
and the political statements that followed as a smokescreen aimed at downsizing the 
violence that UP members and part of its social network of political supporters had 
been victims of. The bulletin stated that the action was being used to silence the UP 
President‘s denunciations of military officers. Furthermore, as an attempt to gain the 
support of international actors for the peace process, the bulletin stated that Barco‘s 
announcement that ―the truce and cease-fire will come to an end wherever the FARC 
clashes with the army‖ was troublesome; for it meant that the civilian government had 
left in the hands of the military the direction of the peace process –this was already 
having an impact on the UP; since July violence against UP members had intensified. 
As the quote below demonstrates, this period marked a shift in UP narratives. 
 
1… the president in a very dangerous act for the Colombian future took the decision of 
giving the military the faculty to decide where and when the cease-fire is broken 
without considering the crimes and abuses that some of its members commit. 
                                                 
5
 The letters were addressed to President Barco and Peace Advisor Carlos Ossa Escobar. 
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2. The Patriotic Union has as its principal ideal the defence of peace and the dialogue as 
the only way to achieve it and to overcome the crisis the country is suffering.  
3. The UP whether or not the truce continues, since we are neither the government nor 
the FARC will continue with its goal of organizing and orienting the Colombian people 
in order to attain its wishes for a change and its social emancipation (Ibid.: 28-9). 
 
The letter was signed by Jaime Pardo Leal, Ovidio Salinas, Carlos Efren Agudelo, 
Plinio Bernal, Iván Marquez, Israel Beltrán, and Jaime Caycedo, as members of the 
UPNB. Thereafter, the UPNB was to carry the flag of peace in its international efforts 
to bring FARC and Colombian administrations to the table.
6
 This came to reinforce a 
slow process of moving away from FARC, which was started by the UPNB‘s request 
for the UP to be accepted as a member of the Latin American Permanent Conference 
of Political Parties (COPPPAL). Joining COPPPAL was part of the attempt to build 
strong regional alliances with alternative political parties which shared the same 
resistance ideals, such as support to Contadora, demanding American Congress to 
stop helping the Contras, and campaigning for negotiated settlement with the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. The foregoing could be seen as a means 
to institutionalise sympathy cross-borderly. 
Writing anti-geopolitics  
By December 1988, most FARC members had returned to wage war against the state. 
Few members decided to give up the membership of FARC so as to remain in the 
legal political struggle carried by the UP. At the time, Alvaro Salazar, one of the few 
who decided to stay in the UP, was not only the UP Director of International 
Relations but had also assumed as editor of the International Bulletin of the UP. The 
UPNB had completely changed since October 1987. After Pardo‘s assassination a 
new UP leadership had contributed to shape a more active UP foreign policy. The first 
of many actions took place in February 1988, when Pardo‘s widow Ms Gloria Florez 
de Pardo was invited to give her testimony in front of the UNCHR in Geneva. Her 
statement sought to bring to the Commission‘s knowledge the outrageous levels of 
human rights violations in Colombia and to request the study of Colombia‘s reality as 
                                                 
6
 At the domestic level, UP members had organised demonstrations in defence of life and for peace 
until 1985, by 1987 other sectors of Colombian society had started joining UP demonstrations; not only 
because of the high levels of violence against the group, but also because broader sectors were being 
affected by violence. This is related to the second period in the development of the movement for peace 
in Colombia (cf. García-Durán 2006: 189). 
210 
 
  
part of its future activities (see Motta 1995: 35-6). The invitation had been arranged 
thanks to the lobby carried out by UP members exiled in Europe and it succeeded in 
its call for international solidarity. During 1988 various NGOs carried out country 
visits to Colombia. In this context, the UP sought to consolidate close links with 
European NGOs, such as Pax Christi and Justice and Peace, by documenting the 
violent campaigns suffered by UP members and its networks of sympathizers. The UP 
also sought advocacy by IGOs‘ missions invited to the country by the Barco 
administration, such as the UN Working Group on Forced Displacement‘s visit to 
Colombia in November 1988 (UP 1988: 4).  
 As assassinations sharply increased and massacres started to proliferate in various 
regions of the country after the Barco-FARC peace talks deteriorated in mid 1987 (see 
chapter 2), the UPNB created the Human Rights Office. Throughout 1988, this office 
did not only centralise the documentation of human rights violations against UP 
members and sympathizers, but also carried out visits to international organizations. 
For example, UP Human Rights Officer Erika Paez visited the OAS Human Rights 
Office. She travelled as a representative of the Colombian Office on Human Rights, a 
human rights platform bringing together aborigines, peasants, local NGOs, alternative 
political movements (such as A Luchar and Frente Popular), and relatives of 
disappeared people. The platform aimed at halting the violence that was spreading to 
various sectors of Colombian social networks, many of which were not formally part 
of the UP but were informally building links and supporting new political alternatives. 
Paez‘s visit disseminated amongst a broader international audience the genocidal 
political violence carried out against the UP. This helped to consolidate a counter-
hegemonic struggle based on the production of sympathy for the UP, which sought to 
neutralise the antipathy resulting from the scripting of reality by US and Colombian 
elites (see chapter 5). Thanks to the visit, Paez stated, 
 
it was possible to show to some members of the Parliament and before the American 
public opinion that this ‗dirty war‘ is not only a conflict between two organizations of 
drug-traffickers, but a systematic attack by paramilitary groups (protected by these 
drug-traffickers and members of the military forces, of which activities the Government 
is well informed) against the civilians and, especially, against the popular and political 
sectors of the left-wing. As a result, the OAS will follow closely the situation in order to 
present a formal denunciation against the Colombian State. The non-governmental 
organizations [sic], on the other hand, proposed a visit to Colombia and the American 
media agreed to publish information about the Colombian situation (UP 1988: 5). 
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The UP also participated in the Fifth Congress of North American Colombian 
Committees, held between 7 and 10 October 1988. UP International Affairs Officer 
Álvaro Salazar went as a representative of the ‗Left-Wing Unity‘, as it was called the 
political agreement signed between the UP, A Luchar and the Frente Popular.
7
 The 
aim of the visit was to plan  
 
solidarity and denunciations about the situation of Human Rights in Colombia in order 
to make it known [sic] by the United Nations, the OAS, as well as by governments, 
parliaments, political parties, unions and non-governmental organizations of both the 
US and Canada (Ibid.). 
 
 The UP‘s lobby was complemented by further steps taken by the UPNB to align 
the party with socialist parties in Western Europe. By the time the eighth issue was 
released the UP had been accepted as member of the COPPPAL and UP President 
Bernardo Jaramillo and Álvaro Salazar have decided to formally ask for membership 
to the Socialist International (SI). The formal request sent on 25 July 1988, and 
reprinted in the bulletin, was the result of internal discussions, which started soon 
after Jaramillo‘s short visit to Western Europe. This visit had convinced wider sectors 
within the UPNB that Pardo‘s call for international solidarity was not enough to halt 
the slaughter. Distancing from communist orthodoxy some leaders saw the 
intensification of political relations with Western European political parties as a way 
of balancing the subjection to US National Security policies, which in their view had 
produced a ‗dirty war‘, despite the US‘s preference of labelling it as a ‗low intensity 
conflict‘. This took place in a context in which the Perestroika was bringing about a 
fundamental debate amongst Marxist-Leninist communist parties around the world. 
The foregoing made it easier for Salazar‘s article to internationally present the UP as 
an organization building bridges between communism and socialism. 
 
The Patriotic Union is not a Marxist Leninist organization. Nevertheless, some of the 
movements within the Patriotic Union are so defined, but at the same time the Union 
                                                 
7
 A Luchar and El Frente Popular were not political parties, as such, were rather political movements 
created by unarmed sympathizers of ELN and EPL guerrilla groups.  On 28 September 1988, A 
Luchar, Frente Popular and the UP signed an agreement –in which a joint presidency of the three 
movements was set up, consisting of the presidents of the three organizations and an Organization 
Committee– seeking to promote the conformation of a political movement known as the ‗Frente 
Político de Covergencia‘. This alliance disbanded in 1989 (Archila 2005). 
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contains liberal, conservative, socialist and catholic sectors, as well as people belonging 
to other leftist tendencies and even independents [sic]. Consequently, the Patriotic 
Union does not form part of the International Communist movement, as suggested by 
some people who try to discredit it using anticommunist arguments and forgetting that 
the Perestroika is establishing the bases for the unification of the two main socialist 
tendencies of our time… In the conditions of the modern world, a party which aspires to 
direct the destiny of its country cannot stand aside from the political and social 
tendencies who [sic] are at work on the international scene. It has to consider the 
economic, technological and military interrelations which now influence any country in 
the world‖ (Ibid.: 27). 
 
 In late 1988, this political party and its broad network of sympathizers was the 
military target of various regional coalitions for violence. Liberal, Communist, and 
Conservative party members, peasants, women, children, teachers, elderly, human 
right defenders, and trade union members to name some of the victims had being 
killed, massacred, cleansed, tortured, illegally detained, stigmatised, and had been 
target of assassination attempts or had received life threats (see chapter 2). The eighth 
issue of the international bulletin of the UP tried to make visible the worst of these 
actions. Therefore, although not even a month had passed since the Segovia Massacre, 
the bulletin informed its international audience of the responsibility of the Bomboná 
Battalion in the massacre. It also sought to spotlight the memory of those leaders, who 
even though not being registered UP members, had been killed as part of the ‗dirty 
war‘. Such was the case of Hector Abad Gómez who although member of the leftist-
wing of the Liberal Party dedicated his life to the defence of human rights. The 
perpetrators targeted him as member of a social network of resistance, closely 
working in a democratic project with the UP. By counting the assassination of 
political leaders close to the UP project as part of the mass killing of the group, the 
UP reinforced the narratives circulating in the grammars of identity that presented it 
as an encompassing self able to accommodate alterity within and against whom 
(para)military violence had been directed. In this genocidal con-text, UP narratives 
implicitly sought the support of transnational democratic networks so as to halt the 
unfolding of an antigrammar of genocide. The UP‘s aim was that the intense work of 
what Sikkink (1993: 412) calls the ‗international human rights network‘ would 
translate into an experience similar to that of the Argentinean case, where by the early 
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1980s after a decade of transnational campaigning, human rights practices had 
substantially improved.
8
  
The unfolding of anti-geopolitics 
The pluralist approach of the eighth issue brought about a transformation in the 
bulletin itself. Hitherto, the bulletin had been issued sporadically. Since mid 1987 
until December 1988 only 9 bulletins had been released. However, the eight issue 
argued that the bulletin had been so well received that the UP was seeking to make it 
monthly magazine with a broader news coverage but specially focused on the 
activities and political views of the UP (UP 1988: 19).
9
  
In April 1989, a couple of months before the Second National Congress of the UP 
in which the party was to define its political strategy for the forthcoming presidential 
elections as well as the survival and safety strategy of UP members, the tenth issue of 
the international bulletin was released. This bulletin shows new developments in the 
UP‘s efforts of building transnational alliances. First, its youth organisation, Unión de 
Jóvenes Patriotas (UJP),
10
 was establishing links with socialist countries and for that 
reason was seeking to participate in the XIII Youth World Festival held in Piong-
Yang, North Korea in June 1989. Committees had been constituted in Medellín, Cali, 
Bucaramanga and Meta, ―breaking all the obstacles of the dirty war‖ (UP 1989: 9). 
Second, to carry out a consistent and organised advocacy work abroad, the UP was 
creating a European Directive Commission, which was headed by UP President 
Jaramillo: Jaime Corena, UP Deputy Jesus Aníbal Suárez, and UP Councilman for 
Tunja Oscar Dueñas were the other members of the commission. This was an 
important move for political exiles belonging to the UPNB because they could 
continue with their political activities in Europe while the threats against their lives 
                                                 
8
 Sikkink‘s analysis of Argentinean victims‘ interaction with the international human rights network 
shares many similarities with the UP‘s experience. In both cases UNCHR, IACHR, AI, and AW played 
central roles in resistance efforts. 
9
 It seems that this was never the case. The last issue found in Boris Cabrera‘s private archive dates 
from April 1989. Agudelo (1994) had also access to the bulletin, but he only referenced issues from 
1987 to 1989. 
10
 Because of the important role that children played in Eastern European Countries and other 
communist regimes, such as Cuba, the UP had carried on with the PC‘s ideas of organizing youth 
organizations. Thus in 1987 the UJP was created, it sought to bring together various student 
organizations, such as JUCO, with youth organizations in different cities of Colombia. The 
participation of UJP in the festival shows that the PC played a central role in the organisation of the 
UPJ through the JUCO. 
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faded away. The aim of the commission was to ―coordinate all political actions of 
solidarity with the Patriotic Union and orientate the task of the UP representatives in 
the different European countries [sic]‖ (Ibid.). By spring 1989, various members of 
the commission had carried out contacts with the Socialist Swedish Party, Austrian 
Socialist Party and the Spanish Socialist Party so as to speed up the UP entrance to 
the SI. Furthermore, Jaramillo was scheduled to meet the European Parliament and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to explain ―the dramatic human rights 
situation and political violence in Colombia‖ (Ibid.). 
The UP continued lobbying the UNCHR throughout 1988. As a result a new 
intervention by a Colombian delegation was scheduled to take place during the 45
th
 
Session of the Commission held in Geneva between 30 January and 10 March 1989. 
The delegation was to participate on items related with forced disappearances and 
arbitrary and extrajudicial executions. Although it was composed of mainly UP 
members, some of them participated in the delegation representing trade unions, 
grassroots organizations, and political parties (in the case of those members who were 
in the UP representing other political tendencies).
11
 As with the previous intervention 
in 1988, all the testimonies gave details of the dirty war and asked for the intervention 
of UNCHR in order to put an end to the ―systematic violations of the Human Rights 
[sic]‖ (Ibid.: 15). However, the most important testimony was UP Mayor of Segovia 
Rita Tobón‘s. Segments of her statement are reproduced below, not only because of 
its historical relevance, but because it demonstrates how UP survivors described the 
genocidal practices so as to awake sympathy amongst international audiences.  
 
In 1988, a new modality of violence emerged in Colombia. Selective assassinations of 
political leadership was no longer enough. For some it appeared necessary to massacre 
masses of people in the regions where the political opposition movements were in the 
majority. During 1988 there were 60 cases of such massacres. The most deplorable 
incident was without any doubt the… [Segovia] massacre… In the days preceding the 
massacre, pamphlets issued by a paramilitary group, were found in Segovia in which 
they expressed the wish to clean the town of UP members in the name of God. The 
subsequent judicial investigation revealed that these pamphlets had been produced at the 
military base. Moreover, surviving witnesses have calimed [sic] to have identified some 
members of the army and the police based in Segovia as having been part of the group 
                                                 
11
 The delegation was composed of Gloria Mancilla de Díaz and Gloria Gómez (from Asfaddes); Aida 
Avella and Héctor José López (CUT); Jaime Caicedo (PC leader); Nubia Serrano (Asonal Judicial, 
Judicial Trade Union); Rita Ivonne Tobón (UP Mayor of Segovia); Eusebio Prada (UP Deputy in Meta 
County); Ramon Argumedo (Sintagro, Banana Workers Trade Union); and Aqueminofel 
(representative of the Colombian Indians) (UP 1989: 15). 
215 
 
  
of killers… In one of Segovia‘s streets the massacre was not indiscriminate but based on 
a known list of names. Here the houses‘ doors were thrown… the victims found and 
murdered cold-blooded in front of their families and friends. 12 Liberal Party members 
who sympathised with the UP were killed... The official version of the Colombian 
government tends to minimize this bloodbath with the argument that these people were 
caught in the cross-fire between left and right extremists whic [sic] are impossible to 
control… The government of Colombia has undertaken a massive diplomatic offensive 
to claim that they cannot stop this violent events [sic] and attempt to diminish their 
responsibility in these violations of human rights. But it has say [sic] nothing about the 
manner it has been protecting the responsible of these violent events [sic]… Since 1986, 
3600 prosecutions against army officers for violent acts against the people have been 
recorded [sic]. The government systematically refuses to remove them from the armed 
forces or police and turn them over to the civilian courts (Ibid.: 17-8). 
 
While these actions were taking place in Western Europe, the UPNB in Colombia 
was meeting Colombian Foreign Secretary Julio Londoño Paredes. UP president in 
charge Diego Montaña and Álvaro Salazar showed support to the amicable solution of 
an international dispute between Colombia and Venezuela. The UP took the 
opportunity to call for the participation of social movements in both countries and 
offered to cooperate with the Venezuelan left-wing political parties and movements 
towards the solution of the controversy. In order to speed up the process of affiliation 
to the SI, Montaña and Salazar also met the Spanish Secretary of State for 
International Cooperation, Luis Yañez. According to the tenth issue of the bulletin, 
after the meeting Mr. Yañez  
 
manifested that his government will intercede before the Socialist International in order 
to find a international forum where the UP could make known the extermination 
campaign which since its fundation [sic] in 1985 has claimed the lives of at least one 
thousand of its members and forced to exile many others (Ibid.: 10). 
  
The UP‘s and local human rights organizations‘ international work had managed to 
catch the attention of global NGOs and IGOs. Between 1987 and 1989 at least 6 
international missions had visited the country.
12
 The last two of such missions had 
been conducted by Pax Christi International and the UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances in October and November 1988 respectively. Both 
missions‘ findings confirmed previous reports, which expressed their concern with the 
high levels of political violence. The report of the UN Working Group, for instance, 
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 America‘s Watch, OAS, Juridical Mission headed by Nobel Prize winner Pérez Esquivel, AI, ILO, 
UN Working Group on Forced Disappearances. 
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noted that paramilitary groups‘, self-defence groups‘ and death squads‘ ‗private 
justice‘ had caused ―numberless victims specially in the political left‖; in most of the 
cases, ―all kinds of evidences tend to demonstrate the participation of Armed Forces 
units or Security Services‖ (quoted in Ibid. : 19-20). By affirming that Colombia had 
―the highest ratio in the world of killings for a country not officially at war,‖ Pax 
Christi also sought to contribute to breaking the silence around Colombia, which the 
US had been scripting at the time as the oldest democracy in the continent (see 
chapter 5). The mission reported that it ―was perplexed about the total impunity that is 
the response to the immense amount of crimes in Colombia‖ (quoted in UP 1989: 16). 
Although Pax Christi had been invited by the UP and catholic NGOs and trade 
unions, the close connection with the UP can be seen in the fact that it organized a 
conference with participants from the UP delegation to the UNCHR so as to launch 
the report on Colombia. The UPNB‘s efforts to place UP members as political actors 
in Colombian politics failed because intellectuals of statecraft continued their 
campaign of portraying UP members as undercover guerrilla fighters. Antonio 
Panesso Robledo, for instance, wrote a newspaper article describing those present at 
the conference as extremists, terrorists, religious fanatics, and followers of Pol Pot 
and designated Pax Christi as a façade organisation, which was flying terrorist from 
Bogotá over to Geneva. 
 By 1990, the circulation of sympathy amongst the different cliques and clusters of 
the transnational network of resistance to the UP genocide had not managed to 
influence rightwing intellectuals of statecraft and other public voices. As this section 
suggests, social, political, and economic networks spread the distrust for the UP to the 
very NGOs and other human rights activists instead. Thus, the UP remained in 
awkward position in the imagery of a fictive Colombian self. The UP and its 
‗accomplices‘ were usually referred to as terrorist, in so doing observer-interpreters‘ 
macronarratives aided in the reproduction of an antigrammar of genocide. 
A short retreat in the UP ’s transnational strategy (1990 – 1991) 
Public opinion narratives, the anticommunist discourse of the army, the transnational 
economic power and access to weapons of Medellín DTOs linked to paramilitary 
groups, and the alignment between US and Colombian administrations were all more 
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powerful than the UPNB‘s transnational efforts to halt the slaughter and to bring 
radical democratic change to Colombian society. In March 1990 the UP‘s national 
political power was finally mortally wounded. Jaramillo‘s assassination not only 
resulted in the explosion of the internal division between orthodox sectors of the PC 
and sectors supporting a more pluralist approach to politics. It also brought fear and a 
sense of disillusionment amongst broader sectors of urban populations who either 
decided to resign to their political identity so as to survive the violence or join other 
political projects in order to advance their personal legacy of resistance.  
 The profound crisis brought about by assassinations of UP national leaders was 
closely related to the turmoil within the UPNB, which allowed the PC to play a more 
dominant role in the UP, and constrained the transnational work developed by the 
previous national board. While most Eastern European countries had started a process 
of democratization, the PC continued for quite some time avoiding the reassessment 
of Soviet communist dogmas. This, however, did not impede the PC from continuing 
to build electoral alliances with democratic sectors within the platform of the UP. As 
a result, newly elected UP President (and PC Central Committee member) Carlos 
Romero over time started taking distance from the communist orthodoxy. In May 
1991, for instance, Romero met US State Department Officer for the Andean Region 
Barbara Euser so as to question US military aid to Colombia; albeit army harassment 
against the UP did not stop. Raids on UP offices in Arauca were carried out by the 
army few days later. According to the data collected for this research, Romero‘s was 
one effort, if not the only one, carried out during 1991 to bring international attention 
to the ongoing genocidal violence against the UP. The transnational strategy that had 
dominated the late-1980s had been relegated to resistance within Colombian politics 
(see chapter 2).  
The consolidation of anti -geopolitics and the hope of bringing the 
perpetrators to justice (1992 – 2010) 
The Third National Congress of the UP elected Aida Avella as president. Avella‘s 
presidency was to bring back the transnational dimension of the UP as a network of 
resistance. This time, however, the struggle was to develop rather differently. In 1992 
the recently created Constitutional Court requested People‘s Ombudsman Jaime 
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Cordoba Triviño to carry out an investigation into the assassinations of UP and 
Esperanza Paz y Libertad members (see, Sentence T-439 of 1992). The investigation 
showed that some 700 UP members had been assassinated and that 95% of the cases 
were in impunity. Cordoba invoked the use of the term ‗genocide‘ for the 
assassination campaign. This event ignited a radical transformation in the UP‘s 
transnational strategy. In 1993 the UPNB decided to ask for UP members protection 
by the Inter-American Judicial System.  
 Since the early days of her presidency Avella had started to recompile the human 
rights archives:  
 
thousands of letters had been sent to the UP human rights office since 1985; survivors 
had typed or handwritten personal statements to leave a record of the army‘s 
involvement in the violence against them.
13
 
 
By the time the People‘s Ombudsman Report was released Avella had already come 
to the conclusion that the violence against the group was of a different scale and 
nature than what Hylton (2006: 67) calls ―the dirty war against the broad Left‖. 
Generalised impunity and the large scale of the ongoing killing convinced her that the 
only space left for trying the perpetrators of the ‗genocide of the UP‘ was the Inter-
American system. With the end of the cold war, leftist activists had slowly started 
moving from portraying the OAS as a symbol of imperialism to seeing it as a space in 
which the battle for resistance was to take place. Thus, Avella directed the UPNB‘s 
efforts to document the UP case against the Colombian state. She contacted many 
NGOs part of the broad network of human rights organizations,
14
 but all of them 
declined to help because ―according to the UN Genocide Convention political groups 
could not be protected from genocide.‖15  It was only until UPNB member Jahel 
Quiroga returned from exile that Avella found an ally to sue the Colombian state, 
before the IACHR, for the genocide of the UP political party. 
 The case was accepted for preliminary investigation by the IACHR, which 
demanded an infrastructure capacity that neither the UP nor Corporation for the 
Defence and Promotion of Human Rights (REINICIAR) –the NGO backing up the 
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 Personal interview with Aida Avella, Geneva, 17 and 18 December 2009 
14
 For an insightful account of human rights activism in Colombia since the 1970s see Tate (2007). 
15
 Personal interview with Aida Avella  
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demand– had. In this context the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ)16 agreed to 
join forces with them. The CCJ was the most experienced Colombian NGO in terms 
of dealing with the IACHR, and the founding provided by the Ford Foundation had 
allowed it to closely work with HRW. Therefore the partnership with the CCJ enabled 
the UP to establish close contact with HRW and re-establish its connections with AI. 
In this context, the two local NGOs started to work together in order to document the 
case. On the one hand the CCJ provided the legal expertise to put together the case, 
and on the other hand Reiniciar gathered together the survivors of the UP genocide to 
document their stories. They documented 1163 assassinations, 123 disappearances, 43 
assassination attempts, and 225 death threats so as to demonstrate the systematic 
destruction of the UP (REINICIAR 2006b: 7). In 1997, although the IACHR (1997: 
art. 25) disregarded the case as genocide because of the 1948 UNGC, it admitted the 
case as the mass murder of a political group. Genocidal campaigns against the UP had 
however continued during the time Reiniciar was documenting the case. Between 
1993 and 1997, the political cleansing of Urabá was carried out by the one of the 
regional coalitions for violence of the perpetrator bloc (see chapter 3).  
 Against this particular genocidal campaign, new forms of resistance emerged. 
Thus, even though the few members who survived violence and decided to stay in the 
region resigned from their identity, they formed grassroots NGOs or peace 
communities to keep a neutral role in the armed conflict. In so doing they sought 
support in international NGOs, such as Peace Brigades International. The decision of 
UP leaders/sympathisers to ‗resign‘ to their political identity/sympathy and form for 
example the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó can be interpreted as 
radically different from most genocide survivors‘ experiences: genocide usually 
reinforces a grammar of identity that essentialises sameness and downplays alterity. 
However, although UP survivors relinquished to their political identity, they 
continued reproducing parts of it by resorting to various narratives through which 
they constructed the axis of the solidarity-bond of their social fabric of the 
community. Neutrality became the signifier that enabled to present the community as 
an apolitical collective self that demanded respect for its social fabric. The neutrality-
                                                 
16
 From its early days, the CCJ‘s difference with other human rights NGOs had been the 
internationalist focus; it tried ―to exploit the potential of international mechanisms in relation to 
Colombia. [It was] the first [ngo] to focus on international organizations so they would work on 
Colombia, like the Inter-American Commission and Court and the UN‖ (Tate 2007: 115). 
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signifier did not do away with political resistance; rather, it informed the community‘s 
grammar of identity so as to create a space out of the perpetrator bloc‘s reach. The 
construction of this ‗apolitical space‘ that resisted being co-opted by the dominant 
order being imposed by the perpetrator bloc and sectors associated with it can be seen 
as part of the reproduction a fluid collective self forming the transnational resistance 
network to the UP genocide. Yet the violence continued (see Carroll 2009).  
 In order to understand how this apolitical space is integrated within broader 
sociomaterial networks one needs to turn to the processes involved in the 
crystallisation of such a space. Following Alther (2006: 287), it could be argued that 
this occurred in five phases. (1) The creation of the UP and the narratives circulated 
by its leaders raised peasants‘ ―awareness of their marginalisation within the larger 
socio-political context‖, thus they joined or sympathized with the UP from the mid 
1980s to the mid 1990s. (2) The perpetrator bloc‘s genocidal campaign against the 
‗UP‘ between 1995-1996 in Urabá was, however, ―a defining violent… experience 
that act[ed] as a catalyst for community cohesion‖; as a result, peasant leaders 
‗resigned‘ to their political militancy/sympathy (seen as a means to better the position 
of their communities within the broader socio-political context) and turned to 
strengthen the social fabric of their communities by attempting to create an apolitical 
space that disrupted the sociopolitical con-text imposed by the perpetrator bloc. (3) 
Peasant leaders turned subsequently to human rights networks so as to look for 
―external support‖ for a neutral initiative of ‗apolitical resistance‘. (4) The targeting of 
the community‘s social fabric further consolidated the leaders‘ drive for resistance. 
(5) A transnational network materialises when international NGOs institutionalise 
their support for the community; thus the community‘s space of resistance becomes 
part of a folded geography aimed at distancing it from the genocidal practices of the 
perpetrators.  
 What is clear from the processes involved in the materialisation of the peace 
community is that they were all but apolitical. The very resistance vis-à-vis the 
dominant project imposed by the perpetrators was the continuation of the circulation 
of imageries that portrayed the community as part of a broader collective self that did 
not submit to relations of domination. This overlapped with Reiniciar efforts to 
circulate sympathy for the UP survivors amongst human rights activists, development 
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agencies, political actors, governmental agencies, international organisations, NGOs, 
and diplomatic missions. The strengthening of this social fabric as means of resistance 
was what the military cliques within the perpetrator bloc interpreted as a threat to the 
reproduction of the body politics they were meant to protect and resulted in genocidal 
campaigns, such as the Plan Golpe de Gracia, which took the lives of many activists 
and drove some survivors into exile, where they nevertheless carried on with the 
resistance struggle (see chapter 2).  
 Quiroga, however, continued leading Reiniciar. In 2000, the transnational efforts 
carried out by UP survivors seemed to finally be bringing to a halt the violence 
against the UP. This was so because during the Pastrana administration –and as part 
of the amicably settlement of the dispute proposed by the IACHR– a Working 
Group
17
 was put into place in order to (1) clarify the violent practices against the UP, 
(2) acknowledge the need for a comprehensive reparation, and (3) seek effective 
protection of UP members and survivors. Furthermore, various human rights NGOs 
had succeeded in campaigning for the inclusion of political groups in the definition of 
the crime of genocide under Colombian law. Although the military strongly opposed 
the inclusion of political groups in the definition of the crime of genocide by arguing 
that ―the definition would impede the anti-subversive activities carried on by the 
military forces‖, thereby restraining them from fulfilling ―their constitutional duties, 
the Colombian Congress passed a definition of the crime covering political groups 
provided they develop legitimate activities‖ (Benavides-Vanegas 2002-2003: 604).  
 The military‘s opposition to the inclusion of political groups shows the ambiguous 
con-text in which these developments were happening. Since the Pastrana-FARC 
peace talks were taking place, it seems contradictory that the military used anti-
subversive activities as the main reason to oppose the bill. However, the peace talks 
had produced new geographies: Colombia had thus been split into a ‗space of peace‘ 
and multiple battlefields. In the army‘s theatres of operations, counterinsurgency 
operations had continued with the 1980s Salvadorian doctrine that did not only target 
guerrillas but what they saw as its socio-political network of supporters. In the case of 
Urabá in particular, army officers carried on harassing former UP members; by 
                                                 
17
 Members of the Working Group are: REINICIAR Director, CCJ Director, UP President, PC General 
Secretary, Colombia Vice-President, Chancellor, Attorney General, Ombudsman General, People‘s 
Ombudsman, Robert Goldman (Ex- ICHR President) and Erick Sottas (World Organisation Against 
Torture- OMCT President). 
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killings, tortures, disappearances they targeted the social fabric of the Peace 
Community of San José de Apartadó. Thus, even though Pastrana advanced more 
than any previous administration in the amicable solution with Reiniciar, the UP 
continued to be the target of destruction by some army brigades that often directly 
carried out assassinations but usually allowed the AUC to freely act throughout the 
different battlefields. 
 Although the definition of genocide in Colombian criminal law was an important 
triumph for Colombian NGOs, no perpetrator has ever been prosecuted for genocide. 
The lack of prosecution of perpetrators surely contributed to the decision made by 
many army officers to continue targeting the UP. This, together with the coming to 
power of Alvaro Uribe, started to tear the hopes of reparation and justice apart. In 
May 2006, the National Board of Victims and Relatives of the Genocide of the UP 
and 14 Regional Boards decided to walk away from the settlement. The Uribe 
administration had not only dishonoured the amicable settlement agreement but under 
its rule violent practices against the UP had also re-emerged: 136 assassinations, 38 
disappearances, and 28 assassinations had taken place (REINICIAR 2006c: 13). 
Furthermore, from the victims‘ point of view, Uribe had shifted his approach from 
Pastrana‘s: instead of prosecuting the perpetrators, President Uribe seemed to justify 
the destruction of the UP at the same time that he denied state responsibility in the 
violence against the group. In this climate of distrust, violent attacks on UP survivors 
continued, assassinations were carried out as late as August 2008, and life threats 
against Reiniciar‘s staff have continued to this day. In this con-text, the Uribe 
administation‘s narratives have contributed to the polarisation of the political 
economy of affective-dispositions by constantly circulating the hyperreal 
narcoterrorist guerrilla threat and linking it with the hyperreal ‗human rights 
traffickers‘ script, of which UP grassroots NGOs are part. This has convinced 
Reiniciar of the need to consolidate its position within transnational human rights 
networks so as to assure justice, truth and reparation. 
 Accordingly, UP survivors continue their resistance struggle. Reiniciar‘s close 
cooperation with the Swedish Embassy, the Swedish International Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA) and the European Union has resulted in the publication of various 
survivor‘s regional accounts of the UP genocide (i.e., REINICIAR 2006a, 2007, 
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2009). Furthermore, as 2007, Reiniciar‘s work with new generations of survivors 
helped to constitute a youth organisation called ‗Hijos e Hijas Contra la Impunidad y 
por la Memoria‘. Drawing on previous transnational actions, Hijos e Hijas has carried 
on building links with youth social movements across Latin America, as in the case of 
Hijos e Hijas Argentina. Today, some UP survivors are moving from human rights 
activism back into politics. Iván Cepeda, for example, won a place in the House of 
Representatives in March 2010 legislative elections.
18
 He has led not only UP 
victims‘ organizations but national organizations of victims. The role played by UP 
survivors in the constitution of the national movement of victims (MOVICE) has been 
central. This has also empowered victims‘ organizations, which today have direct 
contact with European and American cooperation agencies. UP diasporas have helped 
to coordinate resistance actions in Europe. Aida Avella, exiled in Switzerland since 
1997, for example, has informally continued lobbying the UN and the FSM. She has 
somehow joined forces with former UP-PC members. Together, they have formed the 
core of the PDA political party in Switzerland. Furthermore, Avella and Quiroga meet 
twice a year as members of the shadow UPNB. Both meet with CCJ Director Gustavo 
Gallón in Geneva once a year before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights 
Council takes place. Avella‘s networking in Europe has been central to bringing 
together UP refugees scattered throughout the continent, some of whom have been 
called to give their statements to the IACHR in the judicial procedure against the 
Colombian state.
19
  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that UP started to develop a transnational strategy to resist the 
violence unfolding against its members since the early days of its constitution. The 
first international bulletins sought to create awareness amongst the international 
public opinion of the alliance between the army and drug traffickers in assassination 
campaigns against the UP. This was aimed at circulating antipathy towards the 
perpetrators. However, as the violence continued the UP turned to international 
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 Cepeda run for the PDA. However, within the PDA he represents Hijos e Hijas and the MOVICE 
more broadly, within which UP survivors organizations have an important place. 
19
 Personal interview with Aida Avella  
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organisations, such as UNCHR and AI. Although the interventions in the Commission 
helped to draw global NGOs‘ attention to Colombia, the interventions did not manage 
to stop the violence. 
 By 1990, when the UP‘s national political power had been diminished, the UPNB 
turned back to a domestic strategy so as to ensure the survival of the platform. The 
main concern was how to stop the migration of supporters to the new political parties. 
It was only in December 1991 that a new transnational strategy came into place. This 
strategy resulted in pressing charges for genocide against the Colombian state. The 
IACHR‘s provision of considering the UP genocide as a case of mass murder of a 
political group ignited new dynamics not only within the UPNB, but also amongst 
genocide-survivors. Despite the international attention to the case and the IACHR‘s 
mandate to tighten up the protection of UP leaders, the perpetrator bloc continued the 
genocidal campaigns against the UP.  
 Paradoxically, the circulation of sympathy at the international level isolated the UP 
from political circles in Colombia throughout most of the 1990s. This only changed 
during the Pastrana administration, when an amicable solution between the 
Colombian government and the survivors of the UP genocide was on the table. In this 
context, Pastrana sought to accommodate the memory of the UP within the grammars 
of identity/alterity informing the Colombian collective self. However, during Uribe‘s 
two terms in office the grammars of identity/alterity were polarised. The UP was 
portrayed as a sneaky and twisted ‗other‘ who could not be trusted and this was 
transferred to the survivors and to victim‘s organisations. Furthermore, the Uribe 
administration has linked many of the NGOs part of the transnational resistance 
network to the UP genocide with the guerrillas. By the labelling human rights 
defenders as ‗traffickers‘, antipathy has been circulated. Yet the victims‘ struggle has 
prevailed thanks to the consolidation of fluid geographies of transnational resistance 
networks. Today victims‘ organisations have moved from moral-led to political-led 
resistance seeking to ensure the materialisation of reparation, justice and truth by 
securing a space in the Colombian Parliament. This resistance is connected with 
global NGOs and some European Governments‘ agencies, which reinforces victims‘ 
NGOs place in broader transnational networks. 
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 The transnational dimension of the UP survivors‘ resistance did not mean however 
that all former UP leaders were to abandon their political struggle. Even though the 
formal recognition was withdrawn in 2002, still today a shadow national board of the 
UP meets within and without Colombia. This epitomises the anti-(geo)political 
struggle of the UP. Moreover, some PC members who were part of the UP continue 
the political struggle within the PDA. Although the UP‘s presence in the PDA is 
symbolic and marginal, the connection with victim‘s organisations and the 
reconstitution of some political networks of the PC has recently brought back the 
memory of the UP. Today new generations attend international conferences, such as 
the 2009 Latin American Studies Association Conference, to offer testimonies of the 
processes undergone by victim‘s organisations. In this way the transnational 
resistance network to the UP genocide fights the oblivion promoted by political 
networks. 
 To sum up, the UP was not a passive genocide-victim. It resisted the perpetrator 
bloc not only at the concrete level of the genocidal conjuncture, as chapter 2 
discussed, but also, as this chapter demonstrates, at the (imaginary) level of the 
geopolitics informing the spatial-temporal relations of transnational networks. Since 
resistance and victimisation are indissociable dimensions of genocide, which bring 
about a striated geography in which multiplex actors, spaces and times converge, this 
chapter completes the main aim of this thesis: mapping the political economy of 
affective-dispositions that allowed for the crystallisation and solidification of the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. In this context, the UP‘s transnational efforts were 
interpreted by the perpetrators as a call to step up the violence against the group and 
get rid of the threats it represented. By challenging the genocide script, circulating 
among some networks of the global civil society and the international community, 
that portrays genocide-victims as passive actors trapped in domestic settings, this 
chapter suggests that scholars would benefit from studying genocide as a process that 
dissipates across the institutionalised Eucledian conceptions of space and time, in 
other words, from looking beyond the genocidal setting. To condense the findings of 
the study and discuss the challenges posed by the research methodology turns the next 
and final chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
8 GENOCIDAL GEOPOLITICAL CONJUNCTURES AND THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFFECTIVE-DISPOSITIONS:  A  CRITIQUE 
OF THE GENOCIDE SCRIPT  
This thesis is a journey into the muddy waters of affect, into the terrifying processes 
associated with the escalation of violence, and into the unfolding of resistance to 
dominant interpretations of tense human interactions. The argument of the thesis is 
that contrary to the genocide script that simplifies genocide as a state-led domestic 
crime against passive victims, genocide is instead the product of an assemblage of 
complex geopolitical processes. Such processes crystallise into a violent 
intersubjective asymmetric clash between a hard power (product of the interaction of 
various actors into a perpetrator bloc) and a soft power (resulting from the 
consolidation of social networks). Genocide is therefore not the product of ‗the intent 
to destroy a group‘; rather, its occurrence is closely linked with the polarisation of a 
political economy of affective-dispositions.  
The research on the destruction of the UP shows that a genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture crystallised, bringing apparently distant objects, subjects, and places 
together. Alongside the expansion of such a fluid system of relations, a gradual 
polarisation of sympathy/antipathy occurred. This radicalised the grammars of 
identity/alterity ordering social relations. In this con-text, an antigrammar of genocide 
emerged, which shaped a mindset that regarded the destruction of the UP as the path 
to follow. Upon the coexistence of various grammars of identity/alterity and 
antigrammars of genocide, spaces of victimisation and resistance materialised. Such 
spaces linked various sectors of transnational military, political, economic and 
criminal networks together into a perpetrator bloc, and social movements, political 
parties, IGOs, and NGOs into a transnational network of resistance to genocide. The 
transnational connections of genocidists and genocide-victims reveal the material 
dimension of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of 
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the UP occurred. Yet the circulation of narratives reinforcing the idea that Colombia 
is the oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere reveals the discursive dimension 
of such a conjuncture.  
Thus, the research suggests that instead of reinforcing the genocide script by 
focusing on the exceptionality of ‗domestic processes‘, future genocide research 
should strive to con-textualise genocide. To follow con-textualisation as a method to 
research genocide is to go beyond the traditional historical analysis of international 
factors. Hence, the focus is not on the role that other states play in the occurrence of 
genocide in a given state. Instead, it is on deconstructing national borders and 
understanding complex social processes that surpass them.  
The tactic of con-textualisation 
The con-textualisation of genocide follows various steps. First, it moves away from a 
state-based understanding of the international system to focus on the narratives that 
reproduce the simulation of states as containers for domestic processes. The aim is to 
map out the cross-border circulation of narratives amongst various networks. This 
enables one to write the topologies of perpetrators and victims, without restricting the 
analysis to the borders of a particular state. Moreover, this first step helps 
understanding how distant actors and clusters are brought together and the differential 
intensity and connectedness between such clusters and multiple networks. 
Second, it deconstructs the scripts at the core of the reproduction of perpetrators‘ 
and victims‘ narratives. This contributes to unveiling how various actors 
instrumentalise simplifications of reality in order to victimise or resist victimisation. 
Consequently, this second step advances tracing of the connections between the 
macronarratives of observer-intrepreters and the micronarratives of participant-
interpreters. As such, this move contributes to display the role that apparently 
impartial actors play in the (de)construction of (a genocidal) social reality.  
At this point, a third step follows: to enquire how perpetrators‘ and victims‘ scripts 
target affect; a targeting that seeks to produce the distancing or siding of broader 
audiences with the unfolding processes of victimisation and resistance. Put 
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differently, it is time to ask how it is that the polarisation of affective-dispositions 
helps to amalgamate various perpetrators into a bloc that solidifies a genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture, against which victims constantly resist by also resorting to 
affective-dispositions in order to bring about a fluid transnational network of 
resistance to genocide. 
Finally, as a tactic for de-essentialising genocidists and genocide-victims, con-
textualisation demands a further effort:  exposing how scripts circulate through 
different means (i.e., radio, TV, press, and films), depending on the specificity of the 
historical context. For this reason, there is a need to compare the scripts circulating in 
each form of media. Triangulation can help to deal with some of the limits of the 
method, namely the contradictory narratives that often hide the ‗true‘ feelings of the 
actors. However, it cannot solve a larger limitation of con-textualisation, that is, that 
in order to present a viable research project, one might be forced to focus on one form 
of media. This thesis, for instance, relies on the analysis of texts, although con-
textualisation is not restricted to documents. Being aware of this limitation does not 
make up for it, but recognising it opens up avenues for new research agendas that 
contest the essentialisation of knowledge.  
Findings and lessons for future research 
The UP and the perpetrator bloc were complex networks, which changed over time 
during the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. As chapters 3 to 6 demonstrate 
transnational processes informed the crystallisation and the metamorphosis of the 
perpetrator bloc; whereas, as chapters 2 and 7 show, the UP was a changing civilian 
social network that eventually became part of an informal and fluid transnational 
network of resistance to genocide. Hence, the UP was not a passive actor. Although 
the core of the social network (the political platform) underwent various 
transformations, the moral and political resistance of different sectors within the 
social network consolidated its socio-political power. This enabled the UP National 
Board to contest dominant narratives legitimising violence and the UP regional 
clusters to denounce the military‘s central role in early coalitions for violence. Against 
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such a resistance the military escalated violence in the mid 1980s. Such violence 
eventually became genocidal. Notwithstanding the military‘s radicalisation was 
connected to UP politics, the training of high-ranking military officers in US 
academies and the long-lasting armed conflict had already shaped a military mindset 
that regarded the use of exceptional violent methods as a means to deal with 
‗subversive‘ political contenders. 
But the military alone did not target the UP. Besides the security forces, drug and 
gemstone traffickers, political and violence entrepreneurs, big land owners and cattle 
ranchers, local and foreign mercenaries, paramilitary groups and private military 
companies colluded at different moments and spaces of the genocidal geopolitical 
conjuncture. A grammar accommodating difference within a collective self, according 
to context, enabled opposing actors to amalgamate into an acephalous perpetrator 
bloc. By 1987, some actors shared an antigrammar of genocide that construed the UP 
as a ‗threatening other‘ which had to be destroyed; for the UP was a hindrance to the 
fulfilment of their political, economic, ideological, and military goals. Such scripting 
of the UP was not entirely the product of narratives circulating within the perpetrator 
bloc. Instead, it was the result of a multiplicity of scripts transnationally circulated by 
political, economic, social and military elites.  Such elites sought to secure a fictive 
liberal collective self through the writing of communism as a geopolitical threat. 
During the second cold war in the Western Hemisphere, the hyperreal writing of 
reality enabled rightwing politicians to polarise a political economy of affective-
dispositions. Such dispositions became the core of the (anti)grammars (de)structuring 
social relations. The escalation of the armed conflict in Colombia therefore occurred 
alongside the unfolding of the UP genocide. Hyperreal sympathy sided indecisive 
sectors of the fictive liberal Western Hemispheric collective self with the perpetrator 
bloc; whereas radicalised antipathy distanced such sectors from the suffering of the 
UP. The fantasy that the UP was a threatening other radicalised antipathy. As a 
response, moderate-UP sectors recreated sympathy for FARC‘s armed struggle; while 
a reinvigorated antipathy distanced such sectors from political, military and economic 
elites. The portrayal of a genocidal bourgeoisie reinvigorated antipathy. 
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The targeting of the UP continued through the post-cold war years because the 
grammars informing the writing of a liberal global identity continued relying on a 
polarised political economy of affective-dispositions. This allowed (para)military and 
other clusters within the perpetrator bloc to associate the UP with the international 
security threats posed by narcoterrorist-guerrillas. Moreover, the indifference of large 
sectors of the global civil society and the oblivion promoted by transnational political 
networks contributed to solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The civilian 
social network associated with the UP underwent various transformations during these 
years; wherever its social power was interpreted as a threat, violence against it 
prevailed.  
This account suggests that the challenge for future genocide research is threefold. 
First, to overcome the ‗hierarchical syndrome‘ surrounding the study of genocide-
perpetrators; second, to de-essentialise the static identity ascribed to genocide-victims; 
and finally, to understand the transformations experienced by perpetrators and victims 
vis-à-vis the intersubjective violent clash that takes place amidst a polarised political 
economy of affective-dispositions. Furthermore, the research indicates the need to 
follow the tactics of deconstructive thought. This would help to show that the 
decisions (and explanations) made by military-perpetrators are usually connected to 
the exchange of micronarratives with other military clusters. Therefore, scholars 
might gain a better understanding of the topologies of genocide-perpetrators if the role 
of military networks is con-textualised within genocidal geopolitical conjunctures.  
1. The importance of deconstructing geopolitical narratives 
The research shows that the discursive production of the cold war, post-cold war, and 
post-9/11 geopolitical con-texts was central in the escalation of the armed conflict and 
the consolidation of its genocidal dimension against the UP. Had the Colombian army 
not been trained in American military institutions, which circulated radical 
anticommunism and shared tactics for crashing political opposition with other military 
clusters in Latin America; nor had it been facing an insurgency in constant expansion 
and borrowed political networks‘ narratives thereby interpreting such expansion as 
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part of a simplistic reality which enabled them to team up with outlaws; the UP 
genocide may have not happened. The transnational political networks‘ simplification 
of particular social dramas as isolated local processes was then an integral part of the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Such simplification produced scripts, which 
circulated through diplomatic channels and the informal interaction of politician, 
intellectuals, military officers and other actors involved in issues of statecraft.  
The scripts circulated by conservative US diplomats in Colombia allowed human 
rights violations to go unpunished; moreover, the concealment of unlawful military 
tactics against communists also contributed to the escalation of sporadic human rights 
violations into genocidal violence. Dominant liberal geopolitical narratives reinforced 
such scripts and thus the radicalisation of antipathy against the PC, which was later 
transferred to the UP. The rationale behind was the need to protect a ‗liberal‘ regime. 
Such rationale infused the grammars of identity/alterity allowing US politicians to 
create close links with Colombian traditional political networks and to support the 
fantasies circulated by rightwing elites. All of them denied recognising the 
involvement of the security forces in genocidal campaigns against the UP. Yet the 
alliance between political elites is not the only reason for the unfolding of genocidal 
violence. During the mid 1990s, the relative antipathy between US and Colombian 
administrations reinforced radical counterinsurgency tactics amongst military sectors; 
hence, the targeting of the UP continued.  
The (mis)representation of the UP by foreign political elites helped to consolidate 
an antigrammar that shaped the mindsets of various actors. Since they regarded the 
destruction of its social power as the path to follow; such representation aided to 
solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Political networks contributed to the 
polarisation of antipathy/sympathy by linking the misrepresentation of the UP to the 
cross-border discursive construction of the hyperreal narcoguerrillas threat. 
Bystanders‘ indifference vis-à-vis the suffering of the UP was therefore informed by 
the political elites‘ circulation of a radicalised antipathy against FARC. Today, in the 
con-text of the war on narcoterrorist guerrillas, a re-writing of history has been 
accompanied by a transformation in the political economy of affective-dispositions. 
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Thus, oblivion for the UP genocide has been instrumentalised by rightwing politicians 
so as to create a new beginning of collective sympathy. 
The analysis of geopolitical con-texts suggests that a poststructural shift could 
contribute to future genocide research in two ways. First, it could help to unveil how 
cross-border connections radicalise various political networks. This is important 
because such networks put forward scripts that aid the consolidation of perpetrator 
blocs and allow them to freely circulate during genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. 
Second, it could assist the deconstruction of the scripts that recreate genocidal 
geopolitical conjunctures as local dramas disconnected from the international 
community. Resorting to critical geopolitics, as a tactic for problematising the 
narratives that display the world as a globe naturally divided into nation states, might 
be a good starting point for future scholars not only to grapple with the domestic myth 
that maintains the genocide script alive but also to dig for the polarisation of a 
political economy of affective-dispositions.  
2. The need of mapping perpetrator blocs  
Although state institutions played an important role in the UP genocide, the research 
shows that outlaws were also key players. Outlaws‘ transnational connections were as 
important as their alliance with military sectors in regional coalitions for violence. 
DTOs used sympathy for the fictive Colombian collective self as a means to avoid 
persecution, hence, some of them benefited from targeting the UP. Moreover, as 
DTOs could secure economic gains by cleansing the UP in some regions, their private 
armies were deployed against it. DTOs‘ connections with military officers had helped 
their private security forces to become powerful regional war machines. The build up 
of such war machines and the training offered by foreign mercenaries informed 
paramilitary leaders‘ narratives. This experience degenerated further the already 
terrorising techniques used against the UP. The connection between narco-
paramilitary groups and legal actors went beyond political and military networks; 
TNCs saw in financing them a means to protect their economic interests. Thus, the 
genocidal political conjuncture was integrated into the global political economy. The 
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case of Chiquita International shows that the price that sectors of the transnational 
capitalist class paid for colluding with illegal sectors of the perpetrator bloc is 
marginal if compared with the profits to be made when TNCs manage to reduce 
production costs and secure their operations in regions torn by armed conflict. 
However, this complex assemblage of legal/illegal private/public actors is not only 
connected with the expansion of free market capitalism but also with identity politics; 
since local and global actors chipped in with the reproduction of a fictive liberal 
global collective self. Such a simulation is part of an imagined international 
community that reserves only for particular dramas the genocide script. This allowed 
the free circulation of narratives infusing an antigrammar of genocide, which 
constructed the UP as a (para)military target because it could not be accommodated 
within the grammars professing the idea of a (capitalist) global community.  
The analysis of transnational criminal networks shows that paramilitary groups are 
the product of complex geopolitical processes. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the 
cross-border connections allowing violence entrepreneurs to build up strong armies 
during genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. This is not to advocate for approaching 
genocide-perpetrators as racketeers; it is a fallacy to regard criminals as unconnected 
from legal actors. On the contrary, criminal sectors of the perpetrator bloc became 
powerful actors because of convenient alliances with legal institutions: the CIA and 
the Department of the State in regards with the US and the DAS and the Ministry of 
Defence in terms of Colombia. Various state agencies both in the US and Colombia 
saw outlaws as partners to secure ideological goals. Thus, the construction of 
transnational criminal networks as hyperreal threats was closely linked with the 
discursive production of the second cold war and the post cold war geopolitical con-
texts in the Western Hemisphere. Such a construct also sought to hide away the 
complex processes bringing transnational criminals into being and enabling them to 
grow. Nevertheless, the transnational criminal networks taking part into perpetrator 
bloc of the UP genocide were not only subjected to manipulation by political and 
military networks. Instead, as complex social actors, outlaws‘ decision to participate 
in genocidal campaigns was informed in many cases by the cross-border circulation of 
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materials and narratives, which went beyond covert alliances with state agencies. The 
interactions with foreign violence entrepreneurs polarised the outlaws‘ grammars of 
identity/alterity and the denunciations against them pressed by the UP engrained an 
antigrammar of genocide amongst sectors of the criminal networks. 
The foregoing shows that genocide research has long delayed the analysis of the 
complex alliances between various perpetrators. Hence, future studies need to engage 
with the changing alliances between outlaws and legal actors and with the 
intersubjective clash between outlaws and genocide-victims. As a starting point this 
research proposes to understand perpetrators as forming dynamic networks or what 
here is constantly referred as perpetrator blocs. By paying attention to the circulation 
of narratives within criminal networks, new research could offer an insight in the way 
in which criminal and genocidal mindsets intertwine. This would better the 
understanding of the role that criminal sectors play in the reproduction of scripts 
within the perpetrator bloc. Furthermore, the term perpetrator bloc allows for thinking 
of a genealogy of the perpetrators of modern genocide that challenges the genocide 
script. A different focus on the various links (affecting directedness, intensity, and 
connectedness) between (il)legal cliques and clusters that materialise different 
geographies of genocide could shed light in cases as diverse as the genocide of Native 
American Indians in the 19
th
 century, the Armenian and the Nazi genocide in the early 
20
th
 century, and postcolonial genocides,
179
 such as in 1965 Indonesia. Similarly, it 
could contribute to the study of post cold war genocides, such as Rwanda and Sudan, 
and genocidal violence in countries like Kenya (2005) and Congo (ongoing today). 
Thus, a genealogy of the perpetrator blocs of modern genocides could unveil the 
complex topologies of the networks of perpetration that surpass the 
domestic/international dichotomy that underpins the genocide script and obscure the 
understanding of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. Lastly, bringing in a 
poststructuralist approach in critical security studies would benefit scholars seeking to 
unveil the ambivalent relationship between legal and criminal actors. Such a 
                                                 
179
 I am grateful to Benjamin Madley for pointing out similarities between the Colombian case and the 
perpetrator‘s structure in colonial genocides and to Martin Shaw for highlighting continuities and 
discontinuities between perpetrator blocs in colonial and post-colonial genocides. 
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relationship is usually hidden under the writing of international security threats. But 
more importantly, it is written off history by relegating to oblivion the genocidal 
geopolitical conjunctures and putting in place instead the fantasy that outlaws are to 
be prosecuted by inter(national) tribunals for ‗transnational crimes‘ (but conceal the 
participation of many legal political, military, economic networks in genocide). 
3. The significance of unwrapping genocide-victims 
The research shows that to fully account for the different cycles of violence during 
the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the complex dynamics of the perpetrator bloc 
have to be  connected with the UP‘s resistance; such a resistance was not contained 
within artificial political borders. The UP circulated scripts that reinforced sympathy 
amongst a fluid transnational resistance network. This fortified a grammar of identity, 
which was able to accommodate a multiplicity of selves, and thus the UP managed to 
protect (for a short while and in different moments in time) an emerging socio-
political power. When the UP‘s socio-political power was diminished, resistance 
strategies challenged the antigrammar supporting the crystallisation of regional 
genocidal traps. Paradoxically, the more visibility the UP gained, the further violence 
escalated. This developed into a resistance-victimisation spiral. UP members 
conducted the first attempts at unarmed resistance. Then survivors and relatives, who 
structured grammars of identity based upon the political experience of their relatives, 
also supported the struggle. Against them violence spread. To counterbalance the 
diffusion of violence, the UP stepped up a cross-border resistance strategy thus 
connecting with broader sectors of an unfolding global civil society.  
This is not unique to the UP case. The advocacy of genocide-victim diasporas 
demonstrates that the resort to international organisations is part of a social process of 
resistance to genocide, which seeks to transform the political economy of affective-
dispositions. The research indicates that in the case of the UP, the first objective of 
such a strategy was to halt the slaughter and then to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
The UP eventually saw IGOs as an arena to fight state-genocidists; whereas global 
NGOs were regarded as actors capable of increasing pressure on state agencies. UP-
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victims‘ organisations, IGOs, and NGOs were connected through the human rights 
discourse. This solidified a platform which, in few occasions, forced state agencies to 
withdraw from the perpetrator bloc and to pursue some of the sectors that remained. 
However, genocidists often interpret resistance as a direct call for violence. Hence, 
perpetrators escalated the genocidal campaigns seeking to silence the UP and other 
sectors of the fluid transnational resistance network to the UP genocide. As a reaction, 
and as part of anti-geopolitics, the UP resorted to hegemonic liberal narratives to 
incriminate state-perpetrators. Yet the UP not only instrumentalised such narratives; it 
also designed strategies to use some mechanisms of the liberal governance apparatus 
to resist the simulation of Colombia as the oldest democracy in the Western 
Hemisphere.  
The rewriting of history is also central in the anti-geopolitical struggle, which 
challenges the narratives of the transnational hegemonic bloc. Thus, the UP has 
resorted to various strategies to put across the history of the victims. This has not only 
been a symbolic struggle. Instead, it has been one of the few options left after the 
genocidal geopolitical conjuncture that brought about the social-political destruction 
of the UP. UP-victims‘ organisations have received the support of few European state 
agencies. Thus, Reiniciar has published various testimonies. These resistance 
strategies have been hampered by new assassination campaigns. Moreover, political 
elites confront such resistance by putting forward narratives that relegate to oblivion 
past and present genocidal practices. Due to the lack of victims‘ visibility, some 
leaders have moved from moral resistance to political resistance. The return to politics 
is in its early stages. However, recent developments show that victims‘ movements 
are starting to contest the ‗transitional justice‘ system put through by the Uribe 
administration; therefore victims‘ decision to directly participate in the decision-
making process. This complements the process of bringing to light their own history. 
The rapid transformation occurring in soft law mechanisms in the international legal 
order is the background upon which the UP‘s contestation materialises in Colombia. 
The active character of genocide-victims suggests that future genocide research on 
genocide-victims should engage with three broad problematics. First, to connect 
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armed and unarmed forms of resistance and to map resistance transnationally; thus 
future research could trace the relationship between the crystallisation of perpetrator 
blocs and resistance actions by exploring how genocidists re-interpret resistance(s) as 
a threat to their survival. Second, to understand the links between the different cliques 
and clusters of the fluid transnational resistance networks to genocide; this could offer 
some insights on the transformations of victims‘ narratives in the intersubjective 
asymmetric clash with the perpetrators and enable scholars to contrast such narratives 
with the ones aimed at halting the free circulation of the perpetrator bloc in a 
geopolitical con-text. Finally, to explore (1) how the circulation of 
sympathy/antipathy aids the consolidation of the transnational resistance networks to 
genocide; (2) how this reinforces the circulation of narratives that spreads antipathy 
from the victims to the whole transnational resistance network thus contributing to 
solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture; and lastly, (3) how this is interpreted 
by sectors of the perpetrator bloc, which reignites genocidal campaigns against 
different clusters, thereby expanding the genocidal campaign to any sector associated 
with the social power of civilian social networks. 
4. Critical genocide studies’ challenge to liberal identity politics 
Some of the research‘s findings seriously challenge the nature of genocide studies. 
This research did not start as a critique of the genocide script. Rather, its concern was 
whether the destruction of the UP matched the genocide script. Soon it became clear 
that it did not. The literature review of genocide studies, poststructuralist IR and 
political geography revealed that critical accounts had been challenging for sometime 
the dominant fantasy informing the global identity politics of the liberal west. This is, 
that some social groups are worthy of being protected from genocide while others are 
not. The con-textualisation of the destruction of the UP not only suggests that 
genocides are connected with a multiplicity of processes evolving in particular 
historical conjunctures, but also, and more importantly, with the scripts produced to 
simplify a complex reality so as to secure ‗collective fictive selves like us‘. 
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 The genocidal geopolitical con-text unfolding since the second cold war epitomises 
this. During the early days of the Reagan administration, US hegemony produced by 
coercion and consent two scripts. These became dominant within political, economic, 
military and even criminal networks in the Western Hemisphere. First, the US liberal 
democracy is the ideal of freedom and happiness to be achieved by the fictive 
Western Hemisphere collective self. Second, the Cuban and Sandinista Revolutions –
the epitomes of the dark forces of communism– are part of the rhizome-threat 
spreading throughout the self‘s body politics. Such scripts imbued with hyperreality 
the circulation of affective-dispositions. Thus, antipathy against anyone seen as 
sympathising with communism informed the military networks‘ battle against the 
‗internal enemy‘. Likewise, sympathy between diverse ruling elites enabled them to 
supersede the distaste for each other by closing ranks in protecting the body of the 
collective self. Put bluntly, antipathy informed the antigrammar of destroying the 
‗internal enemy‘ and sympathy the segmentary grammar of regulating relations with 
‗others like us‘. 
 The US script is still in place today. However, the convergence of the collapse of 
communism, developments in new technologies, and the continuation of multiple 
violent and non-violent forms of resistance to established social orders have induced 
the production of new scripts amongst ruling elites in the last 20 years. Such scripts 
have produced the closeness or distancing of places in US foreign policy space. Thus, 
the reproduction of a fictive collective self, centred upon US imageries, has produced 
a changing geography of ‗us‘ against ‗them‘, connecting ‗ungovernable spaces‘ within 
the self with ‗badly governed spaces‘ of others.180 In this con-text, the circulation of 
antipathy towards a slippery ‗existential threat‘ –an amorphous ever-changing internal 
enemy– occurs together with a subtle reproduction of indifference for the 
victimisation of those who have resisted assimilation within the hegemonic project 
and the upfront oblivion of tragedies instigated by the scripting of a collective self 
constantly facing hyperreal threats. 
                                                 
180
 Today, this is evident in the case of Colombia, where FARC strongholds are linked to the 
consolidation of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela‘s soil. 
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 In this geopolitical con-text, the rationale behind the destruction of the UP, which 
occurred in a genocidal conjuncture that began to unfold from the late 1970s, 
crystallised in the early 1980s, and solidified after 1987, continues to frame the war 
against the ‗narcoterrorist FARC guerrilla group‘. Thus, an antigrammar of 
destroying FARC has enabled the targeting not only of socio-political networks seen 
as opposing the government,
181
 but also extrajudicial killings of individuals apparently 
less cohesively integrated into these networks.
182
 In this sense, the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture seems to have become a ‗social practice‘,183 whereby the 
other, any given other, who cannot be any longer accommodated into the alterity of 
the fictive Colombian self, is violently and silently exterminated. 
Revisiting Colombian scholarship: policy implications  
Notwithstanding the lessons of the importance of bringing an international dimension 
to genocide research and of bringing genocide into the attention of IR scholars, the 
con-textualisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture offers new elements to 
interpret the ongoing Colombian crisis. This has important implications for 
policymaking. Not only if according to the incoming Santos administration (2010-
2014) the commitment is to end the armed conflict in Colombia and avoid the 
continuation (and escalation) of the destruction of the socio-political power of civilian 
social networks, but also because the juncture in Colombia seems to be ripe for a new 
cycle of genocidal violence. Romero and Arías (2009) discuss (and the mainstream 
media and some IGOs increasingly recognise) that paramilitary groups are 
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 The DAS has been at the centre of an apparatus of security that seeks to dismantle the social fabric 
of an ‗other‘ that does not comply with the reproduction of the collective self institutionalised by the 
Uribe administration. However, only until April 2010 the Obama administration decided to withdraw 
the technical support to the DAS (see, http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/chuzadas-das-pierde-
ayuda-tecnica-estados-unidos/137547.aspx, retrieved 13 May 2010). 
182
 Many army units were involved in the ‗body counting‘ practice, which resulted in more than 700 
extrajudicial killings during 2008. See, http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/dossier-secreto-falsos-
positivos/120025.aspx (retrieved 13 May 2010). 
183
 In this regard it seems useful to revise whether Feierstein‘s (2007) proposal of understanding 
genocide as a social practice for the Argentinean case, can help to account for the genocidal 
geopolitical conjuncture in Colombia.  
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rearming.
184
 As these so-called BACRIM (criminal gangs) have started targeting 
sectors of society that not long ago could well have been labelled as UP
185
 and civilian 
networks are not passive actors, various actors are developing strategies to halt the 
violence and bring the perpetrators to justice. This is demonstrated in PDA MP Iván 
Cepeda‘s recent statements. However, the foregoing is taking place in the con-text of 
an increasingly polarised political economy of affective-dispositions, which is 
informing the grammars of identity/alterity upon which the current fictive Colombian 
self is being construed. One might argue that if the narratives of the incoming 
administration continue the line of its predecessor, it is all too likely to expect the 
crystallisation of a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, in which various legal/illegal 
collective violent actors would step up their alliances in order to escalate violence 
and, alongside this, to radicalise antipathy towards civilian social networks. Although 
civilian social networks have managed to institutionalise linkages with human rights 
networks thus armouring themselves against violence,  when perpetrator blocs 
crystallise they count not only with concrete military power and economic resources 
but also with transnational narratives, which then reproduce and help to make 
invisible the very genocidal practices they carry out. 
 The study of the armed conflict in Colombia was traditionally trapped in a realist 
framework that saw the conflict as a zero-sum game between the guerrillas and the 
Colombian administrations. This has been recently replaced by economic analyses 
that see the ongoing conflict as the product of a war economy that perpetuates all the 
actors involved. Although sophisticated analyses have resulted, that do not completely 
follow the ‗greed versus grievance‘ resource war model, there is in general a lack of 
interest in understanding emotions and narratives. Bolívar (2006) is perhaps the 
exception that demonstrates the rule. Therefore, there is a need to re-assess the past; to 
write a genealogy of resistance in Colombia, one that takes into account the voice of 
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See http://www.semana.com/noticias-on-line/neoparamilitares-bandas-narcos/115181.aspx (retrieved 
1 Sept 2010). 
185
 The recent communiqué of the Aguilas Negras paramilitary group against WOLA demonstrates that 
the violence that once targeted the UP is constantly spreading to cliques and clusters of human rights 
defenders (see http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/nueva-amenaza-aguilas-negras-prestigiosa-
ong-estados-unidos/140342.aspx retrieved 21 June 2010). 
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the victims, one that takes into account their emotions and the way in which affect is 
targeted. The con-textualisation of such a political economy of affective-dispositions 
would perhaps reveal the need of new macronarratives that avoid repeating the same 
history and thus contribute to the unending repetition of the very victimisation-
resistance spiral that it neglects. To do so would confirm the ethics of this project and 
the main challenge of con-textualisation: not to present a future without perpetrators 
and victims but to offer tools to critically assess genocidal geopolitical con-texts in 
which affect drives actors (like us) in various ways thanks to its (unnoticed) 
colonisation by other actors who reproduce dominant mechanisms of power. 
Afterthought: affective implications  
Genocide studies have for a long time contested victors‘ histories that depict nation-
states as legitimately constituted sovereign powers. This endeavour, albeit valuable, 
has contributed to reify a domestic myth upon which the international community of 
states is imagined as the defender of ‗humanity‘. Such a simulation is contested by 
realist IR scholars, but strongly supported by liberals, however scholars at both ends 
share the idea of a world naturally divided into nation-states. The poststructuralist 
shift in IR challenges this very idea. In the same vein, critical geopolitics has in the 
last twenty years deconstructed the writing of the global, a writing that advocates the 
intervention of powerful governing apparatuses into peripheral dramas, thus 
proposing the redrawing of boundaries. By developing the method of con-
textualisation, this thesis calls for a change of direction in genocide research, which 
would in turn contribute to a re-think of the geographies, dramas, and actors of global 
politics. First, as complex social phenomenon, genocide must be researched from an 
interdisciplinary standpoint. New topologies, cartographies, categories, and 
macronarratives are required to account for new waves of genocidal violence and to 
re-assess the history of modern genocide. Second, there is a need to move away from 
positivist ontology, because no matter how ‗real‘ the genocidal practices are, human 
beings resist and standby when they construct an idea of what is real. In this sense, a 
post-positivist approach that looks at how narratives construct ‗perpetrators‘ and 
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‗victims‘ could also shed light on how ‗bystanders‘ interpret them, thus helping the 
reproduction of dynamics of victimisation and resistance. Finally, as human beings‘ 
interpretations of reality also have psychological dimensions, new research must 
critically engage with affect. As such, the search for the psychological patterns of 
perpetrators should be replaced by an analysis of how collective emotions are 
(re)produced and mobilised. This focus on a political economy of affective-
dispositions could help to deconstruct the male-rational-western simulation of an 
international system, in which weak states are condemned to genocide, while resilient 
states claim to be the guardians of humanity. By problematising such a simulation 
through the study of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures, in which multiple networks 
intersubjectively clash, con-textualisation exposes the importance of reimagining the 
cartography of the world we live in. It is for the reader of this thesis to judge whether 
this first attempt of con-textualisation has succeeded in doing so. 
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